I really needed that cold pack on my forehead yesterday afternoon when I heard a nightmare scenario, floated by the Las Vegas Sun's Jeff Simpson: As has been demonstrated here, Harrah's Entertainment -- currently paralyzed by debt -- needs to hook itself up to a big pipeline o' cash flow. Solution? Buy Wynn Resorts.

Now, before you rowlf your Starbucks, let me just say that for all we know, this may be some Steve Wynn mischief, put out there to have fun with us media types. But can you imagine the mass gag reaction of Wynn's player base, knowing that the Apollo Management/TPG bean-counters currently enraging customers at Harrah's Strip properties were on the march up toward Wynn Las Vegas and Encore, looking to bring their special Burger King style to the Strip's most elite properties?

And, even when relations between Wynn and his casino dealers were at their most acrimonious, there was always a residual affection or respect toward Wynn himself. Heck, their relationship was practically cordial compared to the chill, verging upon hatred, that has descended betwixt Caesars Palace dealers and Harrah's management -- or so my sources lead me to believe.

(The full, and complex, rationale for a Gary Loveman takeover of Wynn Resorts can be found in the next "Vegas Gang" podcast.)

Part of the argument for Harrah's devouring Wynn would be A) the gaining of a Macao gambling concession and B) the exploitation of underused real estate, both in Macao and in back of Wynn Las Vegas ... not that Harrah's doesn't have a lot of its own real estate sitting idle, especially those fenced-off apartment complexes between Koval and Audrie lanes. It wasn't exactly the garden spot of Vegas before, but it's justthisclose to turning into urban blight.

And, as with the mooted Galaxy Entertainment buyout (which wouldn't come cheap, but would justify a lower EBITDA multiple than Wynn), the question is still begged: How would they pay for it? Or, having borrowed enough to swing the deal, where would Harrah's find development capital, as its debt servicing sucks corporate income dry? And how much more debt (including that $2.8 billion court judgment Harrah's is trying to pretend doesn't exist, though it keeps getting upheld) can Apollo/TPG pile on before Harrah's collapses under the burden of an insupportable load of indebtedness?

Just asking.

Anyway, given the oh-so-warm feelings that Harrah's customers are vocalizing towar