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Tips on Touts for Smart Sports Bettors

Sports Picks: A Consumer’s Guide

by Dan Gordon
© 2004 Blackjack Forum

[Dan Gordon is the author of Beat the Sports Books]

Understanding NFL Sports Pick Services

As sports betting has grown, so has the tout business. A tout is someone who gets paid for bet selections that are supposed to make the bettor money.

The question I hear many sports bettors ask, even about legitimate sports handicappers, is why don’t these guys, if they know what they’re doing, just bet for themselves and make tons of money? Why do they take on the aggravation of running an advice business?

The answer is that to support yourself just betting on the NFL takes a huge financial stake because your edge is relatively small. Finishing 20 bets ahead after the 11-to-10 odds you must give to the sports books is tough over the course of an NFL season. But even if you can win at this rate every year, you’d need an average bet of about $1,000 per game to make a meager $20,000-a-year living.

Since you have to be prepared to ride out losses (even the best sports handicappers can lose—even have a losing season— because of bad luck over the short term) you need a stake of many multiples of your bet to avoid losing it all. The exact amount depends on your winning percentage, the number of games you bet, and other factors, but for a pro who depends on his bankroll for his living and has no other way than sports betting to replenish it, a very substantial betting stake is required.

To make a decent living, there is nothing wrong or inconsistent with a capable handicapper selling his selections to those who prefer others to do their handicapping.

To Pick A Winning Sports Picks Service, You Need Realistic Expectations

I sell NFL and NBA sports picks myself, though contrary to what sports bettors believe, it is not an easy way to earn a living. Most bettors expect a sports picker to win a huge percentage of the time. They don’t like to hear that realistic long-term win percentages will be in the 55-60 percent range for the most talented handicappers. This is despite the fact that virtually every handicapping tournament has shown that the best anyone can do selecting NFL or NBA games over the course of oneseason is in the low to middle 60 percent range.

I know of no sports service that has done better than about 60 percent over a number of seasons. And those that consistently reach 60 percent are very few. Yet, despite all the evidence available, customers still want someone who claims to win 75 or 80 percent against the point spread.

Many potential customers are turned off when I tell them not to expect those percentages from me, especially when other services out there are making those claims. But just remember this: if someone knew he would win 80 of his next 100 bets, he could turn $1,000 into $15 billion by proper proportional betting—all over the course of one season!

Other would-be customers are often under-financed. This doesn’t mean that I pick more losers than winners, but that these bettors are not ready for the long haul—some of which will contain losing streaks.

Let’s use dollar amounts to show what I mean. Let’s say I charge $600 for an NFL season. Let’s say my customer does well that year, going 58-42 ( a respectable 58% win rate) on my picks. To keep things simple, let’s also say that all of my customer’s bets are the same. This would mean that the customer ended up 11.8 bets ahead after paying the 11-to-10 odds the sports books require. If my customer was betting $100 a game, he’d end up making $1180 minus the $600 for my fee.

Over the course of the season, I would have to end up more than six bets ahead just to cover what this person paid me. Over 100 bets, I would have to win almost 56 percent (56-44) before a person betting $100 per game saw any profit. As for a bettor who can only afford to bet $50 a game, he is betting far too little to be paying me for advice.

I remember one year in the NBA playoffs where I lost nine bets in a row. Because I had the money to continue betting, I ended up hitting just over 60 percent for the playoffs, or nine bets to the good. However, if I had used too large a betting unit, I would have tapped out before I got to my win.

In 1997, I had one week where I went 0-5. Despite this horrendous week, I ended up the season a winner. Someone who was under-financed, however, might have tapped out that week and never seen the profits.

What’s even worse is that it is not at all a sure thing that I—or any other handicapper—will come out ahead over the course of a single NFL or NBA season. Many bettors don’t want to hear about the possibility of losing over the course of a full season, but not wanting to hear it doesn’t make the possibility of its happening go away. Just as bad weather, an injury, a bad call, or bad bounce of the ball can turn a winning bet into a losing one, a number of bad beats can turn a winning season into a losing season. For a truly winning handicapper, an entire losing season is rare. But it always remains a mathematical possibility.

Other potential customers are hampered by not having access to early- and late-week lines. The lines are most valuable early in the week when professional bettors are pouncing on mistakes made by the odds makers in their attempt to read the betting public. Unfortunately, most bettors who follow touts like to bet at the end of the week, and often have betting access only then. Not betting early takes away early-week plays for bettors following me, and will often cost them wins. What’s even worse is when they bet the games against my advice even after the early numbers have changed. This may not only deny them wins, but turn those wins into losses.

I remember a time I gave a bettor just one selection for the week. It was the Falcons +6 over the Bengals. I told him not to take fewer than six points on the Falcons. He followed my advice and took six points early in the week.

However, as the week went on this man craved more action. But no matter how many times he called me for more picks, I kept telling him that the rest of the games that weekend were not good investments. Still, at the end of the week he bet more. First, he increased his bet on the Falcons. However, now he was taking 4 1/2 points instead of six. Then, he bet two games that were on television. You can probably guess what happened. The Falcons lost by exactly six points and the two television game bets lost. A week that should have ended with a push bet ended up 0-3 for him.

I have noticed through the years that many bettors who use touts crave action. To get it, they are willing to take the worst of the betting line after it has changed during the week. Giving up the 11-to-10, betting with the moves, and taking the worst of it costs money. Passing on games that aren’t worth giving 11-to-10 odds saves money.

The Way The Fakes Are Able to Claim Those 80% Win Rates

I know many NFL touts. Some are able to win but most of them have been consistent losers when they bet. Many have actually gone broke betting and are looking to get money from others to make up for their poor selections.

Many touts have multiple services within one service. This way they can almost always truthfully claim that at least one of their services is doing well. For instance, a tout may operate the following services:

a) An early-week newsletter (giving selections on each game, emphasizing two or three);

b) A midweek newsletter (giving selections based on “new” information);

c) A weekend phone service (giving selections over the weekend);

d) A late phone service (giving selections in the two hours before game time that have the latest “inside” information); and

e) An exclusive phone service (giving the absolute top picks within a half-hour of game time).

Typically, the last option will cost bettors the most and the first will cost bettors the least. Typically also, as the week goes on, the tout will switch sides on some games because of “new” information. In this way, the tout can truthfully advertise that one of his services had the winner of the game.

In addition, by systematically switching sides, the tout makes sure that at least one of his five services will have a good week. That the expensive phone service, charging $200 a week, might go 1-4 that week, while the cheap newsletter (costing $75 for the whole season) might go 3-0 is of no concern to the tout. In his next ad, he will brag about going 3-0 the week before.

If, on the other hand, the exclusive phone service has done the best, the tout advertises the phone line’s great week to try to get customers to upgrade.

To top it off, some tout services are owned by others. If one service of the empire is doing poorly, another within it that is doing well can mail a flier to the disgruntled customers of the poorly performing service.

Other sports services give out selections on 900 numbers. With these services, there is a charge-per-call that can vary from as little as $5 to as much as $50. Sometimes there are additional charges for extra minutes.

Sports services use the 900 numbers in various ways. On a five-dollar call, they may offer just one selection and tell the caller to call back in ten minutes for another selection. These calls can add up to much more money than the caller might realize. An average Sunday might mean six calls to the 900 number, turning a five-dollar call into a total charge of $30, or three $50 calls into a $150 charge.

Other services have a practice that might be called “withholding the best.” Touts who offer several different levels of services frequently call one a “best-bet” service. On their other less-expensive services, they give out their “regular” selections (without the best bet). In effect, “regular” customers are paying for not getting the best games.

Then there are the services that offer a money-back guarantee on any pick that loses. A monkey throwing darts at a game schedule should pick 50% winners, and that is about the win rate you can expect from these touts–a win rate that neither covers the 11-to-10 nor the cost of their fees. But these guys aren’t aiming for long-term customers. The way they make their money is the weekly fees on the picks they win by luck.

Sports services realize that most people who sign up with them are insecure about their knowledge and believe they don’t really know what is happening in the sports world. To try to bamboozle potential customers, many services make claims about having scouts all over that give them “inside” information. A number of the more aggressive services even make veiled (and sometimes, not-so-veiled) references to fixed games. This usually sounds good to the customer until the service loses a few “sure things.” When this happens, the service always has another, better “sure thing” coming up.

Other services advertise “lock” games, meaning games that can’t lose. How they can sell such games is beyond me. It would seem to me that if someone had a game that could not lose, rather than share it with many others through a sports service, he should bet it himself and put on it everything he owns. Since the game “can’t lose,” this would not be over-betting!

Anyone who has watched sports for about a month realizes that the difference between winning and losing (especially against the spread) can be infinitesimally small. In the NFL, a game will often be totally turned around by one or two plays, or even a single penalty call. There are an almost infinite number of scenarios that can happen. The best anyone can do in handicapping is come up with a side that has a slightly better than 60 percent chance of covering the spread. This still means that almost four times in ten the game will lose—which makes any talk of a lock complete nonsense.

The only locks that exist are those that need keys to open them.

The business of touting actually tends to worsen the quality of selections because of customer pressure to make or avoid certain picks. I remember when, in 1983, I was on a Las Vegas radio show on which I gave selections. One week I liked Tampa Bay as a 5 1/2-point underdog at Green Bay. The Bucs got killed in the game, 55-14. In fact, the Packers scored 49 points in the first half—still an NFL record.

The next week Tampa Bay played in Dallas. They were 14-point underdogs. I thought the Bucs were an outstanding bet in this game. Someone else on the radio show also liked the Bucs, but said he couldn’t give them out as a selection with his sports service. Why? Because he had given them out the last week against the Packers and his customers “wouldn’t stand” for being given them again. This handicapper had to pass up an excellent value for his customers because of the abnormal result of the previous week. In this game, Tampa Bay lost to Dallas by three in overtime but more than covered the spread.

I remember another example early in the 1996 season. In Week 5, the Packers were playing at Seattle. They were coming off a loss (their first) the previous week in Minnesota. To me, a bounce-back seemed likely.

But another tout I knew said he couldn’t give out the Packers since they were “too easy.” What he meant was that his customers could come up with this selection on their own. What they expected from him were tips that were more “creative.”

This tout’s “creativity” led him to pick the Seahawks in this game. The Packers won and covered, 31-10.

Some of the more laughable tout ads are those that are printed a month or more ahead of time. These are often found in NFL or NBA betting schedules. The ads will claim that this service has winners in games that are to be played a month or more after the ads were placed. But there is no way to know that far ahead whether the right factors will be in place to make a particular game a good bet.

An ad by a tout in the New York Daily News went even further on claims for an NCAA tournament. The ad claimed that the tout had gone 6-0 in the previous round. But the round in question wasn’t even played until long after the ad had been written up!

In summary, the only touts you should even consider using are those who talk about the long haul and realistic winning percentages (in the upper 50% to lower 60% range). These touts are to be commended not only for their win rates, but for their honesty and strength of character. Believe me, it is hard to act this way and survive for long in this field. ♠

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New Blackjack, Same Old Baloney

A Review of E. Clifton Davis’ NBJ System

by Arnold Snyder (with commentary by the Boardwalker)
(From Blackjack Forum XIII #3, September 1993)
© 1993 Blackjack Forum

[Note from A.S.–WARNING! WARNING! If you are considering buying the NBJ system, you are considering investing money in a Martingale betting system! STOP! Consult with a mathematician (a real one) immediately! Emergency mathematicians are now on duty to take your call!]

1991: Enter E. Clifton Davis and NBJ (“New Blackjack”), a dressed-up martingale betting progression system for casino blackjack. The system is published by Jerry Patterson Enterprises.

Davis has been an occasional contributor to Eddie Olson’s Blackjack Confidential newsletter. Olsen is the inventor of the TARGET system, one of the first widely promoted “streak” or “trend” blackjack systems — also sold by Patterson.

I wasted a lot of ink trashing the trendies in the past. Ed Thorp, Ken Uston, Stanford Wong, Julian Braun, Peter Griffin, and Mason Malmuth have all gone on record stating their shared belief that the TARGET blackjack theories are worthless. Every independent computer simulation of non-random casino-style shuffles that I’ve seen refutes the TARGET theories about the effects of poor shuffles.

The Facts About Card Clumping

Here are the facts. When cards are dealt to players who all play perfect basic strategy, the discard stack, if dealt again without being disturbed by a shuffle, would be in an order highly favorable to players. John Gwynn and Stanford Wong independently determined that the play of the hands at blackjack puts the cards into a player-favorable order. Players can confirm this themselves with John Imming’s UBE software.

Low cards and high cards do get clumped together during the play of blackjack hands, and this clumping would be worth about .75% to the basic strategy player if the cards were not put through a shuffle before the next deal. (This is determined by running simulations with no shuffle, just picking up the discards, cutting, and resuming play.)

It’s even possible for brand new decks to favor the first base side of the table by a few tenths of a percent, and similarly hurt the third base side of the table, if you put the new decks through a weak enough shuffle (weaker than any of the moderators at BJF have seen in any casino in the world–one riffle, no cuts, no strips on one-deck).

But it does not appear possible to create a shuffle that has the huge advantages/disadvantages (+/- 5% to 20%) described by the non-random shuffle gurus. In any case, casinos do indeed put the cards through a more thorough shuffle before dealing discards or new decks, and the shuffle is sufficient in every casinos we’ve seen to eliminate this player-favorable effect.

Plus, I have personally tested Martingale systems, like those advised by Davis, vs. extremely sloppy shuffles using Imming’s UBE software. There is simply no effect, regardless of how random, non-random, or “clumpy” the cards are.

It was ten years ago — September, 1983 — when my first TARGET article appeared in Blackjack Forum. Since then, Blackjack Forum has picked up a lot of new readers, many of whom did not follow the TARGET controversy as it developed.

So, here comes E. Clifton Davis with NBJ, as well as his new improved version of NBJ, which he calls WCB (“World Class Blackjack”). I’m regularly getting news clippings of ads for “New Blackjack” introductory seminars from all over the country. Players are sending me direct mail advertisements for NBJ they’ve received from Jerry Patterson.

I’ve even got a complete copy of the 119-page “New Blackjack” Home Study Manual, written by E. Clifton Davis, provided by one of Davis’ students. I’ve got an audiotape of a 45-minute interview with Davis by Jerry Patterson, in which Davis expounds on his theories. This promotional tape is accompanied by a 9-page advertisement for Davis’ “World Class Blackjack” system.

As of the writing of this article, “New Blackjack” sells for $445 mail order. WCB is now selling for $500, though Patterson’s letter states that this is an “introductory offer” to former NBJ students, and that the price of WCB will probably be going up to $1000.

Reports on NBJ from Players

This is one letter I received from an NBJ player:

[Regarding] E. Clifton Davis’ NBJ course… I asked for (and got) my money back because I didn’t play it to the 5%-15% advantage that the system touts. I did, however, win with it. My records reveal that I played it to a 1.96% advantage during three weeks last spring — certainly not a large enough trial to compel anyone to change religions (so to speak), but I wasn’t exactly disgusted with the outcome either, since seldom do I perform that well using a conventional counting system.

If I may be allowed to free-associate (don’t a lot of Californians do that???), my thoughts on NBJ are as follows:

I went to the seminar as advertised, and the following assertions were really made: That currently, the typical house advantage against a basic-strategy player is about 20%. No, not a hold percentage of 20% (which is believable), but a house advantage of 20%. In addition, they claim that because of like-card clumping, the current dealer bust percentage is about 12%…

Furthermore, Davis pledges that to keep the casinos from making any wholesale changes in their procedures resulting from any of the material in this course, under no circumstances will he sell his course to more than two percent of the blackjack-playing public.

Let’s do the math, shall we? 30 million blackjack players times 2% times $445 each (the cost of the course) equals $267 million. You gotta admire the man’s character for placing those kinds of economic restrictions on himself.

Finally, Davis asserts that 92% of his students win, compared to 1% for card counters, and that one fellow in Minnesota won 41 straight sessions with this system…

As for the course itself: I think that Davis’ advice on using betting progressions is ludicrous. To me, it’s like tracking roulette results, determining a pattern, structuring a progressive betting system to match that pattern, and hoping that you’re not too wrong if that pattern collapses. In his course, Davis has the student ascertain a “game type,” which he says sustains itself from one shoe to the next, and then use a betting progression to exploit it. Maybe it was just me, but for me the game types just didn’t remain the same from one shoe to the next.

I also think his strategy charts need a little refinement in places. The basis of NBJ, as Davis says, is non-random cards (due to insufficient shuffling, particularly in shoe games). As a result, sometimes you’re instructed to violate basic strategy plays, depending on whether high or low cards “are running.”

One such play is to split 6’s when the dealer has an ace up and “tens are running.” When I called Davis myself to ask him about this, his response was that the player’s objective in this situation is to go for an overall push by winning one of the two hands. Whaaaat?

But I also believe that there are some viable concepts in his system, particularly with respect to the notion that cards are not sufficiently shuffled so as to be randomly distributed. Although there was one occasion where I didn’t split a pair of aces that I was dealt (because “low cards were running”), then got two tens, there seemed to be quite a few occasions where his methods could be used to determine whether the dealer had a stiff hand with that ten up, and/or what my next hit card would be based on the values of the previous four or five cards.

As is the case with first-basing or playing tells (in blackjack or poker), you don’t have to be right 100% of the time to make your system work. And if I can consistently use this non-random-card business to change an average of two losing hands into two winning hands each hour (over and above the number of winning hands turned into losers by using this method), I’ll be changing careers real soon.

Conclusion: I’m still on the fence. I’ll be experimenting heavily later this year to see if non-random card analyses can be used in conjunction with conventional counting to eke out another percent or so advantage. I’ll let you know the results, both in a simulation environment, and in the casinos.

I think that NBJ might warrant a comment from you and/or other blackjack authorities since, according to Davis, his graduates now number over 1,000. Since one could argue that there is some subjectivity involved when making NBJ playing decisions, do you think that it’s conceivably possible for a computer jock somewhere to simulate this method?

Possible, yes. Probable, no. Many reputable programmers have lost interest in testing betting systems because it has been proven over and over again that such systems do nothing.

Again, I have personally tested Martingale systems, like those advised by Davis, vs. extremely sloppy shuffles using Imming’s UBE software. To repeat: there is simply no effect, regardless of how random, non-random, or “clumpy” the cards are.

The author of the above letter seems to be a thoughtful and intelligent person. His questions about NBJ reflect a genuine interest in whether or not some aspect of Davis’ approach might be valid, even if there are many aspects of the system which he finds hard to swallow.

Blackjack Forum’s “Atlantic City Update” columnist—who writes under the nom de plume The Boardwalker—was less kind in his remarks about NBJ. The Boardwalker never bought the system; he just attended one of the $10 NBJ introductory seminars that appeared in his area. This is his report:

NBJ = (FOH + BBS)CST

The newspaper ad read like a carnival pitchman’s bark: E. Clifton Davis’ New BlackJack is sweeping the country! Why counting no longer works! Triple your bankroll! Win more hands than the dealer! How casinos make you lose! Win 75% of your double downs! Why basic strategy makes you lose!

Being a doubting Thomas for the ’90s, you couldn’t have kept me out of this seminar for an RFB comp. So, I plunked down a sawbuck and grabbed a chair right up front.

Arriving early, I scanned the four page NBJ sales leaflet, which had 10 playing tips from Davis on the front. Tip #7 said to always insure a natural against a dealer’s ace. Knowing this is a 4% basic strategy error, my antenna went into high gain. Tip #9 said to treat a dealer’s deuce like a ten. Not even if you held a gun to my head. Well, maybe for that.

Inside were more gems such as: win 80 units per hour; learn a winning system in 20 minutes; win 54% of your 15’s and 16’s; win 67% of your insurance bets. And all this without having to count. Could I plan to retire on just that last one alone?

A few of the 100+ blackjack curious in attendance and I had a chance for a friendly chat before the main event. I played the part of blackjack moron and let them spill their guts. If their knowledge was any kind of a representative sample, then in my opinion, many couldn’t recite proper basic strategy if asked and those who said they knew how to count cards wouldn’t know a ruin formula if it jumped off the page and bit them on the nose! Cherries, ripe for picking, if you ask me.

Enter the pitchman, Michael Simpson, a full time investment banker and part-time NBJ player/salesman. He began with the words of a confidence man, saying, “You won’t hear the truth anywhere else.” Opening remarks included highly questionable statements like, “Basic strategy used to work and so did card counting.”

Simpson claimed that basic strategy players win 40% of the hands and the dealer wins 60%, therefore, the casino enjoys a 20% advantage. When asked about the effect of doubles and naturals, he muttered some mumbo jumbo that made no relative sense and changed the subject.

Simpson said that NBJ has nothing to do with counting cards, yet in the same breath noted that while a 9 is of little value to card counters, it is a valuable card in the NBJ strategy. Go figure.

In a continuing ramble, he submitted that NBJ is based on card clumping and that after cards are recognized as being properly clumped, they can be predicted, giving the NBJ player a significant advantage over the house.

Simpson went so far as to say dealers intentionally perform high-low stacks while picking up completed hands, then shuffle in such a manner as to complete the stack. (Kudos to Steve Forte for educating me on these techniques in his Gamblers’ Protection videos.)

Besides the fact that I have never, ever, witnessed this in my 1000-plus hours of casino time over the years [note from A.S.–now 15,000 hours and still playing], there is absolutely no legal way the casino could use this to their advantage. Yet Simpson claims NBJ players can recognize this happening and can use it to predict hit and hole cards with 50-75% accuracy. Not likely, in my opinion.

I asked Simpson if NBJ has an insurance strategy and he replied, “Yes, we do insure and we do it very well.”

I asked Simpson how NBJ players assess whether or not they are playing properly and he replied, “If we won, then we made the correct play.”

Finally, I asked how many hours he had used NBJ in actual casino play and how much he was ahead. Simpson said he would rather not say in a public place, but added that he has played recreationally for 2 years and was ahead multiple thousands of dollars. Modest, but not too much so and also still very much in the short run, wouldn’t you say?

On my way out the door, I was given an NBJ newsletter for prospective pigeons. It says 40 units per hour is often earned in a good “type 1” game, whatever the heck that is. NBJ recommends players start small and gradually build up a bankroll, and gives these players specific low risk procedures to follow for a while. I guess once you’ve started making your fortune, you can advance to higher risk play.

 One comment that got my water boiling was that NBJ players don’t stand out like card counters because they don’t cheat. That’s right. NBJ players stand out at the casino cash advance machines. Sorry, I added that. Couldn’t resist.

Also included in the newsletter is a 2 1/2 page testimonial to E. Clifton Davis by Jerry Patterson, which attempts to put Davis on a higher pedestal than Thorp, Griffin, Wong, Uston, et al. But let’s face it. While I’ve heard Patterson is a pretty nice guy, his credibility in the blackjack world has been questionable since the early eighties.

The remaining pages of the newsletter contain a table of contents from the NBJ manual, which includes such amusing topics as “Telltale Signs of Clumping,” “Testing the Water,” “Negative Betting Progressions,” and “Insuring for Less.” Tell me something, if you have a known positive insurance expectation, why would you do it for less? Better yet, would you spend $445 on the NBJ system to find out? I think not. The friendly folks at NBJ will also sell you a different “World Class” system for another $500.

The NBJ people did seem to be genuinely friendly because I called and talked to a couple of them. I spoke with Marv, who considers himself a professional blackjack player, and Suzanne, who is a part time NBJ player and has contracted with Davis to sell the NBJ systems in my area.

Marv sounded like a really nice chap over the phone and was more than willing to tell me about how important 1st and 3rd bases are to NBJ players and that he can control the table from 3rd base, presumably by taking the dealer’s bust card or sticking him with one.

He felt positive that he could guess the dealer’s hole card at the rate of about 80% the other night using NBJ techniques. But Marv was quick to add that you don’t want a whole table full of NBJ players because they take all the good cards from each other! I’m sure the casinos would say the more the merrier.

Likewise, Suzanne raved about how well the system has worked for her. I asked her if Davis supplied mathematical proof for his theories and for some reason she began telling me about his credentials.

She did contradict Marv, however, by telling me the dealer will break more often with more NBJ players at the table and that with NBJ, one can predict hole cards up to 90% of the time.

Marv and Suzanne did agree on two things, though. One of the keys to playing NBJ is using the “tens ratio,” which you derive by observing the number of tens on the table. But hey, that’s not counting because NBJ players don’t cheat.

Also, I just had to ask them both if NBJ included anything on ruin probabilities or anything like that. Both were quick to respond that NBJ uses a 12-unit stop-loss money management strategy. Marv even goes one better. If he loses 3 units, he walks.

I could go on for at least another few pages, but I’m sure the readers of Blackjack Forum have the general idea. However, in case you’re curious and haven’t tried to figure it out yet, the title of my report means New BlackJack is Full OHoles and Basically BullSh*t to the Casinos Say Thanks power!


What’s Taught at the NBJ Seminar

Okay, so the Boardwalker wasn’t exactly enthralled by the NBJ seminar he attended. I have since spent a considerable amount of time reading and analyzing the NBJ Home Study Manual because NBJ is not a system which will only appeal to dummies (as one might assume from the Boardwalker’s report).

NBJ is a complex system, which requires that the player first ascertain which one of six “game types” he is playing in. The patterns of wins and losses determine the game type. The player’s betting strategy will then be one of many recomended Martingale, or sometimes reverse-Martingale, betting progressions, depending on the game type. The hands are played according to a variable strategy, depending on how the player reads the clumping effects of the high and low cards. I couldn’t even begin to explain the details of the system in a short review, but that’s not necessary. What is most intriguing about Davis’ NBJ system are the theories behind it.

Regarding Davis’ Tip #9, from the hand-out which the Boardwalker received—“Treat a dealer two up like a ten”—I would assume Davis is advising less splitting and doubling when the dealer shows a two up, and more hitting on stiffs.

Most of Davis’ deviations from basic strategy, which seem weird at first perusal, would fall into the category of bankroll conservative. The other two deviations on this tip sheet—not splitting 8s vs. 9 or 10, and always insuring blackjacks—would both tend to reduce fluctuations even if they are technically incorrect plays. The fact that Davis includes advice to never split tens (Tip #8) indicates that he may be assuming a low level of expertise in many of the players who take his course.

Tip #10—When in doubt — hit—would also strike most knowledgeable players as very strange advice. If we consider, however, that the most consistent error of poor players is failing to hit stiffs vs. dealer high cards, Tip #10 might not be such bad advice for a lot of neophytes. Nobody is going to lose his shirt by always insuring his blackjacks. Some pros do this religiously as a form of low cost camouflage.

The Boardwalker is correct that this is an expensive error—but it does not come up frequently enough to hurt anyone significantly in the long run. It is also a fact that always insuring your blackjacks will reduce your bankroll fluctuations. Again, not significantly because of the infrequency of the hand, but combined with all of the other strategy deviations Davis recommends, an NBJ player would experience significantly less severe fluctuation than a basic strategy player.

The most effective technique Davis uses to reduce fluctuations is his conservative double down strategy. NBJ never advises doubling down on any player hand vs. any dealer upcard as basic strategy. Doubling down is only advised after the player predicts both the dealer’s likely hole card and the likely hit card the player would receive, depending on the game type, whether or not high cards or low cards are running, etc.

Davis really attacks the double down basic strategy, and all of the so called “basic strategy experts,”—and he likes to put “experts” in quotes. He says basic strategy and card counting fail because the cards aren’t random. NBJ players, au contraire, play on a “higher level.” They exploit the win/loss trends by card predicting. According to Davis, this is why NBJ players win such a high percentage of their double downs.

Actually, NBJ players should win a greater percentage of their double downs—but not for the reasons Davis states.

Any blackjack “expert” knows that a player who never doubles down (assuming he follows the optimal hit/stand strategy) will win more hands than a player who follows correct double down basic strategy. This is elementary. Any time you double down vs. a dealer high card (7-A), you relinquish the right to take another hit should your double down card make you stiff. Doubling down is essentially agreeing to win a smaller number of hands in order to win more money in the long run due to more action on hands that are worth the risk.

Doubling down less often, as Davis advises, would not only result in NBJ players winning a greater proportion of their hands, as he says they do, but they would also experience less volatile fluctuations to their bankrolls than if they followed double down basic strategy. (Hey, if you’re going to sell a Martingale betting progression to the general public as a wise investment, you’ve got to take what steps you can to reduce fluctuations!)

Basic strategy was not devised to reduce fluctuations, but to optimize the player’s expectation in the long run. Doubling down less often is not really a wise long run strategy for a player who wants to beat the house. If you do not take every opportunity to risk more money on favorable hands, you will not beat this game. If your bankroll cannot afford the risks associated with doubling down, you probably shouldn’t be playing blackjack. Watch out! Wake up!

The NBJ variable strategy—as opposed to basic strategy—is really not that bad. True, there is some weird advice that I’ll be damned if I can figure out. (There is a distinct possibility that E. Clifton Davis may actually be from another planet…)

But basic strategy is advised for most hands, with variable strategies allowed for the more borderline hands (depending on how the cards are “running”). The variable (and therefore less frequent) pair splits and double downs are the major differences from traditional basic strategy.

I tried playing the NBJ strategy against one of my computer practice programs (Blackjack—Your Key to Winning Play)—which, of course, must be a sacrilege of some sort. I’m not claiming I actually learned this system… I get the feeling nobody could ever quite “learn” it, since decisions are “intuition” based.

Attempting to employ the system, with the book in my lap, I discovered that—intuitively—I almost never doubled down vs. dealer high cards. Consider: if highs are “running,” there is too much risk that the dealer’s hole card will be high, giving him a pat hand. If lows are “running,” there is too much risk that I’ll make myself stiff. About the only time it ever seemed safe to double down was when the dealer showed a low card, and highs were “running.”

Double downs vs. dealer low cards are, in fact, the most profitable double down plays. Double downs vs. dealer high cards (even when correct) are the riskiest plays. This is not a new revelation, but a simple fact. Davis somehow never mentions this. I’m sure NBJ players do, in fact, win more of their double downs than basic strategy players. But I do not believe NBJ players win more money on their double downs, as Davis’ analysis—based on his private research—finds.

I consider it nonsense that an NBJ player could predict that highs or lows would continue “running,” but if an NBJ player uses his estimation of such factors to make double and split decisions, he will play a more bankroll conservative strategy than a basic strategy player or a card counter, he will win more hands, and he will win more of his doubled bets. I can almost see the above words on the cover of Davis’ next NBJ newsletter. “Arnold Snyder States That NBJ Players Win More Hands!”

Actually, Davis’ theories and explanations are bunk, but he has developed a fairly intelligent style of play for the betting progression system he is selling.

If you are going to play a betting progression system, and especially a Martingale progression like the ones Davis touts, you would want a system designed to win the greatest number of hands. To win a Martingale progression, it only takes one win. A large bet on the table is not indicative of a large advantage, as with card counting, but of a previous series of losses. It would be foolish to double your bets in risky situations with a Martingale strategy. You want to win your series so you can quickly revert to a single unit bet again.

Davis acknowledges this quite blatantly on page 93 of his Home Study Manual, when he explains the “most important reason” for always insuring your blackjacks: “…we aren’t just risking one hand. We are usually risking an entire progression…”

His logic is flawless. If you always take even money for your blackjack, instead of playing it out, you will win your series with certainty. Why play out the hand, risk pushing the dealer, and then risk losing the series on the next hand? A card counter can pull his bet back after pushing a dealer blackjack, but a Martingale man has to win as many series as possible, and abandon as few as possible. Davis’ Martingale strategy is very conservative, since he advises abandoning a series, and reverting to a one-unit bet, after only three consecutive losses. On a coin flip, a player would win 87.5 series out of a 100 with this betting progression. On his 12.5 abandoned series, his average loss would be seven times greater than his average win, and in the long run, he would break even.

Unfortunately, unlike a coin flip experiment, multi-deck casino blackjack is less than a 50-50 proposition without a betting strategy that is based on an intelligent analysis of the mathematical advantage.

Davis does not advise players to use NBJ in single-deck games, nor would I. My reason for not advising it is different from what he says. In single-deck games, a player who bases his strategy on “runs,” with the assumption that the “run” will continue, will be playing at total odds with count logic. My count goes down when I see a run of tens on the table, and such an occurrence would lead me to play as if I were less likely to be dealt a ten.

With six or eight decks, however, a current “run” of high cards or low cards will have a relatively minor effect on the hand probabilities. Davis is still at odds with count logic, but the count is less volatile in shoe games.

For many casual players who do not have the dedication to learn a card counting system, and who do not seriously entertain fantasies about professional play, NBJ is not that bad of a strategy. It might save some players from making some of the more expensive hunch plays, and could also discourage overbetting in players who have a tendency to “steam.” I feel sorry for players, however, who believe that NBJ will turn them into blackjack pros.

The system should appeal to those who prefer to embrace all of the “common sense” myths about blackjack which we know to be baseless. Insuring blackjacks. The third base player controlling the table. Bad players affecting other players’ expectations. Dealer hot streaks and cold streaks. Davis does not really explain the real logic of his system, as he does not admit that NBJ is just a complex progression system. He acts as if he’s discovered some magic blackjack secret based on the non-random shuffle.

Some of his explanations are a howl. On page 15 of his manual he insists that one of the reasons computers cannot be used to analyze casino blackjack is because you cannot program in “the humidity,” and also, there are “…certain player types who can change the odds of the entire game.” He has no shame about spouting such nonsense.

Many players who use NBJ might feel that they are winning more than they are losing. One reason is that they will win more hands. Another is that they will, in fact, win so many more of their betting series than they will lose, that it will feel as if they are winning much more. In fact, some will win, and some will lose. More will lose in the long run.In short runs of play, the positive and negative fluctuations will be pretty wild.

NBJ is not a cut and dried system. The NBJ player is encouraged to “educate” his “intuition,” and to play according to it. If you predict a hole card or hit card incorrectly, it’s not necessarily the system’s fault, it could be your fault for not reading the cards correctly. There’s a chapter on “enhanced card reading,” which is to card counting what numerology is to arithmetic. In my opinion, the Manual leaves a lot of questions unanswered.

Regarding Jerry Patterson’s TARGET system, Davis admits that TARGET and NBJ are “compatible” and “compliment each other.” There’s a chapter titled “Target and NBJ—The Perfect Marriage.” Now there’s a match made in heaven…

NBJ begins with the TARGET premise that the non-random shuffles make the game predictable and exploitable without card counting. On page 41 of his Manual, Davis provides “proof” that casino games are not random. Simple observation, he informs us, tells us that there are “good games and bad games.”

If the shuffles were random, he reasons, “…all games would be the same.” Using this same reasoning, if I were to flip a coin one hundred times in succession, always betting on heads, and then if I were to do this series of one hundred flips again and again, always betting on heads, I should never experience “good games and bad games” with an honest (random) coin. In fact, multi-deck games are not always well-shuffled, and certainly aren’t randomized. I have no argument with that. Professional players do exploit these games, but only with mathematically justifiable methods.

Basic strategy and card counting have been computer tested extensively in poorly shuffled games. Numerous articles have been published in Blackjack Forum in the past decade reporting on these findings. Davis simply ignores all of the literature on this subject.

One amusing note: throughout his Home Study Manual, Davis concludes many of his analyses with the words: “It’s a thinking man’s game!”

On page 56, Davis teaches us that traditional basic strategy assumes that the dealer’s hole card is a ten. However, he reasons, since only 30.8% of the cards in a deck are tens, he can improve on basic strategy simply by coming up with a hole card prediction that is correct more than 30.8% of the time! (Run that by me again…?)

Most serious players realize that basic strategy considers the distribution of all of the cards in the deck(s). No assumptions are made about the dealer’s hole card, other than its proportionate likelihood of being any one of the available cards.

In any case, even if we accept the betting progressions as bunk, and the strategy deviations as simply designed to win more betting series, and all of Davis’ theories about basic strategy and card counting as tongue-in-cheek humor, is there any possibility that Davis is suggesting anything of value to the player? Is it conceivable that a player might profit from playing his hands differently according to how the high cards and low cards are “running?”

To be honest, I’ve never seen a computer simulation of casino blackjack in which the player made strategy decisions by predicting that the short run pattern of the cards would continue. Personally, I tend to doubt that there would be any value to such a strategy. Disregarding the humidity factor, it seems to me that a computer-simulated casino-style non-random shuffle would suffice for the test.

It would also be necessary to define much more specifically than Davis does exactly how to determine the type of game, and what quantities and proportions of high, low and middle cards determine when something is “running” or stops “running.” Computers don’t have a lot of intuition. Some of Davis’ theories could be computer tested, but his NBJ system, as it is presented, could not. There is just too much guesswork.

If, despite my remarks, you believe Davis’ theories are worth investigating, then I’d be interested in hearing about your personal experiences with his methods. If anyone has tested card “running” strategies via computer simulation, we would be interested in your findings. I did talk with one other Blackjack Forum subscriber about NBJ, and he liked the system, though he acknowledged very limited casino experience with it.

From what I’ve seen, Davis is simply selling a betting progression system, and calling it the road to riches. Same old baloney. ♠

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Multi-Action Blackjack: Basic Strategy and Card Counting

How to Play Multiple-Action Blackjack

by Arnold Snyder
(First published in Card Player, November 27, 1992)
© 1992 Arnold Snyder

I’ve received many questions in the past few months about “Multiple Action” (or multi-action) blackjack. No wonder, the game is popping up at casinos all over Nevada, and elsewhere in the country as well. The most common question I get from players is: How do I alter blackjack basic strategy when I have a stiff on my first or second hand? The second most common question is: How does this affect the player/house advantage?

Here’s the scoop: At a Multiple Action blackjack table each player has three betting spots. He must bet on at least two spots, but may bet on all three if he desires. Some casinos require a bet on all three spots. The player receives only one hand, regardless of how many spots he is betting. The dealer, however, will play out his upcard two (or three) times, against the consecutive player bets.

Example #1: Player with three bets on the table is dealt a hard twenty, vs. a dealer ten, and stands. The dealer turns up his hole card to reveal a five. Dealer hits with a seven, busting, and pays off the player’s first bet. Dealer discards the five and seven, hits again with a five and a six, and beats the player’s second bet. Dealer discards the five and six, hits again with a ten, and pushes the player’s third bet.

Example #2: Player, with three bets on the table, is dealt a hard sixteen vs. a dealer ten. Player hits with a seven and busts. Player loses all three bets. Ouch!

History of Multiple-Action Blackjack

The multi-action blackjack game was invented, patented, and is being marketed by the Four Queens Casino in Las Vegas. Casinos who purchase the rights to this game must pay the Four Queens $500 per month per table to offer it. If that fee sounds high to you, rest assured that it does not sound high to the casinos who are offering the game.

The Four Queens has already sold layouts to 27 Nevada casinos, including many major properties in Las Vegas, Reno, Tahoe and Laughlin. You’ll also find it on Indian reservation casinos in Wisconsin, Connecticut, Michigan, and Texas, and on riverboats running out of Illinois and Mississippi. This game is selling like gangbusters.

Why do casinos find this game so attractive? The promotional literature provided by the Four Queens answers this question.

In the first nine months of operation, a Multiple Action blackjack table with a $2 minimum bet showed a gross win almost 50% higher than a traditional blackjack table with a $5 minimum bet. Both tables were open 24 hours per day, seven days per week, with six decks and otherwise identical rules.

Since the Multiple Action blackjack table required at least two bets, the actual minimum bet per player hand was $4, meaning the table action should have been just slightly less than the traditional $5 blackjack table. In fact, the Multiple Action blackjack table showed a “drop” (amount of chips purchased at the table) 10% higher than the traditional table, indicating that either slightly more players were attracted to the Multiple Action table, or that the players who were attracted to Multiple Action were betting slightly more than the traditional blackjack players, possibly by utilizing that third betting spot.

But if the drop was only 10% higher, why was the gross win 50% higher? Good question. The answer is that the “hold” (the percentage of the drop that the dealer wins back from the players who buy in) on the Multiple Action blackjack table was almost 22%, compared to about 16% for the traditional game.

The first assumption that a game analyst might make, looking at these figures, is that Multiple Action blackjack has a greater house advantage over the player than traditional blackjack, but that for some strange reason, players are more attracted to it. I’m sure, in fact, that many casino execs who have looked at these numbers and decided to purchase Multiple Action blackjack tables have done so with this assumption.

The analyst’s first assumption, however, would be wrong. The fact is: Multiple Action blackjack has the exact same advantage over the basic strategy player as traditional blackjack, all other factors being equal (rules, number of decks, etc.).

Basic Strategy at Multiple-Action Blackjack

So why do the casinos win more money from Multiple Action players? The answer to this one is simple: More Multiple Action players are violating basic strategy. Why? Remember Example #2 above? The player is dealt a sixteen vs. a dealer ten. Player hits (which is the correct basic strategy), and loses all three bets! Players at Multiple Action tables, even smart players who should know better, are standing on their stiffs when they should hit.

The way it works in the player’s mind is: “Gee, if I bust, I lose three bets. Now normally I would hit this hand, but if I stand, I’ve at least got a chance of beating one of the dealer hands . . . and I might not lose all three . . . ” Bad logic. The fact is: correct basic strategy does not change one bit at a Multiple Action table. The house advantage does not change one bit. The casinos are cleaning up on this game because smart players are playing like dumb tourists, and dumb tourists are playing like dumber tourists.

Why Card Counters Love Multiple-Action Blackjack

Now, here’s the strange part: Card counters love these Multiple Action Blackjack tables. Why? Because with the combination of multiple bets and lots of players frequently varying from basic strategy, it is much easier to disguise a card counting system. So, I think these Multiple Action tables are great, too. Rarely does an innovation come along at blackjack that allows both the casinos and the card counters to make more money. Multiple Action blackjack does just that — at the expense of the “average joe.”

My advice to card counters is to seek out these tables for the increased profit opportunities. If you’re just a basic strategy player, stick to your basic strategy. Don’t be tempted to stand on those stiffs you know you ought to hit. If you do, you’re just allowing yourself to be counted as a statistic in some casino’s increased hold percentage. That’s not a statistic you want to be a part of.

More Multiple-Action Blackjack Mindbenders

(First published in Card Player, January 1993)
© 1993 Arnold Snyder

On November 27, in this column, I discussed the new “Multi-Action” blackjack games that were popping up all over Nevada. I have received quite a bit of mail on this subject, so I would like to take another chance here at clarifying the Multi-Action blackjack strategies. The specific game we are referring to is the one in which the player places up to three separate bets on his hand, as the dealer’s hand is played out three times in succession, using the same upcard.

There is already a bastardized version of this game being dealt in Las Vegas in which the dealer deals himself three separate upcards, against which the player must play his one hand. Do not play the 3-upcard version.

The difficulty of attempting to play one hand against three different upcards can be illustrated with a simple example: You are dealt an ace and a seven (soft 18) vs. dealer upcards of 5, 7 and ace. How do you play your hand, since your one playing decision must go against each dealer upcard in succession?

According to normal basic strategy, you should double down vs. the 5, stand vs. the 7, and hit vs. the ace. No matter which decision you make in this example, you’ll be playing two out of three hands incorrectly. This insidious form of casino blackjack forces the player to continually violate basic strategy. No card counting system can beat this game. Hopefully this version of multiple action blackjack will not spread.

Another player queried me about the effects of rule variations in the Multiple-Action game. Specifically, if a casino allows surrender, would the Multi-Action strategy differ from standard basic strategy, since you will be surrendering three hands instead of one?

No. It doesn’t matter. If you are dealt a hand that basic strategy tells you to surrender in a normal blackjack game, you should surrender your three half bets in a Multi-Action game. And don’t surrender any other hands.

The most important thing to remember in a Multi-Action blackjack game is that the format of the game should not affect your playing decisions in any way. Casinos are cleaning up on unsophisticated players who are not only afraid to hit their stiffs (because it means losing all three bets if they bust), but are also more timid about doubling down and splitting pairs (because of the treble amount of money put at risk).

Multiple-Action Blackjack and Risk Averse Strategies

Multiple-Action blackjack has proven itself a boon to card counters because it so effectively disguises betting spreads and playing strategy variations. Sophisticated counters, in fact, will see more occasions to employ “risk averse” strategies in a Multi-Action game. Otherwise, card counters should simply follow their card counting systems as if in a normal blackjack game. As risk averse strategies are more important to employ in Multi-Action games, and such strategies are not all that difficult to use, it would be wise for all card counters to understand the risk averse basics.

A risk averse strategy is one in which you technically violate the “correct” strategy because there is a conflict between correct play and the optimum bet. These types of situations only present themselves when you must make a betting decision in the midst of playing a hand. Pair splits, double downs and insurance all put more money on the table after the hand is in progress. Surrender pulls money back. A risk averse player will sometimes violate his count strategy on these types of plays in order to minimize fluctuations to his bankroll.

For example, say you are dealt a hand totaling 11 vs. a dealer ace in a 6-deck game. Basic strategy is to hit, but your slightly positive count tells you that you should double down. If a risk averse player already has a big bet on the table, he will violate his count strategy and hit, not double. Why?

The amount that a player bets on any hand should correspond to the player’s advantage at the time the bet is placed. In the above example, the player put a big bet on the table prior to his hand being dealt. However, if he had known the dealer was going to deal himself an ace, he would not have placed a big bet. Much of the player’s potential advantage on the hand was killed when the dealer’s upcard appeared.

Luckily for the player, his own total of eleven is strong, and with the slightly positive true count, is strong enough to justify doubling down instead of just hitting. But since this is a borderline decision, and the player already has a large bet on the table, doubling this bet will put a greater proportion of the player’s bankroll at risk than he will potentially gain.

According to the Kelly Criterion (somewhat simplified), if you have a 1% advantage, you would optimally bet 1% of your bankroll. If you overbet your bankroll, the fluctuations will slow down your rate of winning, and if you overbet too much (by a factor of 2), you will inevitably go broke due to the inevitable negative fluctuations, despite the fact that you technically have an advantage over the house. Does this make sense? No matter. Here’s how to use risk averse strategies, especially in Multi-Action blackjack games:

With any borderline double down or split decision, if you already have a high bet on the table (or, if the total of your Multi-Action bets constitute a high bet), don’t do it. Just hit or stand as appropriate.

With any borderline surrender decision, if you have a high bet on the table, do it — even if the count does not quite justify surrendering. This play will reduce fluctuations in the long run.

And here’s a good risk averse strategy that will drive the card counting traditionalists bonkers: If you have your high bet on the table, insure your “strong” hands in borderline insurance decisions — even if the count is slightly too low to justify an insurance bet according to the system you are using. Again, this bet will act as a hedge to keep fluctuations down. ♠

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Rebuy Analysis for Skilled Players in Multi-Table Poker Tournaments

When to Rebuy in Multi-table Poker Tournaments

by Pikachu
(From Blackjack Forum , Fall 2006)
© Blackjack Forum 2006

In a recent post on rebuy analysis on the Poker Forum of this Web site, I ended with the conclusion that a player without skill should not rebuy in a percentage payback tournament, and a player with skill should rebuy if he’s got a certain (undefined) edge. While this served to illustrate the point that a winner-take-all example is not an appropriate model for multi-table tournaments, it wasn’t a very useful post. Now I’ll provide some examples from a multi-table tournament format that take a player’s skill level into consideration.

For these examples I make the following assumptions:

  • 100 player field
  • $100 buyin gets 100 in tournament chips
  • A $100 rebuy gets an additional 100 tournament chips
  • All 99 opponents have the same number of chips (makes the calculations easy)
  • The “edge” translates into the increased probability of taking 1st place, and a lesser increased probability of lower finishes. So an unskilled player will have a 1% chance of finishing in 1st, while a player with a 10% edge will have a 1.1% chance of finishing in 1st. Note that this players ROI will be less than 10%. And yes, I might be defining it strangely.
  • The following payout structure:
Place% Pool
129.0%
218.5%
312.0%
410.0%
58.0%
66.5%
75.5%
84.5%
93.5%
102.5%

For the base case, an unskilled player who hasn’t rebought:

Rebuys 0
Edge 0.00%
PlaceProbReturn
11.00%$ 29.00
21.00%$ 18.50
31.00%$ 12.00
41.00%$ 10.00
51.00%$ 8.00
61.00%$ 6.50
71.00%$ 5.50
81.00%$ 4.50
91.00%$ 3.50
101.00%$ 2.50
EV $0.00

If he rebuys we get:

Rebuys 1
Edge 0.00%
PlaceProbReturn
11.98%$ 58.00
21.96%$ 36.63
31.94%$ 23.52
41.92%$ 19.40
51.90%$ 15.36
61.88%$ 12.35
71.86%$ 10.34
81.84%$ 8.37
91.82%$ 6.44
101.80%$ 4.55
EV ($5.04)

As expected, an unskilled player should not rebuy. He doubles his buy-in but does not double his chances of finishing in the money.

Now, consider a player with an 10% edge:

Rebuys 0Rebuys 1
Edge 10.00%Edge 10.00%
PlaceProbReturnPlaceProbReturn
11.10%$ 31.9012.18%$ 63.80
21.10%$ 20.3322.15%$ 40.21
31.10%$ 13.1732.13%$ 25.77
41.10%$ 10.9742.10%$ 21.21
51.10%$ 8.7652.07%$ 16.76
61.09%$ 7.1162.05%$ 13.45
71.09%$ 6.0172.02%$ 11.23
81.09%$ 4.9182.00%$ 9.07
91.09%$ 3.8291.97%$ 6.97
101.09%$ 2.72101.94%$ 4.91
EV $9.71EV $13.38
ROI 9.71%ROI 6.69%

Without rebuying that 10% edge translates into a 9.71% ROI, or $9.71 in EV. Rebuying increased EV (though it lowers ROI). That 10% edge should not be at all difficult to attain (as anyone who has played a low-limit fast tournament can attest to). In all cases where the player has an edge, his ROI when rebuying will be lower than when not rebuying, though the EV will be higher. This assumes no juice on the tournament.

While edges far in excess of 10% are easily had, it may be interesting to see what edge is required to overcome the intrinsic disadvantage of rebuying in a percentage payback tournament. Brute force says:

Rebuys 0Rebuys 1
Edge 5.77%Edge 5.77%
PlaceProbReturnPlaceProbReturn
11.06%$ 30.6712.09%$ 61.35
21.06%$ 19.5622.07%$ 38.70
31.06%$ 12.6832.05%$ 24.82
41.06%$ 10.5642.02%$ 20.45
51.06%$ 8.4452.00%$ 16.17
61.05%$ 6.8561.98%$ 12.99
71.05%$ 5.8071.95%$ 10.86
81.05%$ 4.7481.93%$ 8.78
91.05%$ 3.6891.91%$ 6.75
101.05%$ 2.63101.89%$ 4.76
EV $5.61EV $5.61
ROI 5.61%ROI 2.80%

In the case of a player with a 5.77% edge, he hasn’t gained or lost EV by rebuying, but merely increased his variance. It is worth noting that a player wanting to maximize his EV/VAR should not rebuy unless his edge is greater than 103%. This suggests that a skilled player with a sufficiently small bankroll would not want to rebuy in many cases.

For a decently bankrolled player with a 30% edge our payback table looks like this:

Rebuys 0Rebuys 1
Edge 30.00%Edge 30.00%
PlaceProbReturnPlaceProbReturn
11.30%$ 37.7012.57%$ 75.40
21.30%$ 23.9822.53%$ 47.33
31.29%$ 15.5132.49%$ 30.20
41.29%$ 12.8842.45%$ 24.76
51.28%$ 10.2752.41%$ 19.48
61.28%$ 8.3262.37%$ 15.56
71.28%$ 7.0272.33%$ 12.95
81.27%$ 5.7282.29%$ 10.41
91.27%$ 4.4492.25%$ 7.96
101.26%$ 3.16102.21%$ 5.59
EV $28.99EV $49.65
ROI 28.99%ROI 24.82%

Rebuy!

Consider what happens when we add a $9 entry fee. Assume rebuys are juice free. Playing with a 10% edge (pre-juice) is not so great anymore:

Juice 9Juice 9
Rebuys 0Rebuys 1
Edge 10.00%Edge 10.00%
PlaceProbReturnPlaceProbReturn
11.10%$ 31.9012.18%$ 63.80
21.10%$ 20.3322.15%$ 40.21
31.10%$ 13.1732.13%$ 25.77
41.10%$ 10.9742.10%$ 21.21
51.10%$ 8.7652.07%$ 16.76
61.09%$ 7.1162.05%$ 13.45
71.09%$ 6.0172.02%$ 11.23
81.09%$ 4.9182.00%$ 9.07
91.09%$ 3.8291.97%$ 6.97
101.09%$ 2.72101.94%$ 4.91
EV $0.71EV $4.38
ROI 0.66%ROI 2.09%

The rebuy is a must in this situation. Because there is no juice on the rebuy, the rebuy chips are essentially sold at a discount. Even the small discount makes a large difference in EV and ROI.


Take a look at the 30% edge player when juice is added:

Juice 9Juice 9
Rebuys 0Rebuys 1
Edge 30.00%Edge 30.00%
PlaceProbReturnPlaceProbReturn
11.30%$ 37.7012.57%$ 75.40
21.30%$ 23.9822.53%$ 47.33
31.29%$ 15.5132.49%$ 30.20
41.29%$ 12.8842.45%$ 24.76
51.28%$ 10.2752.41%$ 19.48
61.28%$ 8.3262.37%$ 15.56
71.28%$ 7.0272.33%$ 12.95
81.27%$ 5.7282.29%$ 10.41
91.27%$ 4.4492.25%$ 7.96
101.26%$ 3.16102.21%$ 5.59
EV $19.99EV $40.65
ROI 18.34%ROI 19.45%

The $9 entry fee comes directly out of our EV. Notice the ROI when rebuying is higher because of the discount.

Next, consider the situation where our player has managed to double his stack through play, and is considering an add-on. His 100 chip increase has left each other player 1.01 chips shorter.

Increased Stack 100Increased Stack 100
Juice 9Juice 9
Rebuys 0Rebuys 1
Edge 10.00%Edge 10.00%
PlaceProbReturnPlaceProbReturn
12.20%$ 63.8013.27%$ 95.70
22.17%$ 40.2023.19%$ 59.64
32.15%$ 25.7633.12%$ 37.78
42.12%$ 21.2043.04%$ 30.74
52.09%$ 16.7452.97%$ 24.01
62.07%$ 13.4362.90%$ 19.04
72.04%$ 11.2272.83%$ 15.72
82.01%$ 9.0682.76%$ 12.54
91.99%$ 6.9592.69%$ 9.51
101.96%$ 4.90102.62%$ 6.63
EV $104.26EV $102.32
ROI 95.65%ROI 48.96%

With a 10% edge, having doubled his stack, the player should now decline the add-on.

If the player manages to triple up before the add-on, he needs to play with an edge over 20% to make the rebuy a +EV play:

Increased Stack 200Increased Stack 200
Juice 9Juice 9
Rebuys 0Rebuys 1
Edge 20.54%Edge 20.54%
PlaceProbReturnPlaceProbReturn
13.62%$ 104.8714.77%$ 139.83
23.52%$ 65.1224.59%$ 85.77
33.43%$ 41.1034.41%$ 53.48
43.33%$ 33.3244.24%$ 42.82
53.24%$ 25.9354.07%$ 32.90
63.15%$ 20.4863.91%$ 25.66
73.06%$ 16.8473.75%$ 20.84
82.98%$ 13.3983.60%$ 16.35
92.89%$ 10.1293.45%$ 12.19
102.81%$ 7.02103.31%$ 8.35
EV $229.19EV $229.19
ROI 210.27%ROI 109.66%

From this, we can conclude that even a player with a moderate edge who is getting a small discount on his chips should not rebuy if he has managed to sufficiently increase his stack. A player an edge of 50% should still take the rebuy if his stack is less than 4.5 times greater than his initial stack. A 100% edge player should rebuy with a stack less than 7.5 times his initial stack. For very skilled players rebuys should still be made except in extreme cases.

These examples demonstrate that rebuys should not always be taken. The more skill a player has, the more often he should rebuy. The more chips the player has accumulated the less often he should add-on.

Always rebuying and adding on is a mistake. Most of the time, rebuying and adding on is a good move for the skilled, well bankrolled player. ♠

Note from Arnold Snyder on Rebuys and Add-ons

In The Poker Tournament Formula, I advise that unskilled players should not make rebuys. I advise that skilled players should always add-on or rebuy as soon as possible, in order to always have as many chips in front of you as possible.

In Appendix A of The Poker Tournament Formula, I advise players that it is futile to try to profit from poker tournaments with a small edge, and I give an example of 10% as too small an edge to play with. I also advise players that my win rate, using the exact basic strategy provided in The Poker Tournament Formula in Skill Level 2-4 tournaments, was consistently over 200%.

Higher edges will be available with fast play properly adjusted for tournament structure in slower tournaments with higher patience factors and skill levels, as defined in The Poker Tournament Formula.

And one other point. I consider Pikachu’s analysis to be of value to players in exceptional circumstances, which is why I’ve published it here. But it does not take into account the concept of an implied discount on chips due to the increased utility of chips in a big stack. Due to the implied discount, I would rebuy and add-on much more frequently than Pikachu suggests. In fact, I would almost always rebuy and add-on. ♠

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How to Kill a Casino Promotion

What Went Wrong at the Morongo?

by L.J. Winsome
(From Blackjack Forum XVI #4, Winter 1996)
© Blackjack Forum 1996

Friday the 13th of September was touted as “Your Lucky Day at Casino Morongo,” but instead, the payday turned into an expensive fiasco true to the date. The casino promotion — which portended to offer over $900,000 in excess player pool funds to punters by paying any “natural 13” like a blackjack at 1 1/2 times a bet — was canceled at the last minute.

Although, Casino Morongo undoubtedly pulled some kind of bait-and-switch on the players, it’s arguable that the card counters had no one to blame but themselves.

Let’s face it, counting cards is the easy part. It’s things like game selection, ability to read heat, and a great act that make for longevity, and therefore, give someone the chance to put those counting skills to use. That and bankroll, of course. Another requisite skill, and possibly one of the most important, is discretion, and after the example set at the Morongo casino promotion by the army of professional card counters that showed up to cash in, it appears to be a lesson that needs to be relearned.

The reason every card counter on U.S. soil (including one from Hawaii) showed up at at Morongo casino promotion was Stanford Wong, and and one of his Current Blackjack News “Special Editions,” which are more commonly called “Wong Alerts.” These go out over the Internet and telephone/fax lines, and inform professionals who subscribe to this service of promotions across the country and optimal strategies for playing them. I have been to numerous promotions over the past two years, all of which I have learned about by these “Wong Alerts.”

It costs $295 a year for the fax service, but it used to be worth it, as these promotions injected much appreciated infusions of cash into my bankroll. Also, casino promotions are a lot less work than card counting. During casino promotions all one has to do is sit there and bet the maximum. But there may be a downside to these alerts: too many people are now showing up. In this case, the “Wong Alert” literally killed the promotion before it started. Here’s how the alert looked when it came over the wire:

SPECIAL ISSUE OF CBJN
12 September 1996

Any Natural 13 Pays 3:2 on Friday the 13th at Casino Morongo “Friday the 13th.” Your lucky day at Casino Morongo!

Any natural 13 pays like a blackjack!! 1 1/2 times your bet. September 13, 6 P.M. to 12 A.M.

With those words on small pieces of orange paper, Casino Morongo in Cabazon, west of Palm Springs, CA, announced what could be the all-time biggest casino giveaway. The flyers were distributed on the tournament tables during the Wednesday night tournament on 11 September.

Thirteen is the most common total you are dealt. If A-2 is not recognized as thirteen, you are dealt thirteen about 8.28% of the time. If A-2 counts as a natural thirteen, the total rises to 9.47% of the time, which is twice as frequent as a blackjack. Normally, thirteen is a loser. On average, it loses 35%. Paying 3:2 on a thirteen thus improves the value of a thirteen by 185%. Gaining 1.85 of a bet on 8.28% of your hands is 15.3%. Gaining 1.85% of a bet on 9.47% of your hands is 17.5%.

Thus the natural-13-pays-like-a-blackjack increases your edge by 15.3% or 17.5%. The normal casino edge is 0.35% (eight decks) or 0.48% (one deck) and you must pay the casino $1 per hand for the privilege of playing blackjack.

Overall, on the evening of Friday the 13th you will enjoy an edge of 15% to 17%, less collections. Normally, most tables have a $100 maximum. Last night there were twelve blackjack tables open, of which three allowed $500 max bets, eight were $100 max, and one (the single decker) had a $200 max.

Normally you play about 40 hands an hour in a casino that takes collections, with the slowness due to the time it takes to make the collection. Customers who are enjoying a 15% edge undoubtedly will find ways to speed play, such as never hesitating on a decision, not splitting most pairs, and helping the dealer with collections.

My guess is you ought to be able to play 50 hands an hour for this promotion. Flat $100 bets ought to win at the rate of $750 per hour less $50 per hour of collections for a net of $700 an hour. Flat $200 bets ought to net about $1450 an hour. Flat $500 bets ought to net about $3700 an hour.

These numbers assume A-2 does not count as thirteen; if it does, the win rates will be higher yet. If the promotion actually runs for the full six hours, $100 bettors ought to clear $4500, $200 bettors ought to clear $8700, and $500 bettors ought to clear $22,500. These numbers assume A-2 does not count as thirteen; if it does, the win rates will be higher yet.

Risk is basically nonexistent when you have a 15% edge. The only risk is will the cashier have enough cash to buy back all your chips. The players’ pool is well over $900,000, but it will be considerably smaller by midnight of Friday the 13th.

After reading that, what card counter in his right mind wouldn’t run, not walk, to the nearest airport and catch the first plane to L.A.?

The Morongo Promotion: Like a Card Counter’s Convention

Jerry, one of the floormen working at the casino in the afternoon prior to the promotion witnessed the counters competing for seats in a manner he initially compared to circling sharks and as the day progressed likened to circling vultures. I don’t think Casino Morongo has ever seen so many arguments over seats at which it cost $1.00 to play a hand.

Many people who got up to use the restroom lost their seats, if they didn’t return in five minutes. All that morning bosses and dealers were forced to arbitrate these disputes, and the atmosphere intensified as the day progressed. By 10:30 a.m., it was impossible to get a seat

Many of the larger blackjack teams had arrived the night before and taken their places at the $500 maximum table estimating their e.v. at around $4,000 per hour.

That night, when one professional blackjack player asked for clarification from a pitboss on exactly which two cards constituted a “natural 13,” he was told it was “…any first two cards, including A-2.”

When he asked if the promotion would apply at the $500 tables, however, he was told “no.” With that word, the entire table got up and returned to their hotel rooms in preparation for the next day’s festivities. They would return the next day, of course. At the $100 maximum tables the hourly e.v. was about $800, still well worth the competition for a seat.

In any other casino, no professional card counter who was a member of a blackjack team would openly communicate or distribute bankroll with colleagues under the watchful stare of the eye-in-the-sky, but that’s the sort of thing that went on at Casino Morongo. It was reported by a floorman that they had videotape of professionals passing large sums of money at the tables, openly communicating with their partners and, worst of all, trying to buy the locals out of their seats.

Morongo, with typical casino conspiracy mentality, reported that from the perspective of surveillance, it looked like one giant team had descended on the casino and was operating some kind of scam. That would scare the daylights out of any casino, particularly one unaccustomed to card-counters, and in this case, it scared the promotion out of Morongo.

One card counter, whom I later learned was organizing one of the much-feared big-betting teams, described feeling like he was at a giant convention of counters.

“The atmosphere is just so relaxed,” he said.

I met him hovering behind my table, which was filled with Vietnamese regulars hitting hard 17 against a 10 in order to get the two-of-clubs marked with a PAYDAY (another, less profitable, Morongo promotion gimmick). I was the only professional at this table with a seat. The regulars kept promising to leave at 5:00 pm, when the payday promotion ended, and an hour before the anxiously awaited promotion on “natural 13,” but this did not deter any number of counters from coming up and offering to buy the locals out of their seats beforehand.

At 3:00 pm a pitboss circled the casino announcing that a “natural 13” was made up of only a 10, J, Q, or K and a 3. This lessened the worth of the promotion, but the expected value was still about $400 per hour and there was no heat to contend with. Everybody stayed in their seats, but the continuing devaluation of the promotion was disappointing.

Then, at 5:00, one hour before the party was due to begin, the casino manager, with two beefy security guards in tow, went around announcing the cancellation of the Lucky 13 promotion altogether. The counters were furious, some of them quite vocally.

The trouble is that Casino Morongo, like any other casino on the planet, exists to make money. They are not there to put money into the pockets of card counters who will then disappear and use the winnings to extract even more money from other casinos. Casino Morongo wants it’s regulars to win the player pool, not the professionals, because they want that money to be returned to them in the form of the ante that gets dropped down the slot with each hand that’s played.

The money that would have been given away during the casino promotion comes from the blackjack winnings, not the $1-per-hand drop. That’s why these promotions exist in the first place; the casino will occasionally and publicly give up some of the money they earn from their advantage on the game. Nobody knows how much money they really earn with both the normal house advantage and the phenomenal earn of the drop — Indian casinos are accountable to no one, audited by no regulatory body — so, the casino promotions lend an aura of honesty to the otherwise questionable policy of hitting the average player from both sides.

If, however, the casino can earn the money back in the weeks and months that follow the promotion, from unwitting regulars, that’s fine with them. They’re not going anywhere.

Casino Morongo pulled some kind of stunt when they canceled the Friday the 13th promotion. I couldn’t help wondering, when I heard the news, if the whole thing had been a setup. If so, it was brilliant. Fake a promotion so that all the card counters come in, then make them play for seven hours before the promotion — to guarantee a seat during the big payoff hours — and charge them a dollar a hand while they’re doing it. Brilliant and unethical, if that’s the case.

What has to be remembered is that Casino Morongo is a casino, not a fun place to hang out with your friends and socialize. In a way, we card counters swallowed the same lies that all the regular losers usually fall for: lose money but have a good time while you’re doing it.

We let our guards down, and we ended up paying for it. That’s the trouble with this business, mistakes cost us immediately and dearly, and performance is all.

Come the next casino promotion I hope we’ll have learned our lesson; we’ll be our usual discreet and stealthy selves, and we’ll remember that a casino, by any other name, is still our enemy.♠

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Another Card Counting System for the Vision Impaired

The Ultimate VIC (Vision Impaired Count)


by Arnold Snyder
[From Poker World , February 1996]
© 1996 Arnold Snyder

Last year, a player wrote to me about a card counting system he had developed for his own use, which he had devised because he had less than perfect vision. He called it the “Senior Count,” because his vision problem was something that had developed with age. I wrote an article about it because the system was so ingenious, and so effective. Prior to hearing about the Senior’s card counting system, had someone told me that they had poor vision, so much so that a substantial proportion of the cards dealt, even when face up, were difficult or impossible to read clearly, I would likely have advised that person to just stick to basic strategy and waste little effort attempting to count cards.

After publishing the “Senior Count,” I received a number of letters from other players who had devised their own variations of card counting systems to adjust for their limited eyesight. The player who invented the Senior Count wrote that his specific difficulty in seeing was mostly limited to his inability to distinguish the 7s, 8s, 9s and 10s from each other. He had no difficulty discerning the court cards (J, Q, K) because of the paint, but the pip tens looked like the same blurry mess as the 8s and 9s. The low cards (2,3,4,5,6) were fairly distinguishable because there was enough white space on the cards to make the patterns of the pips stand out. All traditional card counting systems value the pip tens the same as the court cards because the game of blackjack values them the same.

The letters I received from others with vision difficulties reported similar difficulties reading the 7s, 8s, 9s and 10s. One player had no difficulty reading the card values of his own hand, or of the players seated adjacent to him on either side, but the hands of the players two or more seats away blurred. Also, one player – who was in his twenties but was severely nearsighted – said he even had difficulty reading the dealer’s upcard if he was on either end of the table. This player also objected to referring to these types of card counting systems as “senior” systems, as he was far from being a senior citizen. He suggested calling them “VIC” systems, for Vision Impaired Counting.

The idea behind the Senior Count is simply to ignore the pip tens, balancing the painted court cards (-1 each) vs. the 4s, 5s, and 6s (+1 each). Its a balanced card counting system, sort of a streamlined Hi-Opt I, with a surprisingly high betting correlation and playing efficiency for its simplicity of use. The more advanced variation of the Senior Count, which weíll call the “High-Low-Vic,” includes the ace along with the court cards as a -1 count, vs. the 3s, 4s, 5s, and 6s (all +1). This variation raises the betting correlation to a strong 90%.

The most unusual variation on this type of card counting strategy came from a player who had used the high-low count for many years, and when his eyes began to fail, decided that the best way to play conservatively was to count any indiscernible card as a ten, knowing that it was actually either a 7, 8, 9, or 10 – but feeling safer with the assumption that the card was a 10, since the removal of a ten had the most negative effect on his expectation.

This seemed to work okay for a while, until he noticed that in shoe games he continually went into double-digit negative counts. He also noticed frequent wrong assumptions, when players played out hands incongruous with his assumption that one or more cards in the hand were 10s.

His solution was to continue using all of the high-low values for the aces, court cards, and 2s through 6s, but to count all indiscernible 7s, 8s, 9s, and pip 10s as -¼ each. This device raises the betting correlation to an impressive 93%. Weíll call this the Ultimate VIC System. The method strikes me as rather cumbersome to use at the tables, but the player who devised it claims little difficulty. What he likes most about it is that he feels most comfortable continuing to use his long-memorized high-low indices, since the Ultimate VIC has the same number of plus and minus points as the high-low. Actually, if you do not have access to a computer program which will figure out strategy indices for a VIC system, I’d suggest just using a set of indices for the high-low (Wong’s) or High-Opt I (Humble’s), depending on whether or not you elect to count the ace or neutralize it.

In any case, the development of these types of VIC systems, which allow even those who have poor eyesight to extract most of the value from counting cards, provides testimony to the ingenuity of players who refuse to give up the game they’ve learned to beat, and who also refuse to allow a handicap to seriously affect their skillful play.  ♠

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Banking Blackjack Games in California

Mondo Morongo: Player-Banked Blackjack

by Allan Pell
(From Blackjack Forum Volume XIV #4, December 1994)
© Blackjack Forum 1994

[Ed. note—In the California Indian casinos, the house now banks the games. In California at the present time, player-banking is limited to the card rooms. Opportunities for player-banking open up in other states from time to time. –-Arnold Snyder]

It was the best of casinos, it was the worst of casinos—mostly, it was the worst. This story starts a couple of months ago when the right revered Bishop Snyder referred a private student to my blackjack school. We’ll call this student Daddy Warbucks. Warbucks turned out to be an ex-associate of the late, great Ken Uston, and extremely wealthy, as evidenced by his multi-million dollar Wilshire condo in the Westwood area of Los Angeles.

A week after our private four-hour-long tutoring session, Mr. Warbucks called and invited me to join him on a jaunt to one of the Indian casinos. I suggested the Morongo Casino on Interstate 10, two hours east of Los Angeles.

We arrived in the a.m. hours and, to our dismay, stared at an empty bingo hall large enough to hold the crew of the aircraft carrier Eisenhower. In the corner of the building was a small, walled-off section containing the table games—15-20 tables for Indian blackjack and various poker games. There was a small crew of degenerate gamblers hard at work, mostly at the blackjack tables.

Game rules in this house are as follows: double 10-11 only, dealer hits soft 17, no resplits, no insurance, 8-decks. Off the top, players are looking at a 1.2% disadvantage nightmare. But that’s not the worst of it. Since this is a player-banked game, you must pay a 50 cents per hand table rent (tax) to the house. At 60 hands per hour, this translates to $30 per hour. You’re now looking at a combined total of about $37 an hour for the privilege of playing blackjack at $10 a hand.

Absolutely insane to say the least. But there is a way to beat the game, and being a player has nothing to do with this premise. You must be the bank, the one with the wad to make money in the Indian blackjack scene. And you can do it—sometimes that is. To get an edge, you must possess the bankroll and be able to set the minimums and maximums. Setting the minimum bet is the most important, however.

Let’s explore the reasons using the “Profit Formula” from Blackbelt in Blackjack. At Morongo and other California Indian casinos, the banker pays a $1 per hand table rent when banking the game. At 60 hands per hour (average for shoe games), this means it costs $60 an hour to bank a game—no matter what the betting limits of the game are. In order to overcome the table rent, you must be in a higher limit game.

For example, if you’re in a $2 to $15 (common) limit game, your average bet per player will be somewhere around $7. With the eight-spot (minus yourself) tables at Morongo, you’re looking at about $3000 of action per hour at this table with seven players. You will be getting 1.2% of all the players’ money that goes across the table, which in this case is about $36 per hour. With table rent at $60 per hour for the banker, you’re $24 in the hole per hour. To break even in the Morongo game, you must bank a game that has at least a $10 minimum bet.

Of course, some players bet larger, but the Indian casinos are full of soft players who flat bet. I watched a $3 minimum table where several players were flat-betting the minimum and paying 50 cents per hand table rent—truly insane.

To make serious money, you must bank at least a $25 minimum game. At this level, you’ll get better than $10,000 per hour in player action, assuming seven players. With the 1.2% expectation, you get at least $120 per hour, assuming everyone’s flat betting table minimum. Subtract the $60 table rent and you’ve got $60 an hour for your trouble. Not bad!

But at these higher limit games, the players are not flat betting, to say the least. I saw one player with $300 per hand spread to two spots when a player left. I think the average bet is around $75 to $150 per player, depending when and where you play. At these levels, you’ll pull in $300 to $700 per hour. Not at all bad!

Before you run off to Morongo or another Indian casino to bank one of these games, you should know about the catch—there’s always a catch. At Morongo, the $25 game is monopolized by a professional game banker. This guy had over $80,000 in chips on a roller cart situated beside his first base position.

I learned from the casino manager that this game is controlled by a syndicate who rotates bankroll managers on shifts, and that their bankroll was in excess of $500,000. If you try to sit in on this game, expert players from the syndicate would come out of the woodwork and “bet heavily into you” in an attempt to grind you out.

The high minimum is a psychological barrier that excludes many potential bankers because of the heavy bankroll requirements (which I will go into next), and thus a syndicate can dominate a game for long periods at a time. House rules are that the banker can hold the entire shoe, and if someone wants to bank, it goes to the next player. At this big table, there were no other takers.

Daddy Warbucks, a big businessman with a mind for numbers, quickly saw the profit potential of such a venture, but he and I also saw how the game was controlled. Jerry Erico, shift manager, told Warbucks and me that when the casino opened, they were approached by some very big operations out of Nevada who offered to bank the games.

After a visit to another Indian casino in San Bernardino, I found something that made me suspect that something like this may be happening there as well. In San Bernardino as well, there were dominant bankers on the big minimum games. The shift bankers at both casinos had identical smoke fans at their disposal—identical. And since I do not believe in coincidence, there must be some coordinated effort to dominate the banking at both of these casinos.

In the San Bernardino casino, I managed to get a look at the top manager of the syndicate as he held a meeting with several of his shift bankers at an empty table right out in the open. They made no effort to conceal their action from either the players or the house. Take caution and do not bump heads with the big boys.

There is, however, some profit potential at the Indian casinos. In San Bernardino and Morongo, when players appear, the house opens more high-limit tables and they openly seek bankers to keep these games operating. In San Bernardino, they have a waiting list for bankers, and instead of all bankers sitting at the tables playing off one another, they rotate bankers into the game from the waiting list—pretty fair. You have to be there early in the afternoon to get on the list. At all the Indian casinos, the tables fill and play starts to pick up after 5 p.m.

Bankroll requirements for these games are heavy. Expect some fluctuation. Expect expert players, as they are not excluded by the house. In fact, you can openly operate a blackjack computer without the shift managers or the house dealers blinking an eye. A $10 to $25 game would require a $5000 bankroll. A $25 to $300 game would require at least $15,000 to maintain play. And $25,000 would be more realistic and safer. You could have a bad run and fluctuate down several thousand over several shoes, so you need the money to stay in the game.

Do not look for many smart players at these games. Smart players know that you cannot beat these rules. The smart players are the ones who are banking the games. And how do you bank? Just put your money in front of you and press the auto-pilot button. The house dealer will do the rest. Actually, banking a game is quite boring and tedious. You do absolutely nothing—except watch for cheating, that is. Make sure the dealer is not playing with the player. They could make incorrect payoffs or pull any number of scams on you.

And talk about scams, at Morongo they offer video poker with ridiculously high payouts. If you refer back to my Blackjack Forum articles on “Robo-Dealers” (March ’92 and September ’93), you’ll see you stand a good chance of having your clock cleaned electronically.

[Ed. note: Unlike Nevada and New Jersey, California does not require video card game slots to deal randomly from 52-card decks. Paybacks to players on these machines may be internally set with dip switches, and the machines will deal the cards necessary to acquire the preset house profit. This is legal in California, so serious video poker players should beware. “Intelligent” strategies have no effect on your win rate, or to be more accurate, your loss rate. –A.S.]

There are three Indian casinos along Interstate 10, within a few minutes driving time of each other. They are: Casino Morongo in Cabazon, 33 miles east of San Bernardino; the Indio Bingo Palace & Casino, further east of Morongo along I-10; and San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino in San Bernardino. In the San Diego area, there are three casinos operating: Viejas, Barona, and Sycuan in El Cajon. Santa Ynez Indian Casino has just opened north of Santa Barbara, and there are many more to the north. ♠

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Missouri Outlaws Casinos from Barring Card Counters

Missouri Law Prohibits Barring for Counting Cards

by Robert A. Loeb, Attorney at Law
(From Blackjack Forum XX #2, Summer 2000)
© Blackjack Forum 2000

A new Missouri rule prohibits barring for counting cards. Under this new rule, the Missouri Gaming Commission will specifically allow certain countermeasures by the casinos to try to minimize the advantage counters can get. The new rule has been adopted, and I am informed by the MGC that it goes into effect on August 30.

While there is nothing revolutionary about the new policy, I think that serious players may be interested in seeing the fine points of the new rule as it concerns Missouri casinos, as well as seeing the regulatory approach to governing casinos. What follows is the text of the new rule. I have added the underlining, to highlight certain portions that I will discuss.

The Text of the New Missouri Law

Title 11 — DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY Division 45 – Missouri Gaming Commission Chapter 5 – Conduct of Gaming 11 CSR 45-5.051 – Minimum Standards for Twenty-One (Blackjack).

(1) The following words and terms, when used in this rule, shall have the following meanings unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

(A) “Bart Carter shuffle” means the shuffling procedure whereby approximately one deck of cards is shuffled after being dealt, segregated into separate stacks and each stack is inserted into pre marked locations within the remaining decks contained in the dealing shoe.

(B) “Determinant card” means the first card drawn for each round of play to determine from which side of the two compartment dealing shoe the cards for that hand shall be dealt.

(C) “Double shoe” means a dealing shoe that has two adjacent compartments in which cards are stacked separately and which permits cards to be dealt from only one compartment at any given time.

(2) A person who, without the assistance of another person or without the use of a physical aid or device of any kind, uses the ability to keep track of the value of cards played in blackjack (“21”) and uses predictions formed as a result of the tracking information in her/her playing and betting strategy shall not be considered to be cheating.

(3) A class A licensee may implement any of the following options at a Twenty-One table provided that the casino licensee complied with the notice requirements contained in 11 CSR 45- 5.060:

(A) Persons who have not made a wager on the first round of play may not enter the game on a subsequent round of play until a reshuffle of the cards has occurred;

(B) (Persons who have not made a wager on the first round of play may be permitted to enter the game, but may be limited to wagering only the minimum limit posted at the table until a reshuffle of the cards has occurred;

(C) Persons who, after making wager on a given round of play, decline to wager on any subsequent round of play may be precluded from placing any further wagers until a reshuffle of the cards has occurred; and

(D) (Persons who, after making a wager on a given round of play, decline to wager on any subsequent round of play my be permitted to place further wagers, but may be limited to wagering only the minimum limit posed at the table until a reshuffle of the cards has occurred.

(E) Use of double shoe with a determinate card that selected which shoe to deal from during a particular hand.

(4) If a class A licensee implements any of the options in (3) of this rule, the option shall be uniformly applied to all persons at the table; provided, however that if a class A licensee has implemented either of the options in (3)(C) or (D) of this rule, an exception may be made for a patron who temporarily leaves the table if, at the time the patron leaves, the class A licensee agrees to reserve the patron’s spot until his or her return.

(5) Immediately prior to the commencement of play and after any shuffle of the cards, the dealer shall require that the cards be cut in a manner set forth in the class A licensee’s internal controls as approved by the Commission. Such internal controls shall be subject to the following conditions:

(A) If the “Bart Carter Shuffle” is utilized and the cards in the discard rack exceed approximately one deck in number, the dealer shall continue dealing the cards until that round of play is completed after which he shall remove the cards from the discard rack and shuffle those cards so that they are randomly intermixed. After the cards taken from the discard rack are shuffled, they shall be split into three separate stacks and each stack shall be inserted into premarked locations within the remaining decks contained in the dealing shoe.

(6) After the cards have been cut and before any cards have been dealt, a floor supervisor may required the cards to be recut if he or she determines that the cut was performed improperly or in any way that might affect the integrity or fairness of the game. If a recut is required, the cards shall be recut, at the class A licensee’s option, by the player who last cut the cards, or by the next person entitled to cut the cards, as determined by the class A licensee’s internal controls.

Discussion of the New Missouri Law Regarding Barring for Card Counting

The first point that needs to be made is that Missouri is to be commended for even attempting to make an official rule governing barring and what countermeasures are to be authorized. Most state laws do not specifically cover these areas, leaving casinos free to make their own policies without governmental regulation. By way of background, it should also be noted that this rule is an amendment to Missouri’s existing regulatory scheme.

Some of the references in this rule are to other sections of existing law. For instance, existing law already allows for barring, and one of the grounds for barring is when someone is caught cheating. Thus, the language in this rule basically says that card counting is not cheating.

This eliminates card counting as a basis for barring in other sections of the law. The word “cheating” appears in other parts of the statutes as well, including criminal offenses; it is confusing that the anti-barring rule should be based on the word “cheating” because card counting was never considered by Missouri to be criminal cheating.

In any event, this is how Missouri precludes barring for card counters. The phrase “without the assistance of another person” is also important. Under this regulation, if one is deemed to be counting cards with the assistance of another person, both people can be barred.

Realistically, there is no due process; in other words, if a casino arbitrarily decides that two people are counting cards together, or signaling each other in some way, both people can be barred, with little recourse to “appeal” the casino’s actions. In conversations with officials with the Missouri Gaming Commission and officials in other states, I have learned that these regulators truly believe that team play (at the tables, as opposed to merely sharing a bankroll) should be considered improper.

The underlined phrase “licensee may implement any of the following options” begins the list of countermeasures which the casino may take in response to card counters. This suggests, and Missouri officials confirm, that these are the authorized countermeasures, and that other countermeasures should not be implemented.

The Missouri Law Implies No Preferential Shuffling, or Flat Betting or Half-Shoeing a Player

Accordingly, Missouri is allowing a casino to prohibit mid-shoe entry, to impose minimum table bets only on mid-shoe entry, to use a Bart Carter shuffle, and to use a double shoe. By inference, Missouri is not allowing preferential shuffling, flat betting, “half-shoes” or other movement of the cut card, or discriminatory restrictions on a single player at a table (all of which are allowed by New Jersey).

I am curious to see how often Missouri invokes these countermeasures after August 30, particularly the use of a double shoe. Regardless of how clear and fair these new regulations are (or are not), I think that Missouri is to be commended for taking a lead among the states by attempting to make the law clear for both players and casinos, and for attempting to treat all players in a uniform and non-discriminatory way.

It is interesting to note that nine days after running an article about Missouri allowing card counting and prohibiting barring, the Kansas City Star ran an article entitled, “Card Counters Facing New Foe — Innovative Automatic Shuffling Machine Tilts the Odds Back to the Casinos’ Favor.” This article tells about Shuffle Master’s latest continuous shuffle machine. We’ll have to see how the future plays out.

Abuse of Casino Comp Card Information

There have been a few reports of casinos inexplicably providing player’s card information to outsiders. It’s inexplicable to me because casinos have no interest in sharing this information with others, and they have no interest in making their customers angry at the release of their personal information. Here’s what’s happened.

Casinos maintain computerized information of their customers who use player’s cards. That information will typically include name, address, date of birth, and the record of the person’s play each time he visits the casino. This will include how long he played and at what games, average bet, the time of day he played, and total wins and losses.

Usually, this information remains with the casino, and is not given out except perhaps to other casinos which are part of the same company. The casino is also required to obey subpoenas and court orders, so the player’s card information will be given out in response to a subpoena, such as in criminal (grand jury) investigations, or often in disputed divorce cases.

I have learned of three reports in which player’s card information has been released without a subpoena or court order. In two cases, it involved employers checking up on employees to see if they were gambling when they were supposed to be at work. The third instance was a private individual who was just checking up on a “friend’s” gambling habits.

I don’t expect this to become a trend. In at least one of the three instances, the casino executive stated that the release of the information was contrary to casino policy. The casino industry cannot desire to release this information to outside entities. However, it is worthwhile for serious and recreational players alike to be on their toes and be aware that there is no guarantee that your personal information will be kept confidential within the casino. ♠

For more information of laws and lawsuits that affect card counters and other professional gamblers, as well as info on how to protect your rights as a player, see Beat the Players: Casinos, Cops And the Game Inside the Game, by Bob Nersesian. Also see Bob Loeb’s excellent Blackjack and the Law.

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The MindPlay Table Games Management System

Bye Bye Pit Boss: Here Comes MindPlay

by Arnold Snyder
(From Blackjack Forum Vol. XXIII #1, Spring 2003)
© 2003 Blackjack Forum Online

Once there was a time when the pit boss was king. He knew the games better than anyone, and his value to the house was immense. He truly was “the boss.” His decisions were final; his word was law.

The pit boss was the only man with the “power of the pen.” If you wanted a comp, you had to ask the boss. You didn’t talk to a host, or a marketing exec, or plead your case at the “VIP lounge.” There was no VIP lounge. There was no computer program that estimated your average bet, your hours of play, your expected loss.

If you wanted show tickets, or a room compliments of the house, you asked the boss. Period. The surveillance guys were lackeys of the boss. They did what they were told, watched who he said to watch, and looked for the moves he told them to look for. He was the protector of the games. The guys on the catwalks worked for him, did as they were told.

Over the years, these functions have been taken away from the pit bosses. No boss can give you a room for the night anymore. He’s lost the power of the pen. Most bosses don’t understand the games anymore. Surveillance protects the games. The once all-powerful boss has been reduced to a bookkeeper. He records totals, counts chips, watches payouts, calls the cage when a table needs a fill.

Says one exec who has watched this change through the years, “They’re not really bosses over anything any more. They’re just clerks. The old timers remember the power the bosses used to have. It was all-encompassing. If you wanted a job in the casino, the fastest way to get it was through the boss. They had the juice. They could hire and fire dealers at whim. In some joints, the cocktail waitresses were like their private harems.

“These days, nobody thinks of them as ‘bosses’ any more. It’s a title, but it’s an anachronism. They’re ‘pit clerks,’ and they know it. They’re grossly overpaid for what they do, and they know that too. For all the talent and knowledge they need for the job they do, they could be check-out clerks at Seven-Eleven.”

Is MindPlay the End of the Pit Boss?

Now, it appears, the days of the boss are numbered.

“This Changes Everything…”

That’s the advertising slogan for the new MindPlay system.

Remember SafeJack? (Blackjack Forum, Summer 1997)

Remember SmartShoe21? (Blackjack Forum, Summer 2000)

MindPlay appears to be the evil offspring of SafeJack and SmartShoe21, a technological attempt at identifying and eliminating the threat of card counters. MindPlay is owned and distributed, appropriately, by Bally/Alliance Gaming, the same company that dominates the slot machine industry.

The prototype MindPlay tables have been in testing at Eldorado in Reno for about a year now. A few months ago, the Las Vegas Hilton also opened some MindPlay tables. Based on the successful tests at Eldorado and the LV Hilton’s experience with the system, Nevada Gaming Control approved the MindPlay system for widespread casino distribution in Nevada.

Both the (now defunct) SafeJack system, as well as the (now defunct) SmartShoe21, were supposedly fully-integrated high-tech systems for keeping track of the cards, the bets, the players, the wins, the losses, etc., so that the casinos could instantly identify and eliminate card counters and other advantage players. Both systems had numerous bugs and technical problems that never got worked out. But many in the industry believe that MindPlay is the fruition of this idea, and a version of the vision that will work.

I picked up a copy of the MindPlay brochure at the last Gaming Expo in Las Vegas, and at first glance, this is how MindPlay struck me. Just another computer system for trying to find card counters.

The system itself costs an arm and a leg. This is not a system for your average Mom’n’Pop casino. Each MindPlay table costs about $15,000, and the casino using the system would also be required to purchase a maintenance contract from Bally/Alliance for a couple hundred thousand per year more. That means if a big Strip casino wants to install MindPlay tables, it will probably cost them $2 to $3 million just to set up the initial operation.

How can this possibly be cost effective? Are the inventors just dreamers who think they can convince the casinos that card counters are taking this much out of the house? The ratio of cost to value seems so disproportionate that I cannot even imagine any casino considering using the system. Why do they even bother wasting their time testing it?

As I was wandering the aisles at the Gaming Expo, scratching my head as I read the flashy brochure, I ran into a casino exec, a longtime VP with one of the major property groups. Let’s call him “John.” I asked him if he’d seen the MindPlay demo. He had. I asked him what he thought of it.

“Honestly?” he said, “I’m not one of the proponents of the system. I think it will prove to be an expensive flop. But I believe I’m in the minority with that opinion.”

“So most casino execs think this system will eliminate card counters?” I asked.

“That’s probably something that they hope for, Arnold, but that’s not the main reason why they want it. You’re being shortsighted about it.”

I waved the brochure at him. “Shortsighted? That’s all this thing talks about—how the system can count the cards, evaluate the skill of players, keep track of their bets, wins, losses. This is just an automatic counter catcher. Another SafeJack.”

He took the brochure from me and opened it. He pointed to a line of text. “Read that,” he said.

A High-Tech Casino Jobs Killer

I read the paragraph he was pointing to: “And then there is the costly staffing of too many pit clerks and supervisory personnel, all of which manually collect the kind of information that more modern gaming systems, such as slots, can produce automatically.”

“What are you driving at?” I asked.

“For the people who will make the purchase decision on MindPlay, the primary purpose of the system is not to eliminate card counters, but to eliminate pit bosses, floor persons, surveillance personnel, and a good portion of marketing people, namely the small army of hosts that every casino employs. If gaming tables can automatically oversee the games, what do we need bosses for?

Do you have any idea what the annual payroll is for pit personnel in a big Strip casino? Much more than the cost of MindPlay. Most floor personnel are no longer involved in game protection. All they do is monitor the buy-ins, make sure there are no payout errors, watch the check trays to visually verify the transactions. The only thing they do is count the checks and count the money.

With MindPlay, the table counts the checks and the money. The table verifies correct payouts. The table even alerts the cage when a check tray is low and needs a fill.”

“So, you’re saying there will be no more bosses?”

“How many bosses do you see in the slot department, Arnold? All you see are change girls and an occasional security guard. The pay scale for these employees is not comparable to what pit bosses make.

The dream with MindPlay, as the top execs envision it, is that the only supervisory casino employee needed will be a shift manager. And his job will pretty much be a function of accounting. It will not be the same high-paid position it is today. There will be no reason to pay that much, as the job will not entail much more than looking at the numbers and signing off on the daily totals.”

“But don’t big players need to be coddled and comped and wined and dined?” I asked.

“That’s marketing’s job. 99 percent of players don’t need a boss or a host. Look how it works for slot players. Their slot card keeps the records and tells the house how many points they’ve earned. There’s no fudging. MindPlay does that for table games. Either your player card says you’ve earned the comp, or you didn’t.

“The few really big players will still have hosts. But MindPlay will eliminate all of the bosses, half the surveillance department, and most of the hosts. A big Strip casino like Mirage or Venetian, Caesars, or Bellagio, is paying a few million per year in salaries just to the pit personnel. MindPlay looks like a bargain to those at the top, assuming it works.

If you can replace a hundred executive positions with a couple dozen change girls and cashiers, you are looking at a huge increase in profits. It makes no difference if MindPlay can’t catch a card counter. Most pit bosses can’t recognize advantage players any more. Their only game protection function anymore is to make a phone call upstairs if they’re suspicious about a player. Now, MindPlay makes the phone call. And it will probably be more accurate in recognizing a threat than most bosses or surveillance monitors.”

“So, why aren’t you a proponent of the system?” I asked. “What’s the downside?”

“I’m a realist, Arnold,” he said. “There are some things computers and machines can do, and some things they cannot do. In this business, with this cash flow, it’s just crazy to try to foist a job this important onto a machine. This thing is dangerous. It is so complex and so far-reaching, it will be a fiasco of major proportions in this industry.”

“Won’t the casino personnel themselves be opposed to this thing?” I asked. “Why would the pit and surveillance personnel cooperate with upper management to install a system that’s going to eliminate them if it works? This whole idea sounds doomed.”

“That’s not how it will be presented to them,” he said. “It’s all in the spin. The idea will be sold to players as a technological solution to payout errors and making sure that all the cards are being used. It will also be described to them as a surefire method for making sure that they get all the comps they deserve.

“On the other hand, it will be sold to pit and surveillance personnel as a solution to card counters, cheaters, comp abusers and other advantage players. This will not be announced in the industry as a device that will eliminate most pit, surveillance and marketing personnel.

“The marketing people are key in making this thing work. They understand spin. They’ve got the toughest job of all. If MindPlay works, it will eliminate 500 hosts’ jobs in this town. That’s most of them. They are the highest paid class of employees in this industry. There won’t be fifty to sixty hosts left here if MindPlay works. It will be the job of the marketing people at the top—those who hope to survive—to sell this thing to their underlings as a marketing ‘tool,’ when, in fact, it will ultimately eliminate all but one or two hosts from every casino.”

“So you don’t think they’ll figure it out pretty quickly when they see their job functions disappearing?”

John laughed. “I’m afraid to say, Arnold, most of them really are pretty dumb. There are a few smart ones, a few of the old timers who survived the bean counters and a few young hotshots. But most bosses should probably have jobs selling coffee at Starbucks.

“Again, if MindPlay works—and that’s a big if—that’s probably what they will be doing a few years from now. They don’t know the games. They don’t read. They make no effort to educate themselves. They won’t even see it coming. At first, everyone will be saying, ‘Wow, look at all this information we have now! This really makes my job easy!’ Only a few will be saying, ‘Oh-oh, this makes my job disappear.’”

In January, when I heard that the Las Vegas Hilton had installed a twelve-table pit of these MindPlay tables on the main casino floor, I went to the US Government Patent Office website, and looked up the patent. (You can look it up yourself under patent #6,460,848.)

John was right. This is not so much a device for eliminating card counters as for eliminating floor personnel. To quote from the patent:

“The actual gaming and wagering patterns of the customers are visually observed by casino personnel and manually entered into a computer to create a digitized copy of the customer’s gaming habits… Similarly, casinos wish to track the efficiency of the casino and the casino’s employees…

“A typical method of tracking employee efficiency is to manually count the number of hands of blackjack dealt by a dealer over some time period. A change in an amount in a bank at the gaming table can also be manually determined and combined with the count of the number of hands to determine a won/loss percentage for the dealer… “pit managers” can visually monitor the live play of a game at the gaming table.

“The current methods of tracking have several drawbacks. The methods typically depend on manual observation of a gaming table. Thus coverage is not comprehensive, and is limited to tracking a relatively small number of games, customers and employees… The tracking methods are also prone to error since the manual methods rely on human observers who can become inattentive or distracted…

“An employee analysis function receives data from the table monitoring logic, and analyzes the data for the employee dealer efficiency, performance and attendance. A report function receives data from the table monitoring logic, and analysis from the player and employee analysis, respectively.

“The report function generates appropriate reports regarding the playing habits of the players, and about the performance and efficiency of the employee dealer. Reports can cover all aspects of the gaming, including financial reports, statistical reports based on player profiles, human resources reports based on employee data and marketing reports. The above description sets out a non-intrusive system to record and analyze data for accounting, marketing and/or financial purpose.”

Mindplay: “To Bring Factory-Like Automation and Control” to a Casino Near You

Then I went to the MindPlay website to see what the company had to say about the system. Did they really believe they could run table game pits like a bunch of slot machines? A quote on the front page of their site answered my question:

“The challenge was to bring factory-like automation and control to the action on a casino floor.”

I called John. I told him I’d seen some MindPlay tables at the Hilton, and asked him if this was the beginning of the end. I also told him I had downloaded the MindPlay patent from the Internet. “Isn’t there some possibility,” I asked him, “that MindPlay might actually be better than humans at performing these data collection functions?”

“Sure,” he said. “That’s why it’s so dangerous to the industry. There’s an old saying, Arnold: Age and treachery will beat youth and brilliance every time. This is so true in gambling, yet it’s not something that is understood by the corporations that are running the casinos.

“They believe in youth and brilliance. I’m old school. I think Bill Zender had the right idea. If you want to make money on your games, and protect your games, you hire a bunch of ex-card counters, ex-hole-carders, ex-crossroaders, and you let people who know how to take off games keep people from taking off your games.

“These corporate types actually believe that machines can protect the games better than people. In my opinion, this is lunacy. This system is so fraught with potential for abuse it’s insane.

How MindPlay Can Be Used to Cheat Players

“For instance, the computer will know the exact order of the cards in the shoe prior to the deal. This information can be accessed by anyone with the proper authority, meaning the password to get into the data screens. The casino manager can actually access this information from his home, over the Internet, if he wants to. I don’t care how many firewalls and layers of encryption they’re using, a couple of smart-ass humans who want to take millions out of a joint could pull an Ocean’s Eleven without any explosives. One password is literally the key to the vault.

“And how is it, Arnold, that some numbskull in Gaming has actually authorized the casinos to use marked cards? Is this nuts, or what? They really believe this system will be impenetrable? Do they really believe everyone on the inside will always be squeaky clean? Do they really believe no outsiders will ever get a hold of one of these systems in order to take it apart and find the weaknesses, the bugs, the backdoors?”

“How can this device know the order of the cards in the shoe prior to the deal?” I asked. “I watched the Hilton tables, and they were hand-shuffling the cards. Does the shoe itself actually read the card order?”

“I don’t think they’re using the full-blown system yet,” he said. “The dealing shoe is just a dealing shoe. It’s the discard holder that reads the card order. After the shuffle, the dealer has to place the cards back into the discard holder before placing them into the shoe. The discard holder reads the complete stack, top to bottom, in a second.”

“They weren’t doing that at the Hilton,” I said. “But won’t players find that just a bit strange? They shuffle the cards, then they place them back into the discard holder, then they take them out a second later and put them into the shoe?”

“The dealers will be instructed to tell players that they’re just making sure all the cards are still there, that the discard holder checks to see that six full decks are in play.”

“Just in case, during the shuffle, a few cards got up and walked away?”

“It’s the spin,” he said. “They will be unlikely to tell the players that the central computer now knows the exact order of the cards to be dealt. The dealers themselves may not know this.”

“Couldn’t that make this a cheating device, as defined by Nevada law?” I asked. “Couldn’t this actually be used to instruct the dealer to shuffle up if, for instance, high cards were approaching and some player had a big bet out to catch a blackjack, or a monster double down or something?”

“Gaming has already approved MindPlay as a legal device. It never would have gone into live testing if there was a cheating question. Whether or not Gaming will come out and say ‘You can’t use this function of this device in this way,’ has yet to be seen.

“The potential for this kind of abuse is immense. At this point, the casinos can do anything that they are not specifically prohibited from doing, and shuffling up is always a legal option. Dealers in Nevada are currently allowed by Gaming to count cards and shuffle away player-favorable decks, and MindPlay would not really be doing anything that dealers are not currently allowed to do; it would just be doing it with extreme accuracy.

“No one in the industry wants to talk about these features out loud right now, but with MindPlay, imagine this: If the high cards are about to be dealt, and a player is sitting there with a table-limit bet, MindPlay would know if the best hand would go to the player or the dealer. MindPlay knows the exact order of the cards. If a dealer blackjack is coming, to beat a bunch of player 20s, why should the dealer be instructed to shuffle up? The current preferential shuffling practices have no accuracy. MindPlay can make these decisions with absolute precision.”

“So, right now,” I said, “that Hilton game is safe for players, at least insofar as the house not knowing the exact order of the cards?”

“As soon as you see dealers placing the decks back into the discard tray, after the shuffle, before putting them into the shoe, get out of the game,” he said. “The only reason for a dealer to do that is so the computer can see the exact order of the cards to be dealt.”

“That’s scary,” I said.

“Assuming it works,” he said. “I’m predicting a huge failure.”

Implications of MindPlay Automation for Professional Gamblers

I called a few professional players and alerted them about this MindPlay monster, and I told them where they could find the patent data on the Internet. Okay, I called more than a few pros. I talked with just about every serious player I knew. I I mean, this is very interesting stuff.

The possibility of pit bosses disappearing! The patent describes virtually every feature of the system, complete with technical drawings, diagrams, charts. It explains how it counts money, tracks chips, cards, evaluates player skill, and how it will replace almost all of the pit, surveillance and marketing personnel, saving the casinos millions per year in executive salaries.

The general consensus among the players I talked with who studied the patent information was that John is right. This thing is so complex it will never be able to do everything it’s supposed to do. But the casinos, saddled with the start-up and implementation costs, will likely be forced to begin the process of staff reduction despite a few “bugs” that have to be worked out.

“What’s your gut feeling about where this thing will ultimately go?” I asked one pro.

“I’m salivating at the thought of any casino using this system full out,” he said. “I’m just afraid MindPlay won’t work well enough for them to actually use it. My hope is that it will work well enough for them to think it works okay. That would be a dream come true. We can kiss the bosses good-bye. We’ll be dancing in the aisles.”

As the MindPlay promo flyer says: This changes everything!♠

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Man vs. Computer

The Non-Random Shuffle and Streaks

by Dr. John M. Gwynn, Jr. and Arnold Snyder
(Blackjack Forum Vol. VIII #1, March 1988)
© Blackjack Forum 1988

(This is a synopsis of a paper on non-random shuffles and computer simulation of blackjack presented at the 7th International Conference on Gambling and Risk Takng.)

[Arnold Snyder is the author of The Blackjack Shuffle Tracker’s Cookbook: How Players Win (and Why They Lose) With Shuffle-Tracking.]

It has been public knowledge for more than 25 years now that the game of blackjack can be profitably exploited by players who diligently apply strategies based on card counting. First popularized by Dr. Edward Thorp’s 1962 best-seller, Beat the Dealer, card-counting strategies have been expounded upon, refined, and extolled by dozens of authors since. The validity of card counting has been proven many times via computer simulation of the game.

In the past five years, however, some of the standard computer blackjack simulation techniques have been seriously questioned by a number of authors, players, and system sellers. Most authorities on the game believe that the blackjack simulation methods generally employed to test systems are applicable to the game as dealt in the casino, even though all casino procedures are not simulated. The prime complaint of those who question the simulation data concerns the methodology of computer “shuffling.” In a computer simulation, the most time-efficient method of shuffling is to place cards in order via a “random number generator” that assigns each card in the deck or decks a new randomly chosen position with each shuffle.

Detractors of this methodology complain that in the casino shuffle — as applied by less than perfect human dealers — “clumps” of cards often remain together from shuffle to shuffle due to “lopsided” cuts and sloppy riffles; other procedures, such as the order in which dealers pick up played hands, tend to clump high cards with high cards in the discard rack; etc. Indeed, casino shuffles are not random. The most recent work on shuffling indicates that seven riffles are required to randomly rearrange a deck of cards.

In the past five years, numerous new blackjack systems based on these non-random shuffles have appeared. Players are being advised by some system sellers to avoid certain types of shuffles while seeking out others. Non-card-counting systems for beating the game are also being extolled as valid by some system sellers due to these non-random shuffles. Strategies based on “streaks” of wins and losses, allegedly caused directly or indirectly by the non-random shuffles, are also being sold.

Unfortunately, none of these new systems and methods has been accompanied by any published computer simulation data that would support the system sellers’ claims. Nor is any logical mathematical theory presented that would support the validity of these new systems. Some of these systems inventors have claimed they have personally produced non-random blackjack computer simulations that have proven their systems to be valid, but none have published any hard data to support this claim.

Most of the non-random shuffle systems are primarily touted to be used in multiple-deck blackjack games. In this paper, we will limit our computer simulations and analyses to single-deck blackjack games. This is due solely to the time factor involved. It is our intention to continue testing many more of these non-random theories, claims, and systems in both single-deck and multiple-deck games; the results will be published as obtained.

Analyzing Live Casino Non-Random Shuffles

In order to write a computer simulation program that would mimic the shuffle of a human blackjack dealer, it was first necessary to analyze the types of shuffles that dealers in casinos employ.

The common casino shuffling procedures were all provided by Las Vegas author Steve Forte. Mr. Forte at one time owned and operated a professional casino dealing school in Las Vegas after having spent some years as a blackjack dealer, pit boss, and casino manager. In 1986 he personally surveyed all of the major casinos in Nevada; at this time he recorded each casino’s standard series of cuts, breaks, riffles, strips, discard procedures, etc. in an effort to devise various “shuffle tracking” and “card location” strategies.

“Shuffle tracking” and “card location” are advanced strategies, based on card-counting theory, and are most often employed in conjunction with card counting. These tracking and location strategies do take advantage of “non-random” human shuffles. A player applying one of these techniques might do so by first breaking down and analyzing a casino’s shuffling routine so as to learn how to follow the positions of specified cards in the discard rack when they are reshuffled. Although little has been written on card tracking of this type, this will not be a topic of study for this paper. In fact, the data from the simulations sheds no light on this type of strategy.

The purpose of this study is to simulate non-random shuffles and attempt to answer the following questions. Does a “poor” shuffle have a notable effect on the basic strategy player’s win/loss rate? Does it cause lengthier and/or more frequent “streaks” of wins/losses? Does it lower the effectiveness of card counting in determining favorable hands? Are there “biases,” independent of any conventional card counting information, induced by certain non-random shuffles, i.e., positive counts no longer indicate a player advantage because the deck is “dealer biased?” Are certain shuffles disadvantageous to players? Et cetera.

In short, how does nonrandom shuffling affect the game of blackjack? In this paper, we initially chose to simulate two of the most common single-deck shuffles, Riffle-Riffle-Strip-Riffle and Riffle-Strip-Riffle-Riffle. Mr. Forte indicated that most casinos require one of these as a minimum single-deck shuffling procedure. It was then decided to add Riffle-Riffle-Riffle, a procedure that would be used if the dealer omitted the intervening strip; this would mix the cards a little less.

In 1987, Anthony Curtis obtained data from four Las Vegas dealers to determine how they broke the deck for a riffle and how well their riffling mixed the cards. He asked each dealer to perform one riffle on a new deck; then he recorded data about the riffled deck. After each riffle, the deck was reordered and the dealer riffled again. Each dealer performed ten such riffles. Curtis reported the fol lowing data about these 40 riffles.

There were 906 singly interlaced cards, 358 2-card clumps, 72 3-card clumps (less than 2 per riffle), 28 4-card clumps (less than I per riffle), 10 5-card clumps (I per 4 riffles), and only two clumps larger than five cards (I per 20 riffles). On 33 out of the 40 trials, the break was within 2 cards of the center. Three breaks were 3 cards from the center, one break was 4 cards off center, two breaks were 5 cards off center, and one break was 7 cards off center (this break resulted in a 7-card clump after the riffle). Since dealers always break and riffle more than once during a shuffle, it is unlikely that any large clump would be preserved throughout a complete single-deck shuffle.

Richard Epstein, author of The Theory of Gambling and Statistical Logic, stated that when professional dealers riffle the cards, they drop one card 80% of the time, two cards 18% of the time, and three or more cards only 2% of the time. Applying Epstein’s distribution to the same 40 breaks that Curtis reported on, a little approximation yields around 1100 singly interlaced cards, about 250 2-card clumps, and nearly 30 clumps of 3 or more cards. The Curtis data, small sample that it may be, indicates less precise riffling that Epstein reported.

This research deals entirely with single-deck blackjack under the further assumptions that a single player goes head up against the dealer and plays a single hand. The authors are aware of the non-random shuffle theory that multiple players at the table have a sianificant effect on the subsequent non-random ordering of the cards. Again, it is our intention to test the effect of multiple players, and to publish these results as obtained. This initial study is a starting point, not a definitive evaluation of all non-random theories. All simulatians used Las Vegas Strip rules: dealer stood on soft 17; doubling was permitted on any first two cards (not offer splits); only one card could be drawn to each split ace; aces could not be resplit.

Basic strategy governed the play of all hands, and insurance was never taken. The High-Low count was kept for certain measurements, but it was not used to vary strategy. The number of split hands was limited to four because a single deck was used and tens were never split. In this description, the player is identified as male and the dealer as female and right-handed.

Every attempt was made to come up with a realistic model of actual casino play, where the order of cards in the deck is possibly nonrandom. Variables that might influence this order included: was the dealer’s up card dealt before or after her down card; in what order did she pick up the player’s cards when he did not split a pair; did she pick up the player’s split hands clockwise or counter-clockwise; were the player’s cards or her cards placed in the discard rack first; in what order did she pick up her own cards; what rules governed reshuffling; did she place the unplayed cards on top of or below the cards from the discard rack when preparing to reshuffle; how did the player cut the shuffled pack before she dealt from it. A myriad of combinations was possible if one ran the gamut of reasonable choices; hence, a single realistic choice was made for each of the above variables.

When the dealer picked up the cards used in any round, she placed all of the player’s cards in the discard rack before her own. In case a pair was split, she dealt the split hands left-to-right (clockwise) but picked up the unbusted split hands right-to-left (counter-clockwise). If any split hand busted, she placed its cards in the discard rack before play continued.

With these fixed, only the shuffling technique differed from simulation to simulation; for any one simulation, the same technique was used throughout. Seven different shuffles were selected for use in the simulations:

  • Random shuffIling denoted RAN.
  • One perfect riffle, denoted IPR.
  • Two perfect riffles, denoted 2PR
  • Riffle-Riffle-Riffle, denoted RRR.
  • Riffle-Strip-Riffle-Riffle, denoted RSRR.
  • Riffle-Riffle-Strip-Riffle, denoted RRSR.

Three of these shuffling techniques (RRR, RSRR, RRSR) attempted to simulate casino dealer behavior; three others were obviously inadequate (NOSHUF, I PR, 2PR).

The reshuffling rules reflected dealing through 3/4 of every deck. Immediately after each shuffle, the player always cut the cards close to the center of the deck; then the dealer burned the top card by placing it in the discard rack without the player seeing it.

To begin each simulation, the deck was randomly ordered before an initial shuffle; this guaranteed no dependency on the original deck order. Hence, the simulations would only measure the differences between random and other shuffles after the cards were thoroughly mixed. Many non-random shuffle system proponents claim that the continual introduction of cards in “new deck order” is a major cause of the subsequent non-random ordering of the cards via imperfect shuffles. The authors intend to test this effect, and to publish these results as obtained.

Eight simulations were run, one using each type of shuffle and an additional one using the random shuffle. To avoid confusion, the two random simulations were denoted RANI and RAN2. Each simulation dealt 2,650,000 freshly shuffled decks, resulting in over 20,000,000 hands played (a pair split into two or more hands only counted as a single hand played). During each simulation, numerous data were gathered for later analysis; hopefully, this data would provide enough information to determine if random and simulated dealer shuffling produced significant differences in the game of blackjack.

The reason for running two simulations with a random shuffle was as follows. If the gathered data seemed to indicate any significant “difference” between two shuffling methods, the data from RAN1 and RAN2 could be compared to see if the same “differences” appeared. If so, this observed “difference” could be deemed spurious and simply the result of random fluctuations.

Results of the Non-Random Shuffle Simulations

Table I shows the results of the simulations for a flat bet of one unit, giving the total number of hands played, expectation per hand played, and expectation per unit bet. All expectations are given in percent; in addition, all expectations are per hand played unless specifically stated to be per unit bet.

The results for no shuffling agree approximately with those of Stanford Wong, who found that no shuffling gave an increase of about 0.75% over basic strategy for the 6-deck Atlantic City game. The results for 2PR are a mystery. Two standard errors for the difference in expectations between two runs is about 0 07% and 2PR’s differs from others (excluding NOSHUF) by a little more than this. Extensive analysis of the voluminous gathered data led to the following conclusion: within the limitations of this study, point count basic strategy players cannot telI the difference between simulated dealer shuffling and random shuffling.

Point count systems presume that the unseen portion of the deck contains an essentially random mix of cards. The question here is whether non-random shuffles induce sufficiently many patterns in the unseen cards to perturb a count system’s ability to determine which hands are favorable, and, more precisely, how favorable.

Based on the three runs using simulated dealer shuffles (RRR, RSRR, RRSR) and the two runs employing random shuffles (RAN1, RAN2), the High-Low count was an equally effective indicator of player advantage.

HypotheticalIy, assume that the player can sit at the table and not play some hands, i.e., bet 0. If the player bets 0 on the unfavorable hands and 1 on the favorable ones, he will obviously win. The player uses a point count to help decide which hands are favorable; there is a number K such that a true count K indicates favorability and a true count

Table 1. Flat Bet Results for the Eight Simulation Runs
SimulationHands PlayedExp per HandExp per Unit
RAN120094500-0.1124-0.0996
RAN220094022-0.1169-0.1036
NOSHUF201143820.60540.5375
1PR20146678-0.1001-0.0889
2PR20095750-0.1911-0.1694
RRR20110333-0.1141-0.1012
RSRR20098374-0.1078-0.0956
RRSR20095345-0.1016-0.0900
Table 2. Per Hand 0-1 Betting Expectation as a Function of K Simulation Run
KRAN 1RAN2RSRRRRSRRRRNOSHUF1 PR2PR
-10.900.860.880.870.881.400.870.83
00.920.900.910.900.801.380.900.85
10.850.850.850.850.831.090.840.82
20.810.810.810.810.801.000.790.77
30.730.740.740.730.720.890.710.70
40.630.630.640.640.620.730.600.60
50.560.550.550.560.550.630.530.52
60.470.460.460.480.460.530.450.45
70.410.400.400.410.400.450.390.39
80.320.320.320.330.320.350.320.30

For each integer K from -I to 8, the difference in per hand 0-1 betting expectations was examined for all ten pairs of the simulations RAN1, RAN2, RSRR, RRSR, and RRR. None of these 100 expectation differences was significant at the 95% level. These results strongly imply that a point count system is just as effective for casino shuffling as it is in theory, i.e., when random shuffling is employed. For all eight of the simulations, Table 2 shows the observed 0- I betting expectation. For NOSHUF, the 0-1 betting expectations showed the greatest differences when compared to the other runs.

In the simulations, the player always rounded the true count to the nearest integer before using it to make a bet. In determining the player’s expectation per hand, the number of hands played included those on which 0 was bet.

If one plots the expectation per hand at integer values of K, the function increases to a maximum and then decreases. It is conceivable that the maximum might not occur at the same integer value of K for all of the simulations runs, especialIy since non-random shuffling (which includes no shuffling) was used in six of them. However, the function’s maximum occurred at the same value, K = 0, for every simulation except NOSHUF, for which it occurred at K = -1.

The hands were then partitioned into three classes: hands won, hands lost, and hands pushed. A Chi Square test with two degrees of freedom was used to compare the frequencies of hands in these three classes between pairs of simulations. At the 95% level of confidence, there was no significant difference between any two of RAN1, RAN2, RSRR, RRSR, and RRR. Hence, the frequencies of wins, losses, and pushes did not vary significantly between random shuffling and any of the three simulated casino shuffles.

Whereas the frequencies of wins, losses, and pushes seemed to be useful in measuring the differences between two shuffling procedures, the frequencies of hands dealt with positive counts, with negative counts, and with zero counts did not. Most important to the player are his expectations on hands in each of the three categories. If one considers only the hands dealt with positive counts, the per hand expectations did not differ significantly (at the 95% level) between any two of the simulations RAN1, RAN2, RRR, RSRR, RRSR; this was also the case for the difference in per unit expectations for these hands. Expectations for hands dealt with negative counts and for hands dealt with zero counts exhibited identical behavior.

Suppose the hands are partitioned into nine categories: wins with a positive count, wins with a negative count, wins with a zero count, losses with a positive count, losses with a negative count, losses with a zero count, pushes with a positive count, pushes with a negative count, and pushes with a zero count.

A Chi Square test with eight degrees of freedom was used to compare the frequencies of hands in the nine categories between each pair of simulations. For RAN1 versus RAN2, RAN1 versus RSRR, and RAN 2 versus RSRR, the difference was not significant at the 95% level; for the other 25 pairs of simulations, each difference was significant at the 99.5% level. It seems that considerable fluctuations are to be expected in the frequencies of hands in these categories.

As for expectations, however, there was little variation in each of the nine categories if one confined the discussion to RAN I, RAN2, RSRR, RRSR, and RRR. Clearly, hands in each of the three push categories always had expectation 0. For each of the other six categories, the differences in per hand and per unit expectations were examined for all ten pairs of these five simulations. Based on expectation per unit, none of these 60 differences was significant at the 95% level. If RRR was excluded from the list, the per hand expectations for hands in any category also did not significantly differ (at the 95% level) between any pair of the remaining four simulations.

Table 3. Percentages and Expectations of Hands Won and Lost with Positive, Negative and Zero Counts
Win +Lose +Win –Lose –Win 0Lose 0
RAN1 % Hands15.3316.3016.9519.4311.2312.31
RAN1 Per Hand119.64-107.26121.98-112.26120.67-109.55
RAN1 Per Unit105.66-99.69103.31-99.63104.42-99.66
RAN2 % Hands15.3116.2916.9619.3311.2312.33
RAN2 Per Hand119.63-107.26122.00-112.26120.66-109.57
RAN2 Per Unit105.68-99.69103.32-99.63104.42-99.66
RSRR % Hands15.3316.3116.9419.3211.2312.32
RSRR Per Hand119.64-107.22122.00-112.24120.66-109.55
RSRR Per Unit105.69-99.68103.33-99.63104.42-99.66
RRSR % Hands15.3816.3616.8919.2611.2312.32
RRSR Per Hand119.60-107.24121.99-112.24120.69-109.57
RRSR Per Unit105.67-99.68103.30-99.62104.42-99.66
RRR % Hands15.2016.1817.0719.4711.2212.30
RRR Per Hand119.59-107.19121.94-112.17120.68-109 51
RRR Per Unit105.67-99.68103.32-99.63104.43-99.66

For the five simulations using random and simulated casino shuffles, Table 3 shows the percentages (of all 20+ million hands) in each of the six non-push categories as well as the per hand and per unit expectations for these hands.

Some players contend that their casino observations indicate a higher percentage of player losses on positive counts than theory predicts. After examining Table 3, such players might feel vindicated by pointing out that RRSR showed a higher percentage of losses on positive counts than RAN1. If they ignored the fact that the expectations (both per hand and per unit) on these hands did not differ significantly at the 95% level, they would be disappointed that RRSR’s losses on these hands were less than RAN1’s in spite of RRSR’s higher percentage of such hands.

This example has additional implications concerning casino observations. Between RRSR and RAN1, the difference in percentages of hands lost on negative counts is only 0.06% For such a small difference to be significant at the 95% level, the player would have to observe over 2 million total hands, assuming RAN1’s percentage of losses on positive counts is the theoretical one. It seems doubtful that any player has made such extensive casino observations; even if some player has done so, it is even more unlikely that he kept accurate enough records to note this small difference.

The results for hands in the nine categories strongly imply that the simulated dealer shuffles RSRR, RRSR, and RRR do not perturb the per unit expectations of hands won or lost on positive, negative, or zero counts. They further strengthen an earlier statement that the count provides the same indication of the player’s expectation for these simulated casino shuffles as it does for random shuffling. Also, since the per unit expectations of the hands in each category do not differ significantly in spite of the variations in the frequencies, any perturbations in the frequencies of the nine categories probably cannot be exploited.

Non-Random Shuffles and Winning/Losing Streaks

Analysis of the data on winning and losing streaks indicates no significant differences between simulated dealer shuffling and random shuffling. The analysis will be confined to streaks of 1, 2, …, 9 consecutive losses and I, 2, …, 9 consecutive wins. For the purposes of this study, a streak of consecutive wins encompasses all hands from the first win and continues to (but does not include) the next loss. This means that embedded or following pushes are included as hands in the streak. Hence, Win-Push-Win-Win-Push is defined as a streak of three consecutive wins during which five hands were played. Analogously, a streak of consecutive losses begins with the first loss, continues to but does not include the next win, and includes embedded and trailing pushes.

The first test involved the frequencies of I, 2, …, 9 consecutive losses and of 1, 2, …, 9 wins. Each frequency was first divided by the total number of streaks to obtain a probability. Then a Z test was used to compare corresponding probabilities (one for each of the 18 different types of streaks) for all 28 pairs of simulations.

Comparing each of RAN1, RAN2, RRR, RSRR, and RRSR with all of the other four runs required ten sets of 18 tests each. Of these 180 tests, one streak differed significantly at the 99% level, another at the 98% level, and two more at the 95% level; these four differences occurred in testing four different pairs of simulations. The remaining 176 tests did not differ significantly at the 95% level. Hence, apart from expected statistical variation, the streak probabilities did not differ at the 95% level between any two runs.

These results strongly indicate that streaks occur with the same probability whether casino shuffling or random shuffling is employed. However, one fact seems obvious: the less random the shuffle, the more the differences in streak probabilities.

Table 4, shows some of the win-loss streak data from RAN1. This will give an approximate indication of what the player might expect to see during actual play. Negative streak lengths indicate losing streaks and positive streak lengths indicate winning streaks. The percent of streaks is the number of streaks of this length divided by the total number of streaks, which was 9,170,446 in this simulation.

Hands is the total number of hands played, including pushes, during streaks of this length. Hands per streak is column 4 divided by column 2. Expectation per hand is the net win/loss divided by the total number of hands played during streaks of this length (column 4). Expectation per unit bet is the net win/loss divided by the total money bet on all streaks of this length.

Table 4. Streak Data for RAN1
LengthStreaksPercent of StreaksHandsHands per StreakExp. per HandExp. per Unit Bet
-1064510.07037061410.95-100.26-90.84
-9124400.13571224349.84-100.28-90.95
-8237020.25852074438.75-100.23-90.94
-7452660.49363466257.66-100.22-90.91
-6861520.93955655016.56-100.29-90.90
-51639061.78738961245.47-100.33-90.95
-43150323.435313788644.38-100.41-90.91
-35992856.535019664873.28-100.42-90.94
-2114403612.475225022012.19-100.52-90.96
-1218180923.791723848991.09-100.62-91.00
1240468426.222126300721.09100.4095.71
2114384612.473225013082.19100.4795.70
35438995.931017847343.28100.4995.65
42588022.822111312244.37100.5995.72
51228601.339767145975.47100.6195.64
6581070.63363812546.56100.5295.61
7276810.30192120737.66100.5395.59
8132840.14491161548.74100.8195.64
962570.0682615419.84100.8295.62
1030740.03353352110.90100.4895.82

Excepting streaks of length 1, there were always more losing streaks than winning streaks of any length; as the length increased, the ratio of losing streaks to winning streaks increased. In short, the player should expect considerably more losing than winning streaks. Since the table is truncated, the following data may be of interest.

There were 7144 streaks of 11 or more consecutive losses and 2729 of 11 or more consecutive wins. The longest number of consecutive losses was 23 and the longest number of consecutive wins was 21.

Similar to streaks of consecutive wins and losses, a streak of consecutive positive counts encompasses all hands from the first positive count and continues to (but does not include) the next negative count; embedded or following zero counts are included as hands in the streak. An analogous definition of streaks of consecutive negative counts also makes embedded and following zero counts part of the streak.

With minor exception, the authors could not find the same patterns in streaks of positive and negative counts that appeared in streaks of wins and losses. Even between two random runs there were significant differences (at the 95% level) between streak probabilities. These probabilities seem to show considerable fluctuation and are probably not a good measure of a shuffle’s adequacy. This is not surprising since the frequencies of hands with positive, negative, and zero counts also do not seem to provide a reliable measure.

Table 5. Numbers of Streaks with 30 or More Like Counts
RAN1RAN2RRRRSRRRRSRNOSHUF1PR2PR
NEG198419752118200020832859651104262
POS5975835786117071667917741283

The minor exceptions had to do with the numbers of streaks of length 30 or more. The numbers of such streaks were enormous for no shuffling and decreased rapidly to reasonable values as the amount of shuffling increased. This implies that grossly imperfect shuffling increases the probability of long streaks of like counts.

However, it is not clear that the long streak probabilities provide a sufficiently fine measure of the shuffle’s adequacy. There were significant differences (at the 95% level) in the frequencies of long negative streaks between RAN1 and RRR and between RAN2 and RRR.

In addition, there were significant differences in the frequencies of long positive streaks between RRSR and RSRR at the 98% level, between RRSR and RAN2 at the 99% level, and between RRSR and RRR at the 99% level. Table 5 shows the numbers of such streaks for each of the simulations. NEG indicates streaks of 30 or more hands with negative counts; POS indicates streaks of 30 or more hands with positive counts.

Data was gathered to allow computation of the correlation between outcomes of consecutive decks. After the play of each deck was completed, three accumulations took place. First, the mean expectation of this deck’s hands was computed and added to the sum of the deck means. Second, the square of this deck’s mean was added to the sum of squares of deck means. Finally, this deck’s mean was multiplied by the mean of the previous deck and added to the sum of consecutive deck products.

Intuitively, one would expect a statistically insignificant correlation for random shuffling and a statistically significant one for no shuffling; this was indeed the case. Table 6 shows the correlation coefficients for all seven shuffling methods; the note below each coefficient tells whether or not it was significantly different from zero (SIG or NOT, respectively) and at what level. The table values were computed using expectation per hand played; those obtained using expectation per unit bet were similar.

The major conclusion is that for each of the simulated dealer shuffles, there was no significant correlation between the outcome of one deck and the outcome of the next. The lack of any significant correlation between consecutive decks adds to the evidence that each of RSRR, RRSR, and RRR is an adequate shuffle.

Table 6. Correlations for Outcomes of Consecutive Decks
RAN1NOSHUF1PR2PRRRRRSRRRRSR
0.000320.004070.00208-0.00098-0.00013-0.00053-0.00015
SIG 99%SIG 99%NOT 95%NOT 95%NOT 95%NOT 95%NOT 95%

The correlation for NOSHUF and 1PR are perfect examples of values that differ significantly from zero in the statistical sense but are otherwise insignificant. Even for NOSHUF, whose coefficient is larger, the correlation between consecutive deck outcomes seems too small to be exploitable.

For single-deck play, two projects immediately came to mind as natural extensions of this research. The first would be to rerun the three simulated casino shuffles with a new deck being introduced every 100-200 hands. Of course, each new deck would be introduced in its usual order, and a simulated new-deck shuffle would precede dealing the first hand. It is conceivable that hands dealt after the initial and next two or three shuffles might have different characteristics than those dealt after more shuffIing has taken place.

A second interesting project would be to use a less precise riffle in RSRR, RRSR, and RRR. Such a riffle would be governed by a distribution with a decreased frequency of dropping single cards and elevated frequencies of dropping two or more cards; Anthony Curtis’ observations could be used to construct such a distribution. Simulations using this distribution for riffles would be run both with and without introducing a new deck every 100-200 rounds.

Acknowledgements: We owe much to Peter Griffin, who provided invaluable guidance toward proper statistical analysis of the gathered data and made several suggestions that significantly improved the paper.

We are also deeply indebted to Steve Forte, who isolated and explained each of the common shuffle techniques and procedures as employed in Nevada and Atlantic City casinos (even though we have not yet used the Atlantic City data).

In addition, we thank Anthony Curtis, who got four professional dealers to shuffle for him and provide new first hand data about how dealer riffling mixes the cards. ♠