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Did Jess Marcum Invent Card Counting?

Jess Marcum, Mathematical Genius, and the History of Card Counting

by Allan Schaffer, Ph.D.
(From Blackjack Forum Volume XXIV #3, Summer 2005)
© 2005 Blackjack Forum

[Editor’s Note: The thing that keeps striking me about Jess Marcum is the depth and intensity of respect and loyalty to him of the people who actually knew him and his achievements.

Marcum didn’t go for publicity or fame—he avoided it. He never published anything about his pioneering blackjack system. Yet 13 years after his death and over 50 years after his major accomplishments in card counting, he’s still vividly remembered by the professional gamblers who were active in Las Vegas then as the smart guy who figured it out, as well as to his later friends.

We are going to be documenting the history of those early days of card counting by publishing more articles on and by these early players in future issues of Blackjack Forum–Arnold Snyder]

Introduction to Jess Marcum and the History of Card Counting

Jess Marcum, card counting pioneerJess Marcum developed a basic strategy for blackjack and was counting cards a decade before anyone else. Why is it then that not many of the members of today’s gambling community have heard of him? The reason is basically because he was a very private person. In addition, throughout his active gambling career he endeavored to keep his accomplishments secret to protect the opportunities he had discovered.

I am one of the few people who know much of the story. We were close friends for the last 15 years of his life and were also coworkers and partners for extended periods during that time. I had a number of opportunities to ask him questions about his adventures in casino gambling and his answers are the basis for much of this article.

My reasons for writing the article are both to augment the history of blackjack and to correct or verify, as the case may be, some of the things that have been written about Jess.

Jess Marcum at Rand Corporation

Jess Ira Marcum (originally Marcovitch) was born in Knoxville, Tennessee on December 30, 1919. His father had emigrated from Russia in 1904 at the age of 14 and was an entomologist and professor at the University of Tennessee. His mother, a librarian, had come from Austria in 1902. Both were fluent in Yiddish.

There is little evidence in what is known about his early life to suggest that he was destined to become a genius in mathematical analysis. He graduated from college as an electrical engineer about 1940 and went to work for the Westinghouse Corporation in Pittsburgh. His duties later took him to England. After the war he studied for a Ph.D., I believe, at Princeton University, but quit because he lost patience with formal education (perhaps a sign of genius).

In 1947 he joined the highly respected Rand Corporation think-tank located at Santa Monica, California. He was not a founder of Rand, as reported in some articles, but by solving extremely difficult problems that no one else could, he became Rand’s preeminent mathematician with an international reputation. This was an astonishing accomplishment in view of the fact he had only a BS degree and Rand was loaded with brainpower and Ph.D. mathematicians. His genius had emerged.

His principal interest at Rand was statistical physics with emphasis on nuclear radiation propagation, nuclear effects and the processing of electromagnetic wave data. His premiere accomplishment was formulating the original equations for calculating the radar backscatter from a steady target in a noisy background, the so-called signal-to-noise ratio on which all radar design is based. Since the government classified this work as secret, it was many years before the scientific literature could acknowledge it as the Marcum equation.

Thus, his two premiere mathematical accomplishments in life—supplying the formulation for radar design and beating blackjack with card counting—were not widely known. However, this lack of (deserved) fame did not bother Jess at all. He was content with solving problems that others could not and beating the odds.

Marcum Leaves Rand for Gambling

Jess became enchanted with the mathematical analysis of casino gambling around 1949. A few years later he left California for the casino world and lived in that environment for the next 15 to 20 years. Although he still consulted on scientific matters, gambling activities consumed most of his time. Later in this article I will relate what he told me about his blackjack adventures during this period.

Sometime in the late 1960’s or early 1970’s Jess moved back to California and again made scientific work his principal activity. However, he continued to be in high demand as a consultant to both the gambling industry and to gaming commissions. For his scientific habitat in California he joined a company named RDA, formed mostly by ex-Rand luminaries. It was there that I met Jess. We worked together at RDA for a number of years and starting in 1977 were partners in a gambling-related sideline adventure that lasted for almost a decade.

In the late 1980’s Jess became addicted to the sleeping pill Halcion and it almost killed him. Some of the side effects were deep depression, difficulty in concentrating, and physical deterioration. Relatives and friends, myself included, tried unsuccessfully to convince him to seek medical help. Finally one friend literally forced him to go to a hospital and, once there, he made a remarkably fast and almost complete recovery.

He then moved to Reno, his favorite place, where he spent the last few years of his life living in a hotel. In 1990 he briefly returned to casino consulting in an episode so spectacular that it made the front page of the Wall Street Journal. His efforts rescued the Trump Plaza Casino from a mysterious “whale” who had, in a previous visit, won six million dollars at baccarat. I will give some more information about this episode near the end of the present article.

Jess died from natural causes in Reno at the age of 72. He had been dead for several days when his body was discovered in his room by a hotel employee. His death certificate is dated January 16, 1992.

Jess Marcum Invents Card Counting

What I know about Jess and blackjack comes directly from his answers to my questions. It was not his manner to volunteer information about his exploits, but I was curious and he answered each of my queries straightforwardly. In retrospect I wish that I had asked more questions.

You may be wondering why he gave me this information when, to my knowledge, he never provided it to anyone else. The reason is probably that our close relationship came late in his career when his casino playing days were long over.

One day in 1949 a coworker at Rand, who often visited Las Vegas on weekends to gamble, talked Jess into accompanying him on one of these trips. At that time Jess knew little about casino gambling. He spent this first visit to Las Vegas observing the various games, particularly blackjack, which at that time was played with a single deck dealt down to the last card.

On the drive back to California he shared with his friend the (then startling) observation that, if one were to keep track of the cards previously dealt from the blackjack deck, one would have a significant advantage at the end. In fact, one could know exactly what the last card was going to be. He said that he was going to analyze this situation and felt obliged to offer his friend the opportunity to join him. His friend declined. I believe that this was the only time that Jess ever considered partnering with anyone in blackjack.

Jess carried out his analysis of blackjack with only pencil, paper and his mathematical genius. Jess never used a computer to solve a problem; in fact he was, by choice, computer illiterate. He solved everything analytically; that is, he derived equations to obtain his answers. In some cases, once he had derived the relevant equations, he might have an associate carry out any ensuing routine calculations on a computational machine of some type, but in the case of blackjack, I do not believe that even this secondary association with such machines occurred.

The equations that he developed for blackjack produced both a strategy for betting and algorithms for recording the running card count and translating the results into an actionable assessment. To my knowledge his notes have not survived, but it is safe to say that his feat has never been duplicated, since subsequent blackjack analyses have largely been based on computer simulations whereby many thousands of hands are played to analyze each situation statistically.

Jess determined that his overall advantage against the casinos was about 3%, a number within the range of later results quoted for computer simulations with similar systems.

When Jess moved full force on the Las Vegas casinos in the early 1950’s, they literally never knew what hit them. He was aware that counting cards was tedious and that realizing the fruits of a 3% advantage required many long and patient hours, but he also knew that the outcome was a certainty.

He won steadily. He tried to be as inconspicuous as he could, but before too long he began to attract the attention of casino management. The pit bosses hovered over him continuously, but, although it was evident to them that he had a never-before-seen winning method, they had no idea as to how he was accomplishing this feat.

Nine months passed and they were still baffled. Finally in desperation the Las Vegas casinos joined together and banned him from further play. He might be the first person ever banned anywhere for simply being too good at gambling. No one knows how much money he won during this, or any of his subsequent, blackjack ventures.

After Las Vegas the next target area was Reno. The story was the same. He won steadily and the casinos were completely befuddled. After six months, desperate, they engaged a detective, who shortly after uncovered Jess’s Las Vegas exploits. Of course the Reno casinos immediately banned him.

He then moved on to various other casino locations. One place that he mentioned was Hot Springs, Arkansas, at that time a gambling hotbed. Another was Havana. Although I never personally discussed with him any details of his Havana venture, Sam Cohen (whose biography of Jess I will deal with later) reports seeing a clipping from the front page of the Miami Herald that described Jess’s triumph in Havana.

Jess Marcum and Ed Thorp

I was surprised one day when Jess made a less than complimentary remark about the blackjack analyses of Dr. Edward Thorp, who wrote the classic book Beat the Dealer published in 1962. The problem, as Jess expressed it to me, was that Thorp had to use computer simulations to solve a problem that Jess had solved analytically a decade earlier. i

This criticism has always seemed unfair to me in view of the fact that Jess had chosen to keep his own work secret. In any event Jess said that he had no quarrel with the correctness of Thorp’s results and that they were consistent with his own.

Jess also told me that he had tried unsuccessfully via an emissary to dissuade Thorp from publishing the bookii. When I asked Jess why he cared, since I was under the impression that he had exploited all of the available opportunities, he growled back “there was still the Caribbean”. He meant that he had not as yet visited the Caribbean casinos, and in fact he never did. Apparently, however, he had covered all of the casinos in the U.S. as well as Havana and perhaps elsewhere.

Upon the publication of Thorp’s book, Jess chose to end his own active blackjack career. Beating the casinos had been his private province for about a decade, and he was no longer interested when the winning techniques became available to the public.

Although Dr. Thorp did not personally know Jess (out of courtesy he referred to him only as “the little dark-haired guy from Southern California”), he does include in his book a few of the stories about Jess that have circulated around the gambling world. Only one of these stories is, I believe, factual; namely that Jess was the sole player to have been barred from blackjack in Las Vegas up until that time.

Marcum and Ruchman

Peter Ruchman, in his year 2000 column entitled “How BJ Card Counting Really Started” and his follow-up 2001 column entitled “Thorp Steps Up to the Plate,” purports, among other things, to recount Jess’s blackjack adventures. Although Ruchman does properly deduce that Jess was the first person to calculate a Basic Strategy, his deduction is based on the idea that Jess was able to use a high powered computer for this purpose.

Ruchman says that Jess fed thousands of punch cards through an IBM 704 computer to develop his blackjack strategy, which he subsequently shared with a small group of Las Vegas gambling friends to form a winning consortium. What Ruchman wrote is very different from the account that Jess gave me. In particular, Jess took pride in the fact that he had developed his system mathematically.

Jess Marcum and Sam Cohen

Sam Cohen, who was a coworker and sometime friend of Jess’s, wrote Jess’s only biography, which he titled The Automat—Jess Marcum, Gambling Genius of the Century. One reason for my writing the present article is to comment on Cohen’s book.

It is unfortunate that his biography was written by a man who felt extremely hostile to Jess. The book contains many interesting facts and anecdotes about Jess. However, Cohen’s statements that Jess became sadistic, psychotic, and ultimately committed suicide are completely at odds with my experience and with the testimony of all of his friends and associates with whom I conferred. Jess did have some quirks, such as being exceedingly tight with money, but nothing that any of us considered highly abnormal.

I can think of two reasons why Cohen came to hate him. One is that Jess needled Cohen incessantly. The incentive for this needling probably stemmed from Jess’s intense interest in psychiatry, which rivaled his interest in mathematics. His psychiatric self training led him to analyze each of his acquaintances and then to treat them as he concluded that they deserved to be treated. He evidently concluded that Cohen deserved to be needled, but I know of no other person, regardless of status, that Jess treated uncongenially.

The other reason for Cohen’s animosity probably resulted from the strong motherly affection that Cohen’s wife displayed for Jess. She continually looked after Jess despite Cohen’s objections. When Jess went through his disastrous times with Halcion, Cohen’s wife and I, unknown to each other, were both with him a lot and concluded independently that his problems, which were severe, were almost entirely due to the pills. By Jess’s own statement to me later, 90% of his problems disappeared when he finally ended his addiction to the pills.

From the gambling viewpoint there are several apparent fallacies in Cohen’s book. He states that it “is meant to be a tale mainly about the life and exploits of Jess in the world of gambling”. However, Cohen’s account differs greatly from what Jess told me.

Moreover, as I will explain, some of what Cohen thought he knew appears to be based on disinformation. Cohen states that Jess’s original gambling accomplishment was the development of a system that won at horse racing, and that he moved to Las Vegas to exploit this system, was successful and “became the first horse better in Las Vegas history to be barred from betting”.

In actuality, Jess was not an expert in horse racing, nor was it ever really a major focus of his interest. However he did, while at Rand, develop two short-lived schemes that made him some money at horse racing.

One scheme involved using the suggested odds from a newspaper handicapper, which Jess determined could show a profit. This endeavor was terminated after a year or two by the death of the newspaper handicapper.

The other scheme involved win/show anomalies. By peering into the totelizator control room, Jess would surreptitiously observe the win and show pools at certain tracks where, at that time, this information was not displayed publicly on the tote boards. Whenever he detected a gross disparity in the wagering pools, he would make sizeable show bets.

Jess apparently used these two modest ventures in horse racing to mislead Cohen and others at Rand into believing that he was off to Vegas to play the races. Of course, he was going there to play his never-before-seen system for beating blackjack.

Cohen devotes just one page of his book to Jess’s blackjack adventures. He briefly summarizes what he had gleaned, or surmised, about Jess’s various exploits and states that Jess’s major forays were bankrolled by some big time gambling friends. This statement rings untrue to me. Jess was never in need of money and definitely not the type to share his gambling knowledge or winnings with anyone. I think that Cohen was again the victim of disinformation—this time to shield information about the magnitude of Jess’s winnings from others.

Cohen also says that while in Las Vegas Jess became a magnificent poker player. This statement too does not agree with what Jess told me. He said that, although he did play some in the big games in Las Vegas, he soon concluded that he was inherently not good enough to compete with the very top players and therefore lost interest in the game. [Editor’s note: This was a period when cheating was widespread in the poker rooms.]

Poker did not fall within Jess’s characterization of a potentially playable gamble because he could not definitively calculate the outcome. He gambled seriously only when he could calculate a positive return.

Jess Marcum’s Final Triumph

Although the vast majority of Jess Marcum’s gambling income came from playing blackjack, his gambling studies were certainly not limited to blackjack; in fact, he analyzed almost all of the common gambling games and devices from sports books to slot machines. In the various sports books he capitalized on occasional miscalculations by the oddsmakers. With regard to slot machines, his expertise in their statistics and fluctuations led the Nevada Gaming Commission to call on him often as a consultant.

It was principally in this role as consultant to the industry that Jess continued his association with gambling long after his active blackjack days were over. Very late in his life he gained national notoriety from a consulting assignment that he undertook for Donald Trump and his associates in Atlantic City, as I will discuss briefly next.

On June 28, 1990 Jess called me from his hotel in Reno and mentioned that there was an article concerning him on that day’s front page of The Wall Street Journal. It was entitled “Tale of a Whale: Mysterious Gambler Wins, Loses Millions” and it describes how Jess saved the Trump Plaza Casino from a mysterious gambler who, in his previous visit there, had won $6 million at baccarat.

This exciting story (it even includes a murder) was later masterfully researched and recounted by David Johnston in his book Temples of Chance, chapters 1 and 24. Johnston provides a realistic insight into the working of Jess’s mind as Jess combines his mathematical prowess with his (self-taught) psychiatric skill to harpoon the Whale.

In view of these extensive previous accounts of this episode, I am only going to summarize briefly Jess’s part in it. He described the whole thing rather succinctly to me. He said that in winning the first $6 million, the Whale had simply not played enough hands (700) to have a high probability of losing. Therefore, Jess advised the Trump people to just “let him play.” Although they were very nervous about following this advice, they did and ultimately the Whale lost $9.4 million.

I learned from the written accounts cited above that there were two key components to Jess’s analysis of this problem. First, he calculated that if the Whale could be enticed into playing 5000 hands or so, he would have only about a 15% chance of winning. However, since the Whale made a practice of quitting suddenly if he was winning significantly, a scheme was needed to ensure that he would not quit early.

Based on observing the Whale’s mannerisms at the gaming table, Jess concluded that the Whale would readily agree to a double-or-nothing rule; that is, play would end only when the gambler had either doubled his bankroll or lost it all. Jess calculated that the Whale was five times as likely to lose his bankroll as he was to double it.

As Jess (via his “psychoanalysis”) had predicted, the Whale agreed to the double-or-nothing rule. Play proceeded and, of course, turned out precisely as Jess had predicted. After 5,056 hands, the Whale had lost $9.4 million (84% of his bankroll). At that point, he quit in a huff.

Finale

After his Atlantic City triumph Jess returned to Reno and contented himself with exploiting sportsbook betting anomalies that sometimes arose due to calculational inaccuracies by the oddsmakers. He died suddenly less than two years after his return to Reno.

His epitaph should read mathematical genius and gambling legend. The scientific literature abundantly attests to the former. My hope is that this article will cement the latter. ♠


i Jess may possibly have been unaware of the early analytical work performed by Dr. Thorp prior to his resorting to the computer.

ii Dr. Thorp has informed me that he has no recollection of being contacted by an emissary from Jess Marcum.

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Is Card Counting Legal?

Or . . . Is it Legal to Think in Casinos?

by Arnold Snyder

(From The Intelligent Gambler , April 1997)
© Arnold Snyder 1997

If you’re the type of person who lets the word out among your friends and acquaintances that you are a serious blackjack player — one of those notorious “card counters” — you may have noticed that quite a number of people, upon discovering this character flaw of yours, will cock their heads and say, with a disapproving grimace, “Oh . . . Is that legal?”

In the twenty years that I’ve been a professional gambler — writing about the game of blackjack for seventeen of them — I have been asked this question at least a hundred times. It still flusters me.

My immediate response, which is always something on the line of, “Of course, it’s legal! Card counting is just thinking while you’re playing. How can it be illegal to think?” is usually met with something on the line of, “Oh . . . The casinos let you do that?”

This always steams me, the suggestion that I must first get “permission” from the casinos to think while I play. But I usually say something like, “Well, if they know you’re counting the cards while you play, they’ll throw you out . . . But it’s not illegal to count cards.”

“I see . . . ” they say, obviously seeing nothing.

With most people, this is the end of the conversation. But a handful of intrepid souls will want to probe deeper into this curious avocation of mine. At this point, I’ll find myself knowledgeably discussing the innkeepers’ right to refuse service to anyone. I’ll expound upon how the trespassing laws are utilized in Nevada to eliminate card counters from the blackjack tables, as opposed to New Jersey — where innkeepers’ rights don’t extend to the blackjack tables. The Atlantic City casinos generally use more frequent shuffling, and various methods of restricting bets, to foil card counters.

I’ve also received disturbing reports that truly persistent card counters are sometimes arrested for “creating disturbances,” so that the local trespassing laws may then be applied. Some blackjack players have gone to court over these issues.

From here, the conversation inevitably turns to the extraordinary surveillance methods the casinos typically use to identify players as card counters, and the extraordinary methods card counters resort to in order to hide their identities, and their level of skill, from the casinos.

Recently, an hour or so into such a conversation, the woman I was talking with said in an exasperated voice, “Why didn’t you just admit it in the first place: Card counting is illegal!”

“It’s not illegal,” I insisted. “This is America! They can’t make it illegal to think!”

“Who are you kidding?” she asked in all seriousness. “You admit that you have to hide it from the casinos, and that once they know you can do it, they put your picture in a ‘mug book’ that gets circulated to the other casinos, so that you have to wear a disguise and get fake I.D. if you want to keep playing. But, if they see through your disguise, they can have you arrested for trespassing. So, obviously, the police are on the casinos’ side, as are the courts. And you’re saying it’s not illegal? You’re like a cat burglar trying to convince someone it’s not illegal to break-and-enter, provided you don’t get caught.”

“It’s not the same thing at all!” I protested. “A burglar is stealing someone’s property. A card counter is following all the rules of the game, as set by the casino, just like any other player at the table. He’s just thinking, that’s all. He’s not stealing anything.”

She thought about this for a moment, then said, “Obviously, there’s one rule you’re breaking.”

“What’s that?” I asked.

“You’re not allowed to think while you play,” she said matter-of-factly.

Unfortunately, matter-of-factly, she’s right.

When I was a kid, my father worked for IBM. He was a computer salesman back in the 1950’s when the only computers were garage-sized mainframes used by the few huge businesses that could afford them. On his desk at home, he always had a small wooden placard that read: “Think.” It was the motto of Thomas J. Watson, president and founder of IBM. On the few occasions I accompanied my father to his office in downtown Detroit, I saw these placards all over. Think. Think. Think.

Perhaps the casinos should adopt a similar placard they could set on each blackjack table, right next to the betting limit sign, a placard that says: “Don’t Think.” Or, maybe they could just append these words to the rules sign: “Double down on any two original cards. Split and resplit any pair, except aces. Split aces receive only one card each. No thinking.”

Or, as Descartes once said: “I think, therefore I can’t play blackjack.” ♠

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Insurance Oddity Solved

Blackjack Insurance on Good Hands May Be A Good Idea After All

by Peter A. Griffin
(From Blackjack Forum Volume VIII #2, December 1988)
© Blackjack Forum 1988

[Note from Arnold Snyder: In the December issue of Blackjack Forum (Vol. VII #4), Marvin L. Master conjectured that if your card counting system indicated that the insurance bet was dead even, it may be advisable to insure a “good” hand, since this play would tend to reduce fluctuation. Marvin’s logic is clear. If the dealer does have a blackjack, then you will lose a bet you expected to win. Taking insurance would save this bet on one third of these hands, and on those hands where the insurance bet loses, you still expect to win your initial “good” hand. Thus, bankroll fluctuations are reduced.

Here now, to lay this controversy to rest, is Peter Griffin’s final word on whether and when you should take insurance on “good” blackjack hands. More probably, this article will give nightmares to players who consider attempting to work out Griffin’s insurance formula when playing.

Griffin shows that it is sometimes advisable to insure good hands—in order to reduce fluctuations—even when the insurance bet has a negative expectation! Unfortunately, most dealers only allow a couple of seconds for the insurance decision. So, the simplest answer is: Marvin was right! Insure your good hands when it’s a dead even bet.]

Marvin L. Master asks the question: Should you, to reduce fluctuations, insure a good hand when precisely one third of the unplayed cards are tens?

The answer depends upon what criterion for “reducing fluctuations” has been adopted. Griffin, in his monumental epic The Theory of Blackjack, shows that there are occasions when a Kelly proportional bettor would insure a natural with less than one third of the unplayed cards being tens.

Theoretically, this criterion could also be used to analyze whether to insure 20 and other favorable holdings. However, the answer is dependent upon both the fraction of capital bet and the distribution of the non-tens remaining in the deck.

An approximate calculation based upon what would seem a reasonable assumption in this regard suggested that 20 should be insured, but 19 not. Precise probabilities for the dealer were not computed, and the answer could well change if they were, or if a different fraction than assumed were wagered.

Another, more tractable, principle to reduce fluctuations also appears in The Theory of Blackjack: When confronted with two courses of action with identical expectations (the insurance bet here is hypothesized to neither increase nor decrease expectation), prefer that one which reduces the variance, hence average square, of the result.

This proves particularly easy to apply here. Let W, L and T stand for the probabilities of winning, losing, and tying the hand assuming insurance is not taken. In this case the average squared result is

ENx2 = 1 – T

If insurance is taken the average square becomes

EIx2 = 1/3 02 + W(1/2)2 + T(-1/2)2 + (L-1/3)(-3/2)2 = (W + T + 9L – 3)/4

Insurance will have a smaller average square if

W + T + 9L – 3 < 4 – 4T

Equivalently

W + 5T + 9L < 7

Or, subtracting

5(W + T + L) = 54L – 4W < 2L – W < .5L < W + .5

This will clearly be the case for player totals of 20, 19, 18, 11, 10, 9 and 8 if the dealer stands on soft 17. If the dealer hits soft 17, 18 would probably still be insurable, but not 8.

Returning to the Kelly criterion, the interested reader would be well advised to consult Joel Friedman’s “Risk-Averse” card counting and basic strategy modifications. Among Joel’s astute observations is that if a player confronts an absolute pick ’em hit-stand decision he should hit rather than stand. The reason is that he thereby trades an equal number of wins, (+1)2, and losses, (-1)2, for pushes, (0)2, thus reducing fluctuation. ♠

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An Insurance Oddity

Blackjack Insurance on Good Hands?

by Marvin L. Masters
(From Blackjack Forum Volume VII #4, December 1987)
© Blackjack Forum 1987

Should you insure a good blackjack hand? Blackjack gurus ridicule this question, replying that insurance is a side bet that has nothing to do with the player’s hand. They say if you’re counting cards and know that more than one-third of the unseen cards are ten-valued then you insure; if less, you don’t.

But what if the tens make up exactly one-third of the unseen cards? That makes the 2 to 1 insurance payoff exactly right, with no advantage to the casino or blackjack player. At first glance it seems that taking insurance in this case is wrong. It’s like taking the odds in craps; you increase your bankroll fluctuations without any long run gain.

But wait. Let’s look at the statement that the insurance bet has nothing to do with the original bet. This is not true, because correlation is involved, and that is important when making your blackjack insurance decision.

Correlation and the Blackjack Insurance Decision

If you have a natural, the correlation is perfectly negative, -1.0. Whichever bet wins, the other loses. If you do not have a natural but the dealer does, then the negative correlation is also perfect: You lose the original bet and collect on the insurance.

But what if neither you nor the dealer has a natural? Now the correlation between the lost insurance bet and the result of the original bet depends on the quality of your hand. If you have a 20, the correlation will be highly negative: The insurance bet is lost, and the original bet will probably win. With a 16, however, the correlation will be positive: The insurance bet loses, and the original bet will probably lose too.

These correlations lead to some interesting conclusions when there are exactly one-third tens in the deck. If you have a natural, then taking insurance should be automatic. It costs you nothing in the long run, and reduces bankroll fluctuation.

If you have a 20, it seems to me that the decision should be the same. You will probably win the hand if you lose the insurance, so insuring to reduce fluctuation seems like a good idea.

With a 16, however, bankroll fluctuation is increased, not decreased, by the blackjack insurance bet. I speculate that a player hand of 11, 19, or 20 should take the blackjack insurance bet, but other blackjack hands should not. Do any mathematicians out there care to comment? ♠

[Note from Arnold Snyder: Yes, Peter Griffin did care to comment. You can see his response by clicking here.]

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Insurance Camouflage for Card Counters

Can You Disguise Your Insurance Bet?

by Jake Smallwood
[From Blackjack Forum Vol. VIII #2, June 1988]
© 1988 Blackjack Forum

After a recent blackjack trip I was chastised by my teammates. They objected to the fact that, as a part of my card counting camouflage, I was taking insurance on everything but my minimum bet. The consensus was that I had fallen into “idiot” camouflage. I decided to get an idea of what my insurance yield should be and just how much I was giving up with my insurance camouflage plays. Most of my card-counting play (that particular trip) was on double deck blackjack games using the Hi-Lo count with a 1 to 20 spread ($10 to two hands of $100 actually). My betting scale is proportional only in the sense that my top bet is about half Kelly in size after accounting for two-hand covariance.

In order to simplify, I decided to set up three schedules of count per deck (true count) with the assumption that one deck of the two had been played. One schedule was developed with the quantity of each card type (plus, minus, zero valued cards) held constant for each table.

Of course, the sample would have been much more representative if I had prepared tables that took each group of cards with normal density, half normal density, and one-and-a-half normal. But that would be a lot of work and would require weighting by the probability of occurrence of each of the nine subsets. After all, I only wanted an indication, not a high-precision answer.

For all tables I assumed that 20% of the minus-valued cards (tens and aces) were aces. The result was a “profile” of a 52-card remainder for the counts between plus and minus six. I had some old frequency distribution approximations around which I used to weight for the occurrence of each count in the table. The insurance result was tabulated for each of the 52 cards in the remainder to estimate the edge at that count for that type of remainder subset.

The traditional blackjack player who insures at +3 or more count per deck would make about a 2.5% profit on insurance action. With a 20 to 1 spread the “insure all” approach would about break even.

The way I have been playing costs me about 15% of my potential insurance edge.

Actually, the cost is less since at +2 I am betting at two greens but only taking two reds of insurance. The pit knows I can’t be bothered taking more insurance with only two green out. I assume also that there is some element of risk aversion in the sense of fluctuation leveling with taking some negative expectation insurance. Any such effect is ignored.

Now, with my dumb style of play, I often get the pit personnel urging me to bet at 40 to 1 ratios and more. Well, what do you think? Based on the evidence, should I give up my idiot insurance camouflage?
[Snyder comments: It’s easy to see what Jake has done here and why his idiot camouflage works so well. Since he never insures his minimum bets, he doesn’t take insurance at those times when the house has its largest insurance advantage-at low counts. Since he always insures all bets above minimum, he always takes insurance when he has the advantage on these hands (high counts). The hands on which he took the insurance bet when the count was too low for this to be the proper play would for the most part be close to the “borderline” for taking insurance. Very little is actually given up on these incorrect insurance bets.

As a card counting camouflage strategy, Jake’s psychology is sound. Many gamblers and high rollers ignore insurance on insignificant bets. They seem to consider it a waste of time to insure piddling amounts of money.]
Insurance Return for Three Styles

Insure All Approach
Cards ConstantActionReturn%
7,8,9496.0-6.37-1.28
2, 3, 4, 5, 6496.045.589.18
10, Ace496.0-38.19-7.29
 14488.01.02.21
Insure +3 or More (Traditional)
Cards ConstantAction (a)Return (b)%
7, 8, 9380.02.86-.75
2, 3, 4, 5, 6380.056.1814.78
10, Ace380.0-29.26-7.71
 380.029.782.61
Insure All Except Minimum (My Style)
Cards ConstantAction (c)Return (d)%
7, 8, 9427.5.86.20
2, 3, 4, 5, 6427.556.8913.31
10, Ace427.5-32.92-7.70
 1282.524.831.94

Notes

  1. Sum count per deck of 3 to 6+.
  2. Cumulative win for count per deck of 3 or more.
  3. Sum count per deck 2 or more.
  4. Cumulative win for count per deck of 2 or more. ♠
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How to Beat Slots

Progressive Jackpot Slot Pros

by Arnold Snyder
(From Casino Player, August 1995)
© 1995 Arnold Snyder

Professional gamblers beat slots either by limiting their slot play to progressive jackpot slots at which the jackpot has gotten big enough to give a player advantage, or by using slot play to milk various kinds of loss rebates and free money offers, in both online and brick-and-mortar casinos. Usually professional slot players combine both methods—that is, they wait until the jackpot is close to giving a player advantage, and take advantage of casino points and comps as well.

In order to use the first method in slot games other than video poker, you have to record the results of enough spins on a slot game to determine the frequency of each type of payout and the percentage of your bet that goes into the jackpot. From this you can determine the house edge on the game. This all takes some work and a good understanding of the math involved..

Professional gamblers tend to either be good at math, or rich enough to hire someone who is. And they tend to be very dedicated about playing at casinos that give the most back for their play, through good points programs and comps.

How to Beat Slots: Tips for Recreational Players

A recreational gambler who enjoys playing slots, and expects to play slots regularly over a period of many years, would probably do better over the long term playing only progressive jackpot slots on which the jackpot was significantly larger than the average level at which it goes off.

Just be aware that you can’t know for sure where a player advantage starts unless you go through the process of mathematically analyzing the game. And no matter how big the jackpot gets, it doesn’t guarantee that you will win the jackpot, or even that the jackpot will go off while you’re in town. There are no short-term win guarantees in gambling, not even for professional gamblers.

All a player advantage means is that, if you limit your play to such situations, and you put in enough hours, you will likely make more money in the long run than you put in. But the long run can mean a very long time, and if you play only a few hours a year, you may not get in enough hours in an entire lifetime to get ahead.

So no matter how big the jackpot gets, you should play only an amount that you can afford to lose without it affecting your lifestyle.

Also, slot pros don’t like to play for too small an advantage, so they’ll usually wait until the jackpot is significantly bigger than the minimum level necessary to turn the advantage to the player. On the other hand, if they know they’ll be getting valuable points and comps for their play, they can play for a slightly smaller jackpot and still have a player advantage overall.

Pros generally prefer to play jackpots with a smaller average jackpot size than a gigantic average jackpot size. For example, a slot with an average jackpot payoff of $3,000 or $10,000 is considered a better bet than a slot with an average jackpot payoff of $1 million, because the variance on the games with the smaller average jackpots will be a lot lower. (That means a pro will require less of a bankroll to make sure he won’t go broke chasing the jackpot.)

But professional slot players typically have very large bankrolls to play on—much larger than the average Las Vegas recreational player, who may bring a few hundred dollars in mad money to Vegas to try her luck. Slot pros who find a game where the progressive jackpot gives a player advantage are generally prepared to put in whatever money and hours it takes to keep playing until the jackpot goes off. And if that player is not the person to win that jackpot, he’ll stiill have plenty of bankroll left to go after the next jackpot, whenever a player advantage occurs. He won’t be broke.

Again, the reason the pros need such a big bankroll is because even when you’re playing a progressive jackpot slot with a decent player advantage, you can’t guarantee you’ll win that jackpot. All a player advantage means is that you can know you’ll win over the long run if you put in enough play.

For more information on how professional gamblers beat slots, read Million Dollar Slots by Peter Liston, an accountant turned high school teacher turned professional slot player.

The Casino Perspective on Players Who Know How to Beat Slots

Question from a Player:  As a semipro card counter for about two years, mostly in Las Vegas, I have finally given it up for . . . the slots! The heat and the harassment associated with card counting finally wore me down. I’ve hooked up with a pretty well-financed video poker team. The money is steady and the heat is nil. It’s boring, but you can’t have everything.

What I don’t understand is this: Why is there no heat? Some of my teammates, to be honest, are downright rude when we go in to take over a bank of slot machines. Getting rid of the “tourists” is one of my least favorite parts of this job. I’m just a “worker ant” on this team, but I’d like to start running my own slot teams in the future. My technical question is this: Is there a mathematical formula for figuring out how much each “tourist” on a bank costs you in win expectation?

Answer:  In the May issue of Casino Journal, Anthony Cabot, in his “Gaming Law” column, addresses the problem of professional slot teams from the casino perspective. He compares the problems casinos have with slot pros to the problems they have with blackjack pros, and reveals why the casinos seem to have such a high tolerance level for slot teams, who are virtually never barred.

Apparently, there is a gaming regulation in Nevada that implies that casinos are holding “in trust” for “the public” any progressive slot jackpot on any game that has a progressive slot jackpot, until a member of “the public” wins that jackpot. The specific wording of this regulation makes the casinos hesitant to exclude any member of “the public” from playing their progressive slots. The casinos fear the possibility of a lawsuit from some member of that all-inclusive public for whom their slot jackpot is being held in trust.

Cabot’s article is very enlightening. Don’t think that the casinos are unaware that many slot pros are “rude” to their regular customers. The casinos are very vexed with this problem. In my opinion, if slot pros continue to chase tourists away from the machines, it’s just a matter of time until the powers that be rewrite the regulations. The casinos have an enormous amount of political clout in Nevada, especially when it comes to keeping the tourists happy.

A big part of this problem arises from two misconceptions that pervade the slot world — one slot players’ misconception, and one casino operators’ misconception.

One: Many slot pros believe that it is more advantageous to take over all slot machines on a given bank in order to “lock up” the inevitable jackpot. This is false.

Two: Many casino operators believe that they do not profit from slot pros, since the pros only play on slot machines where the players have the advantage. This is also false.

To deal with the second misconception first: The casinos profit from slot pros the same way they do from their other slot customers. The slot pros’ advantage comes solely from the jackpot that is being held “in trust.” Technically, that is not even money that belongs to the casino. It is money the casino has already “lost.” It simply has not yet been determined which player has won that money.

While a slot pro is playing, the casino continues to “rake” the pot, and takes a profit from every pro’s dollar that is played. For a standard 8-5 jacks or better progressive, any time a professional slot team takes over a bank of these machines, regardless of how many machines are on the bank, and regardless of what the jackpot is at the time of takeover, the casino will profit, on average, $2,200 on quarter slots, or $8,800 on dollar slots, directly from the slot team’s play.

When a slot team moves in on a progressive dollar bank, they are virtually “paying” the casino $8,800.00 to “buy” the jackpot (which the casino doesn’t really even “own” anymore). Since the amount of money the slot pros are willing to pay the casino to buy the jackpot is money that those savvy players would not otherwise play in the casino at all, this money is all gravy to the casinos.

This profit to the casino will definitely be diminished by the number of non-pros who are pushed out of the casino by the slot team’s “rudeness.” However, if these non-pros do not leave the casino, but simply move to other slot machines or games within the casino, there is no loss to the house of any of this profit from the slot team’s play.

As for the “cost” of “tourists” to a slot team — there is none. Whether or not the slot team takes over all machines on a bank or any portion of them, they will “pay” the same amount for that jackpot — $2,200 on quarter machines, or $8,800 on the dollars.

In fact, on video poker machines it is actually more advantageous to a slot team for tourists to continue pumping the jackpot up while team members shoot for it, because the tourists will continue to increase the slot jackpot total at no cost to the team, and at the same time the pros are still favorites by a long shot to win the jackpot, because most tourists play so poorly that they are far less likely to hit the jackpot.

The real problem in many slot departments these days is a supply-and-demand problem; specifically, there is a greater demand for progressive slot machines than the casinos are supplying. The overabundant slot pros are fighting for the profitable slot jackpot opportunities that arise, aggressively squeezing the “tourists” off the banks of machines they want to play. If there were enough progressive slot banks available to keep the pros busy, the casinos would maximize their profits by courting these pros with comps!

If I owned a casino in Las Vegas, I’d advertise “All Progressives All the Time!” And I’d put in unusual video poker machines to confuse the amateurs as much as possible, so that the video poker jackpots would get pumped up as high as possible as often as possible. I’d want the pros stalking my aisles ready to jump on any bank as soon as the profit opportunity hit an acceptable level.

I’d maintain a very cordial relationship with the professional slot players, with the understanding that these pros would not offend or pressure my regular customers. If the pros understood that they paid the same amount per jackpot whether or not they monopolized a bank, and if there were enough profitable jackpots to go around, “tourists” would be welcomed by the pros to continue pumping up those already profitable jackpots to even more profitable levels.

The sad situation described by Anthony Cabot is more a result of ignorance on both sides of this battle than any other factor. The casinos are sitting on a virtual gold mine with their progressive slots. They should be “milking” the pros for the real value these players represent, not resenting a gaming regulation that the casinos perceive to be tying their hands. ♠

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A Keno System That Works?

Will Chaos Theory Beat Keno?

by Arnold Snyder

(From Casino Player, August 1994)
© 1994 Arnold Snyder

Question:  According to a recent New York Times article, a computer whiz keno player in the new Montreal (Quebec) Casino used “chaos theory” to win $600,000 at keno one night in April. According to the article, the player picked 19 out of 20 keno numbers three times in a row! Then, the casino manager shut down the keno game.

Chaos theory, as I’m sure you are aware, is a relatively new branch of mathematics that attempts to find patterns in seemingly random results. If it’s true that a mathematician has now cracked this problem to the extent that what was believed to be random is now highly predictable, how will the casinos survive? Won’t new types of systems be developed, not only for keno, but also for games like roulette and craps and many others?

In fact, since blackjack is one of the few table games, along with baccarat, which — as card games — are dependent on less than perfectly random human shuffling, will we find that the truly random games, those which typically have a fixed house percentage, will become the new games of choice for professional players?

I’m not a mathematician, but I don’t understand how a game with a fixed house edge can be beaten in the long run. Isn’t this contrary to the generally accepted logic of mathematics? Please give us laymen the whole scoop on this new chaos theory, which must be the gambling system of the century, and may spell doom for the casinos as we know them.

How a Canadian College Student Beat Keno

Answer:  When this story broke, it was, as you might have guessed, of enormous interest to mathematicians. It seemed inconceivable that this Canadian college student, Daniel Corriveau, could have employed chaos theory — as he reportedly claimed he had done — to essentially predict the future in a game like keno. In fact, had Corriveau done what the newspapers reported he had done, his mathematical discovery would have such far reaching impact on virtually every branch of mathematics and science that the changes to the casino industry would pale in comparison to the advances you would see in electronics, chemistry, aviation, communications, etc., etc.

Unfortunately, when the whole story came out, it turned out that there wasn’t any great discovery with regards to applied chaos theory. There was simply an inadequate electronic number generating system in use at the Montreal Casino. Unlike the swirling ping pong ball systems used in many Nevada casinos, the Montreal Casino was using a state of the art computer random number generator to pick keno numbers. Corriveau simply discovered that the random number generator (RNG) was anything but random, and the only chaos theory he proved was that if you pick 19 out of 20 keno numbers three times in succession, casino management is thrown into chaos.

As RNGs are used these days in virtually all electronic slot machines, and are also frequently used by casino game analysts in simulating betting systems and player/house expectations, etc., allow me to explain what an RNG is, what it does, what it doesn’t do, how it works, and what went wrong in Montreal.

First of all, an RNG is not a piece of hardware, as you might normally assume from the term “generator.” It is a computer program, or more specifically, a mathematical formula, or a series of formulas, utilized to derive a “random” series of numbers. Can any mathematical formula actually produce a series of totally random numbers? No. And no RNG is truly random.

As an example, one RNG with which I am familiar is that used by Dr. John Gwynn in testing blackjack systems. His RNG has a cycle length of 2.7 billion. This means that his RNG will produce a string of 2.7 billion numbers which exhibit no discernible or predictable pattern, random for all intents and purposes, but that the cycle will begin repeating itself after 2.7 billion numbers.

All such RNGs require a “seed” number, which must be fed into the formula in order to start the series. With the RNG utilized by Dr. Gwynn, starting with a different “seed” does not change the 2.7 billion number cycle, but it will start the cycle at a different point. The same 2.7 billion number series, however, will be repeated.

In order to assure the most “random” results, many RNGs pick a seed number by utilizing whatever nanosecond the computer’s internal clock has at the moment the operator starts the program.

Such a random number generator works well for testing blackjack systems if what you want is “randomly” ordered cards, and your tests are going to be in the millions of hands, or even hundreds of millions of hands. If, however, Dr. Gwynn were attempting to pinpoint some expectation to umpteen decimal places, requiring a test of ten billion randomly dealt hands, his RNG would be inadequate because every 2.7 billion hands he would be recycling through the exact same series of cards.

How to Beat Keno: Find a Casino Without a Clock Chip

The problem in Montreal was that they did not purchase the clock chip for picking different seed numbers. As many Nevada casinos also use this same electronic keno number generator, and use it without the clock chip that generates seed numbers, Montreal management may have been under the impression that the seed generator was not a necessary component of the system, or that it was automatically included.

The major difference between Nevada casinos and the Montreal Casino, however, is that the Nevada casinos operate 24 hours per day, never turning off their keno games, while the Montreal Casino shuts down each night and reopens again in the morning. Without the clock chip to generate different seeds, each day the Montreal Casino was cycling through the same numbers, beginning at the same starting point! This is what Daniel Corriveau discovered. And this discovery paid him $600,000 in keno winnings.

So, unfortunately for mathematicians, there is no great breakthrough in chaos theory. Casinos can breathe a little easier, knowing that computer nerds will not start walking away with fortunes from games like keno and craps.

I will assume, of course, that those Nevada casinos which have not been using the clock chip on their electronic keno games, by now have purchased the chip, as this whole scenario has provided scam experts with one of the easiest, potentially most lucrative, and hitherto unknown “inside jobs” that could be imagined. In order to take a fortune from any casino in Nevada which uses this electronic keno random number generator, and which fails to utilize the clock chip for seed number generating, all a casino employee would have to do is turn the game’s power off for a moment at the end of each day, and the same number sequences would start repeating, just as they did in Montreal.

Incidentally, Daniel Corriveau was paid his $600,000 after investigators determined that he did not work in collusion with any casino employees. He took advantage of the game exactly as he found it. Hats off to Mr. Corriveau for teaching the Montreal Casino a lesson in mathematics. If there is a way to beat a game, someone will find it.  ♠

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Evaluating the Heat Factor

How Hot Is It?

by Arnold Snyder
(From Casino Player, November 1996)
© 1996 Arnold Snyder

Question from a Card Counter:  How does a card counter know when he’s getting heat? I play at moderate to high stakes ($25 -$500), but I’ve only been doing this for a short time — a few weekend trips so far.

I get very nervous whenever the pit boss seems to be looking at me, or even in the direction of my table. I do try to be friendly toward the bosses and floormen, and I believe I act like nothing is bothering me, but I often have the urge to bolt out of there as soon as any conversation with pit personnel is over.

I feel like they are also just acting nonchalant when they’re actually scrutinizing my play. A few times I have left tables for no other reason than the floorman came over and watched my table for a while, scribbling notes. I feel like he’s recording what I’m doing and that I’d better leave before his notes get too detailed.

I’ve walked out on a number of pretty decent games, and it irritates me whenever I feel I must do this when the count is high. I haven’t had any trouble so far, but am I being too cautious? It sure would be nice to relax a bit more and hang in there when I’ve got an otherwise profitable situation.

Answer:  My guess is that you probably are being overly cautious, but I can’t tell you this for sure. You might loosen up a bit next weekend, and get barred. As I have never observed your casino play, I really can’t judge if your style of betting is too obvious, or even if your demeanor is too suspicious. Perhaps you are being precisely as cautious as you must be, at the level you are playing, given your limited experience at the tables.

Any player who is betting in the range that you are may expect to draw pit attention. You should also assume that your play is being monitored by the eye in the sky. Once your bets are going into the $100+ range, you are a serious concern to the pit. Their major concern with big players, however, is that they keep them as customers. They do not automatically assume such players are card counters. Most players are not.

A floorman scribbling notes while looking at your table is generally of no significance as far as heat goes. One of the floorman’s jobs is to estimate the average bet size of the big players, and he will walk from table to table recording this information at regular intervals in order to calculate an average. The casinos use this information primarily to “rate” players for comps.

At your level of play, I’m sure you are being asked continually if you’d like a VIP card, which would require you to furnish your name and address, and which also allows the casino to rate your play any time you show your card when you’re playing. This rating system is how the casino determines the value of the comps to award you.

Likewise, a pit boss or floorman coming over to your table to talk with you is entirely normal. Any player betting black action should expect this. After all, you are a major customer to them, so they will try to be friendly and personable. This is normal.

Let’s Define Various Types of Real Casino Heat

Heat is when a pit boss or floorman literally, and obviously — within your line of vision — starts glaring at you. This type of heat generally means that you are under suspicion, and they are attempting to see if this direct surveillance unnerves you, flusters you, or causes you to leave.

The worst reaction to this type of heat, as you might assume, is to act nervous, and the most obvious sign that you are nervous would be your failure to look back at them, i.e., pretend you don’t notice them glaring. If you casually and naturally leave the table, without showing any other sign of nervousness, this may get you off the hook.

The best reaction, however, is to look back at them, and if the glare continues, to strike up a conversation, ask for something, be friendly — ask for information about the showroom, or a dinner comp, whatever. If a boss who has been glaring at you reaches for his phone, or is talking on the phone, you should assume that you are, or have been, or will soon be, under eye-in-the-sky surveillance. Not a good sign, but also not fatal.

Heat is when a pit boss or floorman instructs the dealer to shuffle up on you, or to center-cut the next shoe. If this is the first time this has happened, you might continue playing, even through a few of these shallowly-dealt shoes, as the pit may simply be testing you to see if this appears to bother you.

This, however, is a countermeasure that literally kills your chances of profiting from that shoe, and it also sends a fairly strong message that your play is not trusted. This is a sign that the boss has already made a decision about you. The wisest decision may be to leave casually, and simply avoid playing whenever this boss is in the pit.

Heat is when a non-player (and sometimes more than one non-player), who are wearing suits and ties, appear to take a strong interest in your play from behind you, but who also manage to get into your line of sight just enough for you to know that you are under rather intense surveillance. This is a stronger variation of the pit boss glare.

If this type of surveillance is strong enough you should stop using whatever technique you are using to gain an edge. You may elect to continue playing, at least for a while, strictly for camo, but don’t show them any more of your real game. When you leave, always leave as casually as you can.

Heat is when you are personally told that your play is being restricted in any way — possibly your betting spread, or the maximum amount you may bet. If this type of countermeasure follows you around from table to table, you may assume that the jig is up. You have likely been identified as a counter.

But again, the situations you describe are fairly normal, and none indicate heat in and of themselves. ♠

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The Easy Red 7 Count

The First Unbalanced Point Count System

by Arnold Snyder
© 1983, 2005 Arnold Snyder

Blackjack Basic Strategy

Before you learn about counting cards, learn blackjack basic strategy. Even professional blackjack players use basic strategy to play most of their hands.

The Red Seven Count: Easy and Powerful

If you already know blackjack basic strategy, it’s time to learn an easy and powerful card counting system.

The easy Red Seven Count gets 80% of the potential gain available from the Hi-Lo Count and other counts that are significantly more difficult to learn and use. It is the strongest professional-level card counting system ever devised for its level of simplicity and ease of use.

The Red Seven Count

Blackjack players count cards to keep track of the proportions of high cards (Tens and Aces, the cards that are good for the player) and low cards (the cards that are good for the house) remaining in the decks to be dealt.

We don’t need to maintain separate counts of the Tens, fives, Aces, deuces, or any individual cards. We just need to know if the remaining deck has more high cards than normal or more low cards than normal.

In the Red 7 count, the high cards (Aces and Tens) are assigned the value -1, because each time one is dealt the remaining decks are a little poorer in the cards that are good for us.

Low cards (2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) are assigned the value +1, because each time one of these is dealt the remaining decks are a little better for us.

As for 8s and 9s, they are neutral cards, assigned a value of 0. This means that when we see them we ignore them, and don’t count them at all.

We count red 7s as +1, treating them like another low card. But we count black 7s as 0—that is, we ignore them as a neutral card. This is the device that creates the exact imbalance necessary for this count to work as an easy running count system, with no math at the tables. (Technically, it does not make any difference whether the red sevens or the black sevens are counted, so long as this precise imbalance is attained.)

Start learning to count cards by memorizing these values for each card denomination. Then practice keeping a running count by adding and subtracting these values from a starting count of 0 as you deal cards onto a table, one at a time from a deck. If the first card you turn over is a Jack, add -1 to your starting count so that your running count is -1. If the next card is a 6, add +1 to your count so that your running count is 0. If the next card is a 4, add +1 again so that your running count is +1.

Example:

Cards seen: 2, 6, A, 8, 9, X, X, 5

Point values: +1, +1, -1, 0, 0, -1, -1, +1

Running Count: +1, +2, +1, +1, +1, 0, -1, 0

By the time you get to the end of a single full deck of cards, your running count should be +2. If you have miscounted, try again. Then shuffle and go through the deck once more. Build up speed and accuracy, but do it at your own pace. Note that the deck ends at a running count of +2 because of those two extra red sevens we count as +1. They give the full deck 22 plus counts, against only 20 minus counts.

How to Practice Counting Cards

Practice, practice, practice.

Then learn to count as card counters actually do at the table—counting cards in groups.

When you are proficient at counting down a deck of cards one card at a time, practice turning the cards over two at a time, and count the cards in pairs. This is how you will do it at the casino tables, because it’s faster and easier for most people to count cards in pairs. This is because the cards in many pairs cancel each other out, so you don’t have to count them at all.

For example, every time you see a ten or an ace (both -1) paired with a 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or red 7 (all +1), the pair counts as zero. You will quickly learn to ignore self-canceled pairs, as well as 8s, 9s and black 7s, since all of these are valued at 0.

When you are good at counting cards in pairs, practice turning them over 3 and 4 at a time. Counting in larger groups really speeds you up, and is a technique professional players use. If you turn over a Ten, 8 with a 2 and black 7, the change in your running count is 0, because the 8 and black 7 aren’t counted at all and the Ten and 2 cancel each other out.

Always strive first to be accurate in your count. Speed without accuracy is worthless. You will do much better in your gambling career if you get in the habit right now of taking the time to learn to do things right.

After you are good at counting cards in pairs and groups of three or four, run through the cards by fanning them from one hand to the other as you count. This technique builds your skill for actual casino play. Allow your eyes to quickly scan the exposed cards for self-canceling pairs, even when these cards are not adjacent to each other.

You should be able to count down a deck in this fashion in 40 seconds or less before you ever attempt counting cards in a casino. Most pros can easily count down a deck in less than 30 seconds. Most professional teams require players to demonstrate that they can count down a deck in 25 seconds or less, with perfect accuracy every time. The legendary card counter Darryl Purpose used to win card-counting contests with his teammates by counting down a deck in 8 seconds flat.

I’ve found that if you can count down a deck in 15-20 seconds or less, you’ll be fine in even the fastest-dealt real-life blackjack games.

No matter how fast you get at counting at home, you will probably find it difficult the first time you actually try to count cards at a casino blackjack table. You may find you forget your running count when you’re playing your hand or talking to the pit boss. In face-down games, you may miss counting some cards as players throw in their hands and dealers scoop them up quickly. You may forget which cards you have already counted and which cards you have not.

Don’t worry about it—every successful card counter has gone through this initial awkward period. You will get better with practice. Before you try counting cards in a casino while actually playing blackjack yourself, spend some time counting while watching others play. Do not sit down to play until you feel comfortable counting while watching the game.

If you expect to play in multiple-deck games, practice counting down multiple decks of cards at home. But be aware that your final running count should go up as you add decks. In a single deck, your final running count should be +2 because of the two red 7s in the decks. But if you are counting down 6 decks, there will be twelve red 7s in the decks, so your final running count should be +12. Multiply the number of decks you are counting by +2 to get the correct final running count for your practice.

Setting Your Starting Count for Casino Play

To use your running count to make betting and playing decisions at the table, you need to know about the “pivot.”

What is a pivot? For the Red 7 count, it’s the running count at which you will know your advantage has risen by about 1% over the game’s starting (dis)advantage. The pivot will be an important indicator in making betting and playing decisions.

If you start with a running count of 0, your pivot will change with the number of decks you are counting, just as your final running count changes with the number of decks.

To keep things simple at the tables, and make your pivot and other indicators the same for all numbers of decks, the easiest thing to do is adjust your starting count.

To make your pivot equal 0 for all numbers of decks, simply multiply the exact number of decks to be dealt by -2 to get your starting running count. (With six decks, you should start your running count at -12. With two decks, you start your running count at -4.)

If you always start your running count in this way, your final count (if you count every card in the deck(s)) should always be 0.

Here’s a simple chart that shows what your running count should start at with various numbers of decks. And yes, there are a few casinos in this world that deal 3, 5, and even 7-deck games. They’re not common, but they exist.

Red Seven Starting Counts

# DecksStarting Count
1-2
2-4
3-6
4-8
5-10
6-12
7-14
8-16
The Red Seven Blackjack Betting Strategy

Once you are proficient at counting, you can begin to apply the Red Seven betting guidelines at the tables. The idea is to raise your bet when you have an advantage over the house, raise it even more when you have more of an advantage, and keep your bet small when the house has the advantage over you.

Remember, when counting cards in a casino, if you always begin your count at the appropriate starting count for the number of decks in play, your pivot is 0. This means, again, that any time your running count is 0, your advantage will have risen about 1 percent over your starting advantage.

This zero “pivot” is a good indicator of when to first raise your bet for nearly all the traditional blackjack games available in this country. About 80 percent of the traditional games have a starting advantage between -0.4 percent and -0.6 percent. So, your zero pivot usually indicates an advantage for you of approximately ½ percent.

This is not a huge advantage. It does not guarantee that you will win the hand—far from it. With a ½% advantage, for every $100 you bet, you will end up in the long run with $100.50, or an extra fifty cents per hundred bucks bet. The important thing is that your count tells you when the edge has shifted from the house to you.

How much should you raise your bet when your running count hits the pivot—or beyond? This depends on many factors, including the rules of the game, the number of decks in play, the penetration (shuffle point), the size of your bankroll, what you can actually get away with in that particular casino, etc. (Casino personnel often view a large betting spread as a sign that a player may be a card counter.)

The chart below will provide a guide for the most common games.

Units to Bet
Running Count1 Deck2 DecksShoe
Negative111 (or 0)
0222
+2422
+4432
+6443
+8464
+12466
+16468

The general idea is to bet enough when you have the advantage to cover the cost of all the smaller bets you placed when the house had the advantage. Card counters call these small bets “waiting bets.”

Think of the cost of these waiting bets as overhead expenses, or “seat rental,” and you’ll understand why you want to keep these bets small. When the edge shifts to your favor, you want to bet a sufficient amount to cover all these costs, plus make a nice profit.

Card counters call the difference between your waiting bet and your largest bets (placed when you have your strongest advantage) your “betting spread.” For example, if you bet $5 at the top of the shoe, but raise your bet to $10 when the advantage shifts to your favor, and bet up to $40 when your count is highest, indicating your strongest advantage, this would be a 5-to-40 betting spread. You may also express this betting spread as 1-to-8, with a betting “unit” of $5.

The guidelines above are not to be taken as strict betting advice. In many one-deck games, for example, a 1-to-4 spread according to the count will get you booted out in short order, especially if your unit size is $25 or more.

In many shoe games, a 1-to-8 spread would barely get you over the breakeven point. This is why the 0-unit bet is suggested in shoe games at negative counts. It is often impossible to play only at positive counts in shoe games, but it is often wise to leave the table at a negative count.

Many professional gamblers get away with a spread of 1 to 20. They size their top bets according to their bankroll, and get their waiting bets down to the absolute minimum, to maximize their earnings. I myself play with a bet spread even bigger than that.

Note that the suggested bets are in units, not dollars. Your unit size is dependent on the size of your playing bankroll. I’m going to provide some very simple bet-sizing guidelines here that should prove sufficient for most players.

If you intend to take your game further, I recommend my book, Blackbelt in Blackjack : Playing 21 as a Martial Art, which provides very detailed betting advice for those whose careers depend on casino blackjack winnings as a sole or major source of income.

Bet-sizing and bankroll considerations for professional players require a study of standard deviation, normal fluctuations, risk, and the relationship of your advantage to these factors. For now, let’s stick with practical advice that will apply to most recreational players.

The “Trip” Bankroll

It is very important, first of all, for you to define exactly how much money you have available for gambling. Let’s say you go to Las Vegas or Atlantic City a few times per year and you always bring somewhere in the neighborhood of $1,500 to gamble with. Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose, but if you lose it all, no big deal. You’ll be back again in a few months with another fifteen hundred to take another shot at the casinos.

When you go to the casinos, you are always playing with a “trip bankroll.” This is not your life savings, nor are you depending on this money to make your next mortgage payment. This is expendable income to you, earmarked for entertainment.

As a card counter with a “trip bankroll,” you can play very aggressively. Divide your total trip bankroll by 150, and use this as your betting unit. With a $1500 bankroll, you divide:

$1500 / 150 = $10 unit

So, with the betting guidelines above, in the single-deck game you will spread your bets from $10 to $40. In the double-deck games, you’ll spread from $10 to $60. And in the shoe games, you’ll spread from $10 to $80. Whatever the actual size of your trip bankroll, use this method to obtain your betting unit.

If you think these betting guidelines are not aggressive enough for you, please follow my advice and use them anyway, at least until you learn more and get some experience with normal winning and losing streaks.

You will soon discover that even when you play blackjack with an edge over the house, the short-term money fluctuations are huge on your way to the long run, and more aggressive betting than this will often get you into trouble. Even with these guidelines, you will sometimes lose your entire trip bankroll before your trip is over!

In shoe games, with that high bet of $80, you are starting with fewer than 20 high bets with your initial $1500 trip bankroll. That doesn’t give you a lot of wiggle room for bad luck.

The “Total” Bankroll

If the money you intend to go to casinos with represents any significant amount of your total savings, and it is not an easily replenishable amount, then you must size your bets less aggressively. This also means that you must start with a larger bankroll, or play in smaller games, if you want to survive. There are many professional players today who started out with total bankrolls of $5,000 or less, but this is a very tough grind, and often requires a player to (God forbid!) get a job during the toughest times.

As a general rule, if your card-counting bankroll is not replenishable, obtain your unit size by dividing your total bankroll by 400. Then use the same betting chart above to size your bets. Serious players will need to use much more precise betting strategies, according to their advantage, table conditions, the necessity for camouflage, etc. Again, those with professional aspirations should see Blackbelt in Blackjack for an in-depth treatment of this subject.

The Red Seven Blackjack Playing Strategy

Using the Red Seven Count, you can also increase your advantage over the house by deviating from basic strategy according to your running count. First of all, insurance is the most important strategy decision. In single-deck games, assuming you are using a moderate betting spread, insurance is almost as important for a card counter as all other strategy decisions combined.

Conveniently, you have a very nice insurance indicator with the Red Seven Count. In 1- and 2-deck games, you simply take insurance any time your running count is 0 or higher. In all shoe games, take insurance at +2 or higher.

As for other playing decisions, there are only a few to remember. Any time you are at 0 or higher (any number of decks), stand on 16 vs. 10 and on 12 vs. 3. (According to basic strategy, you would hit both of these.)

In single-deck games, the 16 vs. 10 decision is the second most important strategy decision for a card counter—insurance being first. After you find these strategy changes easy, there are a couple of others you can add that will increase your advantage a bit more. At running counts of +2 or higher, with any number of decks, stand on 12 vs. 2 and on 15 vs. 10; and double down on 10 vs. X.

In multi-deck games, by using this simple running count strategy, you will be taking advantage of about 80% of all possible gains from card counting. Using the simple Red Seven Count, you have no strategy tables to memorize. You simply have basic strategy, which you play on more than 90% of your hands, and a few changes that you will make according to your running count.

In my opinion, most card counters would be wise to ignore more difficult strategies because of the cost of mistakes if you are not perfect in deploying them. Any system that slows you down, or causes mental fatigue or errors, will put more money into the casinos’ coffers than your pockets. Don’t be tempted by a system just because it works better on paper. The simple Red Seven Count works at the casino tables, and it gets the money. That’s the goal.

However, if you find yourself interested in using a more advanced card counting system to take advantage of every possible gain available from counting, I recommend that you look at the Hi-Lo Lite Count or the Zen Count, both included in Blackbelt in Blackjack . There is also an advanced version of the Red Seven Count in that book that is stronger and more versatile than the simple version presented here.

Blackjack Table Conditions

The actual overall advantage that a card counter can get over the house depends primarily on how deeply into the deck the dealer is dealing between shuffles. Card counters call the depth of the deal “penetration.” The deeper the penetration, the more often you’ll see counts that indicate you have an advantage and the stronger the advantage will be.

Without deep enough penetration, you will find that you simply count down shoe after shoe without seeing any high counts. The worse the penetration, the bigger your betting spread has to be to overcome all those extra waiting bets. If the penetration is 50% or less, you’re wasting your time counting cards in that game.

Card counting is also unlikely to be profitable in any game where blackjacks pay less than the traditional 3:2 payout. That’s because you must overcome a higher starting disadvantage on these games. In a game with a 6:5 payout on blackjacks, for example, you must overcome an additional 1.4% house edge. To overcome this, you must use an enormous betting spread.

For more information on table conditions and your overall edge from counting cards, see Blackbelt in Blackjack.

History of the Red Seven Count

I first published the Red Seven Count in 1983. It was very controversial when published, as many experts believed it impossible to whittle a system down to the bare basics, require no math whatsoever at the tables aside from the counting itself, and still get any significant edge over the house. Since that time, however, many independent computer simulation studies have shown the Red Seven Count to be exactly as I first described it, a professional-level system that is both easy and powerful.

Numerous system developers since have used the same approach I pioneered, but none have matched both the simplicity and power of the Red Seven. Some authors, like Ken Uston and George C., developed slightly more powerful systems using my unbalanced point count theory, but their systems are also more difficult to use than the Red Seven. Others, like rocket scientist Olaf Vancura and Ken Fuchs, developed the Knockout Count, very similar to the Red Seven Count, that perform similarly – sometimes weaker, sometimes stronger – in most game conditions. ♠


For more information on card counting on other methods professional gamblers use to win at blackjack, see Arnold Snyder’s Blackbelt in Blackjack. For complete information on the game of blackjack, including its history, variations, and stories of its great players, see The Big Book of Blackjack by Arnold Snyder.

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How to Bet NFL Futures

How to Bet NFL Futures

by Dan Gordon

[From Blackjack Forum Vol. XXI #2, Summer 2001]
© 2001 Blackjack Forum

[Dan Gordon is the author of Beat the Sports Books. Portions of this article are excerpted from Danís book, but most of the nuts and bolts of his NFL futures handicapping system are available only in this issue of Blackjack Forum. ó Arnold Snyder]

As Labor Day approaches, one of the biggest businesses in the world prepares to restart. Itís a business that generates well into 11 figures over a five-month period and involves the participation of millions of Americans and citizens from other countriesóand those numbers grow every year. This business is wagering on National Football League games.

Pro football is the biggest betting sport in the United States, with total wagers on it now running more than $1 billion a week. According to USA Today over half of the American adult population had a financial stake of some sort in the outcome of last yearís Super Bowl. That meant over $5 billion wagered on that game alone.

Because of extensive media coverage of the point spread, increased access to betting through the Internet, and the fabulous returns promised by sports touts, millions of fans now believe they have the expertise to beat the sports books, as if the people who book NFL games were the biggest suckers in the world.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Bookies love the NFL season. It provides them with their greatest profits in sports. Many local bookies operate only during the NFL season because the profit from these few months enables them to live well the rest of the year. Bookmakers represent the vast majority of people who make a profit from wagering on the NFL.

The late Bob Martin, manager of Las Vegasís first casino sports book, once told me that the number of bettors who win betting pro football is so small that “Öit is virtually the same as if no one won.”

Year after year, NFL bettors go into the season filled with confidenceóand end up losing. How can you avoid being one of them?

This is the question I answer, in part, in this article. But first, for beginners to sportsbetting, letís go over a few basics.

How Pro Football Is Bet and How the Line Is Set

Before you can win betting pro football you have to know how the line is set.

Many years ago all sports, including football, were bet according to odds. If someone liked a favorite in a game, he could give, say, 2-to-1 odds on the game (meaning he would have to risk $2.00 for every $1.00 he hoped to win). On the same game, a bettor could take 8-to-5 odds if he liked the underdog (risking $5.00 for every $8.00 he hoped to winóor roughly 63¢ risked for every $1.00 hoped for), thus making the “true” oddsóor how the betting public perceived the gameó9-to-5 for the favorite. (The odds of 9-to-5 are the midway point between 8-to-5 and 2-to-1, which can also be expressed as 10-to-5.) The difference between the give on the favorite (2-to-1, or 10-to-5) and the true odds (9-to-5) was the edge for the bookie on the favorite; the difference between the take on the underdog (8-to-5) and the true odds (9-to-5) was the bookmakerís edge on the underdog.

A problem with this type of betting on football came in mismatches, where a bettor might be asked to give 5-to-1 or 6-to-1óor moreóon the favorite. Few bettors wanted to lay such high odds because they had to risk so much to win so little. Neither would many bettors bet the underdog when it was perceived as having so small a chance of winning. Getting high odds was no consolation if your team seemed certain to lose. Thus, mismatches drew very little betting action (and very little “juice”óor profitófor bookmakers.) This was a situation odds makers could never feel happy about.

This problem was solved with the advent of the point spread (also called the “spread”). As far back as the 1920ís, point spreads were used on a limited basis. By the late 1940ís, the point spread had become the accepted way to bet on individual games.

The point spread is a handicap given to the favorite in terms of points. In the last regular season game of 1996, for example, the New England Patriots closed as 9 1/2-point favorites over the New York Giants. In this game, the odds makers believed that the Patriotsó-in the eyes of the betting publicówere 9 1/2 points better than the Giants. This meant that the Patriots had to win the game by more than 9 1/2 points (ten points or more) for a Patriots bettor to collect. An outright Patriots loss or a Patriots win of less than 9 1/2 points meant a loss for a Patriots point spread bettor.

If you bet the underdog Giants, on the other hand, you received 9 1/2 points on the Giants on your bet. If the Giants won the game outright or lost by less than 9 1/2 points (nine points or less), you won your bet. If the game landed exactly on the point spread (which obviously canít happen with a line of 9 1/2), the game is considered a “push” (or tie) and neither the bettor nor the bookmaker makes a profit.

Thus, when you bet a favorite, you are giving (or laying) points; when you bet an underdog, you are taking the points. In the above example a way of writing up a Patriots bet would be: “Patriots -9 1/2.” For someone betting the Giants, the bet would be: “Giants +9 1/2.”

The reason the point spread is considered better than odds is that, in theory, a handicap makes a game an equal proposition in the eyes of the betting public, with bettors just as likely to take one team as the other no matter how great the mismatch might be. In mid-season of 1996, the lowly 1-6 Bucs went to play the 6-1 Packers (the team that would eventually win the Super Bowl). In the old days, the Packers would have been prohibitive odds favorites and the game would have received few wagers. But with the point spread, the line eventually settled at Packers -17, making the game just another of the 14 games played that weekend that got its share of betting action.

The point spread method also makes it easy for sports books to adjust the “price” (or handicap) on a game as money comes in on one side or the other. Letís return to the Patriots-Giants game discussed above.

Las Vegas Sports Consultants (founded by Michael “Roxy” Roxborough, who is now retired) in Las Vegas, the largest odds-making office in the world and the one with the most clients (sports books that use their numbers), felt that making the Patriots an 8Ω-point favorite would make the game an equal proposition to the nationís bettors. How- ever, as the week went on, more money came in on the Patriots than on the Giants. Sports books in Nevada and bookmakers around the country were quick to raise the price on the Patriots, moving their handicap (the “number” or “line”) to -9 and then -9 1/2. When wagers continued to come in on the Patriots despite the higher price, some books were even forced to move the number to -10. Finally, Giants money came in and most bookmakers closed the game at -9 1/2.

As you can see, betting on pro football is truly a free market activity. Most bettors who wagered on this game considered the Patriots a bargain at -8 1/2 and -9. Their betting pushed the price on the Patriots up. When the line reached -10, bettors at last considered the Giants a good deal and their wagers pushed the line back down. The closing number of Patriots -9 1/2 was the result of pure supply-and- demand.

And this is where opportunity arises for the professional sports bettor.

The reason you can make money betting the NFL is precisely because the lines put out by the odds makers are made not to predict the actual outcomes of games, nor to educate the public about the relative strengths of the teams, but to try to split the betting public by making one team as attractive as the other. And the publicís view of a match-up is occasionally incorrect.

A professional bettor looks for lines that are inaccurate in terms of the real differences between the two teams. When he finds such lines he wagers on themóand that is the only time he wagers.

While good odds makers have to tie their lines to public sentiment, the professional maintains a distance from such sentiment in order to be able to recognize those games where public sentiment is incorrect.

Before going on to specifics about how you recognize good bets, I want to mention three points about how I view the NFL.

The league, like the rest of pro sports, has become one of big contracts and big money. Itís my impression that this causes players and even coaches to become, at times, mentally fat. If a game or two has been played well and won, details might not seem that important for the next game. Letdowns happen more now than in the days when players were less well-paid and when todayís job security and guaranteed money did not exist. This doesnít mean that the game was better in the good old days. It just means that it was different to handicap. Teams tended to play more true to form in those days.

What big money and big contracts also mean now is that when teams perform beyond their capabilities for a game or two, one is more likely to see a bounce-back than in years past. For a handicapper this means that it is important to track and be ready to pounce on situations where such bounce-backs are likely to occur.

Second, there is tremendous parity in the league. That means, despite public perception and constant media star-making, that there is not much difference between the leagueís best player at a position and the worst. When a team of slightly worse players is more motivated than a team of slightly better players an outright upset is possible. Most certainly, itís possible for the “inferior” team to cover the point spread.

Third, the point spread tends to nullify any obvious scrimmage edge (skill or power advantage) a team has over its opponent. In the 1995 and 1996 seasons, for example, there were 166 games in which the point spread was seven or more points. These were games where one team was perceived to have a big edge over its opponent at the line of scrimmage. While the underdog won just 39 of these 166 games outrightó23.4 percentóthe underdog covered the point spread in 87 of the games (while tying it in three): a success rate of just over 53 percent. In 1997, there were 69 games with a spread of seven points or more. The underdog won just 12 of these games outright (17.4 percent), but had a 36-31-2 record against the spread for a success rate of 53.7 percent.

Also, as I shall demonstrate shortly, the difference between teams in the middle of the league is not as great as most bettors think. The statistical difference, for example, between a 10-and-6 team and an 8-and-8 team is only three points on a neutral field.

In summary, the team that most bettors think is the better team may in fact be better. However, the point spread usually more than nullifies that edge. Thus, bettors who bet favorites are often betting poor value.

On the other hand, sometimes a team will perform very well or very poorly for just a game or two, and these short-term performances will give the public a false reading of the team. The odds makers mirror this public reading with their numbers. At this time anyone betting on an overrated team or against an underrated team is again betting poor value.

How can you tell if a team is overrated or underrated?

Power Ratings

In their strictest sense, power ratings are values given to each club that tell where that club stands in skill and strength in relation to every other club. The difference between one team and another in my power ratings tells me what should happen in a game between the two clubs on a neutral field with everyone healthy.

Of course, teams donít play on neutral fields in the NFL, but weíll deal with that later. In the meantime, when the rest of the betting public is blown astray by what happened in the last game, power ratings are my guide to the real strengths or weaknesses of a team.

Some handicappers rely mainly on objective factorsóscores and other statisticsóto set their power ratings. Other handicappers rely mainly on subjective factorsótheir own feeling about a team based on certain types of team-membersí behavior.

Through my experience in over twenty years of handicapping, I have come to use bothótwo sets of power ratings. I have devised these two ratings to reflect both my judgment about teamsí strengths, and their performance as measured by scores.

he first ratingóthe only one we will discuss in this articleóis a letter power rating in which each team is ranked someplace between A+ (the best possible rating) and E- (the worst)ósee Chart #1.

Chart #1: Power Ratings
Letter
Rating
Projected
Record
A+15-1 or 16-0
A14-2
A-13-3
B+12-4
B11-5
B-10-6
C+9-7
C8-8
C-7-9
D+6-10
D5-11
D-4-12
E+3-13
E2-14
E-1-15 or 0-16

These letter rankings correspond to how I feel a team is playing presently, and are meant to reflect how a teamís record would look after a 16-game season playing at this level, assuming that their competition was average. For example, if a team is playing like an 8-8 team, I give them a ranking of Córight in the middle of my range and in the middle of the league. At the very top (A+) of my ratings would be both 15-and-1 and 16-and-0 kinds of teams, while at the very bottom (E-) would be any 1-and-15 or 0-and- 16 teams. Only tthe 1985 Chicago Bears ever made it to A+ in my ratings. No team has ever sunk to E-.

Because they reflect a teamís current performance, letter power ratings are updated continuously throughout the season. And, in my letter power ratings, teams donít always end up ranked according to their actual record. This is because their actual wins and losses may involve an unusually easy or tough schedule, or unusually good or bad luck. Instead, I look closely at the games teams have played to put a “team picture” together.

The letter power rating is to some extent a subjective one, and will only be as good as the experience and judgment of the rater. One way to check your power ratings, as you acquire experience and judgment, is to compare your ratings to those of other respected handicappers. (The Gold Sheet and Power Sweep are among the reputable publications with power ratings in them. You may obtain the current issue of either of these publications from GBC in Las Vegas, or you can subscribe to them directly. The Gold Sheet also has a website at www. goldsheet.com, where you can download a sample back issue of their publication.)

However, if power ratings could be reduced to a simple formula, all good handicappers would be betting the same games. Theyíre not. Different winning handicappersólike different winning card countersócan be looking at different things. Ultimately your ability to find value in a line (and make winning bets!) will depend on your developing your own skills.

Once I have assigned letter power ratings, I use a simple chart to assign corresponding points by which to separate various teams. Iíve arrived at these point assignments through twenty yearsí study of how NFL teams do in pointwise ratio (that is, points scored versus points given up.) The “Average Edge” in Chart #2, below, is the average number of points by which each rank will outscore opponents or be outscored by opponents.

Chart #2: Power Rating Edge
Letter Rating
Point Differences
 Average Edge (points) 
  A+17
A to A+4A13
A- to A2 1/2A-10 1/2
B+ to A-2 1/2B+8
B to B+2 1/2B5 1/2
B- to B2 1/2B-3
C+ to B-1 1/2C+1 1/2
C to C+1 1/2C0
C- to C1 1/2C--1 1/2
D+ to C-1 1/2D+-3
D to D+2 1/2D-5 1/2
D- to D2 1/2D--8
E+ to D-2 1/2E+-10 1/2
E to E+2 1/2E-13
E- to E4E--17
A to A+4A13

My study shows that when a team goes 8-and-8, it gives up and scores the same number of points on average over a season. When a team goes 9-and-7 it outscores teams by 1 1/2 points per game on average. When a team is 7-and-9, it is outscored by 1Ω points per game. Thus the difference between a C- (7-and-9) kind of team and a C (8-and-8) kind of team is 1Ω points. The jump from C to C+ (a 9-7 team) is also 1Ω points. The jump from C- to C+ (two steps) is three points. This means that if a C+ team plays a C- team, a C+ team will be three points superior on average on a neutral field.

In my letter power ratings, I list the majority of NFL teams someplace between B- and D+. At the end of the 1996 season, for example, just eight of the 30 teams fell outside of this range.

When the ratings move above B- and below D+, note that the equivalent point values get bigger. Teams above the B- class outscore their opponents by more and in larger jumps per class than those that are rated between D+ and B-. Teams below D+ tend to be outscored by more and in larger jumps per class than the teams in the D+ to B- range.

Thus, from Chart #2 you can see that a B+ team will outscore an average (8-and-8) team by eight points a game (which is the same as saying it will outscore all opponents, on average, by eight points a game). Teams that are rated A- will have a 10Ω-point-per-game edge, while “A” teams will have, on average, a 13-point-per-game edge. Meanwhile a D- team will be outscored by eight points per game; an E+ team will be outscored by 10Ω points per game; and an E team will be outscored by 13 points per game.

And, at least in the world of power ratings, if an A+ team plays an E- team, the A+ team should be ranked 34 points better on a neutral field.

However, since most NFL teams are ranked between D+ and B-, with a difference between these two letter rankings of only six points, the teams in this area of my letter power ratings are very close to even. It is in this area, incidentally, that I concentrate my handicapping, because it is here that emotional edges mean more.

Now, let us go on to how you can convert power ratings into winning bets.

Uncovering Profitable Season Over/Under Bets

I have mentioned very briefly how power ratings can be used to find value in a gameís line.

But straight bets on games are only one of a number of types of wagers an NFL bettor can make. In addition to straight bets on one team or the other against the point spread, you can wager on over/unders, also known as “totals,” in which you bet against a number that represents the total points scored in a game, betting on whether more or fewer total points will be scored.

There are also a number of “exotic” bets, including parlays, teasers, and reverses ómost of which are sucker bets most of the time, and all of which are beyond the scope of this article. In this article, we are going to concentrate on season over/under future bets, which are some of the first profit opportunities that will arise this football-betting season.

“Future” wagers in the NFL are basically bets you make on how a team will perform in the upcoming season, including the playoffs and Super Bowl. These wagers can be bet at a number of reliable sports books in Las Vegas, on the Internet, and offshore. In regular season over/under future bets, you bet on how many wins a team will garner. In other future bets, you can wager on particular teams to win their conferences or the Super Bowl.

But how do you make money predicting how a team is going to do over a whole seasonóparticularly when you have to overcome a healthy house edge? This again is where your power ratings come into play.

You begin by assigning each team a letter power rating at the start of the season. You do this either by starting with your power ratings from last year, modified for changes in team personnel, or, if you are a beginner, by consulting the power ratings of a more experienced, reputable source. Chart #3, below, contains my power ratings for the start of the 2000 season. Note that there were no teams on the A+ through B+ levels and none between the E+ and E- levels at the start of the 2000 season.

Chart #3: Preseason NFL Power Ratings, 2000
BRams, Titans
B-Broncos, Colts, Jaguars, Bucs, and Redskins
C+Ravens, Bills, Cowboys
CBears, Lions, Jets, Raiders, Chargers
C-Falcons, Packers, Chiefs, Dolphins, Vikings, Giants, Seahawks
D+Cards, Panthers, Patriots, Saints, Eagles, Steelers, 49’ers
DBengals
D-Browns

The next step is to convert your letter power ratings into projected point spreads for each game, using a schedule for the upcoming season, and the Power Rating Point Differences in Chart #2. [Note: You can download a complete 2001 NFL schedule at the NFLís official website: www.nfl.com] In addition, because over the long run in the NFL the home field advantage has been shown to be worth about 2 Ω points, every home club should be given an additional 2 Ω points in your seasonís projected point spreads, unless there is a very compelling reason not to.

After projecting point spreads for each game, I convert the point spreads into decimal numbers (see Chart #4) that represent fractions of games won, according to the percentage of times a team should win a game at a given projected point spread. (This fraction, like the other statistics in this article, is derived from my own research.) These fractions (decimal numbers) can then be added to project each clubís season number of wins.

Chart #4: Spreads as Decimals
Point SpreadDecimal
Equivalent
1/2 or 1.507
1 1/2.512
2.519
2 1/2.524
3.600
3 1/2.615
4.630
4 1/2.643
5.655
5 1/2.667
6.688
6 1/2.706
7.722
7 1/2.737
8.750
8 1/2.762
9.773
9 1/2.783
10.792
10 1/2.800
11.810
11 1/2.818
12.833
12 1/2.846
13.857
13 1/2.875
14.889
14 1/2.900
15.917
15 1/2.933
16.944
16 1/2.952
17.962
17 1/2 and more.968

After you project win records for each club, you are ready to check the over/under totals the sports books have put up. You need a two-game or more difference between a sports bookís total and your projected number of wins to make a wager.

Letís take an actual wager I made in the 2000 preseason as an example.

As you can see from Chart #3, before the 2000 season began, I gave the Washington Redskins a B- rating, a letter power rating that translates to ten winsóagainst an average schedule. This is what I wrote about them as the pre-season was closing: “Team is under enormous pressure to win from owner Daniel Snyder. However, the main defensive additionsóBruce Smith, Mark Carrier, and Deion Sandersóare well over 30. The offensive line also has two old starters. Last year the Redskins were just 1-5 against other playoff teams. The loss of Cory Raymer (center) will hurt badly. The defense will be better but the Redskins will be overrated early in the season. Look to bet against early in the year.”

However, teams seldom have a totally normal or neutral schedule. To develop a projected win record strong enough to be the basis of a wager, I had to see how the Redskinsí actual season schedule would play out mathematically.

In their first game, the Redskins (B-) hosted Carolina, a D+ team. Since there is a six point difference between B- and D+, I rated the Redskins an 8 Ω-point favorite (remember, they got an additional 2 Ω points for being the home team). The decimal number equivalent for 8 Ω points is .762. I rounded off that number and gave the Redskins .76 for this game.

In their second game, the Redskins would play at the Lions, a C-rated club. That meant the Redskins were a half-point favorite (the three-point difference for the letter power ratings minus the Lionsí 2 Ω-point home edge). The decimal equivalent gave the Redskins .51 for this game.

In their third game, the Redskins would play the Cowboysóa C+ teamó at home. I projected them a four-point favorite and used the decimal .63. (For the complete Redskins schedule, and projected wins for the 2000 season, see Chart #5 below.)

Chart #5: 2000 Redskinsí Season Projection
GameLocation/OpponentRating
Gap
Projected LineDecimal
Equiv.
1Redskins (B-) host Carolina (D+)*6Redskins -8 Ω.76
2Redskins (B-) at Lions (C)3Redskins -1/2.51
3Redskins (B-) host Cowboys (C+)*1 1/2Redskins -4.63
4Redskins (B-) at Giants (C-)4 1/2Redskins -2 1/2.52
5Redskins (B-) host Tampa (B-)*0Redskins -2 Ω.52
6Redskins (B-) at Philadelphia (D+)6Redskins -3 Ω.62
7Redskins (B-) host Ravens (C+)*1 1/2Redskins -4.63
8Redskins (B-) at Jacksonville (B-)0Redskins +2 Ω.48
9Redskins (B-) host Titans (B)*-2 1/2Even.50
10Redskins (B-) at Arizona (D+)6Redskins -3 Ω.62
11Redskins (B-) at St. Louis (B)-2 1/2Redskins +5.34
12Redskins (B-) host Eagles (D+)*6Redskins -8 Ω.76
13Redskins (B-) host Giants (C-)*4 1/2Redskins -7.72
14Redskins (B-) at Dallas (C+)1 1/2Redskins +1.49
15Redskins (B-) at Pittsburgh (D+)6Redskins -3 Ω.62
16Redskins (B-) host Cardinals (D+)*6Redskins -8 Ω.76
   TOTAL:9.48 wins

*Home games. At home, the Redskins get an additional 2 Ω pt. home advantage. On the road, they get a -2 Ω pt. road disadvantage.

In the end, adding up the decimal numbers for all sixteen games of the regular season, I projected 9.48 wins for the Redskins.

Once I had projected 9.48 wins, I was ready to check the sports booksí numbers. Since it happened that several sports books had set their regular season over/under total on the Redskins at 11Ω wins, I had the two-game difference I needed to wager on the under. Moreover, in addition to the two-game edge, I was getting 1.20-1 odds on my bet. When I later saw an over/under total of twelve at another book, I went even further in my bet even though here I had to give 2.20-1 odds, since I now had a 2Ω-game edge on my under wager.

There was one other team that I almost wagered on. Using the above system, I projected the New England Patriots to win 6.35 games. One place in Las Vegas had the over/under on the Patriots at 8 1/2. I had my magic two-game edge. However, to bet the under on the Patriots, a bettor had to give hefty 3.20-1 odds. That, I knew from my research, was too great a price to give. Iíll spare you the calculations here, but as a general rule of thumb, the odds you pay should be no higher than the number of games you have as an edge (donít go over 2-1 for a two-game edge, 3-1 for a three-game edge, etc.). Too bad I passed. The Patriots ended up at 5-11 for the season. Still, you have to stand by your math.

While the Redskins gave me some anxiety early in the season when they started at 6-2, they slumped in the second half of the year. Their owner, Daniel Snyder, put undue pressure on the team as I knew he would if they had any problems. The Redskins lost six of seven and ended the year at 8-8: over a game worse than I had predicted they would finish.

The Odds You Must Overcome in Sports Betting

Now letís talk about the odds you must overcome to be successful in sports betting.

When you bet against the point spread, you are not only giving or taking points. You are also almost always giving 11-to-10 odds to a bookmaker or sports book, meaning that if you want to win $50 on a game, you must risk $55. When a bettor is giving 11-to-10 odds, he is bucking a 4.55 percent edge against him.

To make this clearer, take two bettors who choose the opposite sides of the same game. If each one wants to win $100, each must actually risk $110 (the extra $10 being a fee or commission for the sports book, called the “vigorish” or “vig.”) After the game, one bettor will lose the $110 he risked while the other gets it back plus his $100 win. Thus of $220 total risked $10 goes to the bookie. Ten dollars of $220 is 1/22 or 4.55 percent.

The odds on futures bets are differentóhidden in the price. Iíve already mentioned that on my bet on the Redskins to win under 11Ω games I got 6-5 (equivalent to 1.20-1) odds. Since I couldnít bet enough at this price (some sports books have ridiculously low limits) I went further with this bet against the Redskins betting a small amount on them winning under 12 games. On this part of the bet I gave 11-5 (equivalent to 2.20-1) odds. To compute these odds (or “money line”) equivalents for yourself, simply divide: 6 ˜ 5 = 1.20; 11 ˜ 5 = 2.20.

What were the odds or vig for an “over” bettor? At the book where the over/under was 11Ω wins for the Redskins, a bettor would have had to give 7-5 (1.40-1) odds if he felt that going over 11Ω wins was a good investment. Since the difference between what I got on the Redskins (1.20-1) and what a Redskins bettor would have had to give (1.40-1) is .20, this line is often called a 20-cent line.

The odds makers who set this line were saying through their numbers that the real line on the Redskins winning over 11Ω wins was 1.30-1 in favor of it happening. Letís say these odds were true (they might or might not have been, remember, due to how lines are set). I was getting 1.20-1 odds against something that had a 1.30-1 chance of happening.

Letís do the math on this. Letís say I put up $10 on this bet and play it out 23 times (once for every possible outcome: 13 losses for every 10 wins). If the odds were the true line on this event, I would win 10 of the 23 times. I would lose the wager 13 of the 23 times. All told, I would be risking $230 and my return would be $220 (I would get back $22 each time I won: the $10 I risked and a $12 profitóremember I was getting 1.20-1 odds). Thus, the sports bookís profit would be $10. The vig in their favor would be a little over 4.3% (which you figure by dividing the $10 profit by the $230 invested).

If a bettor wagered on the Redskins winning over 11Ω wins he would risk $14 for every $10 he wanted to win. Walking through this 23 times, our Redskins backer would win 13 of the 23 times and get back a total of $312ó13 x $24 (the $14 risked plus $10 profit) on a total risk of $322 ($14 x 23). Here the sports bookís edge or vig is just 3.1% (their $10 profit divided by the $322 taken in).

Thus, any bettor who wagered on the Redskins to win over 11Ω games had over one percent less vig to overcome than us anti-Redskins bettors.

On the part of my bet where I bet the Redskins under 12 wins, the vig worked a bit differently. That is because bettors who took the Redskins to win over 12 games got just 9-5 (or 1.80-1) odds. Remember that those of us betting under 12 wins were giving 11-5 (or 2.20-1) odds. Since the difference between 1.80 and 2.20 is .40, this is often called the 40-cent line.

To calculate the vig against a bettor on this bet, you do it the same way as in the above example. The mid-way point between 1.80-1 and 2.20-1 is 2-1. Assuming thatís the real line, you play out the wager three times (once for every possible outcome), with the Redskins going under 12 wins twice. On a $10 bet, I would be putting up $66 on three bets (2.20 x $10 = $66)óor $22 a wager.

I would win two of the three bets getting back a total of $64 on my total $66 investment. The sports bookís profit would be just over three percent ($2 divided by $66). For bettors going with the Redskins over 12 wins and taking 1.80-1 odds, the sports booksí vig would be greater. These bettors would put up $10 three times but win only once, getting a return of $28. The bookís profit would be $2 on $30 risked, or 6.7%.

If the lines in sports betting represented the real odds, there would be no point in betting. In other words, if the actual odds of the Redskins winning over 11Ω games last year had been 13-10 in favor and the actual odds of them winning over 12 games had been 2-1 against, I would have been going up against insurmountable odds. Though small odds, they would still be insurmountable and in the long run, I would go broke.

However, since the odds set are not the actual odds but the public perception of them as seen by the odds maker, NFL season over/ unders and other sports bets can be highly profitable.

To give you an idea, a solid NFL handicapper with a 55% win rate has a 5.5% edge on every bet. An expert handicapper with a long-term 57% win rate has a 9.7% edge on every bet. Top handicappers, with a long-term 60% win record, have a 16% edge on every bet. You should not bet until youíre confident that your win rate is at least 54%.

It is the job of the NFL handicapper to find the weak spots in the line. As with card-counting, in sports betting discipline and patience are key. ♠