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SMART ONLINE CASINO GAMBLING

INTRO TO SMART ONLINE CASINO GAMBLING

by Deep 21 and Nothing But Net
© Blackjack Forum Online 2004

Playing in online casinos can be fun and can even provide an edge for knowledgeable players. You can play the same games you play in Vegas (and more) with the same odds (or better), for high stakes or low stakes or free, and you can do it in your kitchen, in your pj’s. Or you can do it from your local coffeehouse (but not in your pj’s there). Wherever there is an Internet connection, you can play online.

Since the online casinos can’t give you a comped suite, a show, or dinner, they give you money to play with instead. These free bonuses can add greatly to the power of a lucky streak or reduce the pain of a bad streak.

This is not to say that players who gamble online have never experienced any problems. Many Internet casinos are honest, providing fair games, prompt payouts, and good customer service, but not all. Some have been found to use cheating software; others do not honor their bonus offers; others take six months (or longer) to pay you if you win.

The links we provide online players at Blackjack Forum Online are only for casinos we personally trust. They are the premium online casinos, and we say that on the basis of a lot of player experience, and a lot of win/loss records, with them and others. Near each link, you will find information on what the casino’s software and games are like, what types of sign-up bonus and follow-up bonuses are offered, how good the customer service is, and also anything we don’t like about the casino.

For our choices for best Internet casinos, see our Internet Casino Reviews and Best Internet Casinos pages. But before you choose an Internet casino, here are some other things you need to remember:

Getting Started at Online Gaming

1) Is It Legal?

Online gambling and poker are legal in most countries. In the U.S., the current administration is very hostile to online gambling and poker. However, though the Congress recently passed a law that may make transferring funds to and from online casinos and poker rooms temporarily less convenient, it did not pass a law that makes playing in online casinos and poker rooms illegal in the U.S.

According to gambling attorney I. Nelson Rose, the 1961 Federal Wire Act made betting over the telephone wires on races and sporting events illegal in the U.S., but federal courts have repeatedly ruled that the 1961 Wire Act applies only to sports and race betting, not online casino or poker play. The new law does nothing to change that. Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate, has confirmed this by letter to us.

Some online casinos and poker rooms have decided to stop accepting U.S. players for now, while they figure out the best ways to handle deposits and withdrawals for U.S. players. A number of others have decided to continue accepting U.S. players, and will work out new deposit and withdrawal methods as needed. We have been impressed by the diligence with which the online casinos and poker rooms we list have been making sure U.S. players get money that is owed to them.

We will report on further developments.

U.S. players should also check their local state law before playing online. There’s a lot of legal debate on whether state law applies to online gambling and poker, since the actual betting occurs outside of the state. We don’t really know the answer to that, since no player has ever been charged. For players’ information, the states that have passed anti-online-gambling laws are: Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Washington, Indiana, Nevada, Oregon, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York and South Dakota.

Free games are available at every casino and poker room we list for any players restricted by law from playing with real money.

2) Read the Terms and Conditions

Most of the misunderstandings between players and online casinos come from a player’s misreading of a casino’s Terms & Conditions. Read them carefully! Most casinos require you to give them a certain amount of action (called the Wagering Requirement) before you can withdraw the bonus money. Some never allow you to withdraw the bonus money, only your original deposit and your winnings. (For more information on types of bonuses, see “Traditional vs. Sticky Bonuses.”) In almost all casinos some games are excluded if you receive a bonus. Sometimes the applicable Terms & Conditions are listed in several areas of the casino’s web site, be sure to look for Promotional or Bonus Terms & Conditions, as well as the casino Terms & Conditions. Make sure you can live with a casino’s terms and conditions before you deposit money or accept any bonus money.

3) Deposit Methods for Internet Casinos

A law was passed in the U.S. recently that is changing the ways players in many countries can make deposits to and withdrawals from online casinos and poker rooms. See our current deposit recommendations for online players for the best options.

4) Prepare to Win

If you play, you may win. If you win, you may want to withdraw your money. (If you’re like us.) Some online casinos require that you send them proof of who you are before they send you money. You could fax this info but it’s easier and more reliable to email. So:

* Get a scan of your driver’s license (front and back)

* Get a scan of a recent utility bill (just the top portion with your address)

* Get a scan of a bank statement (again, just the top portion with your address)

Make sure that the name and address are the same on all these documents, and that they are the same name and address as the ones on your casino account. Scan the documents to a digital image and be ready to attach that file to an email to collect your winnings. The casino will notify you by email if they require you to do this.

5) Keep Careful Records

Some players have reported occasions where money was improperly deducted from their accounts at an Internet casino, either during play or between visits to the casino. It has happened to us as well, at both shady casinos and highly reputable ones. Some of the improper deductions have been quite large.

To protect yourself from such glitches, you should play only at reputable Internet casinos and always record your balance at the end of a session, whether you logged out deliberately or accidentally got disconnected. Then check to make sure that your balance is what it should be when you return to the casino. Notify Customer Support before resuming play if there is any problem.

6) Stay Welcome

Most casinos reserve the right to limit or refuse action from players they deem to be “bonus hustlers” or “bonus abusers.”

Bonus “abusers” typically play the absolute minimum required to receive and cash out a bonus. In the past, these players would often bet both red and black on roulette at the same time, or both the “pass” and “don’t pass” at craps, in order to grind through their wagering requirements with minimum fluctuations just to cash out the bonus. This is why you will often see craps and roulette excluded from the games allowed for fulfilling the wagering requirement for a bonus.

Internet casinos try to detect and withhold bonuses from such players, just as traditional casinos try to detect and restrict the play of card counters. Sometimes the language on bonus abuse in the casinos’ terms and conditions can be pretty scary. “If we decide you are abusing our good faith effort to suck you and your paycheck into our site, we will take away your first-born son, not to mention your bonus and ALL your winnings!”

Much of this is just a scare tactic. The casinos we recommend may bar you from receiving future bonuses (most common) or may just shut down your accounts if they feel you are a bonus hustler. But you will still receive all the money you’ve got coming.

What can players do to remain welcome at Internet casinos? If a casino offers you a bonus, by all means take it. But don’t grind through the wagering requirement betting $1 per hand until you have wagered the bare minimum. Do not collect the bonus and withdraw your money right away. If you play more than the absolute minimum required, play without receiving a bonus sometimes, and leave your money in your account for a while, the casino will regard you as a good customer and treat you as such.

And there is one thing that will anger online casinos more than any card counter will anger a Vegas joint, trying to play under more than one name. If you share a computer with someone who would like a separate account at a casino where you play, clear it with the casino first to avoid misunderstandings.

Inside the Online Casino

1) Software

Each of the online casinos uses a particular brand of software to deal their games, arrange deposits and withdrawals, and offer customer support. You might find yourself thinking, hmm, this Jacks or Better game in Golden Palace looks a lot like that Jacks or Better game in Casino Europa. That’s because they both use Playtech software. The themes may be different, but it is the same software, the same buttons, the same games. If you are comfortable with a particular software, you might want to stick with it. Then, if you feel like a change, try another one.

Do be aware that the rules or payouts offered on a game (and thus the house edge!) may be different on different software, or even at different casinos that use the same software. The lower the house edge, the better for you. More information about determining the house edge is available elsewhere on this web site.

2) Customer Support

You might want to contact the casino for help to ask about a withdrawal, find out how a game is played, get help with the software, or to find out what the terms and conditions are if they are not clear to you. Most internet casinos will have toll-free phone numbers you can call to talk to customer service, a real plus. (We also really like casinos that have an online chat feature.) There will also be an email option. You can access this contact info from within the casino software and at their website. Don’t be shy about asking if you are confused about anything.

3) Mistakes

Remember that the friendly dealer who won’t let you hit your hard 19 isn’t available at an Internet casino. Be careful where you click! ♠

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Not Paranoia?

It’s Not Paranoia If…

by James Grosjean

(From Blackjack Forum XXIV #1, Winter 2004/05)
© Blackjack Forum 2004

[Author’s Note: In my description of the trial against the Imperial Palace (IP), quoted matter comes from direct trial testimony given under oath, available in the official court transcript, which we expect to make available online in the future (or which can be purchased from the court reporter, Sonia L. Riley). Questions and answers are not necessarily presented in the same order as the trial testimony, and I have sometimes made minor editing changes for clarity or length.

I try to indicate these changes using brackets for changed words, such as replacing “he” with “[Grosjean],” or ellipses for omitted material. I include numerous excerpts that are not part of the logical flow of the trial, or are not even relevant to the incidents at the IP, but which I feel are important to educate our community, reveal the stupidity and corruption of the actors, or entertain the readers.

After jury selection, then opening statements, there are six witnesses: GCB Agents Paul Stolberg, Anthony Vincent, and Philip Pedote; IP Security Supervisor Donnie Espensen; Plaintiff James Grosjean (thank you, thank you); and former GCB chief Ron Asher (the supposed “expert witness” on the relationship of the GCB and its licensees, and the law enforcement aspects of the case).

“Bob” refers to my attorney, Robert Nersesian, who is assisted in court by co-counsel Thea Sankiewicz.

“IP” when preceding a quote refers to Paul Thomas, the lawyer representing the Imperial Palace.

“Court” refers to statements made by the Honorable Judge Lee Gates.

Also present in the courtroom at all times is Mike Morrill, the risk manager for the Imperial Palace.

Letters after juror numbers refer to the games at which they gamble: VP=Video Poker, BJ=Blackjack, B=Bingo, H=Hold’em, G=Gambling at an unspecified game, N=None. Juror numbers in bold represent those ultimately selected for the jury.]

It’s Not Paranoia if …

Las Vegas, February 28, 2001. Mike and I have already met with two lawyers to discuss a possible lawsuit regarding the Caesars Incident from April 2000. Now the lights are coming on as we enter the night in Las Vegas. I’m not in town to play, but it’s what we do. Enough lawyers—it’s time to take care of business on the blackjack tables.

No games at Casino Royale. Nothing at Harrah’s. This ain’t all glamour and showgirls and penthouse suites. We’re about pounding the pavement. The Imperial Palace? Maybe we’ve got something. Naturally, the dealer goes on break and then to a shoe game, so we’re going to have to wait 80 minutes before we even have a chance to check it out. After a nap in the sports book, we hit the floor again at about 11 p.m.

Mike and I split up and scout the blackjack pit from opposite sides. If nothing pans out, we might be headed to O’Shea’s in a minute. But not just yet. Is that security guard looking at me? Sometimes an errant look is enough to tell you it’s on. It looks like it’s on, but how can it be? I’m not playing. The pit doesn’t even know I’m here. I’ve never played much at the Imperial Palace. I don’t exist. But anything can happen in Vegas.

The security guard is loitering in the middle of the heavily trafficked main aisle on the casino floor. He must be there for a reason. I move across the aisle to confirm that his gaze follows me. I meander over to the slot machines. Does he think I can’t see his furtive glances? It’s on.

I could easily sprint out the door and make it to freedom, but Bob Loeb, my friend and attorney, has advised me that to do so escalates the situation both practically and legally. Why should I be considering running from anything? What is going on?

I have no choice but to walk out and hope the security guard leaves me alone. What are the odds of that? As I exit the main doors, I can hear the guard behind me. He orders me to stop, but why should I? I have nothing to say, and he has no legal authority over me. I keep walking. I’m in the driveway now. Freedom is so close. Then I hear the order over his radio: “Detain him!”

Five feet from the sidewalk. The goon finally gets in front of me. He puts his hands on my chest and starts yelling. I try to walk around him, saying, “You have no right to detain me—I wasn’t even playing.” “Yes, I do!” he counters. Good one.

This goon is about 6’3″, outweighs me by about 75 pounds, carries a gun, and is violent. Though legal, resistance is futile. He twists my arm behind my back, then pushes me into the concrete wall. With my face pressed against the wall, he starts putting handcuffs on, and then I look down the driveway to see five more security guards running out. Their trophy subdued in cuffs, they triumphantly march me back into the casino and into the elevator. The bravado begins right away as they start touching my pockets and one of them says, “Smack his head into the wall.” How can they get away with this?

I am taken to the Lineup Room and forced to lean with my head against the wall and legs spread behind me. For the next nine minutes, all of my possessions are taken out of my pockets and put on the table behind me. The guards are enjoying the festive atmosphere. The goon who had originally detained me says, “He broke my damn watch!” to which another guard replies, “Add on another charge!”

They finally let me sit, and the security supervisor, Donnie Espensen, gives me some vague line about how I might be someone they’re looking for, and that they’re checking on it. What is going on? Could I have just had the bad luck to be in the wrong place at the wrong time? I read a book once that says, “There’s no luck in this business.”

I sit and wait, and sit some more, and wait some more. No one tells me what’s going on. Espensen has already looked at my passport and knows who I am. I ask the guards to remove the handcuffs. They refuse. After about fifteen minutes in the Back Room, a couple of guys in leather jackets walk through, peruse my stuff on the table, tell Espensen they’ll see him tomorrow, say their goodbyes. A few minutes later Espensen says, “Well, they think you’re somebody, but apparently you’re not.”

What? I ask, for the second time, to be released from handcuffs. Espensen refuses and retracts, saying, “We need to make sure you’re not the person we’re looking for.” A few minutes later, he tells me that I’ll be released after he fills out a field interview card, including my passport number, home address and phone number, and Social Security number.

A few minutes before midnight, they finally release me. Espensen tells the security guards that they should escort me to the door, but that I am not 86’ed [barred from the property], since this is apparently just a case of mistaken identity. What is going on?

In the days that follow, I can’t make up my mind about what happened. What are the odds that of all the random people that could have been mistakenly detained, they grabbed me? They had to know. But then, why didn’t they bar me? Perhaps they wanted to stick to their “mistaken-identity” story. But then, why detain me at all if they aren’t willing to bar me? They don’t need a justification to bar me; they can just do it.

Besides, they could stick to their mistaken-identity story and just say that “to be safe” they would bar me. That would do the trick. So did they know who I am, or was this an accident? As we would learn in the months ahead, those aren’t the only two possibilities, and the truth is even darker and more shocking than any of us would have imagined.

Mike and I once asked Richard Wright, a criminal defense attorney, whether we could sue for the Caesars incident. Mike and I like to mimic his cynical, almost-mocking reply, which was, “Who ya gonna sue??” In the months that followed, only one answer emerged—everyone.

Las Vegas, October 18, 2004. I am sitting alone in the back room at 528 S. 8th Avenue, the law offices of Nersesian & Sankiewicz. In the VCR is a surveillance tape from the Imperial Palace. On the table is the three-volume transcript of my deposition, taken about ten months earlier. Trial starts tomorrow. Our lawsuit against Caesars Palace, the Griffin Detective Agency, the Nevada Gaming Control Board, GCB Agent Charles Pointon, GCB Agent Roderick O’Neal, the Imperial Palace, and IP Security Supervisor Donnie Espensen has been bifurcated so that only the IP portion will be heard tomorrow. I’m relieved that we have to attack only one head of the hydra this time.

After three and a half years, it’s odd that we’re actually going to trial tomorrow, but was it not inevitable? Does the IP expect me to bite at their token settlement offer of $10,000? Split with Mike and Bob, my end would be only $3000 or so, before expenses, which already exceed that amount. If I were interested in making $3000, I would just go over to the IP to play blackjack. Sure, if the IP offers a big number, say $50,000, I’d probably take it, but the beauty of my position, and now I’m divulging our secret weapon, is that I don’t care about money.

In high school I did Model U.N. and Model Congress and Mock Trial. In college I took a philosophy class called “Justice.” I was an editor for a nonpartisan political magazine. I want the system to work. Las Vegas is an embarrassment to the United States, and not because of the gambling or the sex. I hope it’s true that what happens in Vegas stays in Vegas. This cancer must not spread.

Jury Selection

Las Vegas, October 19, 2004. District Court #8, the Honorable Judge Lee Gates presiding. It’s time for voir dire, the jury selection process. Mike and I had considered hiring a jury-selection consultant to help, but in the end decided that Bob, Thea, and I could exercise sufficient insight and wisdom. Thirty or so people are sitting in the jury pool. Eight are randomly selected to come forward. We will alternate with the IP in exercising up to four rejections of jury candidates. We might be able to reject a candidate “for cause,” without having to use one of our four precious challenges. Some would argue that the case will be won or lost right here. Let’s get it on.

Prospective Juror 227 [Dale K.]: “Let me just explain something to you. Being brought up in the Midwest, let’s say, and the values that my parents instilled, coming out here to Nevada was like a complete turnaround. … I sit here and I look at what’s going on with law enforcement, it’s like Metro is like one big gang thing, you know. It’s like, always, me first and then… Back there was never like that. You never locked your doors or anything. It’s so different out here, and you know, it’s hard — it’s hard to comprehend, to tell you the truth. I don’t understand the concept that these people have out here that they can’t respect some people first…

They can’t respect people first. It seems like the first thing they do out here — and I go by what they show on the news is — about three years ago, there was a lady that Metro tried to detain, they ended up throwing her on the ground on hot pavement in the middle of the summer, and she’s all burned up, and she’s telling them she’s getting burned, and they don’t care. I don’t understand that. I don’t understand the mentality of these people out here. It’s like strong arm first, and then …”

Court: “Shoot and ask questions later?”

227: “Exactly. That’s the way it is. That kind of mentality I was not used to. … I’m going back to last year, … Somebody evidently walked in [to a casino], security didn’t like it, and they roughed them up. Here again, I don’t understand that. They rough up first, and then they ask questions later.”

IP: “Do you believe that the culture shock that you had … would cause my client to say I don’t want this guy as a juror?”

227: “Truthfully, I would — I really have a preconceived notion about security in the casinos. … I’m going back to what happened a year ago at Gold Coast, for example. Here again, it’s on television, they showed surveillance videos, and I think it was an advantage gambler that that was the term that they used at the time on TV, and they — as far as I’m concerned, instead of them just asking him to leave, they physically abused these people and took them in the back, handcuffed — these people were handcuffed and everything, and that just — that’s not right to me. … they had these guys pinned right down cuffing them, and they were right down on the floor and they had their knees in their back. And I’m saying if this is just an advantage gambler, why are they doing this? This is not right.”

For this guy’s diatribe to be the first thing heard in court is a miracle for us, but, as Bob writes to me on his legal pad, “He’s gone!” [Dismissed by IP, #2]

Prospective Juror 169 [Timothy J.]: A former 16-year aeronautical engineer from California with a party rental business and a coffee service business. Now a 2.5-year Vegas resident and loan officer. He pleads financial hardship, because he works on commission and would not receive any salary for a four-day trial, and needs to support a wife and five children. His wife worked at MGM until recently. [Dismissed, along with five others for financial hardship.]

Prospective Juror 007VP [Scott F.]: A former Air Force pilot for twenty years, now a pilot for United Airlines, living in Vegas for 11 years, originally from Ohio. Previously served on a jury for a murder case, coincidentally heard by Judge Gates.

Bob: “Is anyone here particularly happy about [the Patriot Act]?”

007: “As an airline pilot — some of that because of 9/11, because it helps protect us; so, there are aspects of that — yeah, I would guess I’m in favor of it.”

The guy’s got a smirk plastered on his face, he’s ex-military, he looks like he thinks this is a waste of his time to be here, and he likes “aspects” of the Patriot Act. I tell Bob that the guy has a bad attitude, and bad attitudes have got to go. [Dismissed by Bob, #3]

Prospective Juror 001 [Douglas P.]: A 3.5-year resident of Vegas and real estate agent. Formerly a 25-year electrical engineer in California. Was sued by his neighbor after he filed a complaint about a barking dog. Sued his former employer for wrongful termination.

Court: “Can you follow the Court’s instructions on the law?”

001: “Yes. I should say — I don’t know if it matters — I’m a registered libertarian. … this involves constitutional rights, and that’s a big thing with libertarians, and that’s why I mentioned it.”

Bob: “Did you do programming and code as well?”

001: “Yes.”

Why did this guy have to open his mouth about being a libertarian??!? Godspeed. [Dismissed by IP, #4]

Prospective Juror 002 [Lawrence A.]: A CPA born in Las Vegas, with a brother who does real estate and personal injury law.

Bob: “Does everyone here recognize that generally casinos do put out games where they have an advantage and the casino is playing with an advantage? … Well, they all nodded their head yes except for Mr. A., who I think gave me the eye, only in the sense that sure, that’s what they do.”

Educated, reasonable, with a touch of cynicism towards casinos — nice knowing you, Lawrence. [Dismissed by IP, #6]

Prospective Juror 003HE [Richard F.]: A 2-year resident from Southern California, a retired paper manufacturer. On six previous juries, twice as foreman.

IP: “Do you have any opinions as to how casinos treat advantaged gamblers, any preconceived notions?”

003: “From what I understand, they prefer them not to play. If they find by their security or surveillance they think that someone is an advantage gambler, they ask them to leave.”

IP: “Do you agree that a casino should have the right to decide who is allowed to play?”

003: “Yes.”

That’ll do.

Prospective Juror 004BJ [Nancy V.]: A 7-year resident from Chicago, now a nurse. Her daughter is a pit boss for Coast Casinos. Her brother-in-law has been in casino security for 20 years, and is now at the San Remo.

Court: “Did you ever talk to him about his work?”

004: “Frequently. … You wouldn’t believe some of the stuff. It’s unbelievable. Some of the stuff I wouldn’t even want to mention.”

Court: “Why, because it’s lewd and lascivious or just —”

004: “That too.”

Court: “What about issues involved in this case, arresting people in hotel casinos?”

004: “What about it?”

Court: “Did he ever talk about arresting people who were playing cards?”

004: “Right.”

Court: “Advantage players and that sort of thing?”

004: “Right. … I can’t speak for all security people, but I feel like — I’ve been in casinos all the time, and when you go in a casino and you’re not suspicious and don’t do anything wrong — I’ve never been bothered; I’ve never been spoken to by security. I think security does a good job, but there may be some that are bad, I’ll grant that.”

Court: “What’s an advantage player?”

004: “That would be someone who can count cards.”

Bob: “When your brother-in-law talks to you, has he ever spouted off about how some other security officers just went off or were nuts and he just couldn’t believe that they did stuff?”

004: “They have a pretty good crew there. He doesn’t have any problems there.”

Bob: “Has he ever brought it up at other places where they might have problems and you discussed that with him?”

004: “Not that I recall.”

Gee, she’s been in casinos all the time, and she’s never been bothered. I wonder why that could be. [Dismissed by Bob, #1]

Prospective Juror 005N [Theresa M.]: A 25-year resident, an accountant for a masonry contractor. Brother is a corporate attorney in Washington, D.C. I’ve heard enough about this hotshot brother, which is making me think she’s got a big attitude. The jury box ain’t big enough for her attitude. [Dismissed by Bob, #7]

Prospective Juror 006VP [Dolores D.]: A 13-year resident from Hawaii who works in casino credit at a Strip casino.

Bob: “You mention that you occasionally would gamble. … Do you win?”

006: “Well, once in a while.”

Bob: “Do you think that the [casino reality] shows are real or staged?”

006: “Staged.”

A touch of cynicism we can handle.

Prospective Juror 008VP [Howard F.]: Born in Las Vegas, an equipment service technician at a fast food restaurant. Wife is a pit clerk at a Strip Casino.

Court: “Have you ever heard her discuss what they refer to as advantage gamblers?”

008: “No, sir.”

Bob: “Do you watch American Casino or Casino?”

008: “No.”

IP: “You heard the questions that I asked about security officers …”

008: “I believe a security officer has a certain duty, and as long as he’s not overstepping his duty or his job description, I have no problems with it.”

Solid answer.

Prospective Juror 009N [Marie M.]: A 3.5-year resident, from the New York/New Jersey area, director of food and beverage at a Strip casino, formerly worked at some “very high profile restaurants in New York City.”

Court: “Do you have any preconceived ideas or notions about any of these issues that this case is about?”

008: “No. I’d like to hear the facts.”

Bob: “Do you watch any of those reality shows?”

008: “The Apprentice, Casino, and the other casino show.”

Bob: “Why don’t you gamble?”

008: “It just never really fascinated me. I have no interest.”

Bob: “It’s not a moral question?”

008: “No, not at all.”

Bob: “Are advantage gamblers discussed at those [daily security briefings]?”

008: “Truthfully, I never even heard of the term until I walked into this room today. … I’m a food and beverage person first.”

I like food and beverage.

Prospective Juror 010N [Marissa S.]: A 12-year resident from Colorado who teaches kindergarten, with a BA from Macalester College, and a teaching certificate and ESL endorsement.

Bob: “Why don’t you gamble?”

010: “I work hard for my money, and I save it. It just doesn’t appeal to me. The casinos — it’s dark and it’s smoky and it’s crowded. It’s just not a very pleasant experience for me.”

Bob: “If I were to use the phrase ‘the Nuremberg defense,’ do you know what I’m talking about?”

010: “Yes.”

Court: “Do you believe that people have to blindly follow orders given by police departments or police officers or that they can question them?”

010: “They can question them. … [if a police officer] came up and asked me to do something, I personally would do it, but I don’t — imagine ever finding myself in a position where a police officer would do that.”

A bit of a prude, perhaps. A woman who “[works hard]” for her money, as if we don’t. A woman who can’t imagine being in a situation involving police officers. That’s dangerously close to the attitude that “the police don’t just stop anybody; you must have been doing something.” [Dismissed by Bob, #5]

Prospective Juror 012VP [Jeniece M.]: A 4-year resident from Colorado, who lived for four years in Vegas nine years earlier, works with her husband in an independent floor covering business.

Court: “Do you think people should be able to bring lawsuits if you feel they’ve been wronged?”

012: “I think there’s too many lawsuits going on for reasons that are, you know — I mean, there’s a lot of frivolous lawsuits. … I’m talking about like neighbors or something.”

Bob: “If two people are working together, would you feel that … both of them have to do everything for either of them to be responsible, or are they both responsible for what they do together?”

012 [without hesitation]: “They’re both responsible for what they do together.”

[Accepted, but released by Judge during trial for illness.]

Prospective Juror 013N [Jodie B.]: Has lived in Vegas since age three, now a middle-school teacher at “a Title One school.”

Court: “[What have you heard about advantage gamblers and where and from whom?]”

013: “I grew up next door to a professional poker player, one of my cousins is a card counter who is not allowed in casinos here, and same with my roommate.”

Court: “So, your roommate is not allowed in casinos either?”

013: “He hasn’t been banned specifically from casinos in Las Vegas, but he and his wife have come to an agreement that it’s not a good idea for him to go in.”

Court: “What kind of game does he play?”

013: “Poker.”

Court: “You can be an advantage player in poker?”

013: “Poker and 21.”

Bob: “[Why don’t you gamble?]”

013: “I would rather not throw away my money, and I think gambling often takes advantage of the hopes of others.”

Bob: “Would you agree that [your friends] are not problem gamblers because gambling is only a problem if you lose?”

013: “That’s one way of putting it. I can see why a casino would not want them in their room, and I can also see why one might not want to play at a table with them because it certainly changes the odds.”

Bob: “At 21, if you know?”

013: “Less so there.”

Bob: “You don’t have friends that cheat, though, do you?”

013: “It depends on your definition of cheat, especially when it comes to card counting and 21.”

Bob: “Why? … [If] somebody who you might remotely know might be cheating at something, what would they be doing?”

013: “It depends on whether they’re dealing or playing, dealing from the bottom of the deck. … If they’re playing, possibly counting the odds and swaying figures in their direction, instead of the house’s direction, because I won’t lie to you, casinos aren’t built on people winning.”

Bob: “What would the player be doing that you would see as cheating?”

013: “There’s an understanding with any gambling unit, it’s a game of chance, and any time that somebody is doing something extraordinary in their mind, such as keeping track of figures, then that’s taking away the chance of the game.”

Bob: “And you personally would view that as cheating?”

013: “Yeah.”

Bob: “One of the questions I had asked earlier of the panel as a whole dealt with whether or not you would recognize that generally when you walk in, it’s not a 50/50 game with the casino, right?”

013: “It’s not.”

Bob: “And the casino is playing with an advantage?”

013: “Yes.”

Bob: “And you know what card counting is?”

013: “Yes.”

Bob: “Just very straightforward, is card counting cheating?”

013: “In a casino?”

Bob: “Yeah.”

013: “Yeah.”

Bob: “And you believe that in your heart of hearts?”

013: “Yes.”

Bob: “Your Honor, I’d ask that she be excused for cause. She has an opinion that is directly and four-square contrary to the law.”

IP: “Your Honor, may we approach and discuss this?”

Court: “No … Let me tell you what, can you [Prospect 013] … follow the law and put aside your own personal opinion?”

013: ‘I believe so.”

Court: “All right.”

Bob: “I would renew my cause objection.”

Court: “Denied. She said she could follow the law. As long as she can follow the law and put aside her personal opinions.”

013: “Yes, sir.”

IP: “Thank you, Judge.”

Bob: “Do you believe that a casino could take somebody into a back room for doing something that you call as cheating but is not cheating under the law?”

013: “It depends on the facts and how the person reacts at being asked to leave.”

Bob: “What do you understand are the rights of the casino?”

013: “The casino is a private establishment with the right to refuse service to anyone and the right to ask someone to leave. And if in doing so, that someone either refuses or throws a fit that may either damage the casino’s reputation or possibly cause the disturbance to other patrons, then the casino may need to take further action.”

Bob: “You’re sort of studied on this. Who did you get that from?”

013: “I’m also a rights activist. You mentioned the Patriot Act earlier. I’m a human rights activist and was very vocal and active around the university and things like that.”

IP: “Do you have any preconceived notions about the Imperial Palace?”

013: “Yeah. … Most of them have to deal with the late owner of the Imperial Palace and various myths and unmyths about him and his personal affiliations.”

IP: “Do you consider them myths or do you consider some of those things true?”

013: “I consider them true, especially looking at the architecture of the building.”

IP: “Would that affect your ability to be fair to the Imperial Palace?”

013: “I don’t think so.”

IP: “Do you know how [your cousin was] getting the advantage?”

013: “He is a card counter and hard core 21. … And the other one is a poker player, and he was used at best advantage for dealing.”

IP: “I’m sorry?”

013: “The other one is a poker player. He’s at best advantage with dealing.”

IP: “In dealing. Can you explain that a little bit more?”

013: “Amazing things with sleight of hand.”

Court: “That’s not advantage, that’s cheating.”

013: “Yes, that’s why he doesn’t play here.”

This is the only prospect that I do not like and do not respect. She says she’s a rights activist, but she is apparently trying to escape her civic duty. By saying that card counting is cheating and that the late owner of the IP was a Nazi, she hopes to offend both sides, so that someone will bounce her. Let me get this straight: The cousin is a “hardcore” counter, but card counting is cheating? The roommate is a professional poker player, but has decided with his wife that it’s not a good idea to go into the casinos, and he gets his edge in poker by cheating while he’s dealing. This prospect is either confused, stupid, or disingenuous. [Dismissed by IP, #8]

Prospective Juror 014G [Mary M.]: A 13-year resident from Massachusetts, UNLV graduate, and third-grade teacher, formerly had a restaurant in New Hampshire.

Court: “Do [any of the previous questions] apply to you?”

014: “I did know a professional gambler.”

Court: “When you say ‘professional gambler,’ what does that mean to you?”

014: “He didn’t have a job and that’s what he did, he gambled.”

Court: “Do you know what kind of games he played?”

014: “I think he played a lot of video poker.”

Court: “You can be a professional gambler with video poker?”

014: “Um-hmm.”

Bob: “As an acquaintance, did you have any preconceived notions about this [professional], whether he was a bad guy, good guy or anything like that?”

014: “No; he was a very nice guy.”

Bob: “Do you have any preconceived notions that hotel security has any kind of special rights or authority in Nevada?”

014: “I believe they have more authority than a civilian and that they are protecting me as well as the other patrons.”

Bob: “Do you distinguish between the casino protecting you and the casino protecting its own bottom line?”

014: “I wouldn’t have a reason to think of it from that perspective. What, that they would be abusing my rights?”

Bob: “No, not necessarily. … it seems to me you think that casino security, if they’re undertaking actions, are doing it to protect other patrons. Would you recognize that casino security sometimes might take actions solely to protect their own income?”

014: “I hadn’t thought of it. Possibly.”

Bob: “And you teach your students what the Bill of Rights is and what civil rights are, right?”

014: “Yes.”

Bob: “Do you emphasize how important those rights are?”

014: “Yes, I do.”

IP: “You’ve been to the IP before?”

014: “To see shows. … The shows are good.”

Court: “The plaintiff may exercise their fourth and final peremptory challenge.”

Bob: “If I waive, there’s no retakes, that’s waiving the fourth challenge, right?”

Court: “Correct.”

Bob: “Your Honor, we would like to thank and excuse [Prospective Juror 005].”

We’re now out of challenges, and there’s an empty seat in the jury box. At this point, I leaned to Bob and whispered, “We’re gambling now.” Bob chuckled.

Prospective Juror 015 [Regina S.]: A 15-year resident from Colorado, a claims manager for work comp, formerly at MGM/Mirage. A risk manager for ten years.

015: “I’ve worked really closely with the vice-president of security at the hotel, the MGM, actually, at all of the properties.”

Court: “Because of your close association in the past with folks who work in security, would that affect your ability to be fair in this case?”

015: “I honestly believe it would, yes.”

Court: “All right. You’re excused.”

Whew, we’re out of bullets, but our enemy committed suicide. [Dismissed by Court.]

Prospective Juror 016 [Galan A.]: A 15-year resident from California, a physical therapy student, with final exams over the next two weeks. [Dismissed by Court.]

Now Prospective 013 pipes in: “For secondary schools in Clark County, the quarter ends on Thursday of next week, so right now my kids are in the last crunch for getting everything in the grade book by Friday.”

Court: “Can’t you call in for a sub?”

013: “Yeah, I can, but that doesn’t mean we’ll get one.”

Court: “You have to wait. Let me see how we do.”

Prospective Juror 017N [Cyndy A.]: A 12-year resident from “all over,” now working doing third-party liability work for a medical insurance company. Out of challenges, we lucked out when the 10-year casino risk manager, Prospect 015, admitted bias and got herself dismissed by the Court. Now, here comes the mother of all nightmares.

Court: “Have you ever worked in the hotel casino?”

017: “Yep.”

Court: “Which one?”

017: “Quite a few.”

Court: “Doing what?”

017: “Security.”

This is the worst twist that I could have imagined  that after running out of challenges, our jury is filled with a casino risk manager [that bullet dodged] and a casino security employee!

Court: “Because you worked in security, would that affect your ability to be fair in this case?”

017: “No.”

Court: “If security was shown to be lacking or have done something wrong, would you be able to find against them?”

017: “Definitely.”

A ray of hope? She said “definitely,” instead of a simple “yes.” We’re grasping at straws.

Court: “What did you do with [card counters]?”

017: “I never actually dealt with any of those. Mostly, we dealt with drunks. … I worked at Southern Nevada Women’s Corrections Facility as a corrections officer for a little over a year, and then I tried out security in the casinos, but I didn’t stay with it.”

Bob: “Which casinos did you try that out at?”

017: “Sante Fe, Monte Carlo, Nevada Palace, I believe.”

Bob: “So, you held three security jobs.”

017: “Closer to probably five or six, but I don’t remember the other ones. They were very short-term.”

Bob: “While you were there, did you find that security at the casinos recognized and respected the rights of the patrons?”

017: “No.”

Bob: “Do you know what a hole carder is?”

017: “No.”

Bob: “Did the casinos regularly tell you that your job was to protect the casinos?”

017: “Yes.”

Bob: “Did they highlight protecting casinos or protecting patrons?”

017: “Casinos.”

IP: “You were asked if casinos respected rights of patrons or something along those lines. Did you say that they did?”

017: “They’re more for the casino.”

At this point, we are possibly between a rock and a hard place, or possibly between a pillow and a soft place. We have Prospect 013, who says that card counting is cheating, but who claims to be a rights activist who believes that the former IP owner was a Nazi. Then we have Prospect 017, who worked in casino security, but who seems to be disgruntled and [properly] cynical about that career — a potential jackpot for us . We have no remaining challenges, but the IP has one. Who will they reject, if anyone? IP: “Your Honor, we would thank and excuse [Prospective Juror 013].”

Prospective Juror 018B [Dolores C.]: An 11-year resident from New York, retired, whose husband works for Mandalay Bay in the sports book. She asks to be excused because she cares for her elderly mother in New York. [Dismissed by the Court.]

Prospective Juror 020N [Sandra A.]: A 28-year resident from Ohio, a blackjack dealer at an off-Strip casino, married to a dice dealer.

Court: “What’s an advantage player?”

020: “They’re card counters or they — anybody with a big bank roll can eventually take advantage, but I just feel like they’re card counters.”

Court: “Anybody with a big bank roll can take advantage?”

020: “Card counters don’t necessarily win, but if you have enough bankroll, eventually you will. I’ve been dealing 27 years.”

Bob: “Do you recognize hole carding as not an illegal activity?”

020: “No, I don’t believe it’s illegal.”

Bob: “If you were to find out sitting here that Mr. Grosjean is the best hole carder in the world, would you hold that against him?”

020: “You mean reading the hole card?”

Bob: “Yeah, getting the hole card from the dealer?”

020: “That’s not good. Would I hold that against him?”

Bob: “It’s not cheating though, right?”

020: “It’s taking advantage, yes, of a system. The casinos are for fun. They’re not for, like, trying to beat. People like to beat the casino. I don’t think you can beat them.”

Bob: “If you find out that that’s where Mr. Grosjean — you don’t think you can beat them. So, if you’re beating them, you’re doing something wrong? Would that be true?”

020: “No.”

Bob: “I’m confused.”

020: “I’m confused now. Let’s try that one again.”

Bob: “Let’s go back to the question that I asked. You find out that Mr. Grosjean is the best hole carder in the world, are you going to hold that against him?”

020: “No.”

Now the alternates:

Prospective Juror 021N [Carlos J.]: A 9-year resident from California and Mexico, now working for Republic Services. [Dismissed by the Court for financial hardship.]

Prospective Juror 023VP [Annette E.]: A 4-year resident from New York and California, now working at a credit union.

Bob: “Do you feel that security at a casino can handcuff people without legal cause?”

023: “Usually, I feel that they must have seen you doing something or you’ve done something for them to come and approach you. There’s hundreds of people in there, and they don’t just pick on one person.”

Bob: “You would agree that it’s not an excuse to point to somebody else and say it was his idea when the bank is robbed by both of you?”

023: “You’re both responsible.” [Dismissed by Court for cause, because a member of her Board of Directors also works for the IP.]

Prospective Juror 024 [Diana C.]: A 12-year resident from California.

Court: “Are you a legal resident?”

024: “No, I don’t have any residency yet, but it’s in the process.” [Dismissed by the Court for vague residency status.]

Prospective Juror 027VP&BJ [James B.]: A 4.5-year resident from Michigan, retired from a marketing career in the banking and beer industries, retired from 21 years in the Army, both active duty and reserves.

Bob: “Do you feel that security at a casino can handcuff people without legal cause?”

027: “I believe they could, but I don’t think they should.”

Prospective Juror 028N [Michelle G.]: A 6-year resident from Salt Lake City, now a homemaker, married to a Navy man.

Bob: “Does your reason for not gambling have anything to do with moral reasons?”

028: “No.”

IP: “Do you know any advantage or professional gamblers?”

028: “No.”

Bob: “Your Honor, we waive our peremptory and accept the jury.”

IP: “We will also, your Honor.”

Court: “Swear in the jury.”

And so it was done. I looked at our jury — six women, two men. Five of them gamble, mostly video poker. After using our last peremptory challenge, we see a casino risk manager, an ex-security guard, and a career dealer. The latter two make the jury, but I think it’ll be okay. If we’re going to gamble with the Nevada legal system, I’d rather face the possible stupidity of a jury, than the possible corruption of a judge. But you know, this jury looks reasonable; I daresay intelligent. After three and a half years, the world will find out what happened at the Imperial Palace on February 28, 2001.

Opening Statements

Stripped of the chit-chat, our opening statement outlines the five violations of my Constitutional rights:

  1. The IP grabs and detains me with no legal reason.
  2. The IP illegally searches me under the guise of doing a pat-down weapons search, for nine minutes!
  3. After being instructed that there is no legal basis to hold me, the IP continues to hold me. The IP then concocts a ruse to allow GCB agents to perform an illegal search.
  4. The IP then lies and extorts additional information through a “field interview card.”
  5. The IP then continues to hold me in handcuffs for a few minutes to allow GCB agents time to escape.

In response, the IP lawyer opens with: “Ladies and gentlemen, this is a dispute between Mr. Grosjean and the Nevada Gaming Control Board. The Imperial Palace was involved because they decided to take their dispute to the Imperial Palace. … and if [GCB agents] come in and say detain somebody, we have to do it.” Ah, yes, it really is the Nuremberg defense.

Now make me the bad guy: “[Mr. Grosjean] wrote a book where he admits in this book he is promoting deceiving casinos, deceiving dealers, deceiving pit bosses, deceiving security officers. He talks about going into a casino and getting the dealer’s trust, talking about their personal lives maybe, and then being able to look at their cards. He talks about using aliases, he talks about concealing winnings, …” Excuse me, is now the time when we remind the jury that I wasn’t even playing at the IP?

Perhaps we should wait for another gem from the IP lawyer: “The Gaming Control Board not only thinks it’s cheating, the Gaming Control Board thinks it’s a felony looking at the dealer’s card.” So, even though we all know that hole-carding is legal, because the statutes and the Nevada Supreme Court say so, the IP lawyer is now using the GCB’s ignorance and malice to suggest to the jury that I’m a felon? Did someone say “sleazy lawyer”? But he’s got more: “[On February 28, Mr. Grosjean and Mr. Russo went] to an attorney’s office because you will see that this is not the first time that Mr. Grosjean has had trouble with the way he plays.” (!) I went to an attorney’s office because I was trying to find someone to sue Caesars Palace and the GCB for arresting me on bogus cheating charges. And now, because GCB has a problem with my winning ways, and I seek an attorney, Mr. Sleazy Lawyer says that “this is not the first time that Mr. Grosjean has had trouble”?? What a beautiful circle they have created. And next time GCB arrests me, they’ll probably tell a jury, “This is the second time Mr. Grosjean has been arrested for his play.” Keep going, Mr. SL. “Following the attorney’s office, [Mr. Grosjean] goes out to Harrah’s or goes out to the Strip, and he is looking for a hole card game with Mr. Russo. They openly admit that.” Egads! We just openly admitted to doing a completely legal thing. Yeah, yeah, he’s just doing his job defending his client. His speech grows tiresome; let’s put witnesses on the stand.

But wait, wait, there’s one more. “[GCB agents] knew and, I believe, watched most of the detention, and even gave some orders on additional searches or additional looking at the items on the table. If there was a violation of the rights, they wouldn’t have done that.” Ahh, the logic! There could not have been a violation of my rights, because GCB wouldn’t have allowed that. Ahh, IP and GCB are incapable of violating someone’s rights. There’s the argument. Good one. That one is better than the Nuremberg defense. Let me write that one down. Let’s get to the witnesses.

No, no, I can’t stop. “It will be undisputed that not — had the plaintiff not behaved as he did, in other words, trying to get out of here, he would not have been handcuffed. He was handcuffed for the reasons I gave to you earlier. No one is going to dispute that. [Yes, we are.]” We almost forgot about that line of defense. A tried-and-true classic. Textbook! Chapter 2: Blame the Victim — If She Had Said Yes, She Wouldn’t Have Been Raped.

To reiterate, let’s get back to their bread-and-butter: “When we asked Mr. Grosjean, ‘What was the Imperial Palace supposed to do?’ The answer is, ‘They should have said no.’ No one is going to say that the Imperial Palace has that right. [Yes, we are.] In fact, the evidence will be to the contrary. [No, it won’t.] They can’t say no when [GCB tells] us to stop them, to detain them. [Yes, they can.]” I need Nancy Reagan to come in here and spell this out for them, but instead, let’s start with GCB Agent Stolberg.

Witness: GCB Agent Paul Stolberg
My Innocuous Activity:

Bob: Now, in the entire time — let me do the whole day. Did you ever see Mr. Grosjean do anything suspicious?

Stolberg: No, I did not.

Bob: Did you ever see Mr. Grosjean do anything that would give you probable cause to detain him?

Stolberg: No, I did not.

Bob: At any time at Harrah’s, did he do anything that would give you suspicion that Mr. Grosjean was doing anything illegal?

Stolberg: No.

Bob: When you were at Harrah’s watching Mr. Grosjean, where were you watching him from?

Stolberg: Surveillance.

Staking Out Hole-Carders:

Bob: Mr. Russo was being followed?

Stolberg: No. The subject of the surveillance was being followed originally.

Bob: And that was not Mr. Russo or Mr. Grosjean?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

Bob: So, Mr. Grosjean found himself in this gentleman’s car?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

Bob: And then they went to this gentleman’s house?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

Bob: If I remember from your deposition, you don’t want to tell me who the gentleman is?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

IP: You mentioned that there are two Gaming agents involved in your part of the investigation?

Stolberg: The surveillance?

IP: Yes.

Stolberg: Correct.

IP: And there were two Metro agents?

Stolberg: That this — just the portion when we’re at Harrah’s?

IP: Yes.

Stolberg: That’s correct.

IP: And prior to [the call to the IP], though, Mr. Grosjean had left the target of the cheating investigation with Mr. Russo, correct?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

IP: And he was followed?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

Bob: Agent Stolberg, in my prior questions, I did not mean to insinuate that Mr. Grosjean was doing any of these things in terms of hole carding and in your presence.

Stolberg: That’s correct.

Bob: I’m trying to establish why you were following him. Why were you following him?

Stolberg: I was assigned, as part of the surveillance team, to follow the two individuals. When Mr. Russo and Grosjean left the subject’s house, we were assigned to follow them.

Bob: And the two people in terms of at that house who were the target of the investigation, they were hole carders, correct?

Stolberg: It wasn’t my investigation.

Bob: Okay.

Stolberg: So, I don’t know.

Court: So, you don’t know?

Stolberg: Not for sure.

Court: Right. Okay.

So we come to learn that on the evening of February 28, I was being followed by two GCB agents and two Metro officers, because the Gaming Control Board had someone’s house under surveillance, and by visiting there, I came under surveillance. I’m not even sure whose house it was, but we think that it might have been RC. From other testimony, we infer that the house was under surveillance because the players who live there see the dealer’s hole card and signal this information to partners at the same table. That’s right — they’re wasting massive resources investigating a legal activity. I guess GCB agents don’t have anything better to do.

Stolberg’s Instructions to the IP and the IP’s Ability to Say “No”:

Bob: So, you’re up in surveillance [at Harrah’s], Mr. Russo is gone, Mr. Grosjean is gone, what did you do?

Stolberg: At that point, I called the Imperial Palace surveillance room and asked them to keep an eye out to see if the two subjects that had just left, Mr. Russo and Mr. Grosjean, came into the Imperial Palace.

Bob: Did you request that surveillance at Imperial Palace do anything if they see Mr. Russo and Mr. Grosjean?

Stolberg: Yes, I did.

Bob: What did you request?

Stolberg: I asked them to contact me on my cell phone. I gave them my cell phone number — my name and my cell phone number.

Bob: Did you tell them to pick them up?

Stolberg: No, I did not.

Bob: Did you tell them to stop them?

Stolberg: No, I did not.

Bob: Did you tell them to question them?

Stolberg: No, I did not.

Bob: Did you tell them to detain them?

Stolberg: No, I did not.

Bob: Did you allude in any way they should do any of those things?

Stolberg: Not — no, I didn’t, to my knowledge.

Bob: What would you personally need to cause the arrest of someone?

Stolberg: Are you asking me if I can do it under power of a warrant?

Bob: Under a warrant or probable cause — are those the two ways? Any other ways?

Stolberg: Not that I’m aware of.

Bob: That’s it, a warrant or probable cause?

Stolberg: Correct.

Bob: If you’re ordering somebody to arrest someone for you, is the same thing needed?

Stolberg: Again, I don’t know that I could order someone to arrest someone for me.

Bob: They can say no, can’t they?

Stolberg: Correct.

Bob: What did you tell [GCB] Senior Agent Vincent when he called [you from the IP]?

Stolberg: He asked me a question. He asked me whether I had asked the Imperial Palace to detain anyone, and my answer was no, I had not.

Bob: Anything else said?

Stolberg: I simply, you know, reiterated that I had no grounds to hold Mr. Grosjean, and unless the Imperial Palace or something had happened outside of my presence that I don’t know about, I had no grounds to detain him. That was the gist of our conversation.

Bob: From what you told the IP, there was nothing in there from which they should infer that you wanted Mr. Grosjean detained or that he was a criminal, right?

Stolberg: That was not my intent. What they inferred, I can’t tell you.

Bob: But you weren’t — it wasn’t your intent that they infer it, right?

Stolberg: My intent was that if they saw Mr. Grosjean and Mr. Russo, that they call me on the telephone. That was my only intent. What happened beyond that, I can’t say.

IP: And you gave [the IP] your cell phone number and said, “Call me back if you see them”?

Stolberg: Correct.

IP: You didn’t say why you were looking for them?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

IP: You didn’t tell the Imperial Palace not to detain them?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

The strategy is brilliant! “You didn’t tell the Imperial Palace not to detain them [emphasis mine]?” I’m lucky the IP didn’t shoot me.

Why the IP Couldn’t Call GCB Agent Stolberg:

IP: Now, after the phone call [to the IP], you went and joined the others and you made a search around the areas and met back up in front of Harrah’s, correct?

Stolberg: Correct.

IP: And then you terminated the surveillance?

Stolberg: Correct.

IP: And you went back to your office, got in your car and went home?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

IP: You turned off your cell phone by the time you got home?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

IP: Agent Stolberg, now, you can’t order somebody to arrest someone for you, but you can order somebody, a security officer, to detain somebody for you, correct?

Stolberg: I can ask them to. I can’t order them to.

IP: Was it your understanding that [Grosjean] was out on bail from the Caesars’ incident at the time of the Imperial Palace incident?

Stolberg: Following — after, when I found out about the prior arrest — actually, I wasn’t of any opinion. I didn’t know why he was out.

IP: If Vincent and Pedote ordered the Imperial Palace to not let Grosjean know that Gaming was there, that wouldn’t surprise you, correct?

Stolberg: No, it wouldn’t, [because] the surveillance we were conducting — and I’m sure I told Agent Vincent or Senior Agent Vincent that we were doing a surveillance — is supposedly a covert operation. We don’t necessarily want to tell people outside the investigation what we’re doing.

Oooohhh, I have truly reached a pinnacle in my nefarious career — I am the subject of “covert ops.”

Stolberg’s (Wrong) Belief on the Legal Status of Hole-carding

IP: In your opinion, on February 28, 2001, I should say, was hole carding illegal, in your opinion?

Stolberg: Yes.

Court: What exactly is hole carding?

Stolberg: It is where a player sees the hole card of the dealer at a blackjack table, and in my interpretation, it becomes illegal when that player then passes that information to other people at the table to take advantage of that knowledge in placing their bets, how they play their hands.

Court: So, it’s not illegal for a person to look at a hole card and then —

Stolberg: Take advantage —

Court: — for himself?

Stolberg: Take advantage of the dealer.

Court: Yeah, right. I mean, if he has a king, so the likelihood of him getting busted is greater than if he had a three or a deuce, and he played accordingly, that wouldn’t be illegal, would it, since he’s using his own intelligence and whatever?

Stolberg: I wouldn’t think it would be prosecuted. Whether it would be illegal, you’ll have to ask an attorney.

IP: [From page 19 of your deposition] Question, “So, somebody who goes out looking for a sloppy dealer, in your opinion, is a cheater whether or not they plan on signaling?” Answer, “By the statute, yes.” Is that still your testimony?

Stolberg: I would have to read the statute again, but I believe it probably is.

Stolberg’s (Lack of) Legal Research Informing his (Wrong) Belief

Court: Where do you get these interpretations from? That’s what I’m trying to find out.

Stolberg: I wouldn’t arrest somebody at a table if they were playing and they were by themselves and the dealer was making mistakes. That’s generally taken care of by the pit boss. If he sees the dealer doing something wrong, they will step up and have them stop.

Court: But where did you get your interpretation from, I’m just curious, as to what is illegal and not illegal?

Stolberg: The interpretation that I get is just from discussions with other agents and other people at the Board as far as the conspiracy part of it.

Court: I see. So, there’s no particular law that you reference that defines it?

Stolberg: Well, the law that we use would be fraudulent acts, which is taking advantage of foreknowledge of the outcome of the game.

Court: All right. Go on.

Bob: And you have never read a single decision by the Supreme Court on gaming, have you?

Stolberg: I certainly have.

Bob: Have you read Lyons v. State?

Stolberg: No.

Bob: Have you read Skipper v. State?

Stolberg: No.

Bob: Do you realize that both those cases — now, at your deposition, both of those cases were brought up, and it was represented to you that those cases affirmatively say that hole carding is not illegal. Do you recall that?

Stolberg: I recall you saying it, and I recall the other attorneys objecting, saying that it wasn’t because it hadn’t been cited.

Bob: No, sir. That was Einbinder v. State, the case that said that signaling was not illegal as well. Do you recall that?

Stolberg: I don’t recall the case names. I recall the back and forth between the attorneys.

Bob: You’ve never gone forward and asked anybody or done any legal research to find out if it’s cheating or not, and yet, you stand here today and tell the jury that you believe it’s cheating, right?

Stolberg: That’s correct.

False Accusations Are Still Damaging:

Bob: … if Mr. Grosjean not only was not convicted but was not prosecuted and the prosecutor expressly entered a ruling of no prosecution — [we’re] not going after this guy because there’s nothing here — if that were the case, that would never make it to your records and he still sits there as an arrested person, right?

Stolberg: He would be in our files as having been arrested.

Bob: How does he clear that arrest if nothing ever happened from it?

Stolberg: He doesn’t. It’s public record that he was arrested.

Witness: GCB Agent Anthony Vincent
My Innocuous Activity:

Bob: When you arrived at the IP, had you ever heard of Mr. Grosjean before?

Vincent: I don’t recall that I had. I don’t believe so.

Bob: Everything you knew about [Grosjean] that night until you talked to Agent Stolberg [later in the evening] you heard from the IP, right?

Vincent: Correct, yes.

Bob: What did you understand you were looking at Mr. Grosjean for?

Vincent: I didn’t. They just said come look at this. Again, I had no clue. They wanted me to look at a person on videotape, on live surveillance, and I said yes, I’d look at that.

Vincent’s Instructions to the IP:

Bob: Did you tell anybody to detain him?

Vincent: No, I did not.

Bob: Did [GCB Agent Pedote] tell anybody to detain Mr. Grosjean?

Vincent: No.

Bob: Did the idea of coming or detaining Mr. Grosjean come up in the surveillance room while you were watching him?

Vincent: … it did come up what should we do, what do you want us — something to that effect, and I can’t recall, but my words to him was, “Do whatever Agent Stolberg told you to do,” because I knew nothing about this individual.

The Ruse to Search Me After Admitting Lack of Probable Cause:

Bob: … This is purportedly [IP Security Supervisor] Espensen speaking per the exhibit: “If [Vincent] wanted, I told [him] I would go over and talk to Grosjean, and after a minute or so, [Vincent] could walk through, stop at the end of the table, act like we are friends and he is getting off work and saying he would see me tomorrow or something while at the same time take a look at the money and chips, then leave. [Vincent] agreed to this.” Is that your recollection?

Vincent: I don’t remember the story, but as it turns out, yes.

Bob: And all of this could occur without Mr. Grosjean knowing that Gaming was involved, right?

Vincent: Yes.

Bob: In fact, you had gotten a hold of [GCB Agent] Stolberg before you walked through the door [to the detention room], right? … What did Mr. Stolberg say?

Vincent: To the best of my recollection, it was no, I did not advise them to detain this person. Let him go, and that’s it.

Bob: [GCB Agent] Stolberg, I believe, testified yesterday that he stated he had no probable cause to hold [Grosjean] and that [Grosjean] should be let go. Would that be in accord with what you recall of the conversation?

Vincent: Yeah.

Imperial Palace’s Lies and Cover-Up:

Bob: Were you holding Mr. Grosjean?

Vincent: No.

Bob: Who was?

Vincent: Imperial Palace.

Bob: … this is part of a stipulated exhibit, and it’s a statement of a Daniel Bauer that came from the Imperial Palace in this case: “[IP Security Supervisor Espensen] described to Vincent the money and gaming chips that he found on Grosjean’s person during the weapons search. Vincent stated that he would like to get a quick look at the money and chips. [Espensen and Vincent] decided that Espensen would go and talk to Grosjean, and Vincent would then walk through and take a quick look at the money and chips. [Espensen] then departed the surveillance room. Vincent then stated that this would not violate Grosjean’s Fourth Amendment rights.” Did you say that?

Vincent: I don’t recall saying that.

Bob: That’s not something you would say, is it?

Vincent: No.

Bob: Okay. So, if this appears in an IP security report, from your perspective, this would be made up, right?

Vincent: I wouldn’t say “made up,” but, you know, maybe — I don’t know. I could only be guessing.

Bob: But that’s not something that you would say?

Vincent: Correct.

IP’s Brilliant Strategy Redux:

IP: Before Agent Stolberg called, you never told the Imperial Palace don’t search Mr. Grosjean, correct?

Vincent: Correct.

Witness: IP Security Supervisor Donnie Espensen
My Innocuous Activity:

Bob: [At this time up to that point], what had you or anybody at Imperial Palace seen that indicated that Mr. Grosjean was doing anything illegal?

Espensen: To my knowledge, the gentleman hadn’t done anything illegal.

Bob: And up until that point, what had you or anybody at Imperial Palace seen that indicated that Mr. Grosjean was doing anything suspicious?

Espensen: He hadn’t done anything that we knew of at that time.

Eliminating the “Rogue-Employee” Defense:

Bob: … that entire evening [of February 28], were all the actions with which you are familiar in full accord with the policies and procedures of the Imperial Palace so far as the security department is concerned?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Is it true that you were never reprimanded for anything that you did that evening?

Espensen: That’s correct.

Bob: [Your full] report was circulated to all of those persons? [The general manager, the risk manager, the director of security, the assistant director of security, the assistant director, and the assistant to the assistant director]

Espensen: Yes.

The Nuremberg Defense:

Bob: Now, as I understand it, as you’re here today, I understand that you are saying that

you were working under the authority of the Gaming Control Board, and you didn’t have discretion and you were doing what they told you to do?

Espensen: Well, we stopped him by their call. If it wasn’t for them telling us to stop him, he would have never been upstairs in the first place. … They told us that they want it done, and we have our procedures once we do it what we have to do.

Bob: Let me just ask, do you ever, at any place on this video [IP-provided surveillance video showing Grosjean’s initial exit from casino], see Mr. Grosjean run?

Espensen: No.

Bob: Did he appear to be resisting at all?

Espensen: Not at that point.

Bob: And now he’s in an elevator with six security officers, right?

Espensen: Yes, sir.

Bob: And he is handcuffed?

Espensen: Yes, sir.

Bob: What was he detained for?

Espensen: He was detained because Gaming agents requested us to stop him and detain him.

Bob: The directive to hold Mr. Grosjean came from you, right?

Espensen: That’s correct.

Bob: Gaming wanted him stopped?

Espensen: Yes, sir.

Bob: Meaning the [GCB agents] who were on the scene, Pedote and Vincent?

Espensen: Yes, sir.

Bob: At that time, all the information that Pedote and Vincent, the Gaming agents had about Mr. Grosjean came from you or Imperial Palace personnel?

Espensen: That’s correct.

Pointing Fingers:

IP: What happens when [Grosjean] starts to leave?

Espensen: When Mr. Grosjean starts leaving towards the front door, Agent Vincent is on the phone. I don’t remember if he’s actually talking to anybody at the time, but he’s got the phone to his ear, and he looks at me and says, “Stop him. Don’t let him leave. Detain him.”

IP: How were you feeling at the time that you were doing this with Mr. Grosjean, this entire affair?

Espensen: Very uncomfortable.

IP: Why?

Espensen: Because I didn’t really agree with what was going down.

IP: Did you think you were doing anything wrong?

Espensen: No, I didn’t think I was doing anything wrong.

IP: [Was Imperial Palace] doing anything wrong?

Espensen: No.

IP: Who did you think was doing something wrong?

Espensen: Gaming.

IP: Agent Vincent testified this morning that he didn’t tell you to detain Mr. Grosjean. Do you agree with that testimony?

Espensen: No, I do not.

IP: Is there any way you could have misunderstood him, that maybe he said something that you thought led to your decision to detain?

Espensen: No.

IP: You didn’t 86 [Grosjean]?

Espensen: No, sir.

IP: Why not?

Espensen: He’s done nothing wrong at the Imperial Palace. We had no reason to 86 him.

The Illegality of the (Alleged) Order:

Bob: Now, you heard [security guard] Gentry say, quote, “[Grosjean] told me I have no right to stop him.” Just out of curiosity in your opinion, [in what way] was Mr. Grosjean wrong? … Why did you guys have a right to stop him?

Espensen: Well, Gaming agents told us to stop him and to detain him, not to let him leave.

Bob: Would you agree that if the Gaming agents had said nothing to you about stopping him, that there would have been no right to stop him?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: The Gaming agents who had talked to you at that time got all their information from the IP. We’ve confirmed that, right?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: And that information was another agent had asked to be called, correct?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Did you stop — you’re the guy who ordered that he be stopped, right?

Espensen: I’m the one that put it out over the radio.

Bob: Did you ever stop to think to say no?

Espensen: No, sir.

Espensen’s Training in Search and Seizure:

Bob: You have some police training, don’t you?

Espensen: I have 120 hours special police training.

Bob: And in that special police training, did you learn the parameters of search and seizure?

Espensen: No, sir.

Bob: Not at all?

Espensen: No, sir.

Bob: Do you know — have you heard of the case Terry vs. Ohio?

Espensen: No, sir.

Justification for the “Pat-Down” Search:

Bob: Now, articulate [all] circumstances at the time of that search that gave you reason to believe that Mr. Grosjean may have been armed at the time you commenced the pat-down search.

Espensen: There was nothing that actually gave me any reason to believe that he was armed.

Bob: In fact, at your deposition, you said, “I had no reason to believe he was armed at the time of the pat-down search,” correct?

Espensen: That’s correct.

Bob: What’s the purpose of the pat-down search?

Espensen: Because I can’t see that he is or that he ain’t, and for our protection and for the suspect’s protection as well, we want to make sure they don’t have weapons on their person that they can use to hurt themselves or one of our people while we have them there.

Bob: Where do you get that authority?

Espensen: I don’t know that it’s an authority, it’s just our direction.

Bob: It’s part of the policy and procedure?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Everybody gets searched?

Espensen: Well, at that particular time. I don’t know what the policies are now because I’m no longer a supervisor and I haven’t kept up on the policies. … At that particular time when we bring persons up, we are to search that person, make sure they don’t have any weapons for their protection and ours, and if so, remove them from their reach.

Espensen’s Justification for Opening my Passport:

Bob: Did Mr. Grosjean have any weapons?

Espensen: I didn’t find any weapons on Mr. Grosjean.

Bob: You found a passport, right?

Espensen: I found a passport, yes.

Bob: Did you open the passport?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Were you away from Mr. Grosjean when you opened the passport, more than three feet away from him?

Espensen: Probably three or four feet.

Bob: Did you think there was a weapon in the passport?

Espensen: I don’t know if there is or there ain’t a weapon in the passport.

Bob: Why are you opening the passport?

Espensen: A passport can contain a weapon the same as anything else.

Bob: Four feet away from a guy who has got his head against the wall and is wearing handcuffs, right?

Espensen: Um-hmm.

Bob: For his protection and his safety, you open the passport; is that your testimony?

Espensen: I open the passport and anything else that may contain a weapon, yes.

IP: Can a razor blade be hidden in a wad of cash?

Espensen: A razor blade can be hidden in anything.

The Professionalism of the IP Security:

Bob: As the supervisor, did you carry a gun?

Espensen: Yes, I did.

Bob: So, you were armed?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Anybody else in your department armed at that time?

Espensen: As far as I know, the entire security department is armed.

Bob: So, [security guard] Gentry had a gun?

Espensen: Yes, sir.

Bob: [As we approach 23:16, was] that Officer Gentry saying, “He broke my friggin’ watch”?

Espensen: … It sounds like that’s what he said.

Bob: Did you hear what the other [security guard] said? … “Add another charge” is what he said, didn’t he?

Espensen: I think, but I’m not sure.

Bob: What was Mr. Grosjean being charged with?

Espensen: Nothing that I knew of.

Security Guard Gentry’s Alleged Injury:

Bob: Let’s go back and look at [security guard] Gentry for a few minutes. He seems fine, doesn’t he?

Espensen: To look at him on the tape, he seems fine.

Bob: We haven’t heard anything about him complaining about being injured or anything, have we?

Espensen: Not yet.

Bob: When you were in there, did you hear anything about that?

Espensen: No.

Bob: Do you know how it was decided that he would claim that he was injured and go off to the medical center for a wrist injury?

Espensen: No.

Bob: Do you know if Officer Gentry injured his wrist?

Espensen: I remember we did the report and he went to the clinic, but I don’t remember.

Keeping the Cuffs On:

Bob: Let me ask you something. [Grosjean] is sitting there, far end of the table; he hadn’t done anything suspicious; he hadn’t done anything illegal; you have him in your room; you finished your pat-down search; everything that the man had in his pockets is sitting on the table. Why is he in handcuffs?

Espensen: Because at the time that he was placed in the handcuffs, he shoved an officer, I understand, and the officer cuffed him because he became physical. Once they’re placed in handcuffs, we don’t release them from the handcuffs until the police or Gaming or whoever the legal authority is tells us to do so.

I shoved an “officer”? The same one who claimed his wrist was injured, even though he is shown to be perfectly healthy on the subsequent video? The way it works is: they’ll grab a player with no legal basis whatsoever; lack of knowledge or mere miscommunication is enough to handcuff, search, and detain a player, but releasing a person requires explicit legal authority. Let’s give Espensen another chance on this one:

Bob: [Referring to detention room video] Mr. Grosjean asked your officers to take his handcuffs off, right? … He was refused, right?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: At that point, [Grosjean has] been in that room for 20 minutes, and he’s been fully cooperative, right?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: He’s been conversant with you while you sat down and answered your questions forthright, correct?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Why can’t you take the handcuffs off?

Espensen: It’s customary that we don’t take cuffs off once they’re placed in custody until we release them to the police or back to the street.

Aahh, Espensen can’t take the handcuffs off because it’s “customary” that they don’t.

The Real Reason the Cuffs Stay On:

Bob: Did I hear you say in front of Mr. Grosjean, and I quote, “They think you’re somebody but apparently you’re not”?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: At that point, you’ve got a determination from [GCB agents] Pedote and Vincent that they have no reason to hold Mr. Grosjean, right?

Espensen: I think I do at that time.

Bob: Wouldn’t that be sort of the same thing as “let him go”?

Espensen: It probably was, but as I said, we don’t let them go with the handcuffs until we really release him out of our custody, back to the street.

Bob: Why aren’t you doing that right there?

Espensen: Because we’re not done yet.

Bob: Why aren’t you done yet? The cops just told you they have no reason to hold him.

Espensen: They still had more they wanted to do.

Bob: But you knew they were going to be doing that at a point in time after they said that [Grosjean] should be released?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: And you’re cooperating and going along with them?

Espensen: Yes, I am.

Bob: And Mr. Grosjean asks at … 23:26:07 for the second time if the handcuffs could be removed, right?

Espensen: I’m not exactly sure, but I believe you’re right, yes.

Bob: And again, he’s refused?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: And although you say at 23:26, “Hang on a minute,” not until 23:48 are the handcuffs actually taken off, are they?

Espensen: I couldn’t guess that you’re right. I wouldn’t know unless I watch it, but I would assume that’s the correct answer.

The Ruse to Search Me After Admitting Lack of Probable Cause:

Bob: … You came up with an idea so that [GCB agent] Vincent could see [Grosjean’s] stuff, right?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: And part and parcel of that idea was that Mr. Grosjean would be held longer while this ruse occurred, isn’t it?

Espensen: Well, if I hadn’t came up with the idea, it would have probably been even longer.

Bob: Why?

Espensen: Because they were trying to determine a way that they could get over there and see these chips without being detected, and I wanted to hurry up and get them out of there and get this gentleman set free; so, I came up with an idea.

Bob: You were being benevolent and beneficent towards Mr. Grosjean?

IP: Your Honor, argumentative.

Court: All right.

A Foreign Concept — Saying “No”:

Bob: Did you ever think to look at the cop who had just said to you, allegedly, “Well, we have to let him go, but boy, I would sure like to get a look at this stuff” — did you ever think, “You know, you said you had to let him go, and we’re the guys standing here with him in our handcuffs, we’re just going to let him go.” Did you ever think of saying that?

Espensen: No. …I don’t know if I would have thought that. They’re the authority over me, so I pretty much have to follow their direction, and I have to try to work with these people as well.

Bob: They can stop people, right? … You understand them to be police, right?

Espensen: That’s correct.

Bob: You’re a private citizen working for a private company, right?

Espensen: That’s correct.

Bob: Why is this your job?

Espensen: I work for a gaming organization, and Gaming controls the gaming organizations.

Bob: Even if you don’t know [if] you’re breaking the law, you know you can say no [to Gaming], right?

Espensen: I have to take instructions from the police department and Gaming as long as I know I’m not violating anybody’s rights or breaking any laws.

Bob: Whoever told you you can’t say no to a police officer if they ask you to do something you don’t want to do?

Espensen: As long as I want to keep my job, I follow directives unless I feel there’s really, you know, something really, really bad.

“Voluntary” Production of Information:

Bob: Now, looking at Exhibit 3, did you take down Mr. Grosjean’s passport number?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Did you take down his Social Security number?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Do you recognize that a Social Security number is somebody’s private information?

Espensen: He had a right to deny that information if he didn’t want to give it. It was asked of him, and it wasn’t on the information card.

Bob: It was asked of him while he was sitting in your security office in handcuffs being told that as soon as you get this information he will be able to leave, right?

Espensen: Yes.

Bob: Do you think that’s voluntary?

Espensen: All he had to do was say he did not want to give it.

Bob: But you had also told him as soon as you get this information, “we’ll let you go,” right?

Espensen: I told him I was going to fill out a [Field Interview] card, and as soon as we get this information completed, we’ll get you out of here.

Bob: You also got his home phone number?

Espensen: Yes.

Espensen Ain’t No George Washington:

Bob: [Playing videotape] Did you just say to Mr. Grosjean, and I quote, “Apparently, you’re not the person we were looking for”?

Espensen: Yes, I did.

Bob: He was exactly the person you were looking for, wasn’t he?

Espensen: I couldn’t tell him that, because I was instructed by Gaming not to tell him that.

Bob: So, that was a lie?

Espensen: I guess it was.

Witness: GCB Agent Phillip Pedote
My Innocuous Activity:

Bob: At any time, did you see anything on the video or on the live camera feed or have any information that would cause you to have a reason to have Mr. Grosjean stopped?

Pedote: I did not see anything to give me a reason to stop Grosjean. I did not see anything on the surveillance videotape, no.

Pedote’s (Lack of) Instructions to the IP:

Bob: [Witness reviewing Exhibit 8, GCB Agent Pedote’s personal notes from the incident] Now, let me direct you to a couple of things there. One of the problems is that when we got this, a little bit was cut off. Can you look at the left-hand margin and tell me what your interlineation is there?

Pedote: Sure. It would have said [that] [GCB Agent] Vincent said to do whatever [GCB Agent] Stolberg told them [IP] to do.

Bob: Now, you put in quotes here, “Well, if he said to grab him then don’t let him leave.” Who said that?

Pedote: Tony Vincent did, my senior agent.

Bob: Did you hear that?

Pedote: Yes, I did.

Bob: Do you have an independent recollection of that today?

Pedote: Not of the exact words, no. I would have to refer to my notes.

Bob: And the notes were written when your memory was fresh?

Pedote: Yes, absolutely.

Bob: I notice here it says, “Sergeant [Espensen] was yelling, ‘grab him, grab him,’ to security.” That’s about three lines up from the bottom? … You wrote that near the time of this incident?

Pedote: Yes.

Bob: I’m just looking at the words, “Grab him, grab him.” That sounds pretty emphatic. Do you have an independent recollection of that actually being said?

Pedote: It’s something very close to that because he was on a handheld radio, and we were looking at the monitor of what was happening on the floor of the casino. And when he grabbed the radio was when Mr. Grosjean was walking towards the front door. “He’s right there, grab him, grab him.”

IP: You didn’t stop [IP Security Supervisor] Espensen because you thought he was acting reasonably, correct?

Pedote: Correct. I assumed that [GCB Agent] Stolberg must have told him that they wanted him detained. At that time, I had to assume that. I didn’t really know anything else to go by.

IP: And it wasn’t until later when [GCB] Agent Vincent finally got a hold of [GCB Agent] Stolberg that you realized, oh, shoot, there wasn’t an order going out like that?

Pedote: Correct.

So, according to GCB Agent Pedote, and previously GCB Agent Vincent, they had no independent information regarding the situation, and instructed the IP to simply follow the instructions previously given by GCB Agent Stolberg. Stolberg previously testified that his instructions to the IP were to give him a call if the IP spotted us. Even if GCB Agents Vincent and Pedote had given the IP an order to detain, it would have had to be an illegal order, because they both say, and Espensen agrees, that they had no information about me other than that provided by the IP, and the IP concedes that I had done nothing giving them any probable cause to stop me.

The Ruse to Search Me After Admitting Lack of Probable Cause:

Bob: Were you guys trying to come up with a way to look at Mr. Grosjean’s personal effects and papers and items?

Pedote: … I don’t recall specifically who actually — I don’t recall whose idea it was. They had — once they had gotten him up in the detention room, pulled out the bags of chips out of his pants or wherever they were, and they were sitting on the table. Once we found out that they were large amounts of chips from different casinos, then obviously, as a Gaming Control Board agent, that sparks our interest. So, I knew we would like to see them, but we didn’t do anything to direct anybody to pull them out or do anything like that, if that’s what you mean. I don’t know what you’re trying to get at.

Bob: Well, and we can watch a video here, but do you recall there was frankly a ruse constructed where you guys would pretend that you’re leaving work?

Pedote: Sure, yes.

Pedote’s Justification for Looking at my Chips:

Bob: There’s nothing illegal about carrying chips, right?

Pedote: Absolutely not.

Bob: It sparks interest?

Pedote: Well, we have to make sure there are no counterfeit chips or anything like that, yes.

Bob: Counterfeit? [How about the] money in there [gesturing to his wallet]?

Pedote: I have no idea.

Bob: Do you have to make sure?

Pedote: No.

Bob: What if there’s a hundred thousand dollars in my pocket, you don’t have to make sure, do you?

Pedote: No.

Witness: Plaintiff James Grosjean
The IP’s Violence and My Resistance:

Bob: Did [security guard Gentry] do anything with your arm?

Grosjean: At that point he twisted it behind my back and started twisting me into the wall.

Bob: Assume this [demonstrating] is a hammer lock, Mr. Grosjean, is that what he did?

Grosjean: I’m not sure, but I couldn’t move my arm or anything.

Bob: He had your arm?

Grosjean: So, then he had my arm immobilized behind my back and he started pushing me, I guess, with both arms, I guess kind of pushing me into the wall, and there’s a concrete wall there with a rough surface, and he kind of pushed my face into the side into the wall, and he grabbed my other arm and started putting both my arms behind my back.

Bob: Other than trying to push around the side of him, did you resist him at all?

Grosjean: No. My arms were at my sides the whole time. I didn’t make any resistance other than trying to keep walking and get around him.

The Threat in the Elevator:

Bob: [Reviewing the video] Did somebody in that elevator say something that stuck with you?

Grosjean: Yeah, the security guard who is nearest us, whose back is to us, is on the bottom of the screen; as the elevator was moving, I don’t know what prompted him to say it, but he said, “Smack his head into the wall.”

Naturally, the IP tries to pass this off as a joke. Guess what — bomb jokes at airports don’t fly either.

IP Defense — Question my Motives:

IP: And if a casino is cheating you, you would call the appropriate authorities?

Grosjean: I might or I might not because I’ve had experiences where I thought maybe the dealer might be pulling a move on me, but I don’t really know anything about that, so, you know, I just walk away from that table. I don’t really bother trying to call Gaming, especially because I don’t really expect Gaming to, you know, take an impartial look at something like that anyway. So, I don’t bother with that. I mean, it’s happened to me where I thought something was maybe going on at the table, but I didn’t bother.

IP: I thought you called Gaming at the Maxim?

Grosjean: That’s not where I thought the dealer was cheating, that’s where the casino was refusing to pay off our chips.

IP: I’m sorry, not dealer cheating, but you would call the authorities if the casino was being unfair to you or violating the law?

Grosjean: Well, it all depends what. If we have a lot of chips and are trying to cash them out and they refuse, then yes, I’ll call Gaming. That’s the only way to try to get the money from our chips. I can’t cash them out at the grocery store.

IP Defense — Make Me Look Mean-Spirited:

IP: And you called [security guards] big uneducated goons that love to harass small people?

Grosjean: In the context I’m talking about, I look at that tape, I see six big guys with guns who are taking me in handcuffs, who are threatening me verbally and physically, and who don’t know the law; so, they’re big, they’re uneducated on the law and they’re threatening me, so that makes these guys goons, yeah.

IP: They don’t know the law but police officers do, correct?

Grosjean: Not all police officers.

IP: They should?

Grosjean: They should. Police officers who are sworn to uphold the law I would think should know the law, but many of them don’t even know the gaming laws, which is what I’m primarily concerned with and my rights.

IP Defense — Make Me Look Criminal:

IP: You agree that criminals might carry weapons?

Grosjean: I agree.

IP: And criminals can hurt people trying to detain them?

Grosjean: They can, I agree.

IP: Criminals might hurt innocent bystanders as well?

Bob: Your Honor, I thought this was the objection we just had sustained?

Court: You know — Counsel [Mr. Thomas], he hasn’t been accused of being a criminal, and you keep putting this in a criminal context. Why don’t you just say “person”? It’s more prejudicial than probative the way you’re framing the questions.

Irrelevant Topic — Detecting Hole-Carding:

IP: Hole carding can be mistaken for cheating, correct?

Grosjean: Not by a well-trained observer.

IP: Can hole carding be mistaken for cheating by a casino personnel?

Grosjean: Not by well-trained casino personnel.

IP: How about a non well-trained?

Grosjean: Poorly trained personnel, yes, they can mistake anything for cheating.

IP: If a casino suspects that somebody is cheating, then that is a felony?

Bob: Your Honor, this is all background, and it’s gone on for a good 40 minutes.

Court: True. And not only that, that last question you asked is not true. I think you misstated.

Irrelevant Topic — My Playing Apparel:

IP: And two pairs of pants and the hat, they’re standard gear for you when you’re going out to play, correct?

Grosjean: Pretty much. I don’t always carry a second hat, often.

IP: That’s to avoid detection?

Grosjean: So they can’t get a picture, disseminate it, see who I am, all those things.

IP: That’s something that a cheater might do as well, correct?

Bob: Your Honor, I mean, granted it is something a cheater might do, but that has nothing to do with this case and it’s irrelevant. We’ve had five people stand up there and say they didn’t even know who he was or why he was being watched.

IP: Your Honor, the reason he’s being watched is because of the way he plays. He was under surveillance. That’s why — if —

Bob: Your Honor, the uncontradicted testimony is he was being watched because he was with someone who was under surveillance.

IP: If you go back to the reason that he was being watched in the first place, it’s because of the way he plays.

Court: I don’t know why, but he wasn’t being watched for that reason over at the Imperial Palace.

IP: That’s absolutely true.

Court: The only reason they watched him or did anything was because someone else told them to notify them; so, sustained.

Irrelevant Topic — Barring Skilled Players:

IP: Now, there’s nothing wrong with a casino barring an advantage player, correct?

Grosjean: Nothing wrong with it at all.

IP: Is this what we call 86ing?

Grosjean: I think that’s the industry term most people use. I call it both “86ing” or “barring,” sure, they can kick me out.

IP: And being 86’d means that you’re barred from the property and should not enter the property anymore?

Grosjean: That’s right.

IP: In order to 86 you, the casinos have to read a statement to you, correct?

Bob: Objection, irrelevant, your Honor. It has nothing to do with this matter. No, Mr. Grosjean — it’s all been testified across the board, he wasn’t 86’d.

Court: Counsel, do you have any evidence he was 86’d?

IP: No, your Honor.

Court: Sustained.

Irrelevant Topic — Napping in Casinos:

IP: Now, you’ve taken naps before in casinos, correct?

Grosjean: I’ve fallen asleep before in casinos. I don’t know if I’ve ever really gone to take a nap like I did this time [earlier on the evening of February 28 at the IP] but, yeah, I’ve slept in casinos before.

IP: You realize that casinos can approach you when you’re sleeping there?

Grosjean: Yeah. And every instance where I was sleeping and they noticed —

Bob: Your Honor, objection. Irrelevant. We keep going off on these tangents that have nothing to do with why we’re here.

Court: Sustained.

Irrelevant Topic — ID at Caesars:

IP: When you went in the jail [in the “Caesars Incident” in April 2000], they entered you as John Doe?

Grosjean: That’s correct.

Court: I have a question. What’s the relevance of this to this case, what happened at Caesars Palace? Are we talking about Caesars Palace? I’m tired of this. You better come up here, or I’m going to terminate your examination. I’ve been listening to this for the last hour and a half.

Grift Sense:

Bob: Mr. Thomas was asking you about looking around at the security guard and being nervous. … With 20/20 hindsight, were you right to be nervous?

Grosjean: The way I’m — everything I see, the tape, the documents — yeah, he wasn’t there to help me out or be nice. I was the guy they were interested in, he did handcuff me, even though I didn’t do anything, they did search me, they did go through my ID. They did all the things that I feared they might do. I was lucky they didn’t beat me up, which is something they can do, so in that sense, I looked at the bright side, I guess.

Bob: Have you heard the phrase, “it’s not paranoia if they’re really after you”?

Grosjean: Yeah, I’ve heard that.

Bob: It sort of fits here, doesn’t it?

Grosjean: I think so. Like my call on it from the first time I saw him look at me turned out to be right. He was not just standing in the aisle for no reason, he was there because I was there.

Witness: Former GCB chief Ron Asher
Asher’s Credentials:

IP: Mr. Asher, could you please give the jury a background of your education, college and any post-graduate training?

Asher: As far as my education, I have a Bachelor of Arts degree from Arizona State University in political science and economics. I have a master’s degree from Golden Gate University in San Francisco in public administration, with an emphasis in criminal justice administration.

IP: Can you give the jury a background of your work history?

Asher: Yes. I started — actually, if you go back, my adult work history, I spent four years in the U.S. Navy Air Force. From that point, I went to work for the Arizona Highway Patrol, spent four-and-a-half years with them. From there, went back to school for 18 months, finished my degree, joined the FBI. I spent 20 years eight months with the Federal Bureau of Investigation as a special agent and/or as a supervisory special agent, and then retired on June 16th, 1990, and went to work for the Gaming Control Board as Chief of Enforcement for the Nevada Gaming Control Board. Remained there until June 30th, 1996, at which time I went to my cabin for two or three months, and after that, started Asher and Associates.

IP: You mention in terms of Gaming and the relationship between Gaming and hotel casinos, you have qualified as an expert before?

Asher: Yes, on the floor below.

IP: Beyond this other case, have you testified on that subject matter anywhere else?

Asher: I’ve actually provided both testimony and training in Armenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova on the subject of gaming. I’ve provided training on the Island of Tinian in the Western Pacific. I’ve spent a month there training and also helped them open a casino over there and train their investigators during that month’s period of time, and I’ve spent time in Japan working on due diligence investigations as it relates to gaming.

The Island of Tinian?? Wow, Asher has provided training there? Now I’m impressed.

Asher’s Price:

Bob: How much are you charging an hour?

Asher: I charge 175 an hour.

Bob: To date, how much have they [the IP] paid you?

Asher: Someplace between 3500 and $4,000. I don’t know exactly how much, because it’s a small portion of my work.

Bob: Well, you billed what you did on the case, right? You billed for your work?

Asher: Up through the time to the deposition, yes, sir. … Preparation for trial, I have not billed that. I have no idea how many hours I have in that.

Everybody’s Doing It:

IP: Do you have an opinion to reasonableness of that search?

Asher: That particular search, that type of search, as far as I’m concerned, is reasonable, and it’s done pretty much throughout the industry.

Cooperation Between Casinos and GCB:

IP: In terms of the Imperial Palace, do you have an opinion as to what they did in terms of their cooperation in this viewing of the evidence [Grosjean’s belongings on the table]?

Asher: I personally wouldn’t have expected them to do anything less than to cooperate with the request of the Gaming agent.

IP: What’s your basis for that?

Asher: Simply by knowing the relationship there and, you know, it’s a love — quite honestly, the relationship between Gaming and most of the casino licensees is a love-hate relationship. Most of the things that Gaming does is a negative towards the industry, but when security officers get the opportunity to cooperate with police officers, sworn police officers, they oftentimes really, really enjoy and become very, very helpful in that thing.

IP: How about the continued detention of Mr. Grosjean after [GCB Agent] Stolberg says, “We don’t have a reason to hold him?” Do you have an opinion as to that in terms of the Imperial Palace?

Asher: Again, after the agents had the opportunity to glance at, not inventory, but to glance at the materials on the desk, which — I mean, obviously, in 15 seconds what you see is yes, he’s got chips, and they might remember a few of those, but they’re not going to remember a great deal of that. Apparently, at that point, Mr. Espensen, goes out, follows the agents out, talks to them, and they said that they would like a copy of his passport, which was what he was using for his identification rather than a driver’s license. And Mr. Espensen advised that, well, it didn’t look like there was any way to get the passport, and their normal procedure would be to FI somebody, to fill out a Field Interrogation card on somebody, so he agreed to go back and get that information from Mr. Grosjean and fill it out on an FI card or a Field Interrogation card.

IP: Do you have an opinion as to whether or not that was reasonable?

Asher: Again, because the agents had asked the Imperial Palace to do that, I would be surprised if they did not do that or wouldn’t have done that.

The Supposed Consequences of Saying “No”:

IP: How long were you in charge or head of the Enforcement Division?

Asher: Six years, two weeks and I don’t know how many hours.

IP: Based upon your experience, can you tell the jury what happens to a licensee like the Imperial Palace if they say no to the Gaming Control Board?

Asher: Again, it would depend on this particular case, but if the Gaming Control Board was concerned or it took umbrage with the fact that the licensee didn’t do exactly what they asked them to do, there is a possibility of them opening a separate investigation under Regulation Five, and that’s an unsuitable method of operation. And that’s done routinely if the Gaming Control Board is not happy or if they feel like there have been other regulations violated.

IP: Do you know the ramifications and penalties under that regulation?

Asher: Regulation Five violation can range anything from an oral reprimand to a written reprimand to an order to show cause to a complaint, and can end up in anything from a fine to losing your license if you don’t cooperate with the Gaming Control Board.

IP: Are there times when a casino can say no to the Gaming Control Board?

Asher: Occasionally that happens, but not normally at the working level between a security department or a surveillance department and the Enforcement Division. They’re very much afraid to tell the Gaming Control Board no.

The Frequency of Saying “No”:

Bob: When were you the chief of the Enforcement Division [of the Gaming Control Board]?

Asher: From June 18th, 1990, until June 30th, 1996.

Bob: And in that period of time, 1990 to 1996, how many times was it brought to your attention that a gaming licensee had refused a request by a Gaming agent?

Asher: I am not honestly aware that they have, that that was ever brought to my attention that they had refused a request. If you look at 463.140, it gives Gaming agents extraordinary powers, the powers to seize, to search, to do many things that a normal person cannot do in a criminal environment.

Bob: That’s only with respect to licensees’ properties, right?

Asher: Licensees’ property as well as applicants’ properties.

Bob: Licensees and applicants, right?

Asher: Correct.

Bob: People looking for a license or holding a license?

Asher: Correct.

Bob: That’s issued by the State, right?

Asher: Absolutely.

Bob: Not James Grosjean, no extra rights with respect to him, right?

Asher: There they’re operating as peace officers.

Bob: Right.

Asher’s Defense of the Nuremberg Defense:

Bob: Do you realize that Heimlich Himmler and Albert Speer stood in front of an international tribunal and they said to that international tribunal in 1946 or ‘47, I believe, “We had no choice; we were very afraid of what would happen if we did not listen to what we were told by Hitler”? … Some of them were killed and some of them — and like Albert Speer spent the rest of his life in prison, right?

Asher: Yes, that’s correct.

Bob: And you understand that I was just following orders; what is commonly known as the Nuremberg Defense is no defense, don’t you?

Asher: I understand that the circumstances and the facts of killing millions of people is very different than a temporary detention under the rule of law.

IP Defense — Blame the Victim:

Asher: Do you want me to answer as my opinion?

Bob: Yeah. Give me another opinion, sure.

Asher: If Mr. Grosjean would have simply stopped, it would have gone probably up there, he would have never been handcuffed, he would have been up there for a brief period of time. I doubt seriously that they would have even searched him, and as soon as that phone call came through, which was just a few minutes into the thing, he would have been out of there with them saying the same thing they said, “We’re very sorry to detain you. You weren’t the person we were looking for.”

Bob: But he still would have been up there?

Asher: Yes.

Bob: And he still wouldn’t have had a choice, right?

Asher: Well, his choice would have been to walk up there with him like most of us would do.

Aahh, so I can go to the back room in handcuffs, or free of handcuffs. What a choice! What about choosing to walk to the street and leave the IP?

The Asher Bob-and-Weave:

Bob: I’m not asking you to testify to any facts, sir. I’m asking you to testify to a hypothetical, which is what you are supposed to do as an expert; so, here we go again. Hypothetically, the words given to Mr. Espensen [of the IP] by [GCB Agent] Vincent were, “If [GCB Agent] Stolberg told you to grab him, then don’t let him leave.” That’s all the information Espensen has in this hypothetical; is it then unreasonable for him to detain Mr. Grosjean?

Asher: If that was the information and that was his understanding and the communication at the time, then, you know, I don’t think so, but I don’t know what he meant by that and —

Bob: You don’t think it was unreasonable?

Asher: No, I don’t think that if it was — if you knew that from some other source, but if he was under the misunderstanding — he’s —

Bob: I’m not asking for a dissertation on the evidence, I’m asking for an answer to the hypothetical, sir, and the hypothetical has all its facts. Let’s try it again. …

The “Plain-View” Defense:

Bob: Now, with the police officers coming back through and taking a look at the stuff on the table, isn’t your distinction really a distinction between a little search and a big search, rather than no search and a big search?

Asher: At that point, I would refer to it as a plain view search and plain view — it’s in plain view at that point, and the agents look at it, they don’t inventory it, they don’t touch it and they leave within 15 to 17 seconds. That’s how I would look at it.

Bob: Now, do you recognize that that stuff, from what you’ve testified, the stuff on the table is in plain view because of — and, again, based on your testimony — because of the orders of [GCB Agent] Vincent to the IP?

Asher: I don’t agree with that, sir. The order was to detain; the procedures that the IP have is a separate thing. They didn’t say detain Mr. Grosjean, take out all of his stuff and put it out on the table for us.

Bob: Oh, but you just testified that you know that that’s standard operating procedure when they take somebody into a back room, right?

Asher: I know that that’s done routinely throughout the casino industry. They pat down for weapons and they —

Bob: Empty pockets?

Asher: For protection of personal property, they lay it on the end of the table.

Bob: So, Agent Vincent would know that too, right?

Asher: I don’t know what Agent Vincent knows.

Bob: If — if the property was on the table as a result of Vincent’s order, and Vincent, when he gave that alleged order, expected that that would be where the property would end up, would you agree then that this was not a plain view search?

Asher: I would think that would be up to the Court to decide.

Bob: But you can give opinions on other stuff. Okay.

Bob: Let’s try this: What’s the Plain View Doctrine?

Asher: The Plain View Doctrine is, if you can see it in plain view as a law enforcement officer, then it’s not excluded as part of a search.

Bob: … if you go arrange something in a special way or have somebody do it for you so that you go look at it, that’s no longer something that’s in plain view, that’s something in altered view, isn’t it?

Asher: If it’s done that way, then it’s not necessarily in plain view, that’s correct.

Bob: Right.

Asher: But I think he also acted — if I remember the video, I think he accidentally knocked the chips over.

Bob: Here he says, in his own report, he says he’s moving them around so he can get a better look, right?

Asher: So they can look for 15 seconds, yes, sir.

Bob: No, they can look as long as they want. It just really wasn’t that interesting, was it?

Asher: No, I’m sure it wasn’t.

The Asher Rules:

Bob: Can you look at the jury and tell them right now that a private casino has more rights to search and seize a person than a public police officer?

Asher: As a private individual oftentimes, even as a public or as a private investigator, you don’t advise people under their Miranda warnings. I don’t have to advise when I go out and interview people under Miranda. I go out, and I tell them I’m a private investigator. I don’t play by the same rules as a peace officer.

“Voluntary” Production of Information:

Bob: And while in handcuffs, do you recall while in handcuffs for that other 20 minutes, which I take it you would agree he should have been let go, right?

Asher: Oh, absolutely. Once they said to let him go, then you release him and let him go.

Bob: You don’t go up to him and say, “I need some information on this card — I need some information on this card, and as soon as I get it, we’ll let you go,” do you?

Asher: I think it’s common policy, and I used to do it many times myself is to fill out an FI card on somebody that might some day be suspected of doing a crime or other crimes at some other date. So, that’s a normal procedure to do Field Interrogation cards.

Bob: Do procedures trump the Constitution?

Asher: That is a normal policy and procedure that’s handled in law enforcement and directives all the time. I’m sorry, but it is.

Bob: What about the question?

Asher: The question?

Bob: The question.

Asher: The question is?

Bob: Do procedures trump the Constitution, in your opinion?

Asher: The question is, the Constitution is there always, but it’s a question of whether that particular thing, filling out an FI card, is prohibited by the Constitution.

Bob: No. The question is whether or not getting information — personal information from Mr. Grosjean while he’s held in handcuffs and everybody concerned knows that he must be released is in accord with the Constitution, even though the policy says it’s okay?

Asher: I mean, if that’s your view, I can’t testify to that.

Bob: He stayed there in handcuffs, right?

Asher: He was there in handcuffs.

Bob: And?

Asher: And voluntarily —

Bob: And he had been told that they were not going to be taken off until he leaves, right?

Asher: And voluntarily provided the information that Espensen asked for.

Bob: See, here is my problem, Mr. Asher. You’re the former head of a law enforcement agency in the State of Nevada, and you actually believe that somebody who is in handcuffs, that is told that they can’t leave until they give up the information, voluntarily gives up that information when they give it; don’t you really believe that?

Asher: I believe that you look at the person’s education, you look at the person’s background, you look at the writings that he’s done in the gaming area, and I think he’s smart enough to have declined to give the information based on what’s in his book.

Aahh, it’s a twist of the “Blame-the-Victim” Defense. It’s the “The-Victim-is-Smart-Enough-to-have-Avoided-This” Defense. Or is it the “Smart-People-Don’t-Have-or-Need-the-Same-Rights-and-Protections-as-Stupid-People” Defense? I’m not sure exactly what Asher’s point is, but I can guarantee that the next time I am in the back room, things will go a bit differently.

Who Can Say “No”:

Bob: And then he goes to jail, doesn’t he?

Asher: No. Does he?

Bob: Well, they’re not taking off the handcuffs, are they?

Asher: He doesn’t go to jail. He’s already been told he’s leaving. They’re going to get the cuffs off of him.

Bob: So, he can look at them being directed by security — here we are. Mr. Asher, Mr.

Grosjean, who is a private individual being held in handcuffs in the back of the Imperial Palace, has the ability and the authority and the wherewithal, in your opinion, to look a security officer, who is being directed by a Gaming agent, directly in the eye and say no, right?

Asher: I think he has that authority, and that would have been — they wouldn’t have gone any further with it.

Bob: But … a security supervisor who is directed to detain an individual that he knows the message was, “Give me a call if you see him,” does not have the ability, the authority, the wherewithal, may I say the cajones, to look a Gaming agent in the eye and say no when they say take him and don’t let him leave. They can’t say no, right?

Asher: I can’t answer your question.

Asher Butchers Terry:

Bob: Do you know that under the Fourth Amendment, Mr. Grosjean is guaranteed the constitutional right to be protected from unreasonable searches and seizures. And what is protected is his person, his paper and — his papers and his personal effects?

Asher: I understand that in the Constitution and in Terry v. Ohio, it is also stated that there is no way to stop the enforcement of law enforcement, but that there is an exclusionary rule that if his rights are violated at that point, that then they exclude that from trial and, I’m sorry, but Mr. Grosjean is not in trial.

Bob: So, those protections only apply if he’s arrested?

Asher: That’s not what I said. … I said that in Terry v. Ohio, which you brought up during deposition, Terry v. Ohio makes it specific to law enforcement to start with. It makes it also — Terry v. Ohio — when you look at that — …

Bob: Now, what rights are more important in this country, in your opinion, than the rights that are expressly laid out in the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution?

Asher: The right to protect society as a whole as part of that.

Bob: So, do I understand, then — and you feel that that’s a right that the State holds to protect, right?

Asher: I think after 9/11 we should be concerned about protecting societal rights, yes.

Hallelujah!! I was worried that we would go through the whole trial without someone invoking 9/11 as a justification for any and all illegal corporate and governmental activities. I’ll sleep better tonight knowing that, although Osama still runs free, the IP Security Department is on the case. I wonder if the IP has advised the Homeland Security team to put the U.S. on Red status, because I am planning a large-scale viewing of hole cards tomorrow on day shift.

Bob: Sir, do you realize that you just said that the right of the State to protect the citizens of this country trumps and overrules the rights of the citizens that are guaranteed in the Constitution?

Asher: No, that’s not what I testified to. I’m sorry. I believe in rule of law, sir.

Bob: The rights of the citizen as set forth in the Bill of Rights are the primary protections, the absolute sacrosanct protections that people in our society have, correct?

Asher: Again, I would agree with you, but I’m not a constitutional lawyer.

Bob: I’m just asking.

Asher: That is your opinion, and I really can’t — I wouldn’t care to debate you on constitutional law.

Bob: I am not for a moment seeking to equate Mr. Grosjean’s — the invasion of Mr. Grosjean’s liberty with the murder of millions of people. I am not, but I am asking, doesn’t that and doesn’t an invasion of, in your opinion, an invasion of a constitutional protection also deserve the highest protection from the State?

Asher: I was not hired on behalf of the State. I was hired on behalf of the Imperial Palace.

Asher’s interpretation of Terry v. Ohio: law enforcement (because Terry does not apply to civilians or corporations) can detain and search anyone at any time, but that if they do not have probable cause to do so, then any evidence so obtained would not be permitted in a criminal trial against the detained person.

Bob: Okay. Let’s go to what I asked first, which is, did any of them have, and I’m looking at Pedote, Vincent and Espensen — any — Pedote, Vincent and Espensen, did any of them have any knowledge of anything that Mr. Grosjean himself had done that they then relied upon to reach a conclusion of reasonable suspicion in order to detain Mr. Grosjean?

Asher: I’m not aware that they knew any more than what we’ve just said.

Bob: Which would be no, they did not have any articulable facts regarding his play, what he was doing, anything like that, right?

Asher: Again, I don’t know what they saw on the surveillance because that really doesn’t — they don’t talk about observing him on surveillance down on the floor and what he was doing on the floor, et cetera.

Bob: And you read the reports, and they certainly didn’t rely on anything there, right?

Asher: Again, I did not see anything there that they did.

Bob: Okay. You said you read [Terry v. Ohio].

Asher: Yes, I did.

Bob: Do you realize that the rule of law in Terry, after you read it, is that in order to detain an individual — detain, just stop for any reason — detain an individual, there must be articulable facts about the person’s activities giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that they either have committed or may about to be committing a crime?

Asher: I’m familiar with Terry, and I’m familiar with the articulable facts that you’re talking about.

Bob: Where are the articulable facts? He’s held, right?

Asher: Pardon?

Bob: [Grosjean is] held on Gaming agent orders from what you understand, right?

Asher: My understanding is that he is detained based on an order from a Gaming agent and for temporary detention to find out if he’s wanted for anything.

Bob: And Terry talks about temporary detentions, right?

Asher: Yes, it does.

Bob: That’s what Terry is about. You reread it, right?

Asher: Several times, yes.

Bob: And in rereading it, it says that you can’t temporarily detain somebody, unless you have articulable facts about their activities, right?

Asher: Or if you do that, then that information is — anything that you gain from that is excluded from the trial in a criminal trial.

Bob: Or what you did is an illegal detention, in other words, right?

Asher: I would not — I can’t classify that as illegal in this particular case. If Mr. Grosjean or the plaintiff would have stopped when he was asked to stop —

Bob: There’s no question, sir.

IP: Your Honor, I would like him to be able to answer. He was finishing up the last question.

Court: I’m sure you would, but there’s no question.

Asher Butchers Hiibel:

Bob: So, again, right back where we were before a little bit ago, in your opinion, Terry only applies for the exclusionary rule in criminal cases but does not define what’s legal and illegal in the form of search and seizure under the Constitution?

Asher: Terry defines that you can — that if you detain or seize, that you can pat the person down to do a search for weapons for the safety of the officers, and it doesn’t go much beyond that. There are other court cases, I’m sure, that have added to Terry.

Bob: Terry also said, though, that you [can’t detain] without articulable facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion, right?

Asher: But we now know, even here, that under Hiibel that a police officer could detain and ask for an identification, but what if the person chooses not to stop?

Bob: Wait a minute, sir. Don’t misstate Hiibel to me. I was the attorney on that darn case. Hiibel actually says that if you detain for reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, right?

Asher: Reasonable suspicion.

Bob: Based on articulable facts, right?

Asher: That a crime has been committed.

Bob: Yes. Based on articulable facts?

Asher: Again, I didn’t read it that closely.

Bob: It cites to Terry, doesn’t it?

Asher: It discusses Terry in it, yes. But, again, I can’t answer you as an attorney or as a judge, sir.

Bob: No, because as an attorney or a judge or somebody stating the law, this is an illegal seizure, isn’t it?

Asher: You would have to determine that as the judge or as the attorney.

Bob: Or as the jury.

Asher: Or as the jury.

Bob: Thank you.

Asher’s Firsthand Knowledge:

Bob: And you don’t have any firsthand information on this matter at all, do you?

Asher: I didn’t go — I wasn’t there.

Bob: So, everything you’re testifying about is based on things other people have told you and from what Mr. Thomas [the IP lawyer] has told you?

Asher: Mr. Thomas has told me very little but from reading the depositions and stuff.

Bob: Thank you.

Asher: You’re welcome.

Court: Counsel, redirect?

IP: No, thank you, your Honor, and the Imperial Palace rests.

The Verdict

Listening to Asher was tiring. It was impossible to keep up with all the illogical statements. We had too many targets to attack. The closing statement from the IP is the same. Bob, Thea, and I can’t write fast enough on our pads. We have to let many of the targets go, because the jury seems tired by now, and, we hope, smart enough to have heard what we heard. Sure enough, after less than an hour of deliberation, they contact the judge with two questions that seem promising to us: 1. How exactly did the GCB escape the lawsuit, and 2. How will punitive damages be determined?

It is less than two hours before we get the call to return to the courthouse. I’m not surprised. This one’s a no-brainer, and it’s Friday night. We all want to move on:

Court: Have you all reached a verdict?

Jurors: Yes, we have.

Court: Would you give the verdict form to the bailiff, please? We’ll have the clerk read the verdict out loud.

Clerk: Court, Clark County, Nevada. James Grosjean, plaintiff vs. Imperial Palace and Donnie Espensen, defendant. Case No. A442687. Department No. VIII.

Special verdict: We the jury in the above entitled case find the following special verdict on the questions submitted to us.

Question 1. Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant named below or either of them violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiff James Grosjean, to be free of unlawful search or of unlawful seizure or both under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution? Defendant Imperial Palace, yes. Defendant Donnie Espensen, yes.

Question 2. What amount of money damages do you find should be awarded to the plaintiff, James Grosjean, from the defendants found liable in Question 1? Defendant Imperial Palace, $99,990. Defendant Donnie Espensen, nine dollars.

Do you find that any defendant for whom you marked yes in Question 1 liable to plaintiff James Grosjean for punitive damages? Imperial Palace, yes. Donnie Espensen, no.

Dated 10/22/2004.

The Punitive-Damages Hearing

On November 1, we met again in court in front of the same jury to determine the amount of punitive damages to be awarded. A CPA testified regarding the IP’s financial position. Some exhibits were entered into evidence. Bob made a statement. The IP made an unrepentant statement, the highlight of which was: “We bring that out only because the corporate mob mentality — this is much more of a mom and pop situation. This is not Mandalay Bay; this is not Park Place; this is not Caesars Palace. This is a much smaller situation that a family built. They bought a small hotel, they built it up here.” By the CPA’s testimony, the Imperial Palace’s hotel, casino, and land is owned free and clear — on the Las Vegas Strip. “Mom and pop”?

Six of the eight jurors agreed on a punitive-damage award of $500,000, reduced under Nevada statute to $300,000, and reduced to $150,000 by Judge Gates, who felt the award was “excessive.” With the compensatory damages, the punitives, the interest, and attorneys’ fees, we hope to collect around $320,000, to be chopped threeways (Mike, me, and BobThea). When we rejected the arrogant and stingy offers from the IP, it’s not because we expected this pecuniary result. Like I said, I don’t care about money, but if money is the only way to get the IP’s attention, then I want as much of it as possible.

To date, the IP shows no remorse (they are still appealing this verdict) and the judge thinks the award was excessive, but on October 22, 2004, eight civilian residents of Las Vegas sent a message that they do not approve of the illegal activities of the Imperial Palace and the other casinos in this town (since Ron Asher gave expert testimony that the IP’s actions were normal throughout the industry). Maybe, just maybe, Bob, Thea, Mike, and I have done, or at least started, what we set out to do — change the world. ♠

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The Laughlin Lay-a-way

Dealer Cheating at Blackjack

by Sam Case

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. II #3, September 1982)
© 1982 Blackjack Forum

I met Crazy Bob in a bar in Calgary (Alberta, Canada). I knew it was him by his “Crazy Bob — No Autographs, Please!” t-shirt. We had more than a few Molsons, and he turned me on to a dealer cheating technique I was unfamiliar with.

He had seen it executed by a sweet little old lady dealer on a blackjack table in Laughlin. Done casually, it took him a while to spot it. He said that the dealer would peek at the top card, and if it were a ten or an ace, she would simply lay it down with the discards. Nasty.

Even a blackjack dealer who never practices enough to become a good card mechanic could effectively cheat using the lay-a-way. After speaking to Crazy Bob, I worked out several variations on this cheating technique.

Blackjack Cheating Variation One: The Simple Version

Take a deck of cards, burn the top card, and deal out 4 or 5 hands. Put a ten on top of the deck. This is the card we’ll lay-a-way.

Say we’re at the point where the dealer has paid off all the players and is about to pick up all the discards. Reach over with your (empty) right hand towards third base and start to scoop up the cards. Let your left (deck) hand casually drift to first base. It’s going to look as if you’re going to put that hand down for balance, but here’s where the dirty work happens.

As your deck hand moves, you turn it over so the back of your hand is uppermost (the deck is upside down). When your deck hand is almost over the first base cards, slide the top card slightly towards the right with the fingers of the left hand. This is where you can peek. (If the dealer didn’t know there was a ten on top, she would now. If she saw a small card, she would simply slide it back and keep it in play.)

But since we have a ten under control, we lay-a-way the card as follows: press the ten down onto the table with the left thumb, while releasing it with the left fingers.

You can plop it down where the next first base hit card should have been and keep it covered by the rest of the deck, held close to the table. The main work of the lay-a-way is now over. The ten is lying face-up on the table, hidden by the resting left hand.

Meanwhile, the right hand has been scooping other hands. When it reaches first base, move your left hand away as the right scoops up the cards, and WHOOSH! That’s it. The whole thing takes place in a couple of seconds.

The main tip-off is placing the deck hand on top of the table on or near cards already on the table. Players are not allowed to touch cards on the table and neither are the dealers, except as required by the necessary procedures of dealing the game. Beware of any dealer whose hands ever, however casually or briefly, touch or rest on or near a played hand.

Blackjack Cheating Variation Two: Harder Version

For this version the cheating dealer must be able to execute one of the standard peeks (back peek, gambler’s peek, etc.). Since the value of the top card can be discerned before the lay-a-way move, the dealer can do the slide differently.

She could slide the card to the left, using her thumb, and she could extend the fingers of her left hand to press the card down. Everything else would be the same, so the main tip-off still works.

A dealer might also lay-a-way the card on her own hand, rather than the first base hand, so the dealer can use this move in head-on play also. When you’re playing head-on, you’re pretty busy, so when you look away, she may try:

Blackjack Cheating Variation Three: Bastard Version

Technically, this is not a lay-a-way, but a one-handed top card burn. It works like the lay-a-way in that it removes a good card from play.

The fingers of the left (deck) hand peel off the top card and slide it under the deck, face up. If left uncovered, this move is as obvious as a pregnant nun, so you can spot it if you keep the deck in your peripheral vision.

The only useful cover for the move is to hide the deck from view for a split second with the other hand. Be sure to follow the Case Cardinal rule: Never Play Against a Dealer Who Hides the Deck, Even for a Second.

Thanks again to Crazy Bob for this variation on the second deal. If any readers spot cheating or suspicious moves with cards, please alert Arnold Snyder. These old moves are all showing up again now that there are all of these 6:5 handheld games. ♠

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The First Counters

Edward O. Thorp in Las Vegas, 1962

By Russell T. Barnhart

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XX #1, Spring 2000)
© 2000 Blackjack Forum

In the early 1960s much publicity occurred concerning a 28-year-old professor of mathematics, Edward O. Thorp, first of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) at Cambridge, then of New Mexico State University at Las Cruces, finally of the University of California at Irvine, who was making blackjack history.

I read articles about him in the New York Herald Tribune (January 29, 1961), the Paris edition of the New York Herald Tribune (by Tom Wolfe, December 9, 1962), the Atlantic Monthly (January, 1963), Time (January 25, 1963), Sports Illustrated (January 13, 1964), Life (March 27, 1964), The New York Times (April 3, 1964), and so on.

What was the wherefore of all this publicity? Here’s how the Time article explained matters:

The omnipresent computer, whose attention often seems to be concentrated on the welfare of moon travelers and submariners, may have at last produced a palpable boon for the common run of mankind: a system for winning money in a gambling house.

A 30-year-old mathematics professor named Edward O. Thorp claims to have made this historic breakthrough by feeding the equivalent of 10,000 man-years of desk-calculator computations into an IBM 704 computer and arriving at a set of discoveries about the way the odds fluctuate in the game of blackjack, or twenty-one.

This system enables the initiate to bet heavily when the odds are with him, lightly when they are against him. What’s more, the cost of the system — including a set of palm-sized, sweat-resistant charts to take to the casino — is only $4.95, which happens to be the cost of Thorp’s book, Beat the Dealer (Blaisdell [Random House]). (By this year, 2000, more than 700,000 copies have been sold.)

Hard Hands & Soft. Thorp’s system is based on the fact that blackjack is not what mathematicians call an “independent trials process,” in which, as in craps or roulette, each play is uninfluenced by the preceding plays. As each card is played in blackjack, it changes the possibilities for both player and dealer by diminishing the number and the variety of cards that may be dealt.

Hence the basic blackjack strategy, according to Thorp’s computer, is that the fewer cards valued at two to eight that are left in the pack, the greater advantage to the player. On the other hand, a shortage of nines, tens, and aces gives the dealer an advantage. [In other words, high- or ten-value cards favor the player.]

A scarcity of fives, Thorp’s figures indicate, is more advantageous to the player than a shortage of any other card; when all four fives have been played, the player has an edge of 3.29% or, expressed roughly in odds, 52-48 in the player’s favor. Thorp has devised a series of charts to show when to split a pair (‘always split aces and eights, never split fives and tens’), when to double and when to stand.

Knowing when to stand and when to ask for another card is, of course, the very heart of the game….

This is Thorp’s “basic” strategy; his “full-dress” system [the Ultimate Strategy] involves a much more complex technique of betting in terms of the number of tens, aces, and fives remaining in the deck in relation to the number of cards left in the pack before the next shuffle.

The Plan that Made Blackjack History

As an individual who has always had trouble finding even the On button both on a computer and in life itself, naturally all this intrigued me. Hence before Beat the Dealer was published in late 1962, I approached a life-long friend of mine, William F. Rickenbacker (1928-1995), a businessman, writer, and journalist, to whom I referred at the time as Mr. X, and suggested the following gambling plan, which was to make blackjack history.

If Rickenbacker and one or two others would together put up a bank of $10,000, why could not Edward O. Thorp, with his remarkable blackjack system favoring the player, and Mickey MacDougall (1906-1996), with his expertise in protecting gamblers against cheating casinos, along with Russell Barnhart, his humble servant and stake holder, travel to Las Vegas to earn for us all an honest, capitalistic dollar?

Next I telephoned Mickey MacDougall, who lived in Forest Hills, Queens, and if Henri Daniel, founder of the first magazine for gamblers in Monte Carlo, made his living by repairing typewriters, Mickey MacDougall made a far more lucrative one by being a wholesale and retail numismatic dealer. It turned out that, as MacDougall would be in Boston the following weekend to attend the coin show of the American Numismatic Association, it would be convenient for him to meet Professor Thorp at the latter’s home in nearby Cambridge.

Finally I telephoned Professor Thorp, introduced myself politely, and suggested that he might like to meet Mickey MacDougall and me to hear of our tentative plan to go to Las Vegas and win money using Thorp’s new blackjack card-counting system. As Thorp was also amenable to the meeting, the following Sunday we met for the first time at his home in Cambridge.

The upshot of our meeting was that the three of us agreed to work cordially together to beat the blackjack tables on a trip to Las Vegas. That was our optimistic and rational plan, and I so informed Mr. X (not to be confused with the Mr. X of the first trip to Las Vegas, described in Chapter 6 in Thorp’s Beat the Dealer, a gentleman named Manny Kimmel). What follows is what actually happened.

Mickey MacDougall’s Role

Now let’s turn once more to Mickey MacDougall. For 20 years, MacDougall wrote for the McClure Syndicate on gambling and other subjects, a national newspaper column, “The Inside Straight,” and what follows is part of a column he wrote after our trip to Las Vegas. Titled, “Even ‘Honest’ Vegas House Cheats,” it appeared on December 2, 1962, in 193 American newspapers, including The Sunday Star-Ledger, Newark, NJ:

. . . Professor Edward O. Thorp . . . wanted me to accompany him on a trip to Nevada . . . . certain he had evolved a system whereby the player would beat the house at the blackjack tables, wanted me along to make certain he didn’t get cheated.

I told the Professor he was mistaken on two counts. (1) No one could beat the dealers at their own game, and (2) the better casinos never cheated, so even if his system did work, he wouldn’t need me to protect him from chicanery.

I had previously played at every temple of luck in Las Vegas as a special investigator for the Nevada Gaming Control Board. Like every other agent, my bets were limited, seldom exceeding $20.

However, Dr. Thorp’s system necessitated wagers of $500. And I learned a bitter lesson. Some casinos which wouldn’t think of cheating a small bettor have no qualms about taking an unfair advantage of a big bettor.

I have in mind one particular gambling house [the Riviera] . . . . which gets world-wide favorable publicity . . . . I recommended it highly to Dr. Thorp .… The very next day the cheating began…. I noticed the pit boss signal an idle dealer and whisper some instructions . . . . I edged nearer, overheard the dealer say: “Okay, I’ll give it to ’em . . . .”

A stout man, whom I had seen working as a shill at the dice games, came hurrying down the aisle [and] sat down directly to the right of Dr. Thorp.

On the very next hand Dr. Thorp was dealt eleven. Automatically he turned his cards face up, shoved out $100 to signify he was going down for double.

The newcomer played first . . . . He drew a card, a queen. He drew a second card, a ten. Then he tossed his hand in, face down, so I couldn’t see the cards, and said, ‘I’m busted . . . .’ I thought then that the shill was an “anchor man,” put into the game to draw cards when it would injure Dr. Thorp’s play, or to stand pat when that would be more advantageous for the house.

On the next hand . . . . I watched the dealer’s eyes [This is the key to MacDougall’s method of catching cheaters.] Sure enough, he constantly glanced at the pack in his hand, at the same time bending the corner of the top card so he could see its index . . .

I gave Dr. Thorp the signal that I was suspicious . . . . Soon the anchor man got careless. I could glimpse his cards. Once he stood on eleven, another time he drew to nineteen . . . .

Dr. Thorp, the modern Wizard of Odds, has published a book detailing his winning system, Beat the Dealer. Now, to balance the scales, a Nevada gambler [casino owner] should write a book detailing crooked gambling methods and entitle it, Beat the Player.

Of all Mickey MacDougall’s articles on crooked gambling casinos, perhaps one of the best, explaining both the founding and operation of the State of Nevada Gaming Control Board, the police arm of the State Gaming Commission, as well as sleight-of-hand methods using false dice and cards, is “Why Nevada’s Gamblers Toe the Mark” (Look, October 28, 1958), an article I recommend.

As MacDougall’s article on one Strip casino’s use of an anchor man against Thorp, just quoted in part, wasn’t published , of course, until a few months after our blackjack trip to Nevada, when we three arrived in Las Vegas on Tuesday, January 23, 1962, none of us knew what fate held for us at even the best casinos on the Strip, so our optimism, though tempered, ran fairly high. Our trip lasted until February 1st, when we departed Reno for our several homes.

That First Historic Blackjack Trip

Our first setback occurred when all three of us came down with colds brought on by our ignorance, in the forty-degree cold, of how to operate the heating control buttons in our individual rooms in the City Center Motel on Fremont Street. MacDougall began taking anti-histamine tablets, I visited the local hospital emergency center to obtain sulfa tablets, and Edward O. Thorp tried both. A bad head cold hardly helps to count cards under casinos conditions.

I hired a self- drive car, a light blue Rambler, to drive us from one casino to another. “You’re our wheel man,” declared MacDougall whimsically, who favored the rear seat, the initiative Thorp always sitting on my right so he could see, figuratively and literally, where we were going.

In the Tables on pages 14 and 15, I list the amounts that we won or lost at blackjack at each gambling casino, reserving my text for a brief discussion of what happened to us at each of these so-called temples of chance in both Las Vegas and Reno. At all casinos Thorp played his Ultimate Strategy of counting aces-tens- and-others, which he explains at length in Beat the Dealer.

As all of us were quite tired from traveling to Las Vegas, on our first evening we ate down the street at the El Cortez Casino and then decided, for our financial backers, Mr. X and his partners, to test the waters with only small stakes, so at the El Cortez, Thorp sat down and played his count system for an hour. In wagers his spread was from $1 to $5 as we note in the first entry on page 14. Already suffering from a worsening head cold, MacDougall kept on his overcoat and usually sat on Thorp’s right to watch for any cheating by a dealer.

In contrast, when MacDougall was working as an undercover agent for the Gaming Control Board, he would naturally never sit, even when alone, and stare with even casual suspicion at a dealer’s hands as the latter dealt the cards. Instead, as he explained to me, to catch any cheating he employed only casual, peripheral vision. “There are fifteen different ways they can cheat you at blackjack,” he explained. “I sit there and casually bet and, in my mind, just go down my list, eliminating one by one the methods the dealer isn’t using until I come to the one I see him or her using — if any.”

This brings to mind an amusing experience MacDougall had on another trip at the Desert Inn.

“It was late in the evening, and I was playing blackjack for minimum stakes,” the Gambling Detective recounted to me. “I wasn’t winning or losing much, and the dealer, though odd in mannerisms, hadn’t been cheating so far, so possibly to draw him out, I said…

“‘I’m glad this is an honest house. I didn’t do so well at the Sands though I suppose it was just bad luck.’

“‘We’re an honest house because the Gaming Control Board sends in undercover agents to watch us to see if we cheat.’

“‘They do?’

“‘Yes. One of their main agents,’ he whispered confidentially, ‘is a man called Mickey MacDougall. So every night I keep a look-out for him on my shift.’

“‘What does he look like?’ I whispered back.

“‘I’m not sure. They say kind of tall…’ [Note: MacDougall was actually a rather short man whose appearance was mundane. He had the air of an ordinary businessman — as that’s what he was.]

“‘There are lots of guys that look like that. How’ll you know which one is he?’

“‘By the way he bets. I can always tell an agent.’

“‘How?’

“I told you — by the way they bet. Agents always bet like shills — only one dollar at a time. They just buck us to death.’

“Naturally I reported this conversation to the Gaming Control Board,” concluded MacDougall, “and from then on,every agent has been given enough money so he can spread at least a little bit — no more ‘bucking them to death.’”

Be that as it may, while Thorp and MacDougall sat playing blackjack cooperatively at the El Cortez, what was I doing? I just wandered around this small casino room as unobtrusively as possible, betting small amounts on red and black at roulette, or on two dozens with my Creep Along system, while keeping a weather eye on the pitbosses and various dealers, none of whom paid me any heed.

But why should they have? I did nothing unconventional, being, after all, the most unimportant individual of our gambling trio. Indeed, inconspicuous was my appropriate manner in all subsequent casinos though I often joined MacDougall to peer over Thorp’s shoulder to watch the master play and see if I could detect any cheating on the dealer’s part.

After an hour of warm-up play at the El Cortez we’d lost $33. So for a second hour of play we went down to the Fremont Casino, where Thorp spread from $5 to $50 and lost $100. Then we went for a quarter of an hour to Benny Binion’s Horseshoe Casino, where the Professor of Mathematics spread again from $5 to $50 and won $40.

At this point, as all our colds had worsened, we decided to call it a night and returned to the City Center Motel for a restless sleep in the deep freeze. All told, by the end of our warm-up night, we had lost $93.

The foregoing figures comprise, for our first day of gambling, the results I’ve listed in the Tables on pages 14-15, to which the reader may refer as I discuss matters concerning our remaining eight gambling days in Las Vegas and Reno.

Methods of Casino Cheating at Blackjack in 1962

As Mickey MacDougall demonstrated them to Thorp and me, here are the main ways that the casinos used to cheat us frequently on our trip to Nevada to play blackjack. The reader will find more extensive elucidation comprising Chapter 7, “How to Spot Cheating,” in Thorp’s cited book on blackjack, Beat the Dealer, whence my own name was omitted by Thorp at my personal request, for to become known hobbles further learning and winning.

(1) The anchor man. This method was explained in MacDougall’s article quoted earlier in part. See also Chapter 7 in Beat the Dealer, in which reference to Mickey MacDougall and our blackjack trip begins on p. 133.

(2) The peek and deal. MacDougall elucidated this method as he saw it during his three subsequent trips to Hot Springs, Arkansas. The six illegal casinos were run by the New Orleans mafia according to MacDougall; I myself visited Hot Springs twice.

(3) The turn over. When the dealer holds a deck in his left hand, he openly places discarded cards cumulatively face up under the face-down ones on top. As he picks up these discarded cards, however, he secretly stacks them in an order later favorable to himself. Between hands the dealer slowly inches the pack down in his left hand and out over his left fingers preparatory to the rapid sleight-of-hand move. Then as he reaches with his free right hand to pick up the discarded cards of some last hand, he snaps the deck leftward extremely quickly, thereby invisibly turning it over.

According to MacDougall, this sleight occurs often about half way through a whole deck deal, and the warning tip-off is the inching down of the pack, which one may perceive. Thus the stacked cards, formerly uselessly face up, are now face down on top, ready to be dealt out to the dealer’s advantage. I saw this method of cheating used subsequently at the illegal Automobile (gambling) Club in Nashville, Tennessee.

(4) The high-low pick up. As the dealer overtly picks up the cards discarded from each player’s hand, he covertly and unobtrusively stacks them in the following order favorable to himself: high-low, high-low, high-low. After a false shuffle, if there be an odd number of players, everyone, including the dealer, will get a bad hand consisting of one high and one low card, for a mediocre total like, say, 15. Naturally everyone will ask for another card, and the next high card will put him over 21.

True, the dealer must bust too, but as all the players have lost before him, he’ll thereby win. If there be an even number of players, knowing the stacked high-low order, the dealer, through sleight-of-hand, merely deals the second card from the top, thereby righting the order, rendering it favorable to himself. See Beat the Dealer, p. 132, in which Thorp states that, in his opinion, during our nine-day trip to Nevada the high-low pick up was “the most widespread single method of dealer cheating.”

(5) Marked Cards. MacDougall elucidated on this method as used during his three trips to Hot Springs, Arkansas. To both Thorp and me he confessed that, as an undercover agent in Nevada, he often saw casinos using the Bee brand, sort-edge deck, both along the Strip, in downtown Las Vegas, as well as in Reno and elsewhere in the state, like Winnemucca, Elko, etc.

(6) The Kentucky or seven-card step up (and variations). Ahead of time the dealer stacks the following eight cards thus: 9, 10, 10, J, and 10, 10, Q, A. After the usual false shuffle, the dealer crimps or bridges lengthwise the deck. If the player cuts to the crimp or bend, then on the first hand, he gets 19, while the dealer gets 20. On the second hand the player gets 20, while the dealer gets 21.

While picking up the discards on both hands, the dealer rights their order and crimps again the last card, thereby readying the stack again for the next deal. On the other hand, if the player doesn’t cut to the crimp, no matter, for when the dealer perceives during the deal the crimped or subtly bent card, he may adjust the order of the stack if need be by skillfully dealing the second card one or more times. Remember that, to himself, the dealer often deals a good hand or, to the player, a bad hand, letting chance deal a favorable second hand to himself. In other words, he doesn’t employ the second deal compulsively.

To Thorp and me MacDougall explained that the Kentucky step up was invented by a crooked dealer name Charley in an illegal gambling house in Newport, Kentucky (near Covington). “He was very proud of his invention,” declared MacDougall.

I asked MacDougall if he’d ever seen the Kentucky step up in the casinos in Hot Springs, Arkansas. “No, never,” he replied, “just the peek and deal.”

(7) The Nevada step up. Ahead of time the dealer stacks thirteen cards of various suits in the ordinary serial order thus: 2, 3, 4, 5… 10, J, Q, K, A. Although this step up may be obviously substituted for the Kentucky step up, its great drawback is that, owing to its obvious regularity of order, the dealer may not use it a second time in a row.

(8) The short shoe. This method of cheating wasn’t used against us three gamblers in our January, 1962, trip to Nevada, because at that time almost all blackjack games were dealt from a single deck held in the dealer’s hand. When a casino wants to use several decks — commonly 4, 6, or 8 — it employs a regular dealing shoe, and these became common in Nevada in the 1970s. According to MacDougall, the Gaming Control Board advocated the use of shoes to preclude the sleight-of-hand cheating methods which had theretofore become rampant.

After Mickey MacDougall explained the short shoe to me around 1975, with his permission I explained it in turn to Edward O. Thorp, because its elucidation would require mathematics way beyond my ability and training. So besides writing a magazine article on the short shoe, Thorp included his computational results in Chapter 2 of his book, The Mathematics of Gambling (Lyle Stuart, 1984), which I recommend.

According to MacDougall, the short shoe remained the favorite way of cheating by a casino whenever it chooses to deal from several decks.

Blackjack History, Day 2 (Or How Professor Thorp Missed MacDougall’s Exit Signal)

Let’s return to what happened on my trip with Professor Thorp and Mickey MacDougall in January, 1962. For the extent of Thorp’s spread and the sums of our wins and losses, I again refer the reader to the Win/Loss Tables, pages 14 and 15.

As I mentioned, on our first evening, in our warm up at the El Cortez Casino, Thorp lost $33, and then at the late Benny Binion’s Horseshoe Casino, he won $40.

On our second day, January 24th, as MacDougall suspected that at the Dunes the dealer was using the high-low pickup, we soon left. “Better safe than sorry” was his admirable motto in these matters, for although it was indeed our goal to seek out an honest dealer in a game in order to gain Thorp’s average plus PC of about 3% from his blackjack count system, by the same token it obviously behooved us to scuttle a dealer and his casino when MacDougall reasonably suspected that dealer of cheating. In other words, we always tried to strike an intelligent balance between, at one extreme, baseless suspicion that carks the soul, and, at the other, an equally absurd and inevitably disastrous faith in a casino’s honesty.

And after MacDougall had demonstrated, on more than one occasion, to Thorp and me the sleight-of-hand and other cheating methods that I’ve already enumerated, we two other gamblers would have had to be blind not to detect them occasionally ourselves when a crooked dealer employed them.

Once, for example, when we three had just come out of a rear door to the parking lot of the Desert Inn, MacDougall turned to Thorp and said, “Go back and look at the dealer shuffling at that last table and then tell me what you think.” In the meantime, MacDougall and I loitered by our light-blue Rambler. After a short interval, a cynically smiling Thorp rejoined us: “I think sometimes he’s doing the high-low pick up, and sometimes he’s not. Then he uses the push-through shuffle.” MacDougall smiled paternally: “That’s exactly what I thought myself.”

So we got into the Rambler and drove down the Strip to the Hacienda Casino. Prior to Thorp’s play the evening before at Binion’s Horseshoe Casino, MacDougall had advised Thorp that if he, MacDougall, perceived any cheating, he would poke the mathematical gambler between the shoulder blades and announce: “Let’s get a bite to eat.” That became our signal to leave a casino at once. So when MacDougall saw the blackjack dealer at the Hacienda peeking at his top cards, fearing the next move would be a second deal and another loss to our beneficent Mr. X and his partners, he accordingly poked Thorp between the shoulder blades.

Unfortunately in the heat of his concentrated play Thorp had forgotten that “Let’s get a bite to eat” was a dire signal indeed, so he replied indifferently, “No, I’m not hungry yet.” Again, MacDougall poked the mathematician between the shoulder blades. “I already told you,” replied Thorp irritably, “I’m not hungry yet!” Given this misunderstanding, when we left the Hacienda, we’d lost $60, which sum the reader will duly note as the fourth entry under Day 2 in the Tables.

I mention this trifling misadventure, because it’s most important for us all to realize that at one time or another all of us become fallible under fire, and anon I’ll give much more important illustrations of my own vanity, ignorance, and ineptitude.

Blackjack History, Day 3

On our third gambling day, January 25th, while my two partners were jousting in the arena of aces-tens-and-others, I drove over to meet in his boarding house the elderly host at the Sands, Frederick O. Brown, who’d written an autobiographical pamphlet about his own gambling experiences. Once a year, in the annual Las Vegas Helldorado parade, Frederick O. Brown would stand up in a convertible and, waving to the spectators, lead the parade.

Although I liked the effusive Brown, when I asked him courteously about his claim in his pamphlet that he’d become the confidant of the late King Farouk of Egypt and that both of them, seated side by side at the baccara and roulette tables at the Monte Carlo Casino had been royally cheated there, he admitted having made up the whole episode. He’d never even met Farouk. I mention this trifling incident, because sometimes knowledge of the honorability of a casino arises from some chance remark or fugitive pamphlet like Brown’s and requires verification.

Indeed, I’d like to go on record as saying that I myself have never heard of anyone who could adduce evidence of any cheating whatsoever by the Monte Carlo Casino. In my own opinion, it is now, and always has been, a perfectly honest gambling house — one of the reasons I chose to gamble there.

Meanwhile, back at el rancho Vegas, as it were, Thorp and MacDougall had gone on by themselves to win $180 from the Silver Palace, only to lose back $176 of it to the Stardust, as per the Win/Loss Tables. They told me later that at the Silver Palace, although the dealer had dealt honestly, the pitboss had been visibly upset by their winning even $180.

In Las Vegas and Reno each dealer’s shift lasted for twenty minutes, so my two partners had become suspicious when the dealer hadn’t gone off his shift after the usual twenty minutes, especially after they saw the pitboss go and telephone someone. After thirty minutes with the first dealer they saw a second man burst through the front door of the Silver Palace, and without stopping even to tie on the regulation green apron he came over and tapped the first dealer on the shoulder to relieve him.

Feeling that the second dealer was probably a crooked dealer on call — in the cheating trade, called a mechanic — my two partners left immediately, following Mac- Dougall’s prudent motto, “Better safe than sorry.”

[For confirmation of how corrupt this era was, see Easy Money: Inside the Gambler’s Mind by David Spanier (London, 1987), and especially his All Right, Okay, You Win: Inside Las Vegas (London, 1992 and 1993); see also the book, Casino: Love and Honor in Las Vegas, by Nicholas Pileggi (New York, 1995) and the movie by the same name about Lefty Rosenthal (at the Stardust Casino).]

At this point, I rejoined them, and MacDougall related to Thorp and me that, as on a trip to Las Vegas six months earlier, when he’d detected the Silver Slipper using the Kentucky step up, he wanted to show it to the two of us as “the epitome of what I’ve been trying to teach you two guys.” So we got into the Rambler and drove back to the Silver Slipper. After my two partners got out of the automobile and went into the Silver Slipper, I had some trouble finding a parking place, taking a bit longer than usual. Then I too got out of the Rambler and began walking toward the casino’s front door.

Lo and behold, out popped MacDougall and Thorp, grinning.

“Hey — where are you two guys going?” I cried. “Mickey — you promised to show Ed and me somebody in there using the Kentucky step up.”

“And we saw it,” exclaimed Thorp.

“But it took me only two minutes to park the car.”

“That’s when we saw it,” explained MacDougall smiling.

Sure enough, the two adventurers had gone into the Silver Slipper and walked directly to a blackjack dealer standing behind an empty table. They didn’t bother even to sit down. Thorp made his two bets standing up. On his first hand he bet $1: he got 19 and the dealer got 20. On his second hand he bet another $1: he got 20, and the dealer got 21.

At that point they thanked the chuckling dealer for his cooperation and left the casino, bumping into me as I was heading toward its front door. So all three of us went over and got back into the Rambler. “It cost Mr. X two dollars,” commented MacDougall, comfortably adjusting himself in the back seat, “but wasn’t the lesson worth it? ‘Seeing is believing.’”

Blackjack History: Professor Walker Joins Team Thorp

On our fourth gambling day, January 26th, as we’d won $738 on the day before, Thorp suggested to me the option of our inviting Professor Elbert Walker, one of his mathematical colleagues at New Mexico State University, to join us, thereby doubling our win rate. Thorp described Walker as being as good a counter as he was.

My new role was to stand behind Walker and spot any cheating. In other words, with Walker I was to take the role that Mickey MacDougall took with Thorp.

I mentioned earlier that I would cite an illustration of my own vanity, ignorance, and ineptitude, and herewith is an outstanding example. For as the official and responsible stake holder representing our beneficent Mr. X and his partners I should have had the mature judgment to hold fast to the single partnership approach which had so far produced tangible financial rewards for us all. And in this regard it must be most importantly borne in mind, that had we not been so frequently and unquestionably cheated by practically every major casino on the Strip, in the Win/Loss Tables the plus figures in the Net column would have been far larger, and by the same token, the minus figures far smaller.

Be that as it may, like a perfect fool, instead of conservatively protecting Mr. X, I acceded, largely through vanity, to the option of Professor Walker’s joining us and flying up to Las Vegas at Mr. X’s expense. Thus from our fifth gambling day, January 27th, through our seventh, January 29th, a period of three days, our so-called syndicate was composed, on the one hand, of Thorp and MacDougall, and on the other, of Walker and Barnhart. [In Beat the Dealer, neither Professor Walker’s name nor mine is mentioned.]

As it turned out, under fire, spreading from only $1 to $10, Walker wasn’t so proficient as Thorp himself, for in the middle of a deal, Walker, alas, would often freeze and forget his count. Yet Walker’s lack of experience under fire wasn’t at all the prime cause, in my opinion, of our debacle — it was my own absurd vanity of considering myself, a mere tyro in the harsh world of card and dice cheating, sufficiently knowledgeable and competent under casino conditions to detect cheating and protect Walker from cheating dealers.

That was the chief cause of Walker’s and Barnhart’s losing money at the tables. Try as I did, I was simply never competent enough to perceive when a dealer may or may not have been cheating Professor Walker. To be as proficient as Mickey MacDougall as a gambling detective requires a lifetime of experience under fire. In considering Thorp’s proffered option concerning Professor Walker I should have immediately admitted to myself my own lack of experience. I did not do so.

The wins and losses of Professor Walker I haven’t included in the Win/Loss Tables, probably because I don’t care to look at them again myself. Although Walker was a fine mathematician, a congenial, soft-spoken Texan, friendly and cooperative, for the sake of Mr. X’s dwindling resources, after our three losing days as a second count team I had to see Walker off on a plane back to New Mexico State University in Las Cruces.

And what of MacDougall and Thorp, Mr. X’s premier count team? As these two men had won relatively large sums at the Riviera Casino, they decided to try it again, preferring its tranquility and lack of crowds to the Thunderbird, the deafening clamor of whose lounge acts disturbed them. So to the Riviera they went, but it was at this casino that they were cheated by Fatso, the anchor man, who even followed them invidiously from table to table. For details of this casino’s predatory response I refer the reader to MacDougall’s article, “Even ‘Honest’ Vegas House Cheats,” of December 2, 1962, which I quoted in part earlier.

Disgusted with the anchor man at the Riviera Casino, MacDougall and Thorp moved to the Desert Inn, where MacDougall again spotted the Kentucky step up. So although Thorp’s Ultimate Strategy of aces-tens-and-others rarely calls for the player to take insurance when the dealer has an ace showing, when MacDougall spotted the step up appearing on Thorp’s second hand, he warned Thorp against following the correct mathematical strategy, declaring, “You’d better insure — I think he’s got the ten of hearts in the hole.” Sure enough, when the dealer turned over his hole card, it was the ten of hearts.

Disgusted again, MacDougall and Thorp left the Desert Inn, where on their way out, much to their consternation, they spotted, leaving the dealers’ staff room, the next dealer coming on duty, who had the effrontery to be arranging in his hands the very deck of cards he was to use on the next table of gullible blackjack players.

Meanwhile, at the Sands I’d been standing behind Professor Walker, who’d also been playing the aces-tens-and-others count, spreading only very minimum bets of from $1 to $10. Soon another player sat down on Walker’s immediate right. He was a middle-aged man, who kept grinning and chatting loquaciously with the dealer. Overly friendly, effusively affable, the man proceeded to draw and stand in such a way to ruin Professor Walker even though the latter was making the lowest possible bets.

When Walker and I moved to a second empty blackjack table, the garrulous man had the effrontery to follow us there immediately, plopping himself down again on Walker’s right, declaring, “I’m glad you guys moved — my luck at the first table was lousy too.” The man then proceeded to stand on 9 and draw on 18, a strategy so absurd even a beginner wouldn’t follow it. Most anchor men try to be quiet and inconspicuous. At the Sands their anchor man strove to be a garrulous pest. He certainly succeeded. Walker and I left. And remember: Walker was a very low roller.

On our seventh gambling day, Monday, January 29th, while MacDougall went to talk to Butch, the Sheriff of Clark County (containing Las Vegas), Thorp and I repaired on our own to the Stardust, whose 25 blackjack tables in the morning were largely deserted. The two of us seated ourselves at the first table and watched the dealer shuffle the cards suspiciously. When he dealt Thorp the first hand, he used the second deal, which both of us immediately perceived. When the dealer began doing the high-low pick up, Thorp and I got up and moved down to the fifth empty table. (MacDougall later remarked that, in the cheating trade, the high-low pick up is called hen pecking.)

At the fifth table the new dealer shuffled in such a way that the large bottom stock obviously remained unmixed. Annoyed, Thorp asked, “Would you mind shuffling the cards once more — just for luck?” Blushing, the dealer refused to reshuffle. So Thorp called over the pit boss, who made the dealer reshuffle. Just the same, once more the cards had been so inadequately mixed that, again, too many of them came out in the stacked order of high-low, high-low, high-low. In disgust Thorp and I got up and forsook the Stardust.

That night MacDougall rejoined us, and I drove Thorp and him once more to the Flamingo. As the two partners started off by winning, another anchor man soon sat down on Thorp’s right and proceeded to stand and draw to injure Thorp. But in this process the anchor man was so obvious that, incensed, for the first time, MacDougall stood up and declared angrily to the pit boss: “I’m surprised that in a place like this you’d use an anchor man!” The pit boss reddened and just stared in silence at the floor.

When he so wishes, MacDougall may be outspoken, hard-hitting, and to the point, and although Thorp and I obviously agreed with him, just the same, now at least the Flamingo management realized that that so-called businessman customarily sitting next to the blackjack-playing Professor of Mathematics — that businessman, his overcoat folded across his lap, his fedora perched jauntily on the back of his head — obviously knew a great deal more about the gambling world than they have ever suspected; so on MacDougall’s part, his chastisement of the Flamingo pit boss, however justifiable, was perhaps also a moment of imprudent self-indulgence. As the boys would say over at the poker table, “Never tip your mitt.”

That night, at the City Center Motel, we three held a council of war. Although Thorp’s Ultimate Strategy had won for Mr. X almost $2,000 (more precisely, $1,849), we felt that, owing to the rampant cheating we’d received at the hands of the Strip casinos, this sum was ludicrously small. So we decided that on the morrow we’d fly north to Reno, for although Reno blackjack rules were and are comparably less favorable to count systems, perhaps Washoe County might contain, in its untutored, provincial way, fewer cunning rogues.

As the three of us rose to our feet, I remarked, “Well on the Strip there remain at least two honest casinos — The Tropicana and the Thunderbird.”

“No,” responded MacDougall cynically, “because though the Thunderbird didn’t cheat us, while Thorp and I were playing at our table, I noticed the dealer at the next table doing the high-low pick up. So that leaves just one honest casino — The Tropicana — and how long can they hold out?”

When I said goodnight to MacDougall at his motel door, he stared gloomily down the corridor and, avoiding my gaze, declared: “Do you know why casinos cheat?” “No,” I replied. “Because if they cheat, they make more money than if they’re honest. Goodnight.” With that, he closed his door, and if that’s what the premier agent of the Gaming Control Board said, that’s how I’m quoting him.

Blackjack History: On to Reno with Team Thorp

So on our eighth gambling day, Tuesday, January 30th, we three resolutely boarded an early afternoon plane bound for Reno, Nevada. Our carrier was Bonanza Airlines, owned by the late eccentric billionaire, Howard Hughes, and our equipment was a relatively small turboprop plane, the number of its propellers being just two. Up to that day Bonanza Airlines had never suffered a single fatal crash.

To fly from Las Vegas to Reno, Nevada, is like flying over the moon. Looking down through the passenger cabin ports, the three of us viewed the bleakness of a lunarscape. Toward all horizons we saw nothing but dun-colored mountains, treeless and usually grassless too, interspersed with barren plains: no houses, no people, no animals, nothing. On rare occasions we might sight a long pickup truck slowly jouncing its way over a rutted road leading in the desert from nowhere to nowhere.

Twenty minutes after takeoff, in our cabin I occupied an aisle seat next to Thorp, on my right. Farther forward, on the left side, MacDougall occupied another aisle seat, deep in his old mystery novel, Death in a White Tie. Besides us three, the cabin contained, scattered in seats about its rear, four other travelers, including a middle-aged lady, who kept coughing slightly.

As Thorp and I chatted about blackjack, our attention became gradually focused on the slowly swinging door separating our passenger cabin from the cockpit of the two Bonanza airline pilots. When the turboprop plane tilted gently to port, the door would creak slowly open. When the plane tilted gently back to starboard, the door would creak slowly closed. So half the time, Thorp and I could glimpse the blue-uniformed shoulders of the pilot and copilot, and half the time we could not. The constant swinging and creaking were mesmerizing.

Suddenly I turned to the Wizard of Odds and said, “Just suppose that, the next time the door creaks open, instead of the two pilots facing forward and flying the airplane we see them facing each other, casually playing blackjack, and the pilot remarks to the copilot, ‘Hit me.’”

“Even better,” responded Thorp immediately, “suppose that the next time the door creaks open, instead of the two pilots actually working in their cockpit we see nothing but open sky — nothing but air!”

While guffawing at our own absurdities, we hadn’t noticed that the airplane had become beset with mechanical difficulties. After completely feathering our right engine, the pilot had turned the aircraft around, and we were headed back to Las Vegas. But would we make it? Our problem wasn’t one of insufficient fuel. Would our overheated port engine alone be able to last for the twenty-minute return flight to Las Vegas? Or would it fail too? While dismally contemplating his end, everyone in the cabin watched as the surrounding hills and desert hove closer and closer.

Finally getting up, I walked a few paces forward and tapped MacDougall on the shoulder.

He didn’t even glance up from his mystery novel. “I know,” he murmured, “we’re going to crash. We’ve been losing altitude form some time.” He continued to read calmly.

I went back and took my seat again next to Thorp. Like everyone else in the cabin we too had become silent and grim. I no longer chose to glance out the ports to assess conditions. Why gaze at the dun-colored desert coming ever nearer and bringing only death?

Just as we’d lost so much altitude that everyone aboard the plane assumed his life was near its end, however, the ever-approaching desert suddenly turned into the concrete runway of McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas. We’d been saved, but it had been very close.

As we’ve all heard, after an unnerving experience on an airplane, to regain one’s positive attitude toward life, a person should immediately board the next flight — to anywhere. So that’s what we three adventurers immediately did — but not to regain our emotional stability but to reach as quickly as possible the blackjack tables of Reno, Nevada. So in the late afternoon of Tuesday, January 30th, we belatedly touched down in a second Bonanza airplane at the Reno airport.

In Las Vegas, with our benevolent Mr. X’s $10,000 bank behind us, we’d managed to win roughly $2,000. During our two days in Reno, how did we do? If the reader glances again at Win/Loss Tables, he’ll note, under the final Reno section, at least three dismal minus figures. In other words, in Reno we managed to lose back to the casinos most of the $2,000 we’d won from them in Las Vegas.

What was the cause of our financial loss in Reno? Did the casinos there cheat us even more viciously than had those in Las Vegas? Not at all. In Reno we found the casinos neither more nor less honest than those in Las Vegas — indeed, MacDougall gave both Harrah’s and Harold’s Club an admirably clean bill of health.

Blackjack History: Assessing the Play

Here are a few of my own comments.

As the responsible stake holder for Mr. X, as I’ve already mentioned, in Las Vegas my own primary mistake was, for me — a mere tyro — to substitute for the experienced Mickey MacDougall, a professional in detecting the cheating methods of gambling casinos. In Reno I continued my purblindness. Thus, on the evening of Tuesday, January 30th, at the Holiday Inn there I foolishly substituted for MacDougall again, and in only fifteen minutes Thorp lost the largest sum of our entire nine-day trip — $600. Although two detectives for the Gaming Control Board later experienced the same cheating methods at the hands of the same crooked female blackjack dealer, whom the Holiday Inn management then fired, her just deserts hardly served to compensate Mr. X, who was out $600!

As for our premier gambler, Edward O. Thorp, according to MacDougall, Thorp had a stubborn tendency to ignore prior warnings, so that instead of making small initial bets to see if a dealer was honest, he would imprudently make large initial wagers. As too often, alas, the dealer turned out to be a crook, Mr. X lost therefrom.

Secondly, like many fighters, Thorp never wanted to admit defeat and opt for a strategic withdrawal, conserving his resources for the morrow. According to MacDougall, “ten o’clock at night was Thorp’s witching hour,” after which fatigue would naturally tend to cloud his judgment, and he would begin losing too much even to honest dealers. Sometimes we had trouble getting him away from the tables. [Retired from teaching at the business school at the University of California at Irvine, Prof. Thorp now runs a hedge fund.]

As for Mickey MacDougall himself, of the three of us I believe he had the most difficult job of all, for as both Thorp and I readily concede, from a technical standpoint it’s excessively difficult to know for sure when a dealer is or is not cheating a player. Just the same, according to us, we’re sure that we both perceived cheating going on when MacDougall insisted that nothing of the sort was occurring.

In the general matter of who ran Las Vegas in the 1960’s and the kind of people who run it today, a matter in which Mickey MacDougall, according to him, had little changed his mind, I think it only fair to give MacDougall the final say. So I quote in part from his second column on our blackjack trip, “Cards Stacked Against Big Vegas Winners,” from the November 29, 1964, issue of The Sunday Star-Ledger of Newark, NJ:

Every so often I read of a “lucky” gambler who wins a fortune in Las Vegas. Sometimes it’s $50,000. Sometimes it’s $100,000. Occasionally even more.

Don’t you believe it. No one, and I mean no one, can ever hit the gangster-controlled game in Las Vegas for any sizable sum….

As steady readers of this column know, I accompanied Edward O. Thorp, Professor of Mathematics at New Mexico State University, on a Las Vegas venture…. Professor Thorp thought he was being cheated and asked me along on his second trip to protect him from the tricksters.

All suspicions were soon verified. At casino after casino, once Thorp’s wagers hit the $500 maximum, skullduggery started. It was soon apparent that the hoodlums who control Las Vegas weren’t going to give the sucker an even break. After all, who ever heard of the lamb killing the butcher?

The story of Russian Louie will serve as a perfect example. Louis Strauss wasn’t a tourist passing through Las Vegas. He lived in the gambling capital, had many friends among the gangsters who owned the gambling houses…. So what had Russian Louie to fear if he won a fortune? His friends would protect him.

Russian Louie did win a fortune — $92,000 to be exact. He started playing blackjack at the Desert Inn and got about $6,000 ahead. In an effort to recoup, the gamblers asked him to join a high-stake poker game in one of the private rooms. Russian Louie, who felt he could hold his own in any company, agreed. His luck held. Came dawn, and he had won another $86,000.

Like all big winners he developed a headache and said he wanted to quit…. Then his very good friend, Jack Dragna, suggested a trip to Palm Springs for a weekend of rest and relaxation…. Soon a shiny black Cadillac pulled away from the Desert Inn. Marshall Caifano, like Dragna, a capo mafioso and one of the most feared gunmen in the gambling underworld, was driving. Jack Dragna sat in the back seat, Russian Louie in front with Caifano.

When the big car arrived in Palm Springs, Caifano was still driving, Jack Dragna was sitting next to him. Russian Louie, the $92,000, and a valuable diamond ring had vanished.

“We had a little argument,” Dragna explained, “and Louie decided to hitchhike.”

When I say Russian Louie vanished, I mean just that. He has never been seen since. Rumor has it that he is buried in the desert, minus the $92,000 which couldn’t be identified, but still wearing the expensive solitaire, which could be identified.

“What do the hoodlums themselves think happened to the unlucky winner? Well nowadays, when a Las Vegan wants to postpone something indefinitely, he says, “I’ll do it when Russian Louie gets back to town.”

So the next timer you read of someone winning a fortune in Las Vegas, remember the tale of Russian Louie and decide not to buck the tables there until Russian Louie gets back in town.

On Thursday, February 1, 1962, at the Reno airport Mickey MacDougall and I bid Edward O. Thorp a most cordial farewell. Although both of us believed he verily deserved one, we didn’t pin onto Thorp’s chest a gold medal for blackjack bravery — perhaps because we feared that, if only to get rid of it, he’d give it right back to us.

So far as the money itself goes, from our nine-day trip how much did we three finally win? For the final results, I refer the reader to the two columns of the Summary Table on page 15, which indicate that from the whole incredible venture, we cleared only $317.

When I got back to New York City, on the following Saturday afternoon, as was my occasional custom, at an eatery off Times Square called the 42nd Street Cafeteria, I joined my fellow amateur magician friends for refreshments and a discussion of the best way to saw a woman in half.

One of the younger magicians, a card manipulator with a side interest in gambling, named Persi Diaconis, now a Professor of Mathematics at Cornell University, approached me and whispered confidentially, “Did you hear the rumor that three mathematicians hit the Vegas blackjack tables?”

“No, I hadn’t heard that. How much did they win?”

“A hundred thousand dollars.”

I wanted to say something about that, but I decided to wait until Russian Louie gets back to town.

Thorp’s Card Counting Wins and Losses

The wins and losses at each casino visited by Edward O. Thorp, Michael MacDougall, and Russell Barnhart during their nine-day blackjack trip to Las Vegas and Reno, Nevada, from Tuesday, January 23, through Wednesday January 31, 1962.

In Las Vegas

Day Casino Hours Spent $ Bet Spread Net
1 El Cortez 1 1-5 -33
Fremont 1 5-50 -100
Horseshoe 1/4 5-50 +40
Day 1 -93
2 Fremont 3/4 5-50 +135
Stardust 1 5-50 +145
Dunes 1/2 10-100 +170
Hacienda 1 5-50 -60
Tropicana 1/2 5-50 +60
Sands 3/4 5-50 +175
Sands 1 3/4 10-100 -540
Sands 1 1/2 7-75 +130
Thunderbird 1 10-100 +20
Day 2 +235
3 Fremont 1 10-100 +105
Silver Palace 1/2 10-100 +180
Stardust 1 3/4 7-75 -176
Desert Inn 3/4 10-100 +260
Riviera 1/2 7-75 +250
Riviera 1/2 7-75 +153
Sahara 1/2 5-20 +30
Flamingo 1/4 5-50 -64
Day 3 +738
4 Fremont 1/2 7-75 -165
Horseshoe 1/4 5-20 -13
Las Vegas Club 1/4 5-50 -23
Desert Inn 1 10-100 +200
Riviera 1/4 10-100 +160
Sands 5 min. 5-50 +70
Desert Inn 3/4 5-50 +370
Sahara 1/2 10-100 +40
Tropicana 1/2 10-100 +190
Flamingo 1/2 5-50 -100
Riviera 3/4 5-10 -65
Sands 1 5-50 -165
Day 4 +499
5 Stardust 1 5-50 -80
Riviera 1/2 20-100 +285
Desert Inn 1/4 20-75 -75
Desert Inn 3/4 25-100 +380
Day 5 +510
6 Tropicana 3/4 20-200 +325
Desert Inn 1 20-200 -192
Desert Inn 3/4 25-200 -575
Riviera 5 min. 25-200 +160
Stardust 3/4 25-200 -100
Sahara 1 15-75 +245
Sands 1 1/4 20-200 -5
Day 6 -142
7 Sands 1 1/4 5-50 +40
Stardust 1/2 5-50 -170
Flamingo 1/2 10-100 +40
Dunes 1/2 1-20 -20
Day 7 -110
8 Tropicana 1 1/4 5-50 -25
Day 8 -25

In Reno

8 Holiday Inn 1/4 25-75 -600
Golden Hotel 1 5-40 -215
Harrah’s 1/2 25-200 +70
Harrah’s 2 1/2 25-200 -500
Day 8 -1245
9 Harold’s Club 1 1-20 -50
Day 9 -50

Summary of Wins and Losses

Day Win Loss
1 -93
2 +235
3 +738
4 +499
5 +510
6 -142
7 -110
8 -1270
9 -50
Totals +1982 -1665

And as 1,982 dollars minus 1,665 dollars equal 317 dollars, that was our final total win for our nine-day trip to Nevada, excluding expenses: +$317.00.

[Note: Read more about Ed Thorp and his pioneering research in blackjack card counting in our article on the Blackjack Hall of Fame. In addition to card counting, Ed Thorp is famous for his success as an investor in the stock market.]

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System Smitty

System Smitty and the Blindfolded Monkeys

By Arnold Snyder

(From Blackjack Forum, March 1987)
© 1987 Blackjack Forum

Take the case of Benjamin F. “System Smitty” Smith. You may recall System Smitty’s name from Ed Thorp’s 1962 classic, Beat the Dealer. According to Thorp, Smitty was a Las Vegas character he heard about in the late 1950’s, who had personally devised a near perfect basic strategy for casino blackjack, years prior to the publication of any such strategy. Smitty had also devised a valid card counting system — his own variation of a “ten count” — based on 100,000 self-dealt hands.

A few years ago, Julian Braun, the IBM computer whiz who did the programming for the 1966 edition of Thorp’s book, told me some stories about System Smitty, whom he’d known personally in the early 1960s.

Smitty made his living as a professional gambler. But, although Ed Thorp credits Smitty for developing one of the first valid card counting systems, Smitty did not limit his play to the blackjack tables. He could often be found playing craps, roulette, or any other game that the casinos offered. His nickname came from the fact that he had systems for every game and every situation.

Smitty’s advice was sought out by many out-of-town high rollers who came to play with big money. Smitty charged them nothing for his services if they lost. If they won, he took a percentage of the win.

Because Smitty used many traditional types of gambling systems — progression systems, parlay systems, cancellation systems, etc. — Smitty did win for his clients most of the time. In fact, on negative expectation games like craps and roulette, Smitty’s clients lost more money overall than they won, but Smitty would bet wildly toward the end of a client’s play if the desired win result had not yet been achieved, and he often pulled out a lucky win. It made no difference to Smitty whether his client lost a small amount or tapped out his entire trip bank, since Smitty only got paid when his client won.

Traditional gambling systems like these may not have a long run advantage, but most of them have healthy short run positive expectations. This is why such systems have always appealed to gamblers. Smitty made lots of short-run money, and when one of those horrendous occasional losing situations occurred, where Smitty’s client tapped out, Smitty didn’t lose a cent. He simply failed to collect his percentage of the win.

Smitty had lots of repeat customers and word-of-mouth advertising from satisfied clients, who always remembered the preponderance of wins. These customers, like Smitty himself, tended to forget the losing sessions, choosing to remember the more common winning sessions. The losses could be chalked up to extraordinarily “bad” cards, or “cold” dice, or the “wrong” system at the wrong time, or any other typical gambler’s excuse. Smitty never lied to his clients, never cheated them or stole from them. He did his best to increase his clients’ bankrolls, since that was the only way he could get paid. He didn’t want to work all weekend for nothing. Most of the time, he won.

Smitty was not, while working for a client, a professional gambler. He usually didn’t have a long run edge over the house. He was, in a sense, a system seller.

This is not to say that Smitty didn’t believe in all of his systems. Often when one of his many clients left town after a big score, leaving Smitty with a handsome “consulting fee,” Smitty would hit the tables again with one of his systems. Although he experienced many of those “infrequent” wipe out sessions throughout his life, it never bothered him. There was always another client around the corner.

A lot of players are tempted by “short-run” systems. But unless, like Smitty, you’re playing with other people’s money, essentially making your percentage by “selling” these systems to tourists, you’re going to be a long-run loser.  ♠

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Stock Control Shuffles

How to Stack the Deck with Stock Control Shuffles

by Sam Case (with photo by Ron Hunter)

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. II #4, December 1982)
© 1982 Blackjack Forum

I must be the world’s pickiest card player. I always study a dealer before sitting down. Although there are more ways to cheat while shuffling than there are cards in a game of Blackjack II, there are several important things to watch for to avoid most cheating poker or blackjack dealers.

One thing that I look at is the quality of the shuffle. I don’t want a perfectly even shuffle, but neither do I want to see clumps of cards falling together. In either case, the dealer may be false shuffling. That clump that you see may be a card stock, selected cards that the cheating dealer wants to put in or keep out of play.

This type of cheating was documented way back in 1902, in S.W. Erdnase’s Expert At the Card Table (p. 34-39). I’ll explain the methods of stock control shuffles and the uses of this type of cheating technique.

Stacking the Deck in Your Neighborhood Poker Game

Suppose you’ve stacked the deck in your neighborhood poker game, and you do not want those stacked cards shuffled with the rest of the deck. Or, suppose a blackjack dealer decides to keep several tens on the bottom of the deck. This would have a very nasty effect on your game.

Tip-off #1: If you’re a card counter, you’ll keep getting high counts near the end of the deck. However, poker players won’t get this tip-off, and waiting to find this out in a blackjack game can be expensive. I’ll explain how this stock control shuffle is done, and the only other tip-off you can watch for.

Place three or four tens on the bottom of the deck. Cut the top half to the right, and get ready to shuffle. Lift the inner long sides slightly, then run those three or four cards from the left-hand side before dropping any from the right-hand pack. Continue the shuffle in a normal riffle fashion. Square the deck. A cheating dealer who does this three times before offering you the cut keeps that card stock intact on the bottom. All he has to do is nullify the cut and you’re in trouble.

This running of cards can be used to control a stock at any point in the deck, but the bottom of the deck is the easiest place to use. The top of the deck is the next easiest place, but since the top of the deck is the easiest place to watch, some cover is needed. Now try this: put the card stock on top of the deck, and cut the top half to the right The idea is to do a similar shuffle, except start off shuffling evenly, but drop the top stock last to keep it in place.

Notice how easy this would be to spot (see photograph above, exaggerated for clarity). No dealer would leave this uncovered. What a dealer might do is hold back the top card of the left-hand packet (as well as the right-hand card stock), drop the right-hand stock and then the left-hand top card.

From almost any position, this makes the block of cards more difficult to spot, especially when you consider the speed with which most dealers shuffle. If you suspect an uneven shuffle you might try sitting low in your seat to view the deck edge on.

Why doesn’t that top card get in the way? By using a crimped card, say the bottom one of the stack, the dealer could bring the stack to the bottom with one cut (see “The Gamblers Crimp”, link at the left, for details).

The dealer, however, would probably want to keep a top stock on top. After you cut, in a head-on blackjack game, if the cards were in the following order: ANY CARD, ANY CARD, 10, ANY CARD, ACE, after the burn the dealer would beat you with an ace-down blackjack.

The following stack—ANY, ANY, 5 or 6, ANY, 5—would be a very nasty percentage play in blackjack (dealer 10 or 11 with low card showing). A larger stack could force you to split 8s vs. a dealer 21, etc., depending on the dealer’s stacking abilities and possibilities. And I’m sure you can imagine the possibilities in poker.

So, the moral of the story is to watch for even shuffles, especially at the top and bottom of the deck. Next time I’ll explain how a card stock is set up during a riffle shuffle. Till then remember: you want to play with stacked women, not stacked decks! ♠

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Stickin’ It to the Safari Club

by Nick Alexander

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XVII #1, Spring 1997)
© Blackjack Forum 1997

August 2, 1988, Tuesday. Read an article in the Sunday Times entitled, “SAFARI CLUB’S MYSTERIES MAY BE UNSOLVABLE.” The article details an account of Park Chong Kyu’s dealings with Northrop Corp. You may remember that Northrop paid him $6,250,000 to build a hotel in Korea and was bilked out of the money.

What this translates to is: Northrop paid him a bribe so he would convince the government to buy F-20 jets. The article goes on to detail that Park, who died in ’85, left behind an American Legion Post in Seoul known as the Safari Club. This was to be the site of the hotel.

This club and the rest of Park’s legacy now belong to his partner Ma Myong Dok. In the article, Ma is called “an elusive businessman with a checkered past.” The story tells how he was busted for illegal gambling at the Safari Post in ’85 and spent eight months in jail, which brings me to…

Ma is Not My Mother, and the 21 Card Grab

It was August of ’86, and my first trip to Korea. I had stayed at the one legal casino in Seoul for a week and it was time to give them a rest. I went to Inchon to play and lasted three hours before they told me that I couldn’t play anymore. They were very apologetic about the barring. Much nicer than they ever are in the States. So, I made my way back to Seoul and decided to try one of the illegal casinos. Yes, it had been closed in ’85 but after Ma spent eight months in jail, he opened right back up.

I had been told about the Safari Club by Woodpecker, but his directions were impossible, and pronunciation of a Korean word with an Australian accent left cab drivers stupefied… “Oxy dong… Take me to Oxy dong.” Well, that sure didn’t work.

Woodpecker was in Hong Kong so he couldn’t take me. I tried sidling up to Americans and speaking in hushed tones out of the side of my mouth. “Do you know where the Safari Club is?” No one seemed to know. I had visions of sneaking down a dark alley, rapping on the door and telling the guard, “Cho sent me.” Then I met a guy in Wendy’s one day who opened one of the magazines printed in English to a full-page color ad that said, “Come gamble at the Safari Club.”

As in the U.S., some things are more illegal than others, and it helps to have a brother in the Police Department.

One of the things I’ve learned traveling around the world as a professional gambler is that a casino that’s privately owned hates losing even more than a multi-billion dollar corporation. The smaller the club, the more careful you have to be.

The Safari Club had six blackjack tables and one baccarat table. It was a quiet little place and I was the only Caucasian there. Koreans are not allowed to gamble (even in the illegal casinos) so the other 25 or 30 players must have been Korean-Americans or Japanese.

I sat down at a table and noticed the limit was 300,000 Won, about $350 U.S. Not much compared to the two million limit at Walker Hill ($2500), but what the hell? After 20 minutes I was winning about $1,500 U.S. and the boss brought four new decks of cards to the table.

This is a common practice even in Vegas, although usually it’s stupid and unnecessary. This is also the time to be on your toes. The most common move at this point is for the boss to bring four decks that have a bunch of tens and aces removed, or four decks with lots of extra 4s, 5s, and 6s. The card counter in either case will start counting all these small cards coming out of the shoe and increase his bets, waiting for all those blackjacks that will never come.

This dealer carefully spread each deck face-up on the table as they are supposed to, and I carefully checked each one and found everything to be in order. But don’t relax yet. You never know what you might see if you watch that shuffle closely. And here it was…

The 21 Card Grab

After spreading the four decks the dealer placed two decks on her left, and two decks on her right, as is common when shuffling four decks. Now the procedure is to grab a clump of each stack and shuffle them together, working your way through all four decks. But what my dealer did is grab exactly 21 cards off each stack and shuffle them together.

How do I know it was 21 cards? Because she made the grabs very deliberately and then tilted both grabs exposing the 8 of diamonds on the bottom of both packets. Now to understand why this is important, we must look at a new deck of cards. They are arranged like this:

A2345678910JQK

A2345678910JQK

KQJ1098765432A

KQJ1098765432A

The suits are arranged clubs, diamonds, hearts, spades. So, at this point the dealer has shuffled the first 21 cards of two decks together… No big deal. Now she grabs 10 cards off each deck and shuffles them. So this clump is going to have 16 tens and four nines. Now she shuffles the rest of the cards and arranges them so that this clump is just above the middle of the four decks.

The reason for that is that most people, when they cut the cards, do it in about the middle. A cut like that will put these tens at the back of the shoe, behind the stop card. The same as if they had been removed from the deck altogether.

“Well… let me cut that deck. I feel lucky!”

The dealer smiled and handed me the cut card. I cut that little clump right to the front of the shoe. Now I knew that for 20 cards, there would be 16 tens and four 9s. I bet three hands of the limit…300,000. I got 19, 19, and 20. The dealer had a ten up. I surrendered my two 19s. (That means I gave up half my bet and surrendered the hand.) The dealer had 20 so I pushed the other hand.

I bet three more hands of 300,000. I got 20, 20, and 20. The dealer had a 9 up. Wait just a minute here… I think I’ll split this here pair of tens. I received another 10… split again, another ten, split again. I split out to four hands and got twenty on three and 19 on one.

Well, at this point the bosses went crazy. They weren’t sure what had happened but they knew I had just won another $2,000 U.S. with the most hare-brained play imaginable. There is one thing that all foreign casinos have learned… if an American starts winning, throw him out! This is true from Africa to Aruba, and from Monte Carlo to Macao. Well, I lasted less than two hours and won about $3,000 U.S.

The Wendy’s in Seoul

I was in Wendy’s the next day telling this story to Tom C. It’s very important for anyone visiting Korea to know about Wendy’s. If you’ve seen the movie Casablanca, Wendy’s is Rick’s and Tom C. is Sidney Greenstreet. Anything you need Tom can introduce you to the person who can procure it for you. Need a visa extension? Sure. Want to meet the ambassador from Samoa? No problem. Listen… I know a girl that’s perfect for you. See the one there with the eye patch… And so it goes, every day at Wendy’s.

Anyway, I told Tom the story and he asked me if I wanted to go back. I told him that I didn’t think they would let me back in, at which point he said, “I’ll introduce you to Ma.”

“I thought your Mother was in Maryland?”

“Not Ma… Ma. Ma is not my Mutha.”

Yes, he really says things like “Mutha.” Well, Ma is “a good friend of mine.” It turns out that almost everybody in Korea is a “good friend” of Tom’s. He explained that Ma owns the club now that Pistol Park is dead.

“Pistol Park?”

It seems they called him that because he loved guns and always wore a six gun with a pearl handle. He paid some outrageous amount of money for it because the American that sold it to him claimed it had belonged to Jesse James or Billy the Kid.

I was not keen on meeting someone that was a business associate of anyone with Pistol in his name, but Tom insisted. We went back to the Safari Club a few days later. As we entered, Tom greeted the three Sumo types in the lobby and they all bowed and scraped until they saw me. Their eyes got very wide and they started saying, “No, no. Ahhhh…no no!” and waving their hands back and forth. I think this was the only English word they knew.

One guy picked up the phone and started jabbering away. At this point, Ma appeared from the casino and the three men started pointing at me and a heated discussion ensued. Tom, who has been in Korea for 15 years and still doesn’t speak the language, jumped right in.

“What’s the problem, Ma? This is a very good friend of mine.”

Well, Ma had not been there the night I was barred but had heard the stories. He told Tom that there wasn’t any problem but would prefer it if I would only play for fun and not bet too much money. We stayed for about an hour. I played while Tom and Ma sat at the table talking. I never bet more than $10, and still felt conspicuous. So, Tom did get me back in, and I did meet Ma, but it was very clear that I would not be able to win any appreciable amount of money.

On my next trip to Seoul, Tom told me that Ma had been called by his brother at the police station, and told that he was going to be raided, so Ma shut down for a night, but the raid didn’t come. This happened four or five times and Ma got tired of his brother crying wolf.

The next time the call came, Ma stayed open and was busted. He was back in jail, but I now hear that he’s out, and the Safari Club will be open again soon. ♠

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St. Louis Blues

An Ace Tracker’s Lament

By Darryl Purpose

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XVII #3, Fall 1997)
© Blackjack Forum 1997

[Note from Arnold Snyder: Since the writing of this article, Darryl Purpose has been elected to the Blackjack Hall of Fame. He is also a successful folk singer and songwriter. To check out his latest musical release, see DarrylPurpose.com.]

I’m playing some blackjack around St. Louis. Scouting and playing small stakes, trying to dig out this 50k bank that is now 10k. They have some special gambling law in Missouri designed to protect the players – you can only buy in $500 on any one “cruise.” Before I learned to be careful about that I had to walk away from a +20 shoe for lack of chips. Arghh.

At one point the dealer was a tad sloppy and exposed the card on top of the pack just before the cut. Clear as day, it was a big ol’ ACE. Also clear as day was a big ol’ Queen of Diamonds on the bottom of the pack.

There was one other player on the table and she cut the cards about 1 ¾ decks from the top. I’m thinking – if that Queen of Diamonds comes out as the last card of a round, this could be real interesting…

Tracking the Ace: Strategy

It’s a quarter game, and my strategy to this point, on a quarter game, has been to leave the table at any negative, but when this one goes negative, I stay. The woman sitting in the #2 spot is large, taking up a little of the #1 & #3 spots as well. This doesn’t leave much room for me to squeeze into first base, so I wait to grab the spot, because, after all, it’s a long shot that I’ll need it.

I’m hoping this woman leaves the table because that would increase the chances of the Queen of Diamonds falling as the last card of the round. Sure enough, my prayers are answered. She taps out, gets up… then with a grunt and a mumble reaches between her sizeable breasts and pulls out two sweaty hundred dollar bills, and the game continues. As we get to the middle of the deck, she says, “Mind if I play two hands?” That would certainly reduce the chances of the Queen falling on the last card!

I conjure up a sincere confidence and say emphatically, as if I know that this would bring us all kinds of bad luck, “Play one.”

The deck is down to about the two-deck level. I bet $50. I figure, that Queen might come out in the hit cards leaving me with the option of doing something really interesting and really profitable, like… doubling on a hard 20?! Maybe not, but certainly an A,9.

The possibilities are swimming through my head. I don’t bet too big because I only have $250 in chips and the chance to buy only $500 more, and if that Queen of Diamonds comes out as the last card of the round, I’d like to have some money to bet the ACE!

The dealer has a 6 up, 5 in the hole, hits it with a little card and Boom, the QUEEN OF DIAMONDS! Exactly what I was looking for! Exactly the place in the deck expected!

But…I didn’t really plan this whole thing out… I’ve got to get over to first base!!! I’ve got to buy some more chips!!! I’ve got to figure out how much to bet!!!

I say to the dealer, “Hold it up!” Then, turning to the other player, I say, “Mind if I play first base on this one?!” I speak confidently, just a little like a crazy person, a superstitious person, like a person who doesn’t care what the world thinks, but has a notion that this or that will bring him luck and is hell-bent on carrying that out. (Like your average casino-goer, maybe?)

I give the dealer $200 and announce, “I’m going to play first base!”

As I move over I’m quite relieved to see that the large woman isn’t miffed. She thinks it’s kind of amusing. I think she even feels a little sorry for me. The whole thing must seem a tad pathetic at this point.

How much to bet?! I’m thinking—save enough to double down. Bet half of what I have available (about $350). But as the dealer is changing my $200, I realize that the advantage from doubling (8%??) is nothing compared to the 50+% that I have for getting the ace, besides, since I’m getting the ace, it’s only soft doubles that we’re missing anyway.

Right?!

1/3 Kelly would call for a $3,000+ bet.

Right?

I bet everything.

It’s a big stack ’cause it’s got lots of $1 and 50 cent chips in it.

The floorman comes over and asks, “Is this a bet?!”

I haven’t bet over $100 in this place to this point… I figure the whole scene is already over the top, so I say with conviction, “Yes! I’m going to get a blackjack!! Give me my blackjack!”

I’m thinking hard about the appropriate reaction on my part when I do get my blackjack. I hadn’t really figured it out when the first card was dealt… the ace… but what’s this?!… it’s not the ace… It’s the FIVE of CLUBS!

A Bad Time for a Sad Lesson in Ace Location Technique

In that crack in time between worlds when everything is in slow motion, you have all the time in the world to understand.

I fully understand that I’ve got 7% of the bankroll out there, I can’t double down, and I’ve got the FIVE of CLUBS! The next card falls…

QUEEN of DIAMONDS to the player next to me!… and even before the next card comes out I understand even more… I’ve got 7% of the bankroll on the table and I’ve got the Five of Clubs and the dealer has the big ol’ ACE…

Of course, y’all being professional and all, you know that it doesn’t really matter how the hand turned out… ♠

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Risk of Ruin for Video Poker and Other Skewed-Up Games

By Dunbar and Math Boy

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. XIX #3, Fall 1999)
© 1999 Blackjack Forum

Introduction

In the world of blackjack, the risk of ever going bust when starting with a fixed bankroll and a fixed game is well known. The formulas for predicting fluctuation and the risk of ruin in blackjack can be extended to any game where there is only one payout for winning bets. However, there are a multitude of games for which the risk of ruin (“RoR”) is not well understood. For games like video poker, Caribbean stud with high jackpots, certain advantageous slot machines, state lotteries with large payouts, and similar games little has been written. With this article we hope to remedy this situation.

With video poker and other lottery-type games, the large jackpot creates a substantial skew in the distribution of possible outcomes. This is very different from blackjack, where the payoffs are roughly the same size as the bets, and the possible outcomes from a single event are roughly symmetric. How can we calculate the risk of ruin for these lottery-type games?

The Risk Of Ruin Equation For One Lopsided Game

A few months ago, a Russian mathematician, Evgeny Sorokin, posted a remarkable solution to this problem on the website, bjmath.com. For an example that illustrates Sorokin’s solution., say we are playing this simple game: We bet $1 with the following possible results:

75% of the time we lose $1,

24.99% of the time we win $1,

and 0.01% of the time we win $5101.

Our expectation, or ev is:

75% x (-1) + 24.99% x (+1) + 0.01% x (+5101) = 1%

How much money do you think it would take to play this +1% ev game so that the risk of losing your entire bankroll was just 5%? Would $10,000 be enough? $100,000? Nope, still not enough.

We want to know the risk of ruin for various bankrolls. But what happens if we start with exactly $1? Our risk of ruin will be high, of course, but how high?

If we start with $1, we will be wiped out 75% of the time after the first round. So our risk of ruin is 75% plus the chance that we eventually get wiped out even after we win our first bet. We can write that as follows:

RoR = 75% + 24.99% x (risk of losing $2) + 0.01% x (risk of losing $5102) [1]

But how do we calculate the chance that we get wiped out after winning our first bet? Here’s how: Consider the 24.99% of the time that we win $1 Now our “bankroll” is $2. If we designate the risk of ruin for losing $2 as R(2), and the risk of losing $1 as R(1), then

R(2) = R(1) x R(1). [2]

This is just like saying that the probability of flipping 2 heads is ½ x ½ = ¼ . We want to know the probability of losing a $1 “bankroll” and then losing another $1 “bankroll.” Since the events are independent, we multiply the probabilities, just as with a coin-flip.

And what about the 0.01% of the time that we are lucky enough to win $5101 on the first round? Then our bankroll is $5102, and we need to know the risk of losing $5102. The risk of losing $5102 is the same as the risk of losing a $1 bankroll 5102 times in a row. We just multiply R(1) by itself 5101 times to conclude

R(5102) = R(1).5102 [3]

Let’s rewrite [1] as R(1) = 75% + 24.99% x R(2) + 0.01% x R(5102). Using [2] and [3], this becomes:

R(1) = 75% + 24.99% x R(1)2 + 0.01% x R(1).5102 [4]

Now all we have to do is find the value of R(1), between 0 and 1, which makes the left and right hand sides of [4] equal. That may look difficult, but it is an easy problem for any spreadsheet like Excel. The solution is R(1) = 99.999221%.

Now we can get the RoR for any bankroll. For $10,000,

R(10,000) = R(1)10,000 = 0.9999922110,000 = 92.5%

We can also answer the question we posed earlier: How much bankroll does it take to reduce the risk of ruin for this game to 5%? We’ll use a general expression for [2] and [3] which is good for any game,

R(b) = R(1).b [5]

In our case this becomes 5% = (99.999221%)b, and all we have to do is solve for “b”.

Taking logarithms, ln(5%) = b x ln(99.999221%). Solving this equation for b, we have that b = ln(5%) / ln(99.999221%) = $384,787. This is the answer to our earlier question; it takes $384,787 to play this game with a 5% RoR.

Once you know R(1), you can get the risk associated with any bankroll by using [5]. And you can get the bankroll, b, necessary for a desired risk level from:

b = ln(desired risk level) / ln(R(1)). [6]

The General Risk Of Ruin Equation For Games Like Video Poker

We can generalize [4] to other games. In general, the risk of losing a 1 unit bankroll in a game like video poker is:

R(1) = E [pi x R(zi)] [7].

In [7], R(zi) is the risk of losing a bankroll of size zi. Each zi is the payoff on outcome i which occurs with probability pi. For example, in full pay Deuces Wild video poker, there are 11 types of hands in the payoff schedule ranging from nothing to a royal flush. (see Table 1) Each summed term in [7] would refer to one hand in the Deuces Wild payoff schedule. For example, the 11th type of hand in the Deuces Wild payoff schedule would be a royal flush, and z11 would equal 800. Then p11 would be the probability of getting a royal flush; which will depend on the strategy you use. The value shown in Table 1, 0.0000221, is for perfect play, as listed in Dan Paymar’s Video Poker–Optimum Play (1998).

Table 1. DEUCES WILD PAYOFF SCHEDULE
Hand Payoff Probability
Zi Pi
1 Non-winner 0 0.5468
2 Trips 1 0.2845
3 Straight 2 0.05662
4 Flush 2 0.01652
5 Full house 3 0.02123
6 Four-of-a-kind 5 0.06494
7 Straight flush 9 0.004120
8 Five-of-a-kind 15 0.003201
9 Royal flush (deuces) 25 0.001795
10 Four deuces 200 0.0002037
11 Royal flush (natural) 800 0.0000221

We can use [5] to replace each R(zi) in [7] with R(1)Zi. We conclude

R(1) = E [pi x R(1)Zi]. [8]

This generalized risk equation can be used for any game with a constant set of payouts that occur with a prescribed frequency. If a game does not have a positive expectation, then the smallest positive solution for R(1) is 1, reflecting the fact that ruin is inevitable. Video poker is well suited for the above equations.. In the next section we will show how to use [8] to calculate the risk of ruin for the Deuces Wild version of video poker.

Risk Of Ruin For Deuces Wild Video Poker

Table 1 shows the payout schedule (z1, z2, …z11) for full-pay Deuces Wild. Also shown are the probabilities of achieving each hand (p1,p2,…p11), with perfect play. (Video Poker–Optimum Play, (1998) by Dan Paymar). Thus, for Deuces Wild, [8] looks like

R(1) = 0.5468 x R(1)0 + 0.2845 x R(1)1 +…+ 0.0000221 x R(1).800 [9]

The value of R(1) which “solves” this equation is 0.9993527.

How much money do you need to play Deuces Wild with a 5% RoR? Using [6], we get b=ln(5%)/ln(0.9993527) = 4,626.7 units.

Definition: A unit is the minimum bet on a video poker machine for which the full royal flush odds are paid. (Video poker machines must almost always be played for more than one coin, in order to get the maximum odds on a royal flush.)

Thus, to play with a 5% RoR on a quarter machine which requires 5 coins, we would need $1.25 x 4,626.7 = $5,784. A $1 machine would require $5 x 4,626.7 = $23,134.

Using Excel To Solve The Risk of Ruin Equation

If you are unfamiliar with spreadsheets, you may want to skip this section.

There are a few minor tricks to using Excel to find the correct value for R(1) in Eq 9. First, pick a cell which will end up being your R(1), and place an initial guess of 0.5 in the cell. In a second cell, calculate the right hand side of Eq. 9, using the 1st cell as R(1). Our goal is to find the R(1) which makes these 2 cells equal. So, multiply the difference between the first 2 cells by 1 billion, and place the result in a 3rd cell. (We multiply by 1 billion to force Excel to get a very precise answer.) Now use Excel’s Goal Seek command to force the 3rd cell to zero by adjusting the 1st cell. When Goal Seek is done, the value of R(1) which solves [9] will appear in your 1st cell. In the Deuces Wild example above, this value was 0.9993527.

By making our initial guess for R(1) at 0.5, we have avoided a potential problem. The problem lies in the fact that R(1) = 1 is a solution of [9]. In fact, R(1)=1 is a solution to every such game that has any negative payouts, including both positive and negative expectation games. By making our initial guess at 0.5 in a positive expectation game, we have found that Goal Seek always finds the desired value of R(1) which is between 0 and 1.

What About “Cash Back”?

Many casino slot clubs offer a “cash back”, in which a fixed percent (typically 0.1% to 0.7%) of the total amount bet is calculated and paid to the player after some accumulation. Cash back makes playing video poker more attractive. Even though cash back is paid in increments (after several hours, for example), the effect on RoR can be very closely approximated by assuming the cash back payout is instantaneous. Then we can write [8], the generalized risk equation, as

R(1) = E [pi x R(1)(Zi+C)]. [10]

where C is the percent cash back. Once we solve this equation for R(1), we can easily calculate the RoR for any bankroll, using [5]. This is what we have done in Table 2.

To maintain generality in Table 2, we have related bankroll to the size of the royal flush payoff.

Definition: A 1xRoyal bankroll is the payoff for a royal flush times the unit.

For example, for a $1 machine that requires 5 coins, a 1xRoyal bankroll is 800 x $5 = $4,000.

Table 2 RoR FOR DEUCES WILD WITH CASH BACK
B Cash Back
A in Royals in Units 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0%
N 1xRoyal = 800 59.6% 51.0% 43.2% 36.3% 30.2% 24.9%
K 2 1,600 30.4% 26.0% 18.7% 13.2% 9.1% 6.2%
R 3 2,400 21.1% 13.3% 8.1% 4.8% 2.8% 1.5%
O 4 3,200 12.6% 6.8% 3.5% 1.7% 0.8% 0.4%
L 5 4,000 7.5% 3.4% 1.5% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1%
L

Legend to Table 2: The values in the table give the RoR for various levels of cash back and for various bankrolls. Bankroll is given both as a multiple of the royal flush jackpot and also as the number of units. For Deuces Wild, the royal flush jackpot is 800 units per coin. Thus, “2xRoyal” is 1,600 units. For a $1 game which requires 5 coins, multiply the number of units by $5. For a $0.25 game, multiply by $1.25. So, 2xRoyal on a $1 machine would be 1,600 x $5 = $8,000.

The data in Table 2 are illustrated in Chart 1.

Legend to Chart: This chart shows how cash back affects risk of ruin. Each line represents a different initial bankroll. Bankroll is given as a multiple of the royal flush jackpot. (see, also, Table 2.)

Table 2 and Chart 1 show how valuable cash back is, not just for ev, but also for lowering bankroll requirements. With no cash back on a dollar machine, you need $20,000 (= 5 royals) to have an RoR of 7.5%. But a 0.4% cash back will get you almost the same RoR (8.1%) for only a $12,000 bankroll.

Other Applications

Any positive ev game with a guaranteed set of payoffs with fixed probabilities, including at least one losing outcome, can be analyzed using the generalized risk equation, equation [8]. If a game has a progressive jackpot, such as Caribbean Stud, some “reel” slot machines, and progressive video poker machines, then the generalized risk equation is still useful. If the equation is solved for what one considers the lowest playable jackpot, then the result will be an upper bound on the risk of ruin. If a jackpot almost never rises above a certain level, then solving at that level will give a lower bound on the RoR.

Even a lottery can be analyzed using these methods if one considers the chance the jackpot will be shared by more than one winner.

Comparison To Other Methods

An equation that is often used to accurately calculate the RoR for blackjack was published by George C. in “How To Make $1 Million Playing Casino Blackjack” (1988):

RoR = ((1-ev/sd) / (1+ev/sd)) ^ (b/sd) [11]

where sd is standard deviation and “^” signifies “raised to the power of”. If we apply [11] to the Deuces Wild game with no cash back, we can compare the RoRs to what we get from the generalized risk equation:

Bankroll
(in royals)
RoR approx
by [11]
RoR exact
by [8]
and [5]
5 9.6% 7.5%
6 6.0% 4.5%
7 3.8% 2.7%
8 2.4% 1.6%

So, on a 5-coin dollar machine, the exact RoR for a $32,000 (=8 royals) bankroll is 1.6%, versus the 2.4% we would get from [11]. To get the RoR down to 1%, you actually only need $35,600, instead of the $39,400 predicted by [11].

The differences are caused by the substantial asymmetry of video poker payoffs in comparison to a game like blackjack.

Summary

We have described a method for doing accurate risk of ruin calculations on profitable video poker (and other similar) games. The method involves:

  1. Solving [8] to get the risk of losing a 1-unit “bankroll”
  2. Using [5] to calculate the RoR for any bankroll.
  3. Using [6] to calculate the bankroll required to achieve a chosen level of risk.

In Table 2 and Chart 3 we have presented the results of using this approach to analyze RoR for full-pay Deuces Wild. In a future article, we intend to present similar RoR tables for various other video poker games.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Evgeny Sorokin for presenting and explaining the generalized risk equation which is the basis of this article. We are also indebted to MathProf for helpful discussions about the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the generalized risk equation. Thanks also to Arthur Dent, Bootlegger, JD, MathProf and “P” for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. ♠

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Poker Tournament Satellites

Why Skillful Satellite Play Cuts Your Bankroll Requirements More Than You Think

by Arnold Snyder and Math Boy

(From Blackjack Forum , Vol. XXVI #1, Winter 2007)
© Blackjack Forum Online 2007

This article will look primarily at how you should estimate the dollar value of a poker tournament satellite. It will look at the factors that make a satellite a good investment, and will discuss how skill at satellites can lower the bankroll you need to enter bigger, more costly poker tournaments, or lower your risk of ruin (RoR) for any given bankroll. We’re going to focus on specific satellite strategies in a later article. In this article, we’ll look at the dollar value of satellites to a player who already has the strategic skills necessary to beat satellites.

First, a definition: A satellite is a tournament that does not award money to the winner(s), but instead awards an entry to a tournament that has a bigger buy-in cost. In some satellites, a small amount of money is awarded in addition to a seat or seats into a bigger event, but this money is a secondary prize, awarded either to cover the winners’ travel expenses or to “round out” the prize pool.

It is the seat in the bigger tournament that is the main prize. There are some satellite pros who play satellites primarily for money, not seats into a bigger event. Many satellites, especially for big multi-tournament events, award tournament chips rather than seats in specific events, and these chips can be sold to other players who are buying into the big events. Our primary focus in this article, however, will be on players who want to use satellites to lower their entry costs into main events.

A single table satellite will usually start with ten players, and will typically award one winner a seat in a tournament that has a buy-in of about ten times the cost of the satellite. Some single-table satellites award seats to the top two finishers. A “super satellite” is a multi-table satellite that will award multiple seats into a major tournament, with the exact number dependent on the number of entrants in the satellite.

The “House Edge” on Poker Tournament Satellites

The first thing we need to consider when analyzing a satellite’s value is the house edge. By this, I mean the percentage of the total cost of the satellite that the players are paying to the house for hosting the satellite. Figuring out the house commission is pretty straightforward. We need only two factors: the total combined dollar cost to all of the entrants, and the total dollar value of the satellite prize pool.

For example, a popular World Poker Tour (WPT) single-table satellite has a buy-in of $125. One of the ten entrants will win two $500 tournament chips plus $120 in cash. The other nine entrants receive nothing. For big multi-event tournaments like the WPT or the World Series of Poker (WSOP), it is not uncommon for the hosting casino to run satellites that award tournament chips that may be used in bigger events, instead of seats into a specific event.

Although the series of tournaments may conclude with a “main event,” usually the event with the highest buy-in, there will be many events with smaller buy-ins that precede the main event. A player who wins two $500 tournament chips may use those chips to enter two $500 events, a single $1000 event, or as partial payment into an event that has a buy-in greater than $1000.

In this particular WPT satellite example, the house collects $125 x 10 = $1250, while paying out $500 + $500 (two chips) + $120 (cash) = $1120. So, the house profits $1250 – $1120 = $130 every time they run this satellite. The house edge from the players’ perspective is: $130 / $1250 = 10.40%. Which is to say, the house keeps 10.4% of all the money they collect from the satellite entrants.

At the 2006 Mirage Poker Showdown, a WPT series of tournaments with a $10K main event, there were seven different single-table satellite formats. All were ten-player/one-winner formats. The least expensive had a $60 buy-in, with the winner receiving a single $500 chip plus $50 cash. The most expensive had a $1060 buy-in, with the winner receiving twenty $500 chips (a total of $10K in chips) plus $340 in cash. The chart below shows the buy-ins of these seven satellites with their payouts, the house commission (in $), and the house edge (in %).

Mirage Poker Showdown (WPT)
Single Table Satellites, one winner format
Buy-in Payout in Chips Payout in Cash Total Payout House Commission $ House%
60 500 50 550 50 8.33%
125 1000 120 1120 130 10.40%
175 1500 120 1620 130 7.43%
225 2000 120 2120 130 5.78%
275 2500 120 2620 130 4.73%
810 7500 340 7840 260 3.21%
1060 10000 340 10340 260 2.45%

One obvious trend is that, in general, the greater the buy-in cost, the lower the house edge. The only exception among this group of satellites is that the house edge on the least expensive ($60 buy-in) satellite is smaller than the house edge on the second cheapest ($125 buy-in) satellite.

Poker Tournament Satellite Value for the “Average” Player

As a satellite player, what does the house edge mean to you? Consider your result in these satellites if you play with an “average” level of skill that gives you neither an advantage nor a disadvantage against the field. Some may be better players than you, and some worse, but in the long run, you will average one satellite win for every ten satellites you play.

This chart shows the value (in $ and %) of each of these seven WPT satellites for an “average” player:

Player Wins One Out of Ten Satellites Entered
Buy-in Dollar Value Player Adv. in %
60 -5.00 -8.33%
125 -13.00 -10.40%
175 -13.00 -7.43%
225 -13.00 -5.78%
275 -13.00 -4.73%
810 -26.00 -3.21%
1060 -26.00 -2.45%

Let’s first note that in all cases, the dollar value is negative. “Average” players will lose money in satellites over the long run. Computing the dollar value is simple. Consider the $60 satellite. If you play ten of these satellites, you will invest $60 x 10 = $600 in these ten plays. If you win one, you get paid $500 (chip) + $50 (cash) = $550 in dollar value. Collecting $550 for every $600 you invest is a loss of $50 for every ten satellites you play, which is an average loss of $5 per satellite. So, the dollar value of this satellite to the average player is -$5.00.

Likewise, the “Player Advantage in %” is negative for the average player in the other satellites, as we would expect. Again, the computation is simple. If I lose $5 for every $60 I invest, then my result (in percent) is: -5 / 60 = -0.0833, which is -8.33%. You might also note that if you look at the prior chart which shows the “house edge” on these satellites, the “player advantage” for an “average” player is always the negative of the house edge.

From the professional players’ perspective, this means that to play satellites with average skill is a waste of money. In the long run, it will cost the average player more to enter tournaments via satellite than it would cost him to simply buy-in to the big events directly.

A player who is short on funds might argue that he would never pay $10K to enter a major tournament, but that he is willing to gamble $1060 on a long shot to get into such an event. In fact, this is a good argument if you accept the fact that you are gambling on a negative expectation game. One of the reasons that tournaments have become so valuable to professional players is that so many amateurs are willing to gamble at a disadvantage on satellite entries.

Satellite Value for the “Better-than-Average” Player

Now let’s look at how satellite skill affects the value of satellites to the player. Let’s say you can win one out of every nine of these ten-player satellites that you enter. How would this affect both the dollar value and your advantage (in %) in these same seven WPT satellites?

Player Wins One Out of Nine Satellites Entered
Buy-in Dollar Value Player Adv. in %
60 1.11 1.85%
125 -0.56 -0.44%
175 5.00 2.86%
225 10.56 4.69%
275 16.11 5.86%
810 61.11 7.54%
1060 88.89 8.39%

Big difference. The cheapest satellites are still not worth the trouble, due to the high house edge. Few players at this modest level of satellite skill should be interested in entering the $60 satellite, as the $1.11 value is a pretty low payout for a lot of work. And the $125 satellite (which you may recall has a higher house edge) is still a negative expectation gamble. The player who can win one in nine of these has a notably superior result to the “average” player who can win only one in ten, as the more skillful player will be losing only 56 cents per satellite played, as opposed to losing $13. Still, in the long run, the player who expects to win just one in nine of the $125 satellites would be paying less to enter the bigger tournaments if he skipped the satellites and just paid the full buy-in price of the event.

With the $1060 satellite, the one-in-nine player advantage is 8.39%, which is a dollar value of $88.89. For many players, this modest level of satellite skill might make these satellites worth the effort.

The Satellite Professionals

As your satellite skill increases, the value of playing satellites goes up dramatically. A more talented satellite pro can do quite well in ten-player/one-winner satellites if he can win just one of every eight satellites he enters. Here’s how he would do in these seven WPT satellites with this level of skill:

Player Wins One Out of Eight Satellites Entered
Buy-in Dollar Value Player Adv. in %
60 8.75 14.58%
125 15.00 12.00%
175 27.50 15.71%
225 40.00 17.78%
275 52.50 19.09%
810 170.00 20.99%
1060 232.50 21.93%

At this skill level, there may be sufficient dollar value to warrant playing these satellites at any buy-in level. With the smaller buy-in satellites, you must decide if the expected dollar return is sufficient to spend, on average, about an hour of your time in satellite play. Many of us wouldn’t work for $8.75 an hour, which is the dollar value of the $60 satellite for the one-win-in-eight player.

But we must also consider that for every satellite we play, we gain more satellite experience, and this should translate sooner or later to greater satellite skill. Like all other forms of poker, you can’t increase your satellite skills without playing them. And this becomes more important as the dollar value increases with the satellite cost. For example, with a dollar value of $232.50, the $1060 satellite will gain you entry into a $10K event, on average, for a cost of just over $8K. That’s a substantial discount.

The Top-of-the-Line Poker Tournament Satellite Pros

The top satellite pros win, on average, about one out of every six to seven ten-player/one-winner satellites they enter. They accomplish this with a combination of skill at fast-play strategies, skill at short-handed play, and skill at choosing weak fields of competitors. No pro wants to enter a satellite and find himself facing a table full of other pros. The value of satellites to a pro is as much a function of his competitors’ lack of skill as it is of his own skill.

Let’s compare the dollar values of these seven WPT single-table satellites for players who expect to win one of every ten, nine, eight, seven, six, and five satellites they play:

Dollar Value per Satellite, if Player Wins Once per:
Buy-in 10 9 8 7 6 5
60 -5.00 1.11 8.75 18.57 31.67 50.00
125 -13.00 -0.56 15.00 35.00 61.67 99.00
175 -13.00 5.00 27.50 56.43 95.00 149.00
225 -13.00 10.56 40.00 77.86 128.33 199.00
275 -13.00 16.11 52.50 99.29 161.67 249.00
810 -26.00 61.11 170.00 310.00 496.67 758.00
1060 -26.00 88.89 232.50 417.14 663.33 1008.00

Let’s also look at the various players’ advantages in percent for these frequencies of wins:

Player Advantage (%), if Player Wins Once per:
Buy-in 10 9 8 7 6 5
60 -8.33% 1.85% 14.58% 30.95% 52.78% 83.33%
125 -10.40% -0.44% 12.00% 28.00% 49.33% 79.20%
175 -7.43% 2.86% 15.71% 32.24% 54.29% 85.14%
225 -5.78% 4.69% 17.78% 34.60% 57.04% 88.44%
275 -4.73% 5.86% 19.09% 36.10% 58.79% 90.55%
810 -3.21% 7.54% 20.99% 38.27% 61.32% 93.58%
1060 -2.45% 8.39% 21.93% 39.35% 62.58% 95.09%

The final column in both charts, which shows the player’s expectation if he is skillful enough to win one out of every five of the satellites he plays, is more theoretical than realistic. This may be possible for a skillful satellite player who always manages to face a very weak field, but most satellite players today are not this weak. Many players are aware of the necessity of taking risks in satellites as the field diminishes and the blinds increase.

Nevertheless, we can see from the charts that a satellite player who is skillful enough to win one out of every six or seven of these satellites will have an advantage in the neighborhood of 30% to 60%, and that is a big enough edge to interest any professional gambler.

Other Poker Tournament Satellite Formats

As mentioned at the beginning of this article, not all satellites are single-player one-winner formats. The two-winner format is also quite common. Typically, a player might pay $200 plus the house fee to win one of two seats into a $1K event. With this format, the average player would expect to win two out of every ten satellites entered, as opposed to one in ten. Likewise, a win of two in eight with the two-winner format would be equivalent to winning one in eight with the single-winner format. And the top satellite pros would expect to win two out of every six or seven played in the two-winner format.

The two-winner format is generally advantageous for both the players and the poker room. Satellites played down to two winners finish faster than satellites played down to one winner. This means that more satellites can be played prior to a big event, with twice as many main event entries generated per satellite. The two-winner format also reduces fluctuations for the players.

If you’re good with spreadsheets, you can easily set up a spreadsheet to calculate the dollar return and house/player advantages for the two-winner format based on the buy-in costs and payouts.

Multi-table satellites, often called super-satellites or mega-satellites, are also very common, especially for major events. For example, the WSOP typically has a $1060 super-satellite for the $10K main event. One seat to the main event is awarded for every ten satellite entries. Here’s a chart that shows the dollar values and player advantages based on the frequency of player wins:

WSOP Mega Satellite, $1060 Buy-in,
One Seat Awarded per Ten Entrants
Dollar Value and Player Adv. If Player Wins Once per:
  10 9 8 7 6 5
$ Value -60.00 51.11 190.00 368.57 606.67 940.00
Adv. (%) -5.66% 4.82% 17.92% 34.77% 57.23% 88.68%

Note that the house edge on this event is 5.66%. These multi-table satellites are a good value for a player on a budget who can only afford to enter one satellite for a shot at the main event. And this is especially true if the player is a good tournament player, but not really all that skilled at single-table satellite play. (And there are many players who are skilled at multi-table tournaments who do not fare well in single-table satellites, primarily because of a lack of experience with making the quick adjustments necessary for the speed and short-handed play.)

For a skillful single-table satellite player, however, super satellites have less value than single-table satellites. The higher-priced single-table satellites often have a lower house edge, and they play out much faster. Big multi-table satellites often take many hours to determine the winners, as opposed to the typical 60-90 minutes a single-table satellite lasts. Time is money.

Using Satellites to Lower the Buy-In Costs of Major Poker Tournaments

Let’s say you’ve been playing a lot of small buy-in tournaments and your tournament skills have increased to the point where you want to start playing bigger events where you can make more money. You don’t feel ready for the major $5K and $10K events that the top pros dominate, so you want to start playing in $1K events as a stepping stone to the majors.

Let’s also assume that you’ve been beating the small buy-in tournaments at a rate of well over 200%, and you believe you would have an advantage of at least 100% in these bigger $1K events. You’ve been building your bankroll with these small buy-in tournaments, and your plan is to start using the money you’ve won to advance. The main question you have: Is your bankroll really big enough to withstand the greater fluctuations you’ll encounter in these $1k events?

If you do not have a sufficient bankroll to enter $1K events at this time, that does not necessarily mean that you must resign yourself to smaller buy-in tournaments. In fact, if you are a skillful satellite player, you can start entering $1K tournaments via satellites with a smaller bankroll. As the charts above show, satellites can very effectively lower the buy-in costs of bigger events. And a lower buy-in cost means a smaller bankroll is required. But how much smaller?

Before we can figure out how much satellite skill can lower your bankroll requirements, however, let’s quickly review what your bankroll requirements would be for a given type of tournament if you pay the full buy-in cost.

Let’s say you would like to play a hundred $1K tournaments in the next year. If you live in Las Vegas, this is easily accomplished, as Bellagio has two $1K buy-in tournaments every week. $1K events are also popular preliminary events for WSOP Circuit series, WPT events, and many other special tournament series that poker rooms run throughout the year. In order to estimate the bankroll requirements for entering a hundred $1K events, assuming a player has a 100% advantage on the field, let’s use a real-world example.

At the recent WSOP Circuit Events that were hosted by Harrah’s Rincon in San Diego, the $1k event on February 13, 2007, had a total of 89 players who paid $1060 for a seat. Nine spots were paid. This was the payout structure:

Place Payout
1st $31,079
2nd $17,266
3rd $9,496
4th $6,906
5th $6,043
6th $5,180
7th $4,317
8th $3,453
9th $2,590

Now, we have something to work with. Obviously, every $1K tournament you enter will not have this payout structure, but for our purposes, we’re going to assume that you want to know the bankroll requirements for entering a hundred of these specific tournaments. Since we already said that you estimate that you have a 100% advantage in these events, we next have to make some assumptions as to how that 100% advantage will be realized.

When we say that you have a 100% advantage, we mean that for every $1K you pay to get into these tournaments, you will cash out $2K. That cash out will pay you back your $1K buy-in and provide a $1K profit, which is a 100% advantage. From looking at the payout schedule, we can see that there is no payout of exactly $2,120 (twice the buy-in/entry) for any finishing position. Even 9th place pays $2,590, which is a 144% profit. In order to realize a 100% advantage, we will accomplish this by having many finishes with no return, but a number of finishes that return greatly in excess of 100%. (And note that many tournament pros enjoy advantages in excess of 200% and even 300%. We are using this 100% example for a player who is just moving up to $1K events from smaller events, and who is still sharpening his skills.)

Assuming you play a hundred of these tournaments, let’s create a win record that would provide an advantage in the neighborhood of 100% overall. To do this, I’ll assume that you finish in the money 16 times, or about once every 6 to 7 tournaments. Here’s a set of finishes that includes 3 first places, 3 second places, 3 third places, 2 fourths, 2 fifths, 1 sixth, 1 seventh, 1 eighth, and 84 finishes out of the money, and would earn you 100.35% on your total investment:

Finish Payout # Cashes Total
1st $31,079 3 $93,237
2nd $17,266 3 $51,798
3rd $9,496 3 $28,488
4th $6,906 2 $13,812
5th $6,043 2 $12,086
6th $5,180 1 $5,180
7th $4,317 1 $4,317
8th $3,453 1 $3,453
9th $2,590 0 $0
10-89h $0 84 $0
Total Cashed: $212,371
Total Invested: $106,000
Total Win: $106,371
Win %: 100.35%

That’s close enough to 100% for our purposes. Obviously, no player could estimate that these will be his exact finishes in 100 tournaments. We’re just creating a set of finishes that would return approximately 100% profit to the player. There are many other ways that a 100% advantage could be realized. There could be fewer than 16 money finishes, but more with the higher payouts, or there could be more than 16 money finishes, but fewer with the big payouts and more low-end finishes. The above set of payouts is just one way that a player with a 100% advantage might realize this profit.

In fact, despite the assumed 100% advantage, over the course of these 100 tournaments, a player in real life would be highly unlikely to show a result this close to an actual 100% profit. His real-world result in a series of 100 consecutive tournaments would be subject to what statisticians call standard deviation. He may have an exceptionally good run of tournaments, or an exceptionally bad run, just due to normal fluctuations in the cards and the situations he encounters.

In the Appendix to The Poker Tournament Formula, pages 328-340, there is a discussion of what standard deviation is, what it means to a gambler, and how you figure it out for poker tournaments. I’m not going to reproduce that discussion here, so if you do not understand the concept of standard deviation, and especially how it applies to poker tournaments, read that chapter the book. Also, different payout schedules caused by different field sizes will have a major effect on standard deviation, so don’t assume that the discussion about this specific $1K tournament would apply to all $1K tournaments. This tournament is just an example from real life.

Using the method described in The Poker Tournament Formula, and applying it to the player with the 100% advantage in the $1060 tournaments described above, we find that although our expectation is to win (profit, after subtracting our buy-in/entry fees) a total of $106,371 over the course of 100 tournaments, one standard deviation on that result is $62,853. So, if we finish two standard deviations below our actual expectation (and 2 SDs = $125,706), we could actually finish these 100 tournaments with a loss of $19K, despite our 100% advantage!

This may sound impossible, but keep in mind that we only expect to win $106K and that $93K of our total return comes from just three first place finishes. A few bad beats and cold decks at crucial times at the final table, or before we get to the final table, can wreak havoc with our overall results.

Since we could conceivably suffer a net loss of $19K over the course of these 100 tournaments, and still be within the realm of what a statistician would consider a “normal” fluctuation, we might conclude that a bankroll of $20K would be sufficient to finance our play, though we could conceivably lose it all. In fact, a bankroll of $20K would usually be more than sufficient to finance this level of play, assuming we are correct about our 100% edge. The standard deviation on our expected results does give us a pretty good idea of the kinds of fluctuations that are possible due to bad luck in tournaments of this level over this period of time.

Technically, your $20K bankroll would probably be very safe if you cut back on the cost of the tournaments you entered if you started experiencing significant negative results. In other words, if you finish out of the money in the first ten tournaments you enter—and this is entirely possible—then you really would be wise to start entering $500 tournaments until you hit a few wins (or just one good win) to build your bankroll back up. Fluctuations of greater than two standard deviations happen all the time.

(Cutting back on the size of your bets after bankroll reductions is a method of “Kelly Betting,” another term that would be known to any serious blackjack player, but few poker players. I’ll discuss Kelly betting approaches for tournament players in more detail later in this article.)

If you are familiar with the statistical concept of standard deviation as discussed in The Poker Tournament Formula, you are probably aware of the fact that a statistician expects a fluctuation of greater than two standard deviations 5% of the time. Which is to say that if 20 players were playing these tournaments with a 100% advantage, 19 of them would expect to finish 100 tournaments within two standard deviations of their expectation, but one of them would expect to experience a fluctuation of greater than two standard deviations from his expectation.

A fluctuation of 3 standard deviations is extremely rare, as results this far from expectation have only about a 1/300 chance of occurrence, so it’s not really necessary to maintain a bankroll to withstand this much of a fluctuation. But to be safe, just based on the standard deviation, I’d advise a bankroll closer to $30K for these $1K events, assuming you have a 100% advantage.

But What About Different Levels of Aggression in Poker Tournaments?

Let’s consider the fact that we’ve created our hypothetical 100% advantage in this tournament by devising a specific set of in-the-money finishes that would result in this win rate. In the real world, there are many different ways a player could end up with a 100% advantage. He could be a very aggressive player who had fewer cashes but more top-end finishes, or he could be a more conservative player who had a greater number of cashes, but more low-end finishes. Might not the bankroll requirements for these player types differ from each other?

Let’s analyze and compare the requirements for these different player types.

The More Aggressive Hypothetical Tournament Player

To provide this player with a 100% advantage, let’s say he finishes in the money only 10 times in 100 tournaments (instead of 16 times as in our prior example), but with more high-end finishes. Here’s the aggressive player’s chart:

Finish Payout # Cashes Total
1st $31,079 4 $124,316
2nd $17,266 4 $69,064
3rd $9,496 2 $18,992
4th $6,906 0 $0
5th $6,043 0 $0
6th $5,180 0 $0
7th $4,317 0 $0
8th $3,453 0 $0
9th $2,590 0 $0
10-89h $0 90 $0
Total Cashed: $212,372
Total Invested: $106,000
Total Win: $106,372
Win %: 100.35%

Conveniently, this very different set of cashes provides this aggressive player with the same 100.35% win rate as the player in our first example.

The More Conservative Hypothetical Tournament Player

For further comparison, let’s also create a sample player who has more final table finishes (25, instead of 16 or 10), with more low-end finishes, but still, with a 100% win rate. Here’s this more conservative player’s chart:

Finish Payout # Cashes Total
1st $31,079 2 $62,158
2nd $17,266 2 $34,532
3rd $9,496 3 $28,488
4th $6,906 3 $20,718
5th $6,043 3 $18,129
6th $5,180 3 $15,540
7th $4,317 4 $17,268
8th $3,453 3 $10,359
9th $2,590 2 $5,180
10-89h $0 75 $0
Total Cashed: $212,372
Total Invested: $106,000
Total Win: $106,372
Win %: 100.35%

In order to compare the bankroll requirements of these three different player types, who all have the same overall win rate in the same tournament, let’s use a different statistical method of analysis, the Gambler’s Ruin Formula, or, as gamblers today more often call it, Risk of Ruin (or RoR).

First, here’s an explanation of what we’re trying to figure out here. A player wants to play tournaments that have a specified buy-in/entry cost, say, $1060. He knows from the above discussion on standard deviation that he could conceivably lose his bankroll due to negative fluctuations, even if he has a 100% overall advantage. The player wants to minimize his risk, so he wants to know how much of a bankroll he’d need to insure himself of a 90% chance of success, or 95% chance of success, or even 99% chance of success. Also, if the player could maintain his 100% win rate while using either a more aggressive or more conservative strategy, how would this affect his chance of success?

The Risk of Ruin Formula that was used to analyze the three sample players described above was first published by Math Boy and Dunbar in the Fall 1999 issue of Blackjack Forum. The article is titled, “Risk of Ruin for Video Poker and Other Skewed Up Games”. You may follow this link to get to the article in our online library, so we’re not going to print the Risk of Ruin formula here.

Let’s just look at the RoR data on our three player types. Remember, the conservative player makes it to the final table 25 times in 100 tournaments, but wins the fewest top-end prizes. The middle-of-the-road player has 16 money finishes out of 100 tournaments, with more at the top-end. The aggressive player has only 10 money finishes, but takes four firsts, four seconds, and two third-place payouts. These are their bankroll requirements for various levels of risk:

RoR Conservative Bankroll Middle-of-Road Bankroll Aggressive Bankroll
1% 37,213 45,449 55,853
5% 24,208 29,565 36,333
10% 18,607 22,724 27,926

We want to emphasize here that the “conservative” and “aggressive” styles we’ve created are for purposes of analysis—they are not meant to be realistic. With regards to the aggressive player, it’s unlikely that a player who was skillful enough to always make the top three when he finished in the money (with 80% of those finishes in the top two) would never finish in any other final table position. Even the most aggressive and skillful players will suffer bad beats and cold decks and hit lower payouts occasionally.

It’s really more likely that such a player would have a range of money finishes at all levels, even if he had more than his share of the top prizes. The problem we faced in creating this player, however, was that we were attempting to maintain that 100% win rate for purposes of risk of ruin comparison, and if we start scattering a more realistic set of smaller wins among his finishes, his win rate will climb dramatically (as it tends to do in real life with the best aggressive players).

The conservative player’s results were similarly skewed. It is highly unlikely that a player with so few top-end finishes would be able to hit the money often enough to have a 100% win rate. But the purpose of the example is simply to show that playing style does have an effect on a player’s bankroll requirement, all other things being equal. If we look at the middle-of-the road player’s bankroll requirement for a 5% RoR (95% chance of success), we see he needs a bankroll in the neighborhood of $30,000. The conservative player might get away with a bankroll of about $5000 less than this, but the aggressive player might need $5000 more.

These numbers may surprise many tournament players who have not read The Poker Tournament Formula, as there is widespread ignorance among poker players with regards to bankroll requirements. On one of the WPT shows, for example, a sidebar feature showed professional poker players being asked for advice on bankroll requirements for tournament players, and wound up providing the specific recommendation that tournament players should have a bankroll of ten times their buy-in cost. Don’t we wish…. In fact, that was potentially disastrous advice for serious poker tournament players.

One other thing we must note here is that this sample tournament we’re analyzing had a prize pool based on a total of 89 players. In fact, if you are entering $1K tournaments with 300 players, or 2000+ players as in some of the 2006 WSOP $1K events, the top prizes will be much bigger, and so will your fluctuations and bankroll requirements. We don’t want you to think that a $30K bankroll is sufficient for all $1K tournaments. Again, we ’ll refer you to the detailed discussion in The Poker Tournament Formula on how field size affects bankroll requirements.

Now let’s look at how we can use satellites to lower this bankroll requirement.

Lower Buy-In Costs Mean Lower Poker Tournament Bankroll Requirements

Since we’re discussing a specific $1K WSOP Circuit Event, let’s look at one of the actual satellites that was being offered at Harrah’s Rincon that allowed a player to win entry into this event. They ran ten-player satellites that cost $240, and the satellites paid two winners. Each winner received two $500 chips and $100 cash. So, if you were one of the two satellite winners, you’d have been able to cover your $1060 buy-in/entry to the $1K tournament, and still have $40 cash to put in your pocket.

Here’s a chart that shows this satellite’s dollar value and player advantage, based on a player’s expectation of winning twice out of every 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 satellites entered:

WSOP Circuit Satellite,
$240 Buy-in, Two Winners
Each Get $1000 (chips) plus $100 cash
Dollar Value and Player Advantage If Player Wins Twice per:
  10 9 8 7 6 5
$ Value -$20.00 $4.44 $35.00 $74.29 $126.67 $200.00
Adv. (%) -8.33% 1.85% 14.58% 30.95% 52.78% 83.33%

Now, let’s say the same three hypothetical tournament players (conservative, middle-of-the-road, and aggressive), all with the same 100% advantage in the $1K events, are also skillful satellite players, and they each decide that they will always enter these $1K events through satellites. And, let’s assume their levels of satellite skill provide all of them with an expectation of winning twice for every seven (or, essentially, one for every 3.5) two-winner satellites they enter. How does this affect the actual cost to them of entering the $1K events? Here’s the math:

3.5 of these satellites will cost $240 x 3.5 = $840. For that $840 expense, the player gets $1K in chips plus $100 in cash. Since the buy-in/entry for the $1K event is $1060, the player can buy-in to the $1K tourney and pocket the extra $40 cash, leaving him with a total buy-in/entry cost of $800 even, a discount of $260 from the full tournament price.

This lowered cost per tournament drastically reduces the risk of ruin for each player. You might guess off the top of your head that paying $800 per tournament on average, as opposed to $1060, might cut your bankroll requirements proportionately. Since 800 / 1060 = 75.5%, you might be tempted to take the 1% RoR bankroll requirement of $45,449 for the middle of the road player, and multiply it by 75.5%, for a bankroll requirement of $34,300.

But, in fact, the effect of the satellite discount entry is quite a bit stronger than that. What you must also consider is that although you are entering these $1060 tournaments for only $800, the prize pool does not change. This means that the same win record will increase your percent advantage from 100% to 165%. This increased percent advantage will lower the bankroll requirement for a 1% risk of ruin for the middle of the road player from $45K to $30K.

(Unfortunately, figuring out the RoR for entering these tournaments through satellites is not quite as simple as just using $800 as the entry fee. The situation is similar to a parlay bet at a sports book. The satellite has its own flux, and that must be included with the flux on the main tournament in order to correctly calculate overall flux and risk of ruin.)

Let’s look at the RoR bankroll requirements assuming these three players always enter these $1060 tournaments through these $240 two-winner satellites, with each winning two out of every seven of the satellites:

RoR Conservative Bankroll Middle-of-Road Bankroll Aggressive Bankroll
1% 19,358 30,380 42,905
5% 12,592 19,762 27,910
10% 9,679 15,190 21,452
What Risk of Ruin Should a Poker Tournament Player Consider Safe?

Many players might say off the top of their heads that they’d be comfortable with a 90% chance of tournament success. But bear in mind that ruin means ruin. If you have a $30K bankroll, and you find yourself in that unlucky 10% of players who would expect to lose it all if playing at this risk level, then you are flat broke. So, if this $30K represents your life savings, that would be a foolhardy way to play. If it represents money that is easily replaceable (say by cashing in a few CDs when they mature), then it may not be a bad gamble.

Most professional gamblers prefer to use a “Kelly betting” system. Those of you who have read any of my blackjack books know what this is. If you are not familiar with the term, it essentially means that you always bet proportionately to your bankroll in order ensure that you never go broke.

For example, if a player was playing these $1K tournaments with a 5% RoR, he could do so with a $30K bankroll. If this same player decided in advance that he would enter tournaments with smaller buy-ins than $1K if he lost a significant portion of his bankroll (until he built it back up), then his actual RoR would be quite a bit lower than 5%. This is why, in The Poker Tournament Formula, I advise: “…Should your bankroll go into a nosedive, be willing to start entering tournaments with either smaller buy-ins or smaller fields of players, until you rebuild your bank.”

In an ideal world, a player would create a chart of optimal entry fees to pay, based on his current bankroll, that would virtually eliminate any Risk of Ruin. For example, If he lost 40% of his starting bank, he would play in $600 events. If he lost 50% of his bankroll, he would play in $500 events. With a 75% loss, he would play in $250 events, etc. Unfortunately, in the real world, is that in the real world we can’t always find tournaments priced to our needs. If I lose 10% of my bankroll, can I find a $900 tournament?

For any poker tournament player on a limited bankroll, however, it makes sense to follow such a plan as closely as possible. If your bankroll drops by 10% from the amount sufficient for $1k tournaments, you have to decide if you are willing to accept the increased risk of ruin inherent in continuing to play $1k events, or if you had better drop to $500 events, if that is all that’s available below the $1k buy-in level.

Also, be honest with yourself about the actual size of your tournament bankroll. Your playing bankroll should not include your rent money, car payments, living expenses, credit card or installment loan payments, or the like.

Poker Tournament Satellite Frequently Asked Questions

Q: If I’ve already played a few satellites without winning, should I still buy-in to the main event if there are no more satellites?

A: If you have the bankroll to enter the main event at full price, and you have the skill to make money in these types of events, then by all means, buy-in for the full price. If the reason you are playing satellites is to cut your costs because you can’t afford to play the bigger events, then do not buy-in for the full price. Just keep developing your satellite skills and play only in the big events when you win your seat through a satellite.

Q: If I’m just an amateur but I really want to get into a WPT main event just to play with the pros and take my shot at fame and fortune, but that $10K buy-in is a bit steep for my wallet, should I set a limit to the number of satellites I’ll play in an attempt to enter the event?

A: If you are not a skillful satellite player and you are simply attempting to enter a major event cheaply on a long shot gamble, then you should definitely decide beforehand exactly how much you’re willing to spend on satellites, and quit if you hit your limit.

Q: If I’m skillful at both satellites and regular tournaments, should I limit the number of satellites I’ll play for any one event?

A: For a skillful player, it’s a different situation. First of all, if you fully intend to enter the main event regardless of your satellite result, then there is the practical consideration of time. If an event starts at 2pm, and satellites start at 8am, it may not be in your best interest to play satellites for six hours prior to starting day one of a tournament that might go 12-14 more hours.

Some pros always play a satellite or two before major events, even when they can afford the full buy-in price, because the satellites are a good value and can be used to lower their overall tournament expenses. If a pro can win one out of seven $1K satellites in order to enter $10K tournaments, and if he plays just one satellite before each major event, then six times he’ll be paying $11K for his seat, and once he’ll pay just $1K. If he plays 21 of these $10K tournaments per year, his three satellite wins will lower his overall tournament cost (and raise his overall profit) by $9K.

If time constraints and guarding against fatigue aren’t part of the equation, and you have an edge at satellite play, there is no reason to limit the number of satellites you’ll play to enter any one event. During big multi-event tournaments like the WSOP, there are satellite pros who virtually camp in the satellite area, playing one satellite after another, day after day.

On some days, they may play ten satellites without a single win, then they’ll win three or four the next day. They use the tournament chips they win to buy-in to the events they want to play, and sell the rest to players for full value. Obviously, these pros pay no attention whatsoever to limiting the number of satellites they’ll play for any one event. Nor should they. They’re in it for the long run, and if they have the skill to beat the satellite fields and the house edge, they’ll come out way ahead in the long run.

Conclusion

If you are serious about playing in major tournaments with big buy-ins, there is a huge value to developing satellite skills. At the 2006 WSOP, I overheard one player commenting to another that he was surprised at how many of the big name pros were entering satellites, since they could so easily afford the full buy-ins. If you look at the value of satellites as shown in the charts provided in this article, you can see why many pros are attracted to satellites.

If you play a lot of major events, and a lot of satellites to enter these events, you can substantially lower your overall annual tournament costs while increasing your percentage return. I don’t care how much money you have. If you’re paying $10,000 for an event that you could get into for $8,000 (or less), you may be a great poker player, but you’re not that great at financial planning.

Notes and Acknowledgments

Much of the material in this article will be unfamiliar to poker players who have not read The Poker Tournament Formula, because bankroll requirements are estimated using statistical methods that are not taught in your everyday high school math courses. Professional gamblers really need to understand this math, or they will condemn themselves to many years of going broke repeatedly, no matter how skillful they are. As I put it in The Poker Tournament Formula (Chap. 28, “How Much Money Do You Need?”):

It’s the rare blackjack book these days that doesn’t provide at least some information on such topics as standard deviation, the Gambler’s Ruin formula, risk-averse betting strategies, the Kelly criterion, and various related topics, in addition to simplified charts of data that card counters can use to estimate their bankroll requirements.

Most poker books, by contrast, stick to strategic advice exclusively. Blackjack players learn early how to manage their bankrolls; poker players learn early how to hit up their friends when they go broke.

Thankfully, some five months after I published those lines in The Poker Tournament Formula, another poker book has been published that does deal seriously and intelligently, and in much greater depth for cash game players, with the topic of bankroll requirements. This book is The Mathematics of Poker , by Bill Chen and Jerrod Ankenman. This book is to poker what Peter Griffin’s The Theory of Blackjack is to that game.

Unfortunately, like Griffin’s book, much of the material in the Chen/Ankenman book is not readily accessible to a player who has not taken some college level courses in probability and statistics. I still urge any serious poker player to get this book, just as I have always recommended Griffin’s book to all serious blackjack players. The Chen book is essentially a book for math heads, but there’s a lot of discussion on a wide range of topics I haven’t seen elsewhere for serious players. He even delves into risk of ruin when you don’t know your advantage.

Risk of ruin is a statistical measure that blackjack players would be familiar with, but that has been long absent from the poker literature. There is an excellent explanation of RoR in Dr. Allan Wilson’s classic text, The Casino Gambler’s Guide (1965). But neither Wilson’s description of risk of ruin, nor any of the descriptions that have been published in many blackjack texts since then, allow for the formula’s use in a game where there are multiple possible payouts, ranging from a loss of the bet (buy-in), to a modest win (low-end finish) to a very large payout compared to the size of the initial bet.

The first published discussion of RoR that I know of for games with multiple payout possibilities was an article by Russian mathematician Evgeny Sorokin that appeared in the March 1999 issue of Dan Paymar’s Video Poker Times newsletter. In response to Sorokin’s article, professional gamblers Math Boy and Dunbar developed an Excel spreadsheet method of applying Sorokin’s generalized risk equation to virtually any game with a skewed payout structure, and I published their method in the Fall 1999 issue of Blackjack Forum, in their article, “Risk of Ruin for Video Poker and Other Skewed Up Games”. Now, Math Boy has helped me to adjust his method for analysis of poker tournaments (or any other gambling tournaments).

I am especially indebted to Math Boy for creating an Excel spreadsheet for me that would not only estimate a tournament’s standard deviation and risk of ruin, but would automatically recalculate these values based on entering the tournament via satellite, at any satellite cost, and with any selected percentage of satellite wins. The spreadsheet is not currently user-friendly for anyone who is not familiar with some of Excel’s advanced statistical functions, but Math Boy is working on a simpler version, similar to his Patience Factor Calculator, that he plans to make available to players at this Web site in the near future.

Incidentally, a number of players have asked me where I came up with the standard deviation formula that appears in The Poker Tournament Formula as they had never seen a method for calculating standard deviation for a game with a tournament payout structure. My method was simply to modify a formula originally created by Doug Reul, which first appeared as the “Volatility Index” in one of Dan Paymar’s 1996 issues of Video Poker Times, and can currently be found in his book, Video Poker: Precision Play.  ♠