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By Arnold Snyder
(From Blackjack Forum XV #4, December 1995)
© Blackjack Forum 1995

The initial news reports on the arrests of Tommy Hyland blackjack team members Christopher Z., Barbara D., and Karen C. came to the Blackjack Forum offices from newspapers all over the U.S. and Canada. On May 28, 1994, the three were arrested at the brand new Casino Windsor and charged with cheating at blackjack.

The initial cheating charge was based on use of a device—pop-off beads the two women players were wearing to count the percentage of aces they had successfully tracked with an ace prediction strategy. When it turned out there was no law against players using a device in a casino in Canada, the province charged the players with fraud for use of signals at the table.

The Oakland Press (Michigan) reported: While Chris Z. played the actual game, Barbara D. and Karen C. watched the cards. The practice is called counting cards. Keeping track in your head is OK. Using anything else is not. Dancey and Conroy used beads concealed in their clothes to count the cards.

All three are charged with conspiracy to cheat at play and cheating at play, both of which carry two-year prison sentences Gaming officials said they expected cheaters would test the dealers at Windsor, hoping to find inexperienced people manning the tables.

The Detroit News quoted Sheri Buoncompagno, a local dealing school operator, Card counters aren’t welcome anywhere that I know. Each casino handles them differently, but they are usually encouraged to play fair or leave. It’s really a shame someone is already trying to take advantage of a new casino, but that’s the way it usually goes. Someone new opens up and somebody is going to challenge them right away.

The Las Vegas Review Journal’s report was more succinct: Three people won more than $100,000 over three days before they were stopped and accused of cheating at blackjack One gambled while the other two sat at the table and used a bead system to illegally count cards.

Many of the news reports mailed and faxed to me after the arrest implied that there was something unfair about card counting itself and characterized the casinos as victims of these sneaks. Most reports stated that it was the bead system that made the Windsor trio’s activities illegal, not the card counting itself.

A few months later, I was contacted by Tommy Hyland. The arrested trio were members of his blackjack team. He asked me to be an expert witness in this case.

Although I had never met Tommy Hyland, I’d spoken with him over the phone on various occasions in years past, and had also corresponded with him. I knew he was involved in New Jersey gaming politics, because on his advice I had sent letters to every New Jersey legislator in 1987 in an attempt to kill the anti-device legislation pending at the time. In spite of players’ efforts, the legislation passed in 1988.

I knew at that time that Tommy had been running both card counting and blackjack computer teams for a few years, and that his was widely regarded as one of the more successful team operations. To my knowledge, he always ran 100% legal operations. I couldn’t fathom what he could possibly have been doing with beads in Windsor that would have justified the arrest of his players.

When I received the complete investigation report a few days after my conversation with Tommy, everything was clear. I fired off a letter to Don Tait, the Windsor attorney who was defending the accused players. A very short excerpt:

Dear Mr. Tait:

I have read all of the documentation provided to me, which consists of the 166 pages of the Casino Investigation Unit report in the matter of Regina vs. Chris Z., Barbara D. and Karen C. Based upon the documentation provided to me, I have formed an opinion of what occurred on or about the 27th and 28th days of May 1994 at the Windsor Casino. I believe the documentation supports my opinion beyond any doubt.

Virtually all of the witnesses who observed the play of the defendants’ state that defendant Chris Z. was varying his bets widely, from a single hand of $100 or $200 to two hands of $2500 each (table limit). This is stated by Casino Shift Managers Bacharow and Davenport, as well as Surveillance Officers McDonough and Bell.

Davenport states he became suspicious of his (defendant Zalis’) erratic play. Chris Z. would bet one hand ‘at $100, then two hands at $2500. His betting strategy also indicated ace location play.’

These observations, taken at face value, indicate to me that defendant Zalis may have just been an erratic bettor; he may have been counting cards, though this also appears to be unlikely; and he was most likely using ‘ace location’ play as his primary method of attempting to obtain an advantage over the house.

It must be noted that the ace location player will not always win with his big bets, nor will he always get the predicted ace. Less than perfect dealer riffles, cards of the same denomination and suit as the key cards which simply happened to be located in proximity to the actual key cards, etc., make ace location play both difficult and risky.

The inexcusable ignorance of the casino personnel with regard to ace location strategies is not limited to the Windsor Casino personnel, but is also evident in the testimony of Joanne Vroom, who is identified as being ‘in charge of the card counting team at the Claridge Hotel in Atlantic City.’ Ms. Vroom was apparently shown tapes of the defendants’ play, then asked to comment on ‘the use of beads and their possible uses as far as counting cards or whatever their possibilities are.’
I find the testimony of Joanne Vroom particularly disturbing, as she was apparently called in by the Windsor Casino as an outside expert to render an opinion. As the Windsor Casino was such a new operation, the game protection personnel might be forgiven for some amount of lack of knowledge when it comes to advanced playing strategies, though it is still difficult for me to imagine an operation of such financial magnitude not spending the relatively small amount of time and money necessary to properly train and educate their personnel.

If, in fact, the Windsor Casino personnel were such rookies that they did not recognize a legitimate blackjack strategy that had been in use for more than a decade, and which had been discussed not only in the more esoteric professional players’ literature, but also in the casino industry’s publications, such as Bill Zender’s Card Counting for the Casino Executive, and even in the mainstream press (New York Times), then their calling in an outside gaming expert of more experience is laudable.

But where did they get this Vroom? I have never heard of her. I do not believe she has published anything that would qualify her as an expert, though she claims to have written the ‘manual’ that is used by the Claridge Casino in Atlantic City to train personnel to recognize card counters.

States Ms. Vroom on pages 56-57, when asked what the confiscated beads could be used for: ‘For tracking the aces. Keeping a count of them so they know when there is an excess of them in the deck or the shoe, it helps them in adding to the true count to give them an overall advantage on the house. Their accounting system as far as their being able to be paid by the team. Um, also tracking possibly 10’s and 5’s locations around the deck.’

On page 58, she then states: ‘Accounting purposes would be they’re using a multi-level system of card counting so with so many things to memorize they’re using them to track and keep an accurate record of the amount of aces that have been played, how many are left in the shoe so they’d be able to use it to their advantage in counting.

They have two sets of beads on them. One set of beads is for the accounting purposes. The other set of beads is actually for tracking the aces. So you’re actually having a two level system going on at the same time. One is their pay system, the other is the amount of aces coming into play.’

.On page 58, Ms. Vroom states the players are ‘tracking the aces,’ but also speculates that they are using the ace count simultaneously as a traditional side count to adjust the player’s ‘true count.’ This is absurd, and indicates to me that Ms. Vroom has a very limited and erroneous knowledge of how location play works.

.On page 60, when questioned about why the keygirls were ‘breaking off’ the concealed beads, Ms. Vroom does admit to being perplexed at this as the keygirls did not appear to be breaking off the beads at the beginning of the playing session. She speculates that at the beginning of play: ‘.they could be using any form even memorization um, I can deep count of aces plus keep running count true count without using any other device.’

She offers no explanation as to why the keygirls would be able to ‘keep count of aces’ at the beginning of a session but not at the end.

.On page 65, when asked to clarify her previous remark about using beads as a ‘two level system,’ she now expounds that the system in use was ‘.between a two and three level system. One for counting for their bonuses and ace tracking and third beads may be possibly be for a secondary count the primary beads would be for the aces coming through the other may be for second plugs throughout the shoe because they’re looking to cut the tens and aces to the front of the shoe and they’re tracking the aces as they come out of that section. The secondary beads would be used to track another plug throughout the shoe.’

This is pure gobbledygook, and indicates to me that Ms. Vroom has absolutely no idea what these players were doing. I defy her to take two sets of detachable beads and demonstrate how she would use these beads to locate aces from one shoe to the next. I can conceive of no way in which concealed detached beads could be used to identify or remember key cards, nor to indicate locations of aces or any other cards in a stack of cards.

Furthermore, she ignores the fact that if these beads were used in order to side count the aces in the more traditional sense for the sole purpose of true count adjustments by the player, it would be necessary for the keygirls to reattach all of the detached beads in between shoes, so that the fresh shoe would begin with a fresh count!

.Keying the aces is a visual strategy that requires concentration and a good memory. If Ms. Vroom can use concealed beads for this purpose, I’d like her to demonstrate how.

.The purpose of the beads, in fact, is described in detail in the Hyland team’s General Policies manual (page 119): ’All KG’s will wear 3 strings of beads. One string signifies bets, another signifies pointers (aces), and the third string signifies your own pointers. One bead should be disconnected every time a bet or a pointer occurs.’ Disconnecting a bead each time an ace is dealt is therefore called for in the team policy manual, but this is not done for any strategic purpose at the table.

On page 124, we learn that the keygirls’ pay rates are based upon the ratio of pointers/bets, which can be determined by the bead counts at the end of the playing sessions. This use of the beads, as described in the Hyland team player’s manual, does make sense.

The beads simply provide a method of determining how much each of the keygirls will be paid based on their success at keying the aces, after the play is over and the players have returned to their room. The beads are not used for counting the cards, side counting the aces for use with a card counting system, adjusting the true count, or any other such function at the time of playing.

.The theories of sequential tracking, the effects of the common shuffle actions of riffling and stripping the cards, and the utilization of key cards to locate aces/tens, are not well defined in the materials confiscated from the defendants. But these concepts would not be difficult to explain in court, even to the unsophisticated, as it is not difficult to demonstrate these concepts with actual cards.

.I feel certain that video footage would totally discredit the casino ‘experts’ in this case, and would prove that the defendants were playing precisely according to their own manual’s instructions and not using any illegal cheating techniques. The defendants themselves could describe and explain every bet made and every signal passed on the videos, as per their General Policies manual..

The casino ‘experts’ are grasping at straws to build a cheating case. I sincerely hope the casino personnel are thoroughly embarrassed at the hearing by their own ignorance, and their shameful treatment of skillful professional players who were totally acting within the law.

I find the treatment of skillful professional players as cheats and criminals very despicable. After discovering that no electronic computers were in use, as the casino security personnel allegedly suspected at the time the defendants were arrested, the casino management should have apologized to these players and extended every courtesy to them. Instead, they fabricated this bead ‘device’ to be some new cheating method, then publicly slandered the reputations of these talented players whose only crime was that they were smarter than the casino’s ‘experts.’

I find the casino’s actions in handling this matter, and the analyses of their game security personnel and their hired ‘card counting expert’ to be so ignorant that it is difficult for me to believe that any of these ‘experts’ are doing anything other than purposefully manufacturing a phony case against the defendants in order to hide their own stupidity, and the public embarrassment of having been taken to the cleaners by three skillful players who simply accepted the Windsor Casino’s public challenge to beat them at blackjack, and who did so successfully and legally.’

In December of 1994, Don Tait informed me that he had made portions of my comments (including portions not included in the excerpt above) available to the prosecuting attorney, in an attempt to get the charges dropped. He also told me that the prosecutor would soon be making a trip to Las Vegas in order to discuss the case with some of Nevada’s gaming executives and attorneys. Tait was still feeling fairly confident that the charges would be dropped, and that the trial, now scheduled for January 1995, would never occur. My feeling was the same.

I knew that the Casino Windsor was run by a conglomerate of casino megapowers that included Caesars, the Hilton Corporation, and Circus Circus. In my opinion, these corporations had been around long enough to know that, based upon the evidence collected, it was irrefutable that the players were simply employing a legal shuffle tracking strategy.

I was talking regularly with Tommy Hyland about this matter over the phone. More than anything, he just wanted the whole thing put to rest. He did not want a trial. He did not relish the public exposure. And his players just wanted the nightmare to end. Chris Z. was a salesman who lived in New Jersey and had never been arrested for anything. Karen C. was a Pennsylvania school teacher, recently married, who also had never been arrested. Barbara D. was a grandmother who lived in a suburb of Detroit. She had formerly worked as a Sheriff’s Deputy in California.

All had been recruited and trained by Tommy Hyland because they seemed to him to be intelligent and honest. All knew that they had been breaking no laws. Now, all three had been arrested, taken away from the casino in handcuffs, strip-searched at the police station, spent a weekend behind bars, had all of their personal property and money in their possession at the time of arrest confiscated, had been reported in newspapers all over the U.S. and Canada as cheats and criminals, and they were potentially facing up to two years each in a Canadian prison for their ‘crime.’

To the dismay of both Tommy Hyland and his attorney Don Tait, when the prosecutor returned from his Las Vegas fact finding foray, he decided to pursue the cheating charge. Curiously, the prosecution agreed to stipulate that the players were using the beads legally, as per their manual. The prosecution also agreed to stipulate that my analysis of what the players were doing to beat the casino (sequentially tracking the aces) was accurate.

The province had probably discovered by this time that it was not a crime in Ontario for a player to use or possess a computer or other device at a blackjack table. There is a gaming regulation that prohibits the casino from allowing players to use such devices at the tables, but there is no criminal offense by the players involved.

So, the beads were suddenly no longer an issue, but the cheating charge was not going away. According to Tait, a new rationale was being formulated. The prosecutor now contended that ‘team play’ constituted fraud.

Tait said that the prosecutor, Dennis Harrison, was an experienced and respected attorney. These new grounds for pursuing the charge of cheating, following the prosecution’s consultations with Las Vegas attorneys, seemed to indicate that these U.S. casino powers had decided to test in Windsor whether or not casinos could prosecute card counters whenever blackjack team play or shuffle tracking was suspected.

It seemed unlikely to me that such a prosecution would ever be attempted in Nevada or New Jersey, as there was such a long history of blackjack team play in these states. But in a new venue, like Windsor, the casinos were gambling that a successful prosecution might be possible. And, although Canadian law would not get written into the U.S. law books, a success in Canada could certainly influence a U.S. court to consider hearing such a case, and similar prosecutions in the U.S. could follow.

This, to me, was ominous. The potential repercussions of this trial could affect blackjack players all over the world. It was an attack on a skillful method of play and valid, legal strategies that had been in use by honest players for decades.

As is often the case in court proceedings, legal sparring delayed the trial for another six months. The trial itself, which lasted four days in July 1995, was a media circus. Both sides went all out to impress not only the judge, but the newspapers and TV reporters who filled the courtroom. At every break, TV cameras converged on the attorneys, the players, and the officers of Hyland’s team who had flown in from as far away as Hong Kong to testify, if need be.

The prosecution showed videos of the players in action, displayed the confiscated team documents, called as chief witnesses the Casino Windsor shift manager, Ken Davenport, formerly with Caesars World in Atlantic City, and Terry McIntosh, the detective constable with the Ontario Provincial Police, who made the arrests.

Don Tait lived up to his reputation as a brilliant defense attorney from day one. He made mincemeat of Davenport, who turned out to be more a witness for the defense than the prosecution.

I was on the witness stand for a day and a half–longer than Davenport and McIntosh combined. Prosecutor Harrison had a difficult time with me because he did not understand the math or the theory of blackjack with any depth at all. He did not have much grasp on gambling as an occupation either. He repeatedly attempted to get me to say that shuffle trackers removed the element of chance from the game, and made other players at the table lose more.

Aside from the fact that he was mistaken about these concepts, I could not understand why he even pursued them, since the whole issue of legality, as I pointed out, should be decided on whether or not the players did anything more than observe the game and use their brains to made decisions. How can making a decision based on your intelligent use of the information provided by the casino be illegal?

Even if a player could remove all element of chance from a game, and win every hand, this could not possibly be illegal if he accomplished this by simply using the information available by observing the game to make his decisions. By the time Harrison had finished grilling me, and Tait completed his cross-examination, I felt confident that the defense had made every point that needed to be made.

On the last day of the trial, as I had done all week long, I had lunch with Tommy at a cafe across the street from Don Tait’s office, a few blocks away from the courthouse. We had met briefly with Tait and we were all feeling cautiously optimistic. Walking back to the courthouse after lunch, eager to see Don Tait’s closing arguments, we were stopped in front of the courthouse by a uniformed Ontario police officer. I was about to learn what it meant to play hardball with the casinos.

‘Are you Thomas Hyland?’ the cop asked Tommy.

‘Yes, I am,’ he acknowledged.

Even now, we were surrounded by cameras and reporters. A plain clothes officer flashed a badge at Tommy.

‘You’re under arrest for violating Canadian immigration laws,’ he said.

Tommy protested. ‘What are you talking about?’ he asked, incredulous. ‘I’m a U.S. citizen. I have my passport. I came here legally. I’m due in court in about five minutes.’

The immigration officer pulled out his handcuffs. ‘You can explain it to immigration officials at your trial,’ he said. ‘I’m under instructions to place you under immediate arrest.’

The front page of the Windsor Star on the following day had a huge photo of Tommy Hyland being led from the courthouse in handcuffs, with the headline: ‘Blackjack Team Leader Arrested.’

Tommy learned from Canadian immigration officials that afternoon that he had been arrested because it was discovered that he was a ‘convicted felon’ in the Bahamas ten years earlier (1985). As an alleged ‘ex-convict’ in another country, he was not allowed into Canada.

Tommy explained that in 1985, while playing blackjack in the Bahamas with a concealed computer, he was arrested. There was no law banning blackjack computers in the Bahamas at that time, but the casino refused to drop the charges. They offered Tommy two options: pay the $2100 fine and leave the country, or go to trial and tell it to the judge. The trial date would be set six months later and bail would not be allowed, as Tommy was considered a ‘flight risk.’

Tommy paid the fine and left the Bahamas on the next flight out. He was not about tosit in a Bahamian jail for six months to save $2100, all of which would undoubtedly be spent on legal fees anyway. Now, Canadian immigration officials had dredged up this ten-year-old fiasco to prosecute Tommy Hyland as an illegal immigrant to their country!

Hmmm, was it possible that the casino powers had anything to do with this new harassment against Tommy Hyland? Was it curious that Tommy was arrested in front of the courthouse where his attorney had been shredding the prosecution’s cheating arguments for 3 Ω days?

Don Tait was quoted by reporter Roseann Danese in the Windsor Star the following day as saying, ‘Tommy Hyland is being held captive in Canada. It’s another means of trying to harass these people.’

According to Tait, Canadian immigration laws state that a person can only be deported if the action for which he was convicted in another jurisdiction is also illegal in Canada.

‘They’re trying to deport him from this country for something that is not an offense in this country,’ Tait said, adding: ‘I’m embarrassed to be a Canadian right now. I’m asked by the defendants, and I keep telling them we are basically a gracious people. Yet, ever since these people stepped into the casino, they have been continually harassed. The casino and prosecutor are trying to convict them because it’s an offense to use your brain. That means it’s cheating to think. Because that’s all you’re doing with card counting or shuffle tracking, using your brain.’

Tait added that Tommy was arrested ‘.because casino don’t want people to come in and play intelligently.’ He pointed out that Tommy’s arrest occurred the day after Tommy had appeared on local radio and TV news shows explaining the concept of professional blackjack play.

The following morning, the judge announced that he would render his decision on September 8, some six weeks in the future. I couldn’t get a flight out that evening, but I felt I wanted to get out of Canada as quickly as I could. The arrest of Zalis, Dancey and Conroy in May of 1994, and their subsequent indictment and prosecution for cheating, were not technically actions of the Casino Windsor, but of the provincial police and government of Ontario. This new arrest of Tommy Hyland was not technically a casino action, but an action of Canadian immigration officials. It stunned me.

It appeared that the Casino Windsor, which was netting more than a million bucks a day, was running the local Canadian government. Were the interpretation and enforcement of laws in Ontario being dictated by three casinos in Las Vegas? Were the Ontario Police, the provincial court system, and even the border guards now taking orders from Circus Circus?

As I write this article, Tommy Hyland has been officially deported from Canada and is not allowed into that country. He has appealed this decision of the immigration authorities, and has retained Don Tait has his attorney. I have been retained as an expert witness, should this matter go to trial.

On September 8, 1995, Judge Saul Nosanchuk rendered his decision on Zalis, Dancey and Conroy.

To quote from his judgment:

The accused, Christopher Z., Barbara Josephine D. and Karen C., are charged with the offence of cheating at play while playing blackjack at the Casino Windsor.

To reverse the odds that favour the Casino the concept of card counting was introduced in about 1962. Card counting systems have been written about extensively since 1962 in many books on sale in casinos and elsewhere throughout the world. A card counter uses his or her powers of observation during the play of the game to assess the probability of a ten valued card or an ace being dealt. The card counter places a larger bet when he or she believes that it is more likely that an ace or ten will be dealt. The prosecution in this case concedes that card counting is not cheating.
On May 28, 1994, the date of the alleged offence, the accused, Chris Z., was involved as a player in a game of blackjack at Casino Windsor. The accused, Karen C. and Barbara D., sat on either side of him and appeared to be simply watching him as he played.

In fact, Barbara D. and Karen C. were members of a professional gambling team trained to observe the cards as they were dealt, played and shuffled. Their purpose was to try to predict the arrival of aces and to give covert signals to their team member, Chris Z., at the appropriate time.

What they were doing has been described as key-carding or ace-locating. Key-carding or ace-locating involves carefully observing the shuffling, playing and discarding for the purpose of keying in on where the aces are expected to be located. Zalis, Dancey and Conroy were operating in accordance with a team manual that was located in a Windsor hotel room in the course of a search that followed the arrest of the accused.

The manual confirmed that the members of the team had to operate under the utmost secrecy. They were required to camouflage their identity and purpose. Each team member had to pass proficiency tests in basic strategy and card counting. Each member had to understand shuffling techniques. Each member had to take a lie detector test.

Extracurricular activities were restricted, with financial penalties for their violation. There were rules in the manual as to casino comportment; betting guidelines; accounting; security and quality control; scouting the casinos; scouting key games, cutting of the decks and shuffling.

Nowhere in the manual were there any instructions to suggest that the members become involved in any collusion with any dealers. There were no suggestions that there should be crimping or marking of cards; there were no instructions as to the use of any devices in the course of participating in the game or as to any other deceitful activity to be exercised in relation to the cards to be dealt or the play of the game. The camouflage of the members was of course part and parcel of their team instructions, as were other techniques involving the exercise of skill.

Each team that went on the road had a player called the big player, or B.P., and two keygirls, called K.G. Chris Z., at Casino Windsor, was the B.P., and Barbara D. and Karen C. were each K.G. players.

The prosecution argues that Chris Z., Dancey and Conroy were cheating by camouflaging the identity of Barbara D. and Karen C. as simply observers when they were indeed assisting Chris Z. as a member of the gambling team. Counsel for the Crown argues that keying the cards and signaling the information secretly with a view to having Chris Z. increase his bets constitutes cheating.

The defense, on the other hand, contends that Chris Z., Barbara D. and Karen C. were not cheating, but in fact were skillfully observing the shuffling and discarding in order to obtain an advantage, and in order to implement the key-carding tactics successfully.

The question to be determined is whether the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused were cheating within the meaning of the Criminal Code of Canada. Section 209 of the Criminal Code of Canada provides that, ‘Everyone who, with intent to defraud any person, cheats while playing a game. or in betting is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not to exceed two years.’

Section 197 of the Criminal Code provides that game means ‘a game of chance or mixed chance and skill.’ It is common ground that blackjack is a game of mixed chance and skill.

In R. v. McGarey, 1974, 6 C.C.C. (2d), AT P. 525, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the gist of the offence of cheating was perpetrating some fraud or ill practice or making use of some unlawful device in the act of playing.

In Lyons v. The State of Nevada, 1989, 1065 N.R., p. 317, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada overturned a cheating conviction against an accused who had been handle-popping a slot machine. Handle-popping involves a process of handle manipulation that enables a player to exploit a mechanically vulnerable slot machine.

The Court of Appeals referred to Nevada Statute, N.R.S. 465.015, which was enacted to prevent persons from taking unlawful advantage of Nevada’s Gaming Industry by cheating. That statute declares that, ‘To cheat means to alter the selection of criteria which determine (a) the result of the game or (b) the amount of frequency of payment in a game.’ The Court of Appeal in Nevada stated at page 121 that the Nevada Statute addresses, ‘Knowing, purposeful, unlawful conduct designed to alter the criteria that determine the outcome of any lawful gambling activity.’

The Court pointed out that the statute clearly applied to a person who tried to enhance his chances of winning by any activity such as crimping cards, which made it possible to identify certain cards. By doing this, the player was able to supplant elements of chance with actual knowledge that substantially altered both the nature of the game and the criteria for winning. At page 321, the Court of Appeal of Nevada pointed out that examples of conduct that fall within the definition of cheating involved conduct such as,

‘Resorting to mirrors, confederates, electronic equipment, magnets, tools or other devices that alter the play of the game or alter a machine to increase the prospects of winning.’
On the other hand, the Court stated that, ‘Gaming patrons who are especially gifted and can increase the odds in their favour by card counting, or perhaps a patron who notices and takes advantage of a dealer’s habit of play that will occasionally provide an unintended view of the dealer’s cards, are not cheating. The casino management might take measures to deny them the right to play but no criminal offence of cheating would have occurred. In either case, the players are simply exploiting what their skills and the play of the game afford them.’

In the case before the court the accused, Chris Z., Barbara D. and Karen C., were doing nothing to alter the character or play of the game. They were trained members of a professional gambling team making an effort to exploit the weaknesses of a dealer. They were trying to obtain an advantage for which there was no guarantee. Indeed, there is evidence that in one two-hour-and-45-minute session the team lost $15,000.00.

The court agrees with the contention of the defense that the advantage that the accused could gain was not caused by any physical act or dishonest conduct that caused the cards to come out in any particular way.

The court accepts the testimony of Mr. Arnold Snyder, a world-famous blackjack consultant and writer on the subject, who testified that key-carding or ace-locating is a form of card counting. According to Mr. Snyder, the advantages to a player from key-carding or ace-locating are generally the same as those gained from card counting, except that the camouflage aspect will allow the player to remain in the game longer.

Mr. Snyder testified that key-carding is a difficult and risky business and is always done in the context of a team. It is a discipline that takes an immense amount of study and patience. In the opinion of this Court, the fact that Zalis, Dancey and Conroy operated as members of a team camouflaging their identity does not constitute cheating, within the meaning of 209 of the Criminal Code.

It must be noted that the team concept was first written about in 1962, and in fact teams have operated extensively since that time all over the world. Mr. Snyder placed in evidence excerpts from 25 books on blackjack, each available through public distribution and each of which dealt with various aspects of team play tactics. Mr. Snyder was not aware of a single prosecution in any jurisdiction anywhere in the world against card counters or team players.

Of course, that fact does not oblige this Court as a matter of law to conclude that cheating did not occur in this case. It confirms to the court that what counsel for the accused aptly described as a ‘cat and mouse game’ is expected to occur at a casino. While the players are covertly signaling in the course of a team play, and using their card counting and key-carding strategies, the casino is operating is own surveillance on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

It must also be observed that it is open to the casino to take countermeasures against the card counters and key-carders or team players. The use of an automatic shuffling machine would probably solve the problem card counting presents to the casino. But, of course, such a machine is not an attractive proposition to many players and the casino would lose such players.

Cutting the deck in a different place could reduce the player’s advantage. Taking more time to riffle the deck would cut the advantage. Reshuffling the deck at any time would of course destroy the advantage. But none of the foregoing approaches are attractive to the casino because of the time that would be lost in implementing them. And, of course, time means money to the casino.

Finally, the casino may exclude card counters if authorized by the Gaming Commission in the jurisdiction of the casino. The exclusion of card counters is the procedure used most often by casinos.

In conclusion, this Court has determined that the accused were not cheating contrary to Section 209 of the Criminal Code. They were indeed highly trained professionals using highly developed skills in an extremely risky venture. The court finds considerable astuteness and wisdom in the testimony of Mr. Arnold Snyder that the explosion of the casino industry and growth of casinos came about because of the publication of so many books on casino skills. Many people have read the books but few have had the patience or determination or bankroll to implement the skills.

Finally, the Court accepts as valid Mr. Snyder’s testimony that the Casino will make much more money from players attempting card counting or key-carding than it will ever lose from such tactics.

The charge against the accused, Chris Z., Karen C. and Barbara D., is dismissed.

According to Ivan Sack, in the October issue of Canadian Casino News, an industry trade journal, the province is not planning to appeal Judge Nosanchuk’s decision. ♠

By Bill Zender

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XXIV #4, Fall 2005)
© 2005 Blackjack Forum

[Editor’s Note: In this article, Bill Zender, a former Gaming Control agent and successful co-owner/casino manager of the Aladdin Hotel and Casino, discusses the resistance of casino managers to objective lessons in casino math he provided at a recent seminar at the University of Nevada, Reno.

Any poker player knows that to get action, you have to give action–and that means, give your opponent a chance to win. But casinos seem to want to sit there like the tightest players in the world and give absolutely nobody any chance to win. Bill Zender provides an excellent casino-side analysis of the flaw in this kind of thinking. –Arnold Snyder]


Several years ago I wrote an article on blackjack, published in Blackjack Forum, that detailed the card counting “Cat and Mouse” game that went on at the old Aladdin Hotel and Casino in the mid 1990’s. The article outlined what our pit management at the Aladdin were doing to triage the potential risk to our bankroll; identify advantage players in blackjack that posed a real monetary problem, ignore knowledgeable players who did not wager enough to present an immediate risk, and loosen procedures, especially game protection procedures, that would be beneficial to the profit potential of the games.

During this time I concluded, in agreement with several other gaming experts and even a number of professional players, that an ongoing atmosphere of cat versus mouse was necessary to extend the health and wealth of the casino game of blackjack for all parties involved, including the casino operators, the professional players, and the gambling public. It has always been obvious that the success of blackjack from the 1960’s onwards was primarily due to the fact that casino blackjack can be beaten. Other casino games did not attract anywhere near the same numbers of new players, despite the fact that they provide the customer with the thrill of a gamble.

A healthy balance of customer playability and house profitability was quite successful for the Aladdin Hotel during the middle 90’s. This player-casino ecological equilibrium provided many players with a reasonable blackjack game of decent rules and consistently superior deck penetration, while at the same time providing our casino management at the Aladdin some of the highest drop/win hold percentages in the state. Obviously, players and casinos could pleasantly coexist under certain gaming conditions.

However, blackjack success and happiness seemed to end with the beginning of the new millennium, and have actually taken several steps backwards in the process. Today casino blackjack games are less player friendly while being less productive for the casino, with drop/win hold percentage drifting lower then they have ever been, dipping below 10% several times in the Las Vegas Strip properties over the last twelve months.

Why has this happened? Didn’t the Aladdin experiment provide enough information to establish the proper course for blackjack procedures throughout the gaming industry? Why in today’s highly competitive gaming market have casino management deserted procedures that have been productive in the past for those that consistently provide only lukewarm returns?

Today there is no longer a balanced cat and mouse game. The casinos have gravitated to the position of trying to kill off the mouse and destroy the profitable blackjack eco-system. This situation didn’t happen overnight. It has occurred for several reasons over the last several years due to casino management’s need to increase win percentage without taking into consideration a statistical feature of gambling known as fluctuation.

In an attempt to preempt natural mathematical variation into the negative regions, casino executives have turned their backs on time and motion issues that are the bread-and-butter of all service and manufacturing business, and have opted for more disruptive and pace-inhibiting game protection procedures.

Casino Management Goes Down the Wrong Path

Why would any member of management in any business field establish rules and procedures that retard productivity and cost their operations thousands of dollars over the period of a year, while not providing substantiated positive returns from discouraging professional card play?

One of the best examples of this phenomenon was recognized during a casino mathematics seminar I was conducting last spring for the University of Nevada, Reno’s Extended Education program. After providing examples of how decreasing deck penetration will actually lower blackjack revenue production as well as lower the game win/drop hold percentage, and how greater deck penetration would increase the casino’s overall profitability (even after taking into account the possible increase of losses to card counters), members of the seminar were reluctant to go along with this analysis. Their reason? It had nothing to do with the mathematical explanation or examples; it had to do with their own job security.

Several members of the seminar agreed that deeper penetration in blackjack would produce more revenue for their casino; however, they felt that this type of thinking, radical to the blackjack industry at this time, would place them personally in an unsecured position. If changes made to the existing procedures coincided with a negative swing in the games’ normal fluctuation, i.e., a lower drop/win hold percentage, the attendees believed that they would more than likely lose their jobs.

“A deep deck penetration would be more beneficial for the house, but what good does that do me and my family if by doing the right thing I have an increased chance of losing my well paying position?” they asked. Unfortunately, with the beginning of the second millennium the gaming industry is still recognized as an industry that believes in “management through termination” when actual numbers don’t fit with management’s expectations.

A number of game protection procedures have become more prevalent in recent years–becoming, in fact, more the rule then the exception–which have been highly problematic for blackjack time and motion issues. These protection procedures are costing the casinos more in blackjack revenue then they save from potential advantage players. I’ve taken the liberty of listing some of these procedures and how I feel these procedures are hurting the casinos while reducing the games’ attractiveness to customers and producing–let’s face it–very boring games.

Game Protection That Actually Costs Casinos Money

No Mid-shoe Entry: This procedure was established to prevent professional players from back counting and jumping into games. The casinos also support the use of this procedure by explaining that it makes the seated players on the table happy because other customers can’t “jump in” and disrupt the “run of the cards”. Unfortunately, although I’ve asked to see findings from customer polls, comment cards, or focus groups that support this assumption, I have yet to see anything of material substance.

Yet, the use of “No Mid-shoe Entry” has not only seemed to be on the increase in multiple deck shoe games, it has spread to the double deck blackjack games as well. In some instances I’ve seen casinos that have “No Mid-shoe Entry” only on their hand held games; why, I have no idea.

Personally, I find implementing a procedure that tells players “I do not want you to play on my games”, seriously wrong. Consider the extreme although still possible example of synchronized dealers shuffling at the same time on every six deck game in a small to medium size casino. If a player were to walk into the casino immediately after the shuffle and the first round of cards had been dealt, that player may have to wait up to fourteen minutes (plus through the next shuffle) to make a blackjack wager.

Based on a model designed to illustrate the effects of time and motion on blackjack, this procedure could cost the casino between two and three rounds on all opened tables per hour. For a medium size casino “No Mid-shoe Entry” could cost around $400k to $500k in blackjack win annually with nowhere near the parity gain due to increased game protection. I doubt “bus loads” of card counters back counting blackjack games would cost the casino anywhere near this much.

Decreasing Deck Penetration Points: Now here’s a big killer for casinos utilizing hand shuffling. The intention of casino management is to decrease the percentage of cards dealt so that the card counter will have less chance of winning money from the house. Several years ago I was contacted by an executive from the Flamingo Hilton in Las Vegas and asked if I thought anyone could beat their six deck blackjack games if they cut off three of six decks. I explained that the procedure change would all but eliminate attacks from possible card counters, but the amount of revenue he would lose from decreased productivity would dwarf any expected savings; i.e., the cure worked but the patient died.

In this case, the management’s concern wasn’t about what they wouldn’t win; they were concerned with having their boss believe they were doing everything possible to protect the bankroll. I guess you could say that management was doing what was best for their job security.

However, based on a model created to illustrate time and motion issues with blackjack, the increase or decrease of the shuffle point by one half a deck (26 cards), adds or subtracts between four to six rounds per hour from normal round production. This will result in substantial revenue gains if penetration is increased and substantial losses if penetration is decreased. In almost every model example utilizing a hand-shuffled blackjack game, estimated gains from tightening game protection by decreasing shuffle points fails to overcome revenue losses from decreased productivity.

Triple Pass Shuffles: Some casinos still utilize a triple-pass shuffle in an effort to prevent shuffle tracking. In most situations, casinos are probably successful in eliminating shuffle tracking, but at the cost of greatly increasing the amount of time wasted shuffling cards, and decreasing the time cards could be in front of the player.

The more time spent shuffling, the more potential revenue-producing rounds wasted for virtually no expected savings from discouraging card counting. This also becomes a problem when casinos utilize a “wash or scramble” before each shuffle. Casinos concerned about shuffle tracking should spend their dollars on batch shuffling machines or better training for their floor supervisors and surveillance operators.

Paying Six to Five on Blackjacks: At the gaming show last fall in Las Vegas I jumped all over Howard Grossman about using a 6 to 5 blackjack payoff with his game of Superfun Blackjack. I was wrong. Grossman explained that his original game did not include the reduced blackjack payoff, but that this was the brain child of Park Place Entertainment management of that time.

They wanted a better house advantage on their single deck games and wanted to incorporate the 6 to 5 blackjack payoff rule. While 6 to 5 increases the casino’s house advantage by approximately 1.3% and makes the single deck game more profitable theoretically, it becomes a double edged sword.

Six to five will produce more revenue for the casino over the short run, but it will create ill will when the players figure out that they are being shorted on their blackjack payoffs. It doesn’t take long for most players to realize that one casino might be shorting their blackjack rewards while another is giving the players their proper amount due. From what I understand, the customer backlash has already started.

And here’s one aspect that will surprise most people on both sides of the blackjack table…

Continuous Shuffling Machines: At first I was a big proponent of the continuousl shuffling machine. I actually fell in love with Shuffle Master’s Shuffle King machines when they first became available for use in the casinos. These machines eliminated the total amount of time wasted for shuffling cards, which greatly increased total hand production, which in turn created greater profit potential for casino blackjack.

Then I realized that continuous shuffling machines eliminated card counting, which all but eliminated the possibility that any knowledgeable player could beat the game. For a casino person like me this was a good thing–right? Maybe in the short run, but I no longer think that is the case over the long haul. Why? Because the game of blackjack cannot be promoted as a casino game that can be beaten by the player if the casino is using a continuous shuffling machine.

If we examine the reason blackjack became an extremely popular game we will realize that it achieved this status due primarily to the fact it could be beaten. Immediately after Dr. Thorp’s book, Beat the Dealer, became a top selection on the New York Times best sellers list in 1962, blackjack took off like a shot, and continued to climb in popularity throughout the 60’s, 70’s, 80’s, and 90’s. My new concern: If blackjack becomes an unbeatable game will it fall from grace?

The cat has largely closed the trap on the mouse, and the fine balance once achieved between casino revenues and skilled players is quickly vanishing. Soon the public will no longer be romanced by the idea that they can learn how to play blackjack so well that they can live the glamorous life of the professional player, even though only a faction of those people would ever be able to beat the game in the long run.

Maybe this is another reason, besides televised tournaments, that poker has become more popular; it is a game pitting player against player, but with profit potential if one learns the intricacies of the game and masters the ability to seek out and crush the weaker adversary. I believe casino management should learn the lesson being taught by poker.♠

by Sam Case
(From Blackjack Forum Vol. III #2, June 1983)
© 1983 Blackjack Forum

It’s time for more comments about dealer cheating in general. I’ve said before that I rarely suspect dealers of cheating. I used to play only low-stakes. Since that time, I’ve logged in quite a few hours with Crazy Bob’s team, at high stakes. I must say, some of the dealers I’d played nickels against would change their style (and not for the better!) when big money was out on the table. I suspected more cheating at higher stakes levels. I’d like to comment on the several courses of action a player who thinks he’s been cheated might consider. I admit to having experimented with all of these options:

Make a scene. I tried this. I would call over the pit boss and explain the problem. He would, of course, assure me that I was mistaken. In order to get some action taken, I knew I would have to say that I was capable as a card cheat, and that I knew when I was being taken. Then I’d get action all right, but not the kind I’d want. So, forget this option.

Leave and report it. Call the Nevada Gaming Commission. They’ll need all the specifics: date, time, place, dealer’s name, your name. No thanks!

Just leave. This option is very attractive, but boring. First, a little fun…

Cheat them back. I’ve given up on this and I don’t advise it. Getting corrected about how to hold your cards or tuck them under your chips is embarrassing. Besides, if they ever could prove something, you’d be in real trouble. You’d have to guard your moves from the cameras. Although counter catchers are almost as easy to spot as Griffin agents, they’re only half as stupid. People do get caught cheating. Don’t try this one.

Try to turn the game honest. For this you’ve got to be on guard at all times. Just bully the dealer and sometimes he will be forced to deal honestly. If you suspect a second deal, ask for “the top one for a change.” One dealer at Foy’s Tall Beaver Casino would do a peek by bringing his deck hand up to his nose to scratch it. A good comment to make is: “I don’t care if you scratch, rub, or pick your nose, as long as you do it with the other hand.” This is a good option, because it might scare the dealer into reconsidering how smart and slick he is.

Have fun, then walk. Hand the dealer a one dollar chip and say, “This is for you. We both know you need more practice, but do it at home. I wanted you to make at least one honest buck tonight.” Or say, “If your moves are that sloppy in bed, you’ll be getting a divorce soon.” Then walk. This option is good for the same reason as #5.

Whatever you do, tell other players about your experience with a cheating dealer. You may be able to save some of a fellow player’s bankroll.

One final comment: Just because you play low stakes doesn’t mean you won’t be cheated. Inform yourself, and always keep an eye open! ♠

By Max Rubin

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. XIV #2, June 1994)
© Blackjack Forum 1994

[The first part of this article on Las Vegas casino comps is excerpted directly from the first edition of Max Rubin’s Comp City: A Guide to Free Casino Vacations, Second Edition. The second part of this article, subtitled Comp City Outtakes, is a Blackjack Forum exclusive.]

Comp Counters Who Count Cards

Do you know how to count cards and win? If the answer is yes, then you, my friend, have the absolute nuts from this day forward. Think about it. If the casino pit bosses ignore you all night long, you can combine comp counting with card counting and win the equivalent of two bets an hour (one in money, one in stuff).

If there’s heat, cut your bet spread down to a level that’s breakeven, and you’ll still earn great comps. If you want deep cover, how’s this? You can pound booze and never look at anyone else’s cards all night long and still be an overall favorite because of the comps.

Meanwhile, no one on that shift will ever suspect you’re a counter, and you’ll be welcome forever. This book was written to show basic-strategy-level blackjack players how to crush casinos by earning comps valued at ten times their gambling losses. Every tactic portrayed in Comp City can also be used by an accomplished card counter, and you won’t even have to fade the losses.

Although I’ve played my share of winning blackjack, I don’t pretend to be a world-class blackjack player on a level with the legendary counters who earn hundreds of thousands a year. But based on my extensive experience on both sides of the table, I believe I have some insight worth discussing here. Some of these tips you’ll be familiar with and some may be new to you. A few of them threw me off when I was working the floor. If they’re not already in your repertoire, incorporating them might gain you years of card-counting longevity.

Laying Cover to Score Comps

You know all about cover, while most bosses don’t even know what it means. But that’s not to imply that you should underestimate the enemy. A few bosses in every casino have read the books and a handful of them can actually play a winning game. Although their numbers are few, you should assume that at least one sharp boss lurks in every joint.

This is paramount. Don’t take your money back when the dealer shuffles. You’re giving up a little, but pulling the money back confirms all of the boss’s worst suspicions, especially if the shuffle was prompted by your big bet.

Watching the Pit Boss

If a boss catches you looking at him, smile and call him over. Ask him for something-a comp, directions, a recommendation for a show, anything, but don’t ever let him see you divert your eyes away from his. It’s a dead giveaway that you’re up to something.

Tipping the Dealer

Tip the dealers. You should budget at least 5% of your expected win for the dealers. If you’re a big player with a high hourly return, it’s almost imperative that you give the dealers at least 10% of your expectation. So what if your profit is reduced by a little blood money? I’ve had hundreds of conversations in pits about counters and 90% of the bosses believe that counters don’t tip. Tipping will buy you years of playing time.

By the same token, if you’re betting more than $100 a hand, tip the cocktail waitress $5, no matter what. The bosses will think you’re a sport and they know that counters are anything but.

Cover Bets

If a boss is watching, you want to look like a sucker. When you win a hand and he’s watching, bet it up no matter what. If you lose, you can go up or down. (If the count’s good, bet it up. If it’s bad, bet it down.)

A boss only has to see you do this two or three times in a session to be convinced that you’re a negative-progression or money-management player, not a counter. It will reduce your expected win by a few bucks. But I see it as a valid expense of doing business. Unless you’re the type who plays till you’re barred, it’s the only way to go.

There are people in this country who play solo, live in penthouse casino suites, and make half a million dollars a year because they’re not afraid to tip and lay cover. Some of these guys lay $500 in cover during a $1,000 session. Guess what the net result is here? $500 an hour, after hour, after hour, after hour.

Sucker Plays That Work

If you want to get a boss thinking you’re a stone sucker, slam that first shot of whiskey and bet a quarter for yourself and a quarter for the dealer on the first hand.

Take insurance when you have a natural. You might even insure your twenties when the boss is watching. Do it with conviction and without hesitation (you know you have to protect those good hands). It’ll come up infrequently so it won’t cost too much overall, but it leaves a lasting impression with the bosses. A move with similar value is not hitting a soft 18 against a nine, ten, or ace. The word is out on this play; hitting the 18 identifies you as a player in the know.

There are other plays. It’s fun to use Stanford Wong’s Blackjack Count Analyzer software program to discover those that cost you only a few dollars in expectation for hundreds of dollars worth of cover. If you’re a comp counter first, and only use card counting to defray your over-the-table losses, these moves are inexpensive indeed.

Appearance

I never trusted a guy who looked like he woke up just to play blackjack. Don’t come in on graveyard shift between 4:00 and 7:00 am rubbing the sleep out of your eyes. No true degenerate gambler (which is what you want them to think you are) ever had to set an alarm clock to tell him when it was time to play.

Most graveyard bosses are on the lookout for the ghouls nesting upstairs who descend on the tables before sunrise. If you’re playing the graveyard shift, stay up all night or make your plays later in the morning when you can wake up naturally.

Don’t drink mineral water. Don’t ask me why, but an inordinate number of counters drink mineral water. Get juice, coffee, tea, Dr. Pepper, but stay away from the bottled waters. As far as the bosses are concerned, anyone sitting in a casino drinking anything that smacks of health is not to be trusted.

Card Counter Conduct

Introduce yourself to the boss and give him your VIP card. Talk to him. A lot. If you want to enlist a co-conspirator for the weekend, buy your favorite floorman a $25 three-teamer for Sunday’s games (Monday if you’re staying that long). The boss will be your buddy for the next couple of days. If you win big, yuck it up. Until you’ve established a pattern of winning (five or more sessions), if your cover is good enough, there’s no way they’ll throw you out of the casino for counting. When they like you, some bosses will even warn you if the heat is on upstairs.

Hiding Chips (Ratholing)

As a pro, you know you’re doing well if you win an average of one big bet an hour. All you have to do is hide one big bet an hour and you’ll be doing great in terms of preserving your welcome. Unless you’re playing head up, where the boss can determine exactly how many chips are missing from the rack, you can swing with up to two bets an hour and you’ll look like a loser forever. Most places are reluctant to bar “losers,” unless they’re blatant scufflers.

Buying In

If you’re a cash player, don’t ever buy in with a lot of currency. Don’t buy in for $500 and make $15 bets, for example; gamblers don’t do it that way. If your eventual big bets will be $100, buy in for $100 and start by playing quarters. Win or lose, you’ll be able to move your bets into your normal spread within a few minutes. If you’re losing, it looks natural for you to come out of your pocket, especially when you want to bet big. If you’re winning, it looks like you’re making a parlay play, also very natural. If you bet $5 for the dealer and $25 for yourself early on, you’ll look real easy!

When you come out of pocket, let the money play. I haven’t seen five counters in my life who let money play (unless they were trying to get around Regulation 6-A).

Drinking at the Blackjack Table

Buy an O’Douls or a Sharps at the bar. Pour it in a glass. Take it to the table with you. When the waitress comes by, ask for a shot of whiskey, making sure the boss hears you. Slug it down when the boss is watching. Then chug the O’Douls.

The next time the waitress comes by, order a real beer and sip it slowly. Time for a break. Take the beer and get rid of it. Buy another fake beer, pour it into a glass, mosey back to the table, and chug it while you’re talking to the boss. Order another real beer. Then you sip again.

When it’s a quarter gone (half an hour or so), order another cold one. By now you’ll have to go to the bathroom again and, yep, go get some more fake stuff. In a two-hour session you’ll consume the equivalent of a drink and a half and look like you’re getting smashed. It works.

Wonging

Start your play with the best of it. Wong into a rich shoe and make those important big bets when you have a big edge. If you’re good, you can back count the game next to you (make sure you’re in a position to watch the other layout) and pop into that one when it gets juicy. Just let the boss know you’re moving.

Getting Rid of Pit Bosses

If a boss is hawking your game, get in his face. Be nice, but bombard him with requests. Ask him for reservations for the show. He’ll have to do it, even if he doesn’t want to. If he comes back to your game, ask him for reservations for dinner. If he comes back again, ask him for a comp for the coffee shop. Keep this up long enough and he’ll stay as far away from your game as he can get. The problem is, he’ll also get mad, which will probably have an adverse effect on your rating. If you are playing primarily for the comps, you’ll have to tolerate a boss’s scrutiny.

Comp City Outtakes:

Beat the Heat

How can you tell when there’s heat? It’s pretty simple. If a floorman who’s been gunning your game gets on the phone, and another boss comes over to watch your play (and they both talk while trying not to move their lips), it’s getting warm. If either of them picks up the phone after that, you got heat!

Sometimes the second boss will go over to the computer terminal and pull up your “profile.” The first thing he looks for is a history: how long you’ve played (lifetime!), how much they should have won, how much they have won, and the difference between the two.

It you’re somewhere within the normal range, they’ll surmise that you may not be that dangerous a blackjack player.

Theoretical Casino Win	$10,000
Actual Casino Win	$ 8,000
Difference	$ 2,000

If they see that you’re only losing about 10% of what is expected, their radar switches on and they’ll surely tell the eye to watch what you’re doing.

Theoretical Casino Win	$10,000
Actual Casino Win	$ 1,000
Difference	$ 9,000

What you don’t want them to see, although it’s sometimes impossible not to if you book an extraordinary winner, is any kind of winner at all, especially if you have 100+ hours of play.

Theoretical Casino Win	$10,000
Actual Casino Win	($ 1,000)
Difference	($11,000)

They know they should have won $10K, but they’ve lost $1K. What does that mean to them? Something’s wrong, no doubt. What does that mean to you? If you want to play over a long period of time in one particular house for comps, monetary profit, or both you’d better learn to hide two units per hour.

But the issue here is heat detection and what to do about it. Most card counters really sweat the boss’s scrutiny, but they don’t need to. If a floorman is standing over your game and watching every hand, he probably suspects that you’re counting, but it’s highly unlikely that you’re already being watched from upstairs. You still have time to implement some damage control.

If you keep moving your money, and he goes to the phone, it’s time to go on red alert. (Floormen can’t order a surveillance check. The order must come from a pit boss or higher.) Here’s what happens in most places:

Floorman agitated, calls bigger boss ==>

Big boss watches you and/or pulls up your computer file ==>

Big boss notifies surveillance ==>

Floorman “gives you air.” (Acts disinterested so the “eye” has time to evaluate your play.) ==>

Eye tries to match your face to mugs in Griffin Book. If no match, they do a “skills check” (30-60 minutes). Reports to management. ==>

If you are labeled as “counting,” you will be barred and possibly photographed. If you are labeled as “not counting,” your name is logged as such, and you have a free pass (until you win a lot of money).

So what do you do when you know you’re under the microscope? At this point you have three options: leave, keep counting, or lay some cover.

Leave

If you beat a hasty retreat, every time a pit clerk calls up your computer file (marker, rating input, comp request, etc.), SKILLS CHECK! flashes on the screen. That means you’ll be branded as a potential counter for at least the duration of this trip and maybe for a whole lot longer. Your counting life expectancy in that joint has just been reduced.

Keep Counting (And Moving the Money)

Sure, it takes anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour for a good surveillance expert to tag you properly. You should be able to win at least a piece of a big bet before they take your picture, post it in the security office, give it to Griffin, pass it around to other casinos, bar you for life and terminate your comps. Nice move.

Play Like a Chump

If not for the rest of the trip, at least for the next couple of hours. You’ll still get your comps and you’ll still be a slight favorite, but you can’t move your money with the count, unless it’s real, real natural. What you must do is keep moving your money randomly, with no consideration of the count. If all of a sudden you turn into a flat bettor, you’re going to embarrass the boss who alerted surveillance, and he’s going to follow you like a dog in heat forever.

I know this play’s going to crumble your corks, but the heatiest play you can ever make is not insuring a natural. It’ll cost you about eight bucks every time you do it (assuming a $100 bet), but if you have a snapper and don’t insure, the other players will get bug-eyed, the dealer will stop the game and ask you why you didn’t, and the boss will head straight to the phone and put Big Brother on your butt, especially if the dealer doesn’t have the ten. You’ll only get a natural against a dealer’s ace once every four or five hours, so give up the two bucks an hour and you’ll live to play another day (or swing).

If you choose to play like a chump, you can decide for yourself how to alter your play depending on how much you’re willing to give up in expectation. Here are some examples. None of these plays will cost you more than $4. (The following were derived using Stanford Wong’s Blackjack Count Analyzer, assuming a $100 bet on a six-deck shoe.)

Player	Dealer Up-Card	Cover Play	Cost
14	4	hit	$0.40
14	6	hit	$1.80
12	3	stand	$1.80
11	A	double	$3.10
A7	10	stand	$3.50
10	10	double	$3.60
12	2	stand	$3.90
13	3	hit	$4.00

Card Counting Index Plays

The real savvy guys upstairs know the index plays. If you suspect you’re being watched, don’t use them. Either stick to basic with a few cover moves or vary from them on things that look natural, like standing on 16 vs. 10, etc. Do not hit stiffs against stiffs when you should. It’s a dead giveaway.

Spotters

If you get spooked by someone on your game who appears to have a keen interest in what you’re doing, remember this: spotters do not sit on blackjack games. Period. They stand behind or beside the game. They try to remain invisible, but they can’t. If you want to spot one (or freak him out) stand up when you play. If you suspect he’s trying to see your cards, move your body so he has to move his. Very few disinterested game watchers will contort themselves to watch your cards. If he’s squirming like the snake that he is, he’s a spotter. Gaming agents and coppers are a different matter (they will play on a game), but if you’re just counting, you don’t have to worry about them.

Counter Catchers

Most clubs have a designated “counter catcher” (who’s called to confirm the suspicions of spotters, other bosses, etc.). They usually work in the pits or upstairs.

The technology they use to catch counters is getting more sophisticated every day. Suffice it to say (and it’s always been this way): It’s much more important to have a world-class cover than a world-class card counting system.

The only way they’ll catch you is if they suspect something in the first place. Don’t let them think that you’re smart. Don’t be a stiff. Don’t be a nerd. And don’t move your bets up and down precisely according to published guidelines (counter catchers read the same books). If you play with a casual and relaxed style, bosses aren’t compelled to surveille you.

Comp Notes for Team Players

If you’re calling plays for a Big Player, always get rated, but not necessarily with the same name every time. You’ll be amazed how much money you’ll save the team’s bankroll if you keep expenses down by getting free rooms and food.

If you’re calling plays and the BP scores a big gourmet room comp, you can’t go. How would you like for your (un)favorite shift boss to saunter in to say hello to the BP and see you, a measly $25 bettor, swilling $100 wine with him? You wouldn’t. If you want to feast together, do it with room service. The same goes for other members of your teams. If you want to party together, do it when you make bank. And do it in a joint other than where you went over the top.

For the same reasons, don’t ever use a BP’s gourmet comp for yourself in a Las Vegas casino. The shift bosses often cruise the big rooms at least once a night. They look at the maitre ‘ds comp log and then exchange pleasantries with the RFB customers. You might wind up exchanging blows if you’re the wrong guy in the wrong chair. ♠