Category: Blackjack

Surprise Party at the Klondike Hotel

by Arnold Snyder
(From Blackjack Forum XX #2, Fall 1996)
© Blackjack Forum 1996

On Sunday, June 23, 1996, speaking before a small crowd of card counters and other gambling enthusiasts who were attending his blackjack seminar at Casino Players’ Las Vegas Gaming Festival ‘96 at the Tropicana Hotel, Stanford Wong predicted that, due to a casino promotion, a “party” would soon take place at the Klondike Hotel and Casino, just a few blocks down the street on Las Vegas Blvd. South.

Despite its Vegas “Strip” address, many in the crowd had never heard of the Klondike, a small casino which boasted a total of five blackjack tables and a handful of slot machines. No craps. No roulette. No poker. No keno.

Betting limits on the BJ tables were $1-100, though $100 action was pretty much unheard of in this sawdust joint. The casino, in fact, owned no black ($100) chips – just silver ($1), red ($5), and green ($25). The $1 action was most common with the regular customers—truckers and the local blue collar crowd who enjoyed the relatively quiet atmosphere and the inexpensive, uncrowded coffee shop.

Within 24 hours of Wong’s prediction, the “party” began, and by 12:15 A.M. on Tuesday, June 25, not much more than 8 hours after it had started, it was all over. Another successful Pi Yee Press “surprise party” went down in blackjack history.

Here’s how it happened.

The Klondike “Free Ride” Casino Promotion

About 3 weeks earlier, the Klondike introduced a new rule on its blackjack tables: the “Free Ride.” The rule had been invented by Jim, one of the pit bosses, apparently to encourage more $5 action. Placards on the tables and large signs on the walls explained that you could only take advantage of the “free ride” option with bets of $5 or more.

What is a “free ride?” In fact, it turned out to be pretty expensive for the Klondike…

If the player was dealt a blackjack with a bet of $5 or more, his betting spot was marked with a “lammer.” Lammers are those small plastic disks that dealers in some casinos use as chip separators in their racks. The Klondike had lammers imprinted with dollar amounts from $5 to $100.

If a player was dealt a blackjack when he had $10 bet on the hand, a $10 lammer was placed on the edge of his betting square. The player could then use the lammer for a “free ride” on any subsequent hand dealt to that position up to the amount imprinted on the lammer, in this case $10. A “free ride” was simply an option to call any hand a push prior to playing it out.

In other words, if the player had a $10 lammer on a betting square, and if he was then dealt a total of, say, 16 vs. an ace, he could announce “free ride,” and the dealer would pick up his cards, remove the lammer, and the hand would not be played out—technically it became a push. As this was done before the dealer peeked under his ace, this was actually an “early free ride,” and since the player did not even relinquish half of his bet, it was quite a bit more valuable than early surrender. How much more valuable had yet to be seen…

A few other fine points of the free ride option: if a player had a $10 lammer on a betting square where he subsequently had a $25 bet, the lammer could only be used for a free ride on $10 of that bet. In other words, if the player elected to use his free ride option, only $10 of his bet would be returned to him, then the hand would be played out for the $15 remaining.

If a player was betting on two squares and had a lammer marking only one position, he could not move the lammer to the hand of his choice. The lammer could be used only on the hand in the marked square. If a player were dealt another natural on a hand which was already marked with a lammer, he could not get another lammer. Tough beans. Only one lammer per hand.

At his Sunday Casino Player seminar, Wong said he’d just heard about this new free ride rule, and he didn’t know the precise value of it, but that he planned to start running some computer simulations on it as soon as he got home that evening. Nor did he know the best strategy for using the lammer.

Obviously, any time you give up a hand that has a negative expectation, you’re profiting. But giving up a stiff vs. a dealer low card (2,3,4,5,6) would be nowhere near as valuable as giving up a stiff vs. a dealer high card (7,8,9,X,A). There is a danger, however, to saving the lammer for a really bad hand, and that danger is that you might be dealt another blackjack prior to getting a really bad hand, thus “wasting” the use of a lammer.

Prior to Wong’s revelation of this new rule at his seminar, a few local players had already discovered the rule, and the Klondike was already seeing more red and even some green action on its tables. I wandered in on Sunday evening. There was one player making $25 and $50 bets, who appeared to be losing heavily. There was also a smattering of red action.

The green action player was obviously not a pro, as he was using a plastic basic strategy card at the table as he played, but violating the advice on the card any time he had a hunch the card was wrong. One of the casino customers I talked with told me that a few players had made some “real money… 500 to 1,000 bucks,” on that weekend, betting green action. These players had also discovered the rule independently, and may or may not have known what they were doing.

I called Wong the following morning to find out if he had run any computer simulations yet to analyze the free ride option.

He said he was currently testing the rule with “aggressive” use of the lammer—i.e., taking the free ride on virtually any hand of negative value. He told me he intended to test a more conservative lammer strategy later, and by 2 P.M. or so, he would be putting the word out to his FAX subscribers, as well as to his Internet group.

At 2:30 P.M. on Sunday, I called Wong again. He told me he would be sending out his FAX and Internet announcements within an hour or so. “You’d better get over there, Arnold,” he said. “You’ll have a chance to see what a Pi Yee Press surprise party looks like first hand. By later this afternoon, I guarantee you there’ll be a $100 bet on every spot on every open table.”

I told Wong one player told me that a pit boss had said the Klondike planned to patent the rule and market it to other casinos.

Wong laughed. “No, they won’t,” he said. “That rule will die tonight. Aggressive lammer use gives the basic strategy player about a 1% advantage over the house. With a more conservative lammer strategy—and I just simulated the standard early surrender strategy—you can get about a 1.5% advantage. If I had another 24 hours to play with this, I’m sure I could come up with a more perfect strategy, and a stronger advantage, but I can’t afford to waste any more time on it. My customers need to know this information right now. This is what they pay me for.”

I asked Wong if he intended to continue running his simulations so that he could publish the perfect strategy the next day.

He laughed again. “You don’t understand, Arnold. This rule won’t exist tomorrow. I would be wasting my time. The casino will surrender before the night is through. I guarantee it. 1% to the players is just too strong. With $100 bets, a small casino like that just won’t be able to take it.”

The Klondike Promotion Starts

Within two hours of that conversation, the players began arriving at the Klondike. One at a time, they sat down and pulled out a handful of hundred dollar bills and asked for all green chips.

By 5:30 P.M., there wasn’t a betting spot available on any of the three open tables. Most were playing two hands, flat-betting $100 per hand, playing basic strategy and using early surrender strategy to give up the lammer when they had one.

The pit bosses and dealers seemed confounded at where all these table limit players had come from. They asked almost all of them individually how they’d happened to stop in at the Klondike on that night. Most gave a version of the same story: “Oh, I was just on my way into (or out of) town, and I thought I’d stop by and look at this place. Pretty good game you’ve got here. I really like this new `free ride’ rule.”

The rule produced some of the most unusual player reactions I’d ever seen at a blackjack table. Players with lammers cheered when they were dealt stiffs vs. dealer tens and aces, gleefully calling out “free ride!” Stranger still, players with lammers cursed when they were dealt blackjacks, knowing that they would not get another lammer, and that a blackjack had been “wasted.”

As the casino allowed players betting two spots with max bets to continue betting two spots even when other players wanted to play, all of the tables had only four players, three betting two spots, and one—the last to sit down—betting one. Hordes of players lurked behind the tables like vultures, waiting for any player to stand up and give up his seat, or even to take a break to one of the rest rooms.

Rest room breaks were infrequent and quick, as the attitude at the tables was that with a 1% advantage, each $100 hand missed cost the player $1.50, so players with two hands gave up $3.00 per round for every round they missed when nature called! The casino did save their seats, while the lurking vultures fought to squeeze a few $100 bets in on-to those temporarily vacated betting square(s).

One player, who had been playing two spots for five or six straight hours gave his seat up to his female companion so that she could play his spots for awhile. The adjacent single-spot player, however, quickly grabbed one of the two spots, claiming some sort of “squatter’s rights” to the second spot, since he had been there for many hours, and she had just arrived. One of the pit bosses had to arbitrate the argument, while the dealer stood dumbfounded. Why on earth were players fighting to place $100 bets on their tables?

Virtually every player I talked to later had nothing but praise for the dealers and pit crew. Said one: “They were so cordial and accommodating. They were offering everybody comps to the coffee shop and a room if they wanted one. I heard them offer one player a room at the Hacienda! I don’t know how they would swing that deal! But nobody would leave their seat. It was too expensive to go eat, even though we were starving! A couple players asked to have sandwiches brought to them at the table, and they even did that! They were so nice while we were cleaning them out!”

The scene was wild. The players continually emptied the dealers’ chip racks of greens and reds. After the first hour or so, the pit crew brought all the green chips the house owned out of the storage room, but that didn’t help much. All of those chips quickly wound up in front of the players, again leaving the dealers with nothing but silver.

So, a new chip replenishment strategy was born. The security guards were put to work as “chip runners,” bouncing back and forth from the tables to the cashier’s cage, buying chips from players right at the tables, and paying them off by counting hundred dollar bills onto the felt in trade for their greens and reds.

A couple times during the evening, they stopped the games completely, once to buy all of the chips from all of the players at all of the tables, and once to change all of the decks of cards in the shoes.

I don’t know how many times the dealers’ chip racks were cleaned out, or how many thousands of dollars in chips the house bought back from the players, but at one point a little before midnight, buying $1,000 in green chips from one player, the security guard started counting $20 bills onto the table. The cashier’s cage had run out of hundreds!

The punishment couldn’t last much longer. The incredible patience the pit had shown while being hammered for eight straight hours, waiting for the tide to turn, as it always did in casinos games, waiting for the “house edge” to start moving all those chips in the other direction, the right way, back into the dealers’ racks, was all for nought. The house was running out of money. The tide went out, and it wasn’t coming back in. The party was almost over.

At midnight, the grave shift arrived. The new pit crew looked positively confounded at the strange scene before them. A table limit player at every open seat in the house? Every spot covered with a $100 bet? On a Monday night?! And why were all the green chips in front of the players? And why were the security guards running back and forth like keno girls from the tables to the cage, buying chips from the players? What the hell was going on?

They were scratching their heads, talking in a huddled group with the swing shift pit crew, who were attempting to explain to them rationally the inexplicable eight hours that had just passed in which the impossible had occurred—the players were winning, and not just some of them, but all of them! For eight crazy hours, the chips had been flowing in the wrong direction!

A few hundred miles away, I imagined Stanford Wong with a grin on his face, wearing a paper party hat and blowing a little horn… “Surprise!”

Another Casino Promotion Ends

At fifteen minutes past midnight, Bud, the swing shift manager who had witnessed the entire debacle, threw in the towel.

“The pit is closed!” he announced. “No more blackjack. No more hands. It’s over. Cash in your chips and go home.”

There was a small stampede of bedraggled players to the cashier’s window, all praying the house would have sufficient funds to cash them out. They did. Everyone got paid. Most had been in their seats a full eight hours by this time. They were tired and hungry.

Once outside, the players stretched and breathed the night air, and immediately started making connections with each other, asking each other how they happened to find out about the game. At least two of the players had been attending the Casino Player’s Festival the day before, were not pros in any sense, but just happened to hear about the game at Wong’s talk.

A couple players said they were on Wong’s FAX service. A few had read about it on his Internet site, but were not subscribers, just net surfers who were interested in blackjack. One local player had discovered it on his own earlier in the week, but learned about Wong’s advice to use the early surrender strategy from another player he happened to meet at the tables. A few players exchanged phone numbers and e-mail addresses. It was a real conglomeration of locals and out-of-towners, mostly amateurs and a few pros who just happened to be in the right place at the right time.

I called Stanford Wong the next day to tell him what had happened at the Klondike. He suggested that I wander over there again to see if they still had the free ride option on their tables. “There’s a law in Nevada that requires a casino to have some minimum amount of money in the cage in order to pay off winning players,” he told me. “It’s possible they only closed the tables to comply with the law if they were running out of money. They still may not know that the free ride option was responsible for what happened to them. A lot of casino people are pretty dumb.”

I told Wong that at one table the players kept talking about how much the dealer kept busting, as if that was responsible for the house’s eight-hour long negative cash flow.

“I’ve got some pretty sharp players on my FAX service,” he said, “and they might definitely say things like that to divert the house’s attention from what their real problem is. I think it’s very possible the casino personnel may not know that the free ride rule is the culprit. I’d go back in and check it out today if I were you.”

So, I wandered over to the Klondike, and who should I bump into outside the door but one of the local players who had been there the previous night. I asked him if the free ride rule was still in effect.

“No,” he said, “and they’re not particularly friendly today. I was just coming here for lunch. I walked in and noticed, while walking through the video poker machines, that the sign on the wall advertising the free ride option had been taken down.

“I did not go near the blackjack tables, I just went into the coffee shop. While I was waiting to be served, I saw the day shift pit boss, Sammy. He asked me if I had played last night and how I did. Sammy knew me from two days prior and we had developed a nice friendly rapport.

“Then another man moved in on our conversation and I began to explain that I had done well and how unlucky the casino was the night before. The second person, whose eyes were bloodshot and looked like he had been up all night, said `Did you play here last night?’ I said, `Yes,’ and he said, `I don’t think you’re welcome here any more,’ and he started to walk away.

“I called him back and attempted to speak to him in a friendly tone, and he responded with `Why don’t you just get the fuck out of here.’ I said, `Okay. See you later, Sammy,’ so I’m leaving.

“This treatment upsets me. After all, all I did was sit down and play the game that they offered. I didn’t mark cards, or use a computer, or run a scam with the dealer. Nor would I ever! You didn’t even have to count cards to beat that game. All I did was sit down, flat bet, play basic strategy, and enjoy the wonderful game that they were offering to the public. I took advantage of what they gave as anyone else who walked in would be able to do. It wasn’t my fault that they were too stupid to realize that the game they offered gave the basic strategy player a big edge!

“I’m going home now, but I’m going to write a letter to the Gaming Control Board. I’ll probably call the casino manager first to vent my anger over this discriminatory treatment.”

I asked this player if I could call him later to find out what transpires in his conversation with the Klondike’s casino manager. He gave me his number so that I could contact him, which I did the following day.

“I called the Klondike,” he said, “in order to secure the name of the casino manager, to whom I would direct my letter, as well as to the Gaming Board. The operator informed me that the owner, Mr. Woodruff, acted as casino manager, and would I like to speak to him?

“I said `sure.’

“In our conversation, Mr. Woodruff explained to me `exactly what happened last night.’ That his `management could not figure it out, but when he came in the casino around midnight, it only took him 15 minutes’ to do so, in part because of his experience as he `had been in the business for 33 years.’

“The Klondike was correct in kicking me out the next day, according to Woodruff. What occurred, he said, was that everyone playing at the Klondike that night was part of one big team. I guess he made this assumption because everyone was flat betting the table max of $100. Each player at the table had a function on the team, he said. Some people `kept a plus-minus,’ some people `called plays’ for others, and the key was the person at third base. The third base person at each table `directed the cards to the dealer to keep the dealer in a minus situation.’

“His 33 years of casino experience must have taken some time out of any years of basic math. I could not believe that a casino owner could speak with such ignorance. I assured him that I certainly was not part of this `dream team’ he put together. If things were that easy, any group of people could sit at any table in any casino and `put the dealer in a minus situation!’

“Why go to the Klondike, of all places? Why not the MGM Grand where you can bet $10,000 a hand instead of a hundred? Simply `direct’ the proper `minus’ cards to the dealer! There was no point in trying to reason or be logical with him, so the conversation ended with me again denying his claim that I played for this enormous team with this impossible strategy, and him insisting I was not telling the truth.”

But, regardless of what this player was told when he called the Klondike, the fact exists that, as Wong had initially predicted, the casino did remove the free ride option approximately 8 hours after Wong publicized it, along with an easy strategy for beating it. I tend to doubt we will ever see that option surface again in any U.S. casino.

Good-bye, Free Ride, you were great fun while you lasted! And if you want future casino promotions to last long enough to make some money from them, keep your casino promotions to yourself!, ♠

Jerry Patterson’s Break the Dealer: Bad Information on Shuffles

by Arnold Snyder
(From Blackjack Forum VII #1, March 1987)
© 1987 Blackjack Forum

All of the “non-random” shuffle exploitation gurus including Jerry Patterson, Eddie Olsen and Doug Grant claim that Patterson’s systems won’t work vs. computer-random shuffles. Yet, none of you have ever published any computer simulation data on your systems in which the computer uses a non-random human-style shuffle.

There is nothing magical nor mystical nor impossible about having a computer shuffle like a human dealer. Instead of having a random number generator put the cards in order, one would simply program the computer to shuffle the cards like a human being would. You have it break the deck(s) into the approximate sized portions that a dealer would, mixing the cards by riffling, stripping and boxing the deck as is done in the casino. The computer can do this as perfectly or as sloppily as any human dealer would. Computers do what you program them to do.

The only computer studies I’ve seen on the effects of poor shuffling on the game of blackjack were the studies published by Stanford Wong in his Blackjack World newsletter in August, 1983. In Wong’s study, he decided to use the poorest shuffling of all, i.e., no shuffle.

The cards were, of course, being slightly shuffled, because as hands were played by the computer, Wong had his computer pick the cards up and place them into the discard rack in the same order that a human dealer would do this. At the end of each shoe, he had his computer just start playing again with these discards. But this standard casino discard ordering was the only “shuffling” that Wong used.

He was using this computer simulation to test the theory that a multi-deck shoe would tend to stay “hot” or “cold” from shoe to shoe if the shuffle were inadequate. His finding was that there was no basis for this belief. Even with no shuffle, the mixing up of the cards caused by placing them into the discard rack as a dealer would was a sufficient shuffle to make the results of the following shoe unpredictable.

This test of Wong’s did not, obviously, test all of the various theories about the possibilities of exploiting a non-random shuffle. Wong did not test the length or frequency of winning or losing streaks or compare such data to random results. He did not input any specific streak-based system to see if it would work. Wong tested just one theory and found it to be invalid.

In your response to Wong’s review of the Bias Barometer, Jerry (elsewhere in this issue), you state that “a few of my students have performed their own independent research activities and written nonrandom shuffle programs to validate B.l.A.S.” So my telling you that a non-random human shuffle is reproducable via computer is nothing new to you. You claim to have access to this type of computer data, yet you have never published any of it.

Jerry Patterson’s Break the Dealer: Even Worse on Playing Ace-Rich Decks

And what you have published, I disagree with. Although you describe some of the elementary methods of shuffle-tracking, which could be of great value to many shoe players, I disagree with your recommendations for how a player should use this data.

To even suggest that any shuffle-tracking player should attempt to create a shortage of aces, or bet low and play his hand as if in a negative count when in fact he is in the middle of a high card clump, strikes me as ignorant, regardless of the fact that the shuffle was non-random. This is the exact opposite strategy that was used by the highly effective concealable “Thor” computer, developed by Keith Taft many years ago for the express purpose of shuffle-tracking.

Keith performed many computer simulation tests of his Thor computer, using “casino-style” non-random shuffles, to develop his strategies. So unless you can produce some data which indicates Keith Taft was wrong—and Taft’s methods are solidly backed by what is currently known about the mathematics of blackjack—my opinion is that you are very badly mistaken about how to get an advantage by shuffle-tracking.

Jerry Patterson’s Break the Dealer And “Game Control Techniques”

As for my “missing the major point” of your book—that casinos are using “game control techniques” to keep players from winning—I don’t think any publication has presented more information on this subject over the years than Blackjack Forum. From warnings and descriptions of preferential shuffles, Sam Case’s and Steve Forte’s exposes of card manipulation, etc., I publish everything of value on this subject that I have access to.

I simply fail to perceive what you describe as “game control techniques” to be what you and Eddie Olsen claim them to be. For instance, you warn players against the “strip” shuffle, especially in single-deck games. You accurately describe the stripping action which may be done by single cards or in clumps of cards, and you note that stripping the deck simply reverses the order of the cards or clumps of cards.

But you write about this common shuffling technique as if it is detrimental to players. It has long been a myth among gamblers that changing the “order of the cards” will change the players’ luck. But I’ve never seen any scientific data to support this notion, and frankly, I don’t believe it. The only players I know who were ever hurt by card stripping were players who were using concealed computers to track the shuffle, and whose computers were not programmed to be able to reverse the order of clumps of cards.

But stripping cards doesn’t hurt human shuffle-trackers, who can easily reverse clump values. Nor does it hurt card counters, according to any accepted mathematical theory.

If you make a claim, you should back it up. Did you computer-simulate stripping a deck to test its effect? If so, why don’t you produce the data? Why not tell us about it? Your whole book is filled with claims that strike me as superstitious nonsense. Let’s see some facts.

And don’t give me that “Blackjack-is-a-short-term-game” nonsense, as you say in your responses to both Wong and myself. Selling players methods for winning in the short run is a cop out. This is what phony system sellers have been doing for years with their betting progression systems, their Martingales, cancellations, stop-losses, double-ups, cut-backs, etc.

It’s easy to create a betting system that will win most of the time in the short run. The simple Martingale (double after a loss – bet one unit after a win) will win 90% of short-run craps sessions if a player has $511 bucks in his pocket, and spreads his bets from $1 to $256 on the pass line. It would take 9 consecutive losses to wipe this player out. It only happens occasionally.

Unfortunately, a loss on the $256 bet, which will put the player $511 behind on his “series,” will occur slightly more frequently in the long run than this player’s expectation of winning 511 series in a row. This player is going to lose 1.41% of all the money he bets in the long run, because that is the house’s advantage. It doesn’t matter that this player will win 90% of his short run sessions. He’s a long run loser.

If your system does not produce a long run player advantage, the house will beat you in the end. They’ve got the time and money to sit through your system. The people who get most caught up in these foolhardy short run systems are compulsive gamblers. They’re always talking about how they usually win. And they’re always behind because of their few big losses.

As for your getting a 100%+ advantage over the casino, which you attribute to exploiting biases caused by non-random shuffles, which you support by claiming to have personally multiplied your bankroll in short run sessions, this is absurd. I often practice card counting on a little Radio Shack computer that deals a single deck out 75%, then “randomly” shuffles. I once multiplied a $100 bankroll to $31,000 in a few hours of play vs. the Radio Shack dealer via a mixture of incredible luck and foolhardy betting. (Unfortunately, I couldn’t get Radio Shack to pay up.) But this phenomenal “winning streak” had nothing to do with biases caused by a human shuffle. There are numerous stories of real life incredible wins like these at casino crap tables, roulette tables, etc.

Jerry, I’d love to find out there was some validity to your TARGET system, or your Bias Barometer, or any of the other streak-based blackjack systems being touted by you or Eddie Olsen or Doug Grant or Charles Einstein, etc. I’d be amazed to find out your theories were right since they seem to violate accepted mathematical theories. But I wouldn’t mind eating humble pie on this if there were something to it, as much as I have enjoyed making fun of you over the years.

So, will you please send me some non-random computer simulation data that might validate your claims? If you have this data, why don’t you publish it? ♠

Shoehenge: Probing the Mysteries of the Non-Random Shuffle

by Arnold Snyder
(Blackjack Forum Vol. X #4, December 1990)
© Blackjack Forum 1990

[Arnold Snyder is the author of The Blackjack Shuffle Tracker’s Cookbook: How Players Win (and Why They Lose) With Shuffle-Tracking.]

Many times over the years I have had to eat my own words. So many times, in fact, that my words have become an essential part of my diet.

How often have I insisted in print and otherwise that any non-random shuffle that you are likely to find at a casino blackjack table makes no difference whatsoever to your expectation as a player?

Hold the phone…

Whoops!

What I meant was…

That is to say…

You see, this computer freak named Imming comes out of nowhere with this program that mimics human shuffles. And you start playing with it and testing it and gaining confidence in its results, because all of the results seem to support what you already know and already believe.

The thing is, there are hundreds of serious players out there who now own this software, and they’re all running tests that just a year ago would have been impossible for any average player to run because software like this wasn’t available at any price. So, it’s inevitable that letters start coming in from players who are using this software asking why they’re getting such and such weird results when they set up certain weird conditions. Most of these results can be explained pretty easily. And then one day, hmmm… What have we here?

Hmmm…

Set the table, baby.

It’s word eating time again.

Recap of Earlier Research on Non-Random Shuffles

If you haven’t read the feature article in the March ’90 issue of Blackjack Forum (Vol. X #1), “Ruffled by the Shuffle,” I would suggest you read that article as background material for this one. In that article, I not only reviewed numerous previous computer studies on non-random shuffles — by Stanford Wong, Dr John Gwynn, Mason Malmuth, and Percy Diaconis, I published a lot of data I had personally obtained using John Imming’s Real World Casino software.

A brief recap of the results indicate:

1. That the play of the hands without any shuffling puts the cards into an order that favors the players.
2. Multiple players at the table diminish this no-shuffle advantage.
3. Even the slightest shuffling eliminates the player advantage completely, making the results no different from those obtained with a completely random shuffle.
4. Card counting systems work just as well with the random and non-random shuffles.
5. Winning and losing “streaks” are not predictable by looking at previous wins/losses, regardless of whether or not the shuffle is random or non-random.
6. Even if new decks are brought into play every 50 shuffles, with all shuffles being grossly inadequate – far sloppier than you could ever hope to find in a casino – the player results show no significant difference from what you would expect with a completely random shuffle.

My readers, however, cynical, mistrustful bunch that you are, still were not satisfied.

One reader wrote: “It is interesting to see that it doesn’t take much of a shuffle to return the players’ expectation to normal. But what happens immediately after new decks are brought into play? We often see short runs of cards m sequence by suit, indicating that the initial shuffle was poor. Although your simulations show that the players’ expectations average out to about normal when new decks are brought in every 50 shuffles, is a player’s expectation normal on the first round after fresh decks are put into play?”

The Effect of New-Deck Order on Blackjack Basic Strategy Players

This was an interesting question which had not previously been answered. The first simulation I set up to discover the effect of cards in new deck order on basic strategy players. I set up an 8-deck shoe in new deck order, put seven players at the table, all using basic strategy, and played through six of the eight decks with Atlantic City rules. No shuffle was done, not even a cut. I just played through that one shoe in new deck order.

The house lost at the rate of 28%, 6 of the 7 players won. First base won at the rate of 67%. There’s nothing all that exciting about this weird result. Obviously, we’ll never find a casino that will offer this game.

Next, I tried the same game with one difference — a random cut was performed prior to the deal. Now the house lost at the rate of only 15%. But 5 of the 7 players won, first base taking top gain again with a 38% win rate. Interesting, but of no practical value.

Next, I performed a “wash” on the decks which consisted of cards being picked up in clumps of up to 8 cards in sequence. This is the “gross wash” in version 3.0 of Imming’s RWC Universal Blackjack Engine. Then, with no other shuffling, the cards were dealt. With this wash, 35 out of every 36 cards dealt are in new-deck sequences, running up or down; the length of the sequences varies from 2 to 8 cards. At the end of every shoe, I started again with fresh decks. I ran 10 million hands for each player.

With a single player at the table, the effect of the sequences again worked to the basic strategy player’s advantage. Instead of losing at the rate of 0.5%, the player won at the rate of 1%.

Seating Position and Non-Random Shuffles

With three players at the table, however, it became obvious that seating position is everything when the cards are in sequential order. The first base player’s expectation was still 1.5% above his normal basic strategy expectation. The third base player’s expectation, however, was 1.2% below his random basic strategy expectation. The player in the middle seat, was about a quarter percent below normal.

Running simulations for various numbers of players at the table, the trend was obvious: the first base side of the table wins; the third base side loses. With a full table, seven players, the first three players at the table all do notably better than they would expect from basic strategy. The player sitting dead center, seat 4, is only about 0.1% over his basic expectation. The players in seats 5, 6, and 7 do not do so well. Seat 5 does about 0.4% worse than he’d expect with a random shuffle. Seat 6 does 1.9% worse. And seat 7, third base, loses at a rate 4.5% worse than his random shuffle expectation.

Although we’ll never find a casino that will deal unshuffled cards, these tests provide us with some insight into the ways sequences affect players. Even when changing penetration levels and the number of decks in play, as well as the number of players at the table, cards in new-deck sequences are advantageous for the first base players and disadvantageous for third base.

Card Counting and Non-Random Shuffles

I then tested a theory of the non-random shuffle system proponents—that card counting wouldn’t work if the cards were in sequences. With seven players at the table, and no shuffling—just that one gross wash—card counting was actually much stronger than when the cards are in random order.

With a random shuffle, betting one unit on advantageous hands only, the player’s average gain over his basic strategy expectation is about 1.3%. With just a gross wash, however, this same betting strategy raised the counter’s expectation by 2.2%! Again, the lion’s share of the profits went to the first base side of the table. Third base still loses, though at a slower rate.

Is it possible for players to make money by seeking out poorly shuffled new decks and sitting at first base?

Probably not.

Remember, these results are all for playing new-deck sequences with decks that haven’t been shuffled at all, but simply “rearranged” in sequential clumps of varying length. All casino dealers, in fact, shuffle.

However, these results do indicate that sequential cards have a notable effect that varies by seating position. We’ve all seen short sequences of unshuffled cards come out immediately after new decks have been brought into play. Certainly, not 35 out of 36 cards, as in this simulation test, but the fact remains that sequences have measurable effects. The question is: How much of the sequential effect will be retained through a sloppy shuffle, and how many shuffles does it take until the game returns to normal?

As soon as I put in two very gross riffles, even on the first round after the shuffle, the first base player’s advantage completely disappeared. The third base player, who had been losing at a rate 4.5% worse with a gross wash than his expectation with a random shuffle, was still losing after two gross riffles, but only at a rate of 1.4% worse. But 1.4% is a significant amount!

Does this mean that the third base side of the table should be avoided immediately after new decks are introduced?

Possibly. The gross wash and two gross riffles I used in this simulation were, to be sure, still far more gross than anything you’d expect to find in a real casino. A “wash” that retains 35 out of 36 cards in new-deck sequences would be highly unusual.

And Imming’s “gross riffle” interleaves cards equally in one, two, three and four card clumps. Empirical studies of professional dealers show that pros almost never riffle a four-card clump, and rarely a three-card clump. The new-deck sequences we see after fresh decks have been brought into play are more likely caused by “lopsided” picks which leave a relatively small proportion of the cards unriffled.

When I tested a more thorough shuffle, however, which was poor but not impossible, all seven players at the table lost more on the first hand after the shuffle than they would expect to lose with a completely random shuffle. With a finer wash, and two “fine riffles,” first base did best again, but lost at a rate of about 0.2% below his random basic strategy expectation. Third base did worst, losing at a rate of 0.6% below his random expectation.

One interesting discovery was that when a card counting strategy was used, the discrepancies between the first-base and third-base win rates disappeared. Although basic strategy players who play through all hands do notably worse on the third base side of the table, card counters (who leave the table when their advantage disappears) all win at approximately the same rate regardless of seating position. This indicates that the third base disadvantage occurs at negative counts. For some reason, the negative counts do not affect the first base side of the table in the same negative way.

It must also be noted that on the first round after a poor shuffle on fresh decks, as described above, even the card courters’ win rates were all about 0.3% below what their expectation would be with a completely random shuffle. Counting still beats the game, but at a slower rate.

Eddie Olsen’s Phase II System for Non-Random Shuffles with “Card Clumping”

This raises the question: is it possible that a different basic strategy might be advisable if the player knows that a significant portion of the cards are in new-deck sequences? I know of one such strategy that has been published. In July of 1987, Eddie Olsen (inventor of the TARGET system), in his Blackjack Confidential newsletter, published a new basic strategy he called “Phase II,” specifically designed for games with like-card clumping, and especially for poor washes and insufficient shuffles on new decks.

Then in July of 1988, he published a revised version of the Phase II strategy based on more extensive empirical data. Olsen suggests in his revised Phase II article that the player can test the Phase II strategy by dealing and playing through an unshuffled 4-deck shoe and comparing the results to the standard basic strategy results. (Olsen did not, incidentally, mention that seating position might affect the player or the strategy.)

I tried a somewhat different test. I played through six decks in new deck order with no shuffle, first with basic strategy, then with Phase II. With basic, the player won at a rate of 44.7%. With Phase II, the player’s win rate went up to 52.6% – a gain of almost 8% just by altering the basic strategy!

But, had Olsen discovered a real strategy that could milk the new deck sequences caused by an inadequate shuffle? No casino, in fact, would deal a game off the top of new decks with no shuffling whatsoever. I wanted to see what would happen in the 8-deck game, 75% dealt, A C. rules, with 7 players at the table, when the cards were in sequences, but grossly washed.

I used Imming’s gross wash again which leaves 35 out of 36 cards in new-deck sequences, with no other shuffling. Unfortunately, even this minimal reordering of the cards invalidated Olson’s Phase II strategy. These are the results, after 140 million hands for each simulation (20 million for each individual player), showing the overall house advantage, and each player’s advantage by seating position:

	House:	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	P6	P7
Basic:	+1.1	+0.4	+0.5	+0.1	-0.4	-0.9	-2.4	-5.0
Ph II:	+2.3	-1.3	-0.8	-1.1	-1.6	-2.2	-3.4	-5.1

Phase II, unfortunately, killed the advantage on the first base side of the table. Varying the number of players at the table, and using various sloppy shuffles, all of the Phase II results I obtained indicate that this strategy would be ill-advised when cards are clumped in new deck sequences (unless no shuffling at all is done).

Olsen states that his strategy was devised by analyzing the results of some 468,000 hands played in the A C casinos over a six-year period. I would guess this is why his strategy fails. Although 468,000 hands may seem like a lot to any one player, it is statistically insignificant for purposes of devising a playing strategy.

Olsen, for instance, in his Phase II strategy, changed 26 of the basic strategy pair split decisions. According to Julian Braun’s simulation studies (How to Play Winning Blackjack, p.82), some of these pair split decisions will occur only 38 times per 100,000 hands. So, in an observation of 468,000 hands, we’d expect to see these hands only about 178 times each.

Many of the individual hit/stand decisions would not be observed more than a couple thousand times each. In devising a strategy via simulation, it is often necessary to play out more than a million hands for each individual decision. Basing your decisions on the results of a few hundred or a few thousand hands is futile. The standard deviation for such a statistically small sample is too great to yield a valid strategy.

Change Blackjack Basic Strategy for the Shuffle?

This, however, does not mean that some changes to basic strategy might not be in order if extreme new deck sequences were observed.

The problem is that the more out of sequence the cards are, the less applicable your new “sequential” basic strategy will be. Also, and most importantly, your basic strategy would assuredly vary by seating position. To be honest, if I saw a large proportion of cards coming out in new deck sequences, my strategy would be simple: sit at first base!

It is also probably impossible to come up with a universal strategy for use against all poor shuffles in a casino environment. If I program the computer to use two “fine” riffles, following a finer wash of the fresh cards, then stack each deck one on top of the other with no attempt to intermix the cards, the house advantage on the first round after the shuffle goes up by about 0.4%.

If I use two washes, one “gross” the other “fine,” followed by one “fine riffle,” the house advantage right after the shuffle is the same as with a completely random shuffle, though the advantage for specific players at the table varies. First base, again, does best, with an expectation of about 0.3% better than with basic strategy. (There’s something about that first base seat that sequential order favors.)

Small differences in the poor shuffles can cause significant differences to the various players. Any casino that purposely shuffled fresh decks poorly, possibly believing that sequential cards hurt the players, could risk being taken to the cleaners by high rollers on the first base side of the table.

Based on the data I’ve obtained thus far using the Real World Casino software, I would personally avoid sitting on the third base side of the table immediately after fresh decks were introduced if I felt the shuffle were inadequate. For me, this is a big change in my opinion, but the fact is it takes a fairly thorough shuffle to completely eliminate the third base disadvantage.

I don’t know whether or not any of the non-random theorists have ever pointed out the first-base/third-base effects of sequential cards. If not, then they have missed the most striking effects of a poor shuffle on fresh decks. This first-base/third-base dichotomy is present with virtually every poor shuffle on fresh decks I’ve tested.

I’ve also learned that if a very poor shuffle is continued through a shoe, it can take a number of shuffles to completely eliminate the non-random effects. Players should realize, however, that these effects are, at most, measured in tenths of a percent. In his Phase II article, Eddie Olsen estimates that the Atlantic City “zone” and “stutter” shuffles put the basic strategy player at about a 15% disadvantage to the house. Highly unlikely, in my opinion.

Version 3.0 of Imming’s Universal Blackjack Engine, which I used in these tests, allows only one type of standard multi-deck shuffle, the old “center cut, riffle and stack.” The new version 4.0, which will be available by the time this issue of Blackjack Forum goes to press, will allow user-programmable shuffles, including “zone” and “stutter” variations.

From the tests I’ve run thus far, however, my initial conclusions are:

1. Totally unshuffled fresh decks strongly favor the players, not the house.
2. As the new-deck sequences are broken down, the player advantage swings to a small house advantage, especially over the third base side of the table. The first base side of the table retains an advantage over the house if new-deck sequences are still present.
3. If the fresh deck shuffle is thorough enough to break up virtually all of the fresh deck sequences, a small advantage, measurable in tenths of a percent, swings to the house over all players at the table.
4. Depending on how poor the shuffle is, this house advantage may continue through a number of successive shoes before the random basic strategy expectation returns.

It seems unlikely to me that any type of shuffle, “stutter” or otherwise, could create a strong house advantage (15%?), though I will assuredly test the A C. style stutter shuffle when I get the new version 4.0 of this software (as I’m sure hundreds of other players will!)

Contrary to what the non-random shuffle theorists have also reported, card counting does work, even when the sequential effects of a poor shuffle on fresh decks are present. Card counters who play only when the count is in their favor need not worry about entering games at any betting position after fresh decks have been introduced, though the advantage from counting may be lowered a few tenths of a percent.

Thanks to John Imming’s efforts, and his phenomenal Real World Casino software, for the first time average players can test systems that they previously had to accept on faith. And so-called experts like me sometimes have to eat our own words. ♠

Card Counting for Players with Weak Vision

by Arnold Snyder
[From Card Player, September 1994]
© 1994 Arnold Snyder

Question from a Reader:  I do not have very good eyesight. I love playing blackjack, but as you might imagine, card counting is not easy for me. I have no trouble distinguishing aces, kings, queens, jacks, or 2s, 3s, 4s, 5s or 6s on the table, but I have great difficulty distinguishing 7s, 8s, 9s and 10s from each other when they are across the table from me. So, after learning to use the high low count at home, I found I could not use it in a casino environment.

Finally, I developed my own card counting system, which I call the “Senior’s System,” for people whose eyes aren’t what they used to be. The easiest version counts jacks, queens and kings as -1, and 4s, 5s and 6s as +1. Sort of like a simplified Hi-Opt I. The more advanced version, which I use, counts jacks, queens, kings and aces as -1, and 3s, 4s, 5s, and 6s as +1. That’s my seniors’ version of the high low count.

I’ve been doing pretty well with this method of playing, but I’m wondering how good it really is. I use the standard high low strategy variations. What do you think?

Answer:  This is one of the most original (and best!) methods of card counting I’ve seen for anyone with who has vision problems. The “advanced ” method is better. It has a betting correlation of about 90%, compared to the high low’s 97%; and a playing efficiency of about 43%, compared to the high low’s 51%. So, this “Senior’s System” retains about 90% of the power of the complete high low count. That’s very impressive.

In the past, a number of blackjack players with poor vision have told me that the only system they could use was the Uston Ace-Five count, from Ken’s book, Million Dollar Blackjack (SRS, 1981), which is very inferior to the method you’ve developed. Uston’s Ace-Five Count has virtually no playing efficiency and is simply played with basic strategy. Aces count as -1, and fives count as +1. The betting correlation is about 53%, which is impressive only because the system is so simple. The 90% betting correlation you’ve attained, however, despite your bad eyes, is quite an accomplishment.

I also suspect that most of the strategy indices you are using from the high low iwill work pretty well with your simplified version of the high low count. The only computer software on the market that I know of that will devise strategy indices, and allow you to assign a 0 value to the “pip” tens and a +1 value to the “paints,” is John Imming’s Universal Blackjack Engine. If you have this software, or you know someone who does, you could devise strategy indices especifically for the Senior’s Count. If you do not have this software, my advice is to continue using the standard high low indices, as most of these are going to be pretty accurate for the Senior’s Count, and the few changes will be on more or less borderline decisions.

Played accurately, I would consider your Senior’s Count to be every bit a professional level system. Congratulations on developing a powerful method of card counting that can be used by the visually impaired!

The simpler version of your Senior’s Count, which ignores the aces and 3s, has a slightly higher playing efficiency (about 56%) than the advanced version, (and this is even higher than the high low’s 51%), but a considerably lower betting correlation, only about 80%. If you have no trouble distinguishing aces and threes, then the advanced version is definitely worth the effort. But even this simplified Senior’s Count is a vast improvement over Uston’s Ace-Five Count when it comes to total system power. Hi-Opt I indices from Lance Humble and Carl Cooper’s 1981 book, The World’s Greatest Blackjack Book (Doubleday), should work just fine if you do not have the software to devise the count specific indices.

Another excellent variation of your method would be to keep the simpler version of the Senior’s Count, using the Hi-Opt I indices for playing your hands, along with a side count of the aces for betting accuracy.

Somewhat off the subject, one of the most amusing stories I’ve heard about card counters’ efforts at camouflage was from a counter who claimed he wore wraparound sunglasses and carried a cane and represented himself at the table as being totally blind! His wife would accompany him, her job being to tell him his hand total and the dealer’s upcard. In fact, he had perfect vision and had no trouble seeing every card on the table. He claimed this act allowed him to use a very large betting spread while taking his time whenever it was needed to recall strategy indices, figure out insurance, etc. Whatever works!  ♠

Can You Beat Costa Rican Rummy with Card Counting?

by Arnold Snyder
(First published in Card Player, December 1993)
© 1993 Arnold Snyder

Question from a Player:  I will be vacationing in Costa Rica again this year. They have casinos there, but blackjack is illegal. Instead, they have their own variation of blackjack, which they call “rummy” — not in any way related to the card game of rummy as played in the U.S.

“Rummy” in Costa Rica is exactly like blackjack, dealt by a house dealer, except that they have a slew of weird rules and bonuses. The game is dealt from a 4-deck shoe, and they deal pretty deeply — I’d say about 3 decks dealt.

Costa Rican Rummy Rules

The one bad rule is that blackjacks pay even money. But, listen to the good rules:

*Dealer stands on soft 17.

*Unlimited resplits of pairs, including aces.

*Double down on any two cards.

*Double after splits allowed.

*Early surrender vs. both ten and ace!

*Three 7s pays 5-to-1.

*Any other 3 of a kind pays 3-to-1.

*Take insurance on a dealer ten up! (And if the dealer has an ace in the hole, the insurance pays 10-to-1!)

*Three card straight flushes pay 3-to-1!

Have you ever heard of a set of rules like this before? I’ve been an amateur card counter for many years. I use the old John Archer ten-count. Can you tell me what kind of an advantage I can get in this Costa Rican rummy game, and also do I take insurance vs. ten up at the same count that I use for insurance with an ace up? Thanks!

Costa Rican Rummy—the Killer Rule

Answer:  Frankly, I doubt that you can get much of an advantage in this game. Because of the deep shuffle point, you may be able to get an edge if you use a very large spread, but it won’t be much of an edge. I admit that I have not done any detailed analysis of this unique game, because I believe it’s a waste of time.

That “one bad rule” — blackjacks pay even money — is a killer, worth about 2.3% to the house. Even with all of the other great rules and bonuses, the house still probably has close to a 1% advantage over you off the top of the deck. That’s tough to beat with card counting at this level of penetration.

Regarding the option to take insurance when the dealer has a ten-valued card up — don’t do it. This is a sucker bet. That 10-to-1 payoff is just too low. You would need about 12-to-1 to make it a break even proposition.

Also, your card counting system will provide no help in determining when to place this bet. You would want to be counting aces vs. non-aces in order to know when to place this bet, but with such a poor payoff, you’d be wasting your time if you kept the side count. If they ever offer the option with a 12-to-1 payoff, then it might be worth it to count the aces. The house would still have the advantage off the top, but you would see occasional profitable insurance opportunities. At 10-to-1, don’t hold your breath.

Despite the vast array of bonus payouts, altogether they are not worth very much. All of those 3-card hands are pretty rare. It’s more likely that the house makes more money by offering these bonuses than the players make by collecting on them. Some players will be tempted to violate basic strategy in order to try for the bonus payouts, such as occasionally hitting a two-card stiff when basic strategy tells you to stand, or hitting a pair when you should be splitting it. Such plays could be quite costly in the long run.

Few players would be tempted to hit a pair of jacks or kings in order to try for three of a kind, but more might be tempted to hit a pair of aces or eights instead of splitting. If you’ve got a pair of eights, the odds against being dealt a third eight in a 4-deck game are about 14-to-1. But the payout for making the hand is only 3-to-1! The actual cost to the player who makes this blunder-bet will, of course, depend on the dealer upcard.

As for those 3-card straight flushes, the odds against your making one of these hands are even worse. Assuming you start with two of the necessary cards, the odds against catching a straight flush on the next card dealt are almost 26-to-1, or about 51-to-1 if you’re foolish enough to try for an inside or closed end straight flush! Trying for that 3-to-1 payoff for making it is very costly to the player.

It’s unlikely that any practical card counting system could be devised to take advantage of these bonuses. It would be extremely rare that any variation from basic strategy, or your count strategy, would be the optimal way to play a hand in order to try for a bonus.

Recommended Strategy for Costa Rican Rummy

If you think the game of rummy is fun, and you’re intent on playing it since it’s the only form of blackjack they have in Costa Rica, here’s my recommended strategy:

Follow your normal card counting strategy for all playing decisions. It’s especially important that you take full advantage of the early surrender option, because this is the most valuable rule on the table.

(I don’t believe the “Archer Method” provided early surrender decisions. If not, you should either learn basic strategy for early surrender, available in most modern card counting books, or switch to a more recently developed counting system so that you can learn a few of the important indices for altering your strategy.)

Ignore the insurance vs. ten-up option. Never try for a bonus hand; just be happy when you collect on one during the course of your normal play. Don’t raise your bet until your count system indicates that your advantage has gone up by about 2% (with that unbalanced Archer Count, wait until a running count of +30!), and use as much of a betting spread as you can get away with (and afford).

If a casino with otherwise standard blackjack rules (i.e., blackjacks pay 3-to-2!) put all of those other Costa Rican rules and bonus hands in a game, it would be a very valuable game for a card counter. Even the basic strategy player would have the edge in such a game. But when blackjacks pay even money, forget it.

If you can use a very large spread, you might get slightly over the break even point in this Costa Rican rummy game. But don’t expect to make big bucks at it. ♠