Posted on Leave a comment

Card Counting in the Courts: Caesars and Circus Try to Frame Hyland Team Players

By Arnold Snyder
(From Blackjack Forum XV #4, December 1995)
© Blackjack Forum 1995

The initial news reports on the arrests of Tommy Hyland blackjack team members Christopher Z., Barbara D., and Karen C. came to the Blackjack Forum offices from newspapers all over the U.S. and Canada. On May 28, 1994, the three were arrested at the brand new Casino Windsor and charged with cheating at blackjack.

The initial cheating charge was based on use of a device—pop-off beads the two women players were wearing to count the percentage of aces they had successfully tracked with an ace prediction strategy. When it turned out there was no law against players using a device in a casino in Canada, the province charged the players with fraud for use of signals at the table.

The Oakland Press (Michigan) reported: While Chris Z. played the actual game, Barbara D. and Karen C. watched the cards. The practice is called counting cards. Keeping track in your head is OK. Using anything else is not. Dancey and Conroy used beads concealed in their clothes to count the cards.

All three are charged with conspiracy to cheat at play and cheating at play, both of which carry two-year prison sentences Gaming officials said they expected cheaters would test the dealers at Windsor, hoping to find inexperienced people manning the tables.

The Detroit News quoted Sheri Buoncompagno, a local dealing school operator, Card counters aren’t welcome anywhere that I know. Each casino handles them differently, but they are usually encouraged to play fair or leave. It’s really a shame someone is already trying to take advantage of a new casino, but that’s the way it usually goes. Someone new opens up and somebody is going to challenge them right away.

The Las Vegas Review Journal’s report was more succinct: Three people won more than $100,000 over three days before they were stopped and accused of cheating at blackjack One gambled while the other two sat at the table and used a bead system to illegally count cards.

Many of the news reports mailed and faxed to me after the arrest implied that there was something unfair about card counting itself and characterized the casinos as victims of these sneaks. Most reports stated that it was the bead system that made the Windsor trio’s activities illegal, not the card counting itself.

A few months later, I was contacted by Tommy Hyland. The arrested trio were members of his blackjack team. He asked me to be an expert witness in this case.

Although I had never met Tommy Hyland, I’d spoken with him over the phone on various occasions in years past, and had also corresponded with him. I knew he was involved in New Jersey gaming politics, because on his advice I had sent letters to every New Jersey legislator in 1987 in an attempt to kill the anti-device legislation pending at the time. In spite of players’ efforts, the legislation passed in 1988.

I knew at that time that Tommy had been running both card counting and blackjack computer teams for a few years, and that his was widely regarded as one of the more successful team operations. To my knowledge, he always ran 100% legal operations. I couldn’t fathom what he could possibly have been doing with beads in Windsor that would have justified the arrest of his players.

When I received the complete investigation report a few days after my conversation with Tommy, everything was clear. I fired off a letter to Don Tait, the Windsor attorney who was defending the accused players. A very short excerpt:

Dear Mr. Tait:

I have read all of the documentation provided to me, which consists of the 166 pages of the Casino Investigation Unit report in the matter of Regina vs. Chris Z., Barbara D. and Karen C. Based upon the documentation provided to me, I have formed an opinion of what occurred on or about the 27th and 28th days of May 1994 at the Windsor Casino. I believe the documentation supports my opinion beyond any doubt.

Virtually all of the witnesses who observed the play of the defendants’ state that defendant Chris Z. was varying his bets widely, from a single hand of $100 or $200 to two hands of $2500 each (table limit). This is stated by Casino Shift Managers Bacharow and Davenport, as well as Surveillance Officers McDonough and Bell.

Davenport states he became suspicious of his (defendant Zalis’) erratic play. Chris Z. would bet one hand ‘at $100, then two hands at $2500. His betting strategy also indicated ace location play.’

These observations, taken at face value, indicate to me that defendant Zalis may have just been an erratic bettor; he may have been counting cards, though this also appears to be unlikely; and he was most likely using ‘ace location’ play as his primary method of attempting to obtain an advantage over the house.

It must be noted that the ace location player will not always win with his big bets, nor will he always get the predicted ace. Less than perfect dealer riffles, cards of the same denomination and suit as the key cards which simply happened to be located in proximity to the actual key cards, etc., make ace location play both difficult and risky.

The inexcusable ignorance of the casino personnel with regard to ace location strategies is not limited to the Windsor Casino personnel, but is also evident in the testimony of Joanne Vroom, who is identified as being ‘in charge of the card counting team at the Claridge Hotel in Atlantic City.’ Ms. Vroom was apparently shown tapes of the defendants’ play, then asked to comment on ‘the use of beads and their possible uses as far as counting cards or whatever their possibilities are.’
I find the testimony of Joanne Vroom particularly disturbing, as she was apparently called in by the Windsor Casino as an outside expert to render an opinion. As the Windsor Casino was such a new operation, the game protection personnel might be forgiven for some amount of lack of knowledge when it comes to advanced playing strategies, though it is still difficult for me to imagine an operation of such financial magnitude not spending the relatively small amount of time and money necessary to properly train and educate their personnel.

If, in fact, the Windsor Casino personnel were such rookies that they did not recognize a legitimate blackjack strategy that had been in use for more than a decade, and which had been discussed not only in the more esoteric professional players’ literature, but also in the casino industry’s publications, such as Bill Zender’s Card Counting for the Casino Executive, and even in the mainstream press (New York Times), then their calling in an outside gaming expert of more experience is laudable.

But where did they get this Vroom? I have never heard of her. I do not believe she has published anything that would qualify her as an expert, though she claims to have written the ‘manual’ that is used by the Claridge Casino in Atlantic City to train personnel to recognize card counters.

States Ms. Vroom on pages 56-57, when asked what the confiscated beads could be used for: ‘For tracking the aces. Keeping a count of them so they know when there is an excess of them in the deck or the shoe, it helps them in adding to the true count to give them an overall advantage on the house. Their accounting system as far as their being able to be paid by the team. Um, also tracking possibly 10’s and 5’s locations around the deck.’

On page 58, she then states: ‘Accounting purposes would be they’re using a multi-level system of card counting so with so many things to memorize they’re using them to track and keep an accurate record of the amount of aces that have been played, how many are left in the shoe so they’d be able to use it to their advantage in counting.

They have two sets of beads on them. One set of beads is for the accounting purposes. The other set of beads is actually for tracking the aces. So you’re actually having a two level system going on at the same time. One is their pay system, the other is the amount of aces coming into play.’

.On page 58, Ms. Vroom states the players are ‘tracking the aces,’ but also speculates that they are using the ace count simultaneously as a traditional side count to adjust the player’s ‘true count.’ This is absurd, and indicates to me that Ms. Vroom has a very limited and erroneous knowledge of how location play works.

.On page 60, when questioned about why the keygirls were ‘breaking off’ the concealed beads, Ms. Vroom does admit to being perplexed at this as the keygirls did not appear to be breaking off the beads at the beginning of the playing session. She speculates that at the beginning of play: ‘.they could be using any form even memorization um, I can deep count of aces plus keep running count true count without using any other device.’

She offers no explanation as to why the keygirls would be able to ‘keep count of aces’ at the beginning of a session but not at the end.

.On page 65, when asked to clarify her previous remark about using beads as a ‘two level system,’ she now expounds that the system in use was ‘.between a two and three level system. One for counting for their bonuses and ace tracking and third beads may be possibly be for a secondary count the primary beads would be for the aces coming through the other may be for second plugs throughout the shoe because they’re looking to cut the tens and aces to the front of the shoe and they’re tracking the aces as they come out of that section. The secondary beads would be used to track another plug throughout the shoe.’

This is pure gobbledygook, and indicates to me that Ms. Vroom has absolutely no idea what these players were doing. I defy her to take two sets of detachable beads and demonstrate how she would use these beads to locate aces from one shoe to the next. I can conceive of no way in which concealed detached beads could be used to identify or remember key cards, nor to indicate locations of aces or any other cards in a stack of cards.

Furthermore, she ignores the fact that if these beads were used in order to side count the aces in the more traditional sense for the sole purpose of true count adjustments by the player, it would be necessary for the keygirls to reattach all of the detached beads in between shoes, so that the fresh shoe would begin with a fresh count!

.Keying the aces is a visual strategy that requires concentration and a good memory. If Ms. Vroom can use concealed beads for this purpose, I’d like her to demonstrate how.

.The purpose of the beads, in fact, is described in detail in the Hyland team’s General Policies manual (page 119): ’All KG’s will wear 3 strings of beads. One string signifies bets, another signifies pointers (aces), and the third string signifies your own pointers. One bead should be disconnected every time a bet or a pointer occurs.’ Disconnecting a bead each time an ace is dealt is therefore called for in the team policy manual, but this is not done for any strategic purpose at the table.

On page 124, we learn that the keygirls’ pay rates are based upon the ratio of pointers/bets, which can be determined by the bead counts at the end of the playing sessions. This use of the beads, as described in the Hyland team player’s manual, does make sense.

The beads simply provide a method of determining how much each of the keygirls will be paid based on their success at keying the aces, after the play is over and the players have returned to their room. The beads are not used for counting the cards, side counting the aces for use with a card counting system, adjusting the true count, or any other such function at the time of playing.

.The theories of sequential tracking, the effects of the common shuffle actions of riffling and stripping the cards, and the utilization of key cards to locate aces/tens, are not well defined in the materials confiscated from the defendants. But these concepts would not be difficult to explain in court, even to the unsophisticated, as it is not difficult to demonstrate these concepts with actual cards.

.I feel certain that video footage would totally discredit the casino ‘experts’ in this case, and would prove that the defendants were playing precisely according to their own manual’s instructions and not using any illegal cheating techniques. The defendants themselves could describe and explain every bet made and every signal passed on the videos, as per their General Policies manual..

The casino ‘experts’ are grasping at straws to build a cheating case. I sincerely hope the casino personnel are thoroughly embarrassed at the hearing by their own ignorance, and their shameful treatment of skillful professional players who were totally acting within the law.

I find the treatment of skillful professional players as cheats and criminals very despicable. After discovering that no electronic computers were in use, as the casino security personnel allegedly suspected at the time the defendants were arrested, the casino management should have apologized to these players and extended every courtesy to them. Instead, they fabricated this bead ‘device’ to be some new cheating method, then publicly slandered the reputations of these talented players whose only crime was that they were smarter than the casino’s ‘experts.’

I find the casino’s actions in handling this matter, and the analyses of their game security personnel and their hired ‘card counting expert’ to be so ignorant that it is difficult for me to believe that any of these ‘experts’ are doing anything other than purposefully manufacturing a phony case against the defendants in order to hide their own stupidity, and the public embarrassment of having been taken to the cleaners by three skillful players who simply accepted the Windsor Casino’s public challenge to beat them at blackjack, and who did so successfully and legally.’

In December of 1994, Don Tait informed me that he had made portions of my comments (including portions not included in the excerpt above) available to the prosecuting attorney, in an attempt to get the charges dropped. He also told me that the prosecutor would soon be making a trip to Las Vegas in order to discuss the case with some of Nevada’s gaming executives and attorneys. Tait was still feeling fairly confident that the charges would be dropped, and that the trial, now scheduled for January 1995, would never occur. My feeling was the same.

I knew that the Casino Windsor was run by a conglomerate of casino megapowers that included Caesars, the Hilton Corporation, and Circus Circus. In my opinion, these corporations had been around long enough to know that, based upon the evidence collected, it was irrefutable that the players were simply employing a legal shuffle tracking strategy.

I was talking regularly with Tommy Hyland about this matter over the phone. More than anything, he just wanted the whole thing put to rest. He did not want a trial. He did not relish the public exposure. And his players just wanted the nightmare to end. Chris Z. was a salesman who lived in New Jersey and had never been arrested for anything. Karen C. was a Pennsylvania school teacher, recently married, who also had never been arrested. Barbara D. was a grandmother who lived in a suburb of Detroit. She had formerly worked as a Sheriff’s Deputy in California.

All had been recruited and trained by Tommy Hyland because they seemed to him to be intelligent and honest. All knew that they had been breaking no laws. Now, all three had been arrested, taken away from the casino in handcuffs, strip-searched at the police station, spent a weekend behind bars, had all of their personal property and money in their possession at the time of arrest confiscated, had been reported in newspapers all over the U.S. and Canada as cheats and criminals, and they were potentially facing up to two years each in a Canadian prison for their ‘crime.’

To the dismay of both Tommy Hyland and his attorney Don Tait, when the prosecutor returned from his Las Vegas fact finding foray, he decided to pursue the cheating charge. Curiously, the prosecution agreed to stipulate that the players were using the beads legally, as per their manual. The prosecution also agreed to stipulate that my analysis of what the players were doing to beat the casino (sequentially tracking the aces) was accurate.

The province had probably discovered by this time that it was not a crime in Ontario for a player to use or possess a computer or other device at a blackjack table. There is a gaming regulation that prohibits the casino from allowing players to use such devices at the tables, but there is no criminal offense by the players involved.

So, the beads were suddenly no longer an issue, but the cheating charge was not going away. According to Tait, a new rationale was being formulated. The prosecutor now contended that ‘team play’ constituted fraud.

Tait said that the prosecutor, Dennis Harrison, was an experienced and respected attorney. These new grounds for pursuing the charge of cheating, following the prosecution’s consultations with Las Vegas attorneys, seemed to indicate that these U.S. casino powers had decided to test in Windsor whether or not casinos could prosecute card counters whenever blackjack team play or shuffle tracking was suspected.

It seemed unlikely to me that such a prosecution would ever be attempted in Nevada or New Jersey, as there was such a long history of blackjack team play in these states. But in a new venue, like Windsor, the casinos were gambling that a successful prosecution might be possible. And, although Canadian law would not get written into the U.S. law books, a success in Canada could certainly influence a U.S. court to consider hearing such a case, and similar prosecutions in the U.S. could follow.

This, to me, was ominous. The potential repercussions of this trial could affect blackjack players all over the world. It was an attack on a skillful method of play and valid, legal strategies that had been in use by honest players for decades.

As is often the case in court proceedings, legal sparring delayed the trial for another six months. The trial itself, which lasted four days in July 1995, was a media circus. Both sides went all out to impress not only the judge, but the newspapers and TV reporters who filled the courtroom. At every break, TV cameras converged on the attorneys, the players, and the officers of Hyland’s team who had flown in from as far away as Hong Kong to testify, if need be.

The prosecution showed videos of the players in action, displayed the confiscated team documents, called as chief witnesses the Casino Windsor shift manager, Ken Davenport, formerly with Caesars World in Atlantic City, and Terry McIntosh, the detective constable with the Ontario Provincial Police, who made the arrests.

Don Tait lived up to his reputation as a brilliant defense attorney from day one. He made mincemeat of Davenport, who turned out to be more a witness for the defense than the prosecution.

I was on the witness stand for a day and a half–longer than Davenport and McIntosh combined. Prosecutor Harrison had a difficult time with me because he did not understand the math or the theory of blackjack with any depth at all. He did not have much grasp on gambling as an occupation either. He repeatedly attempted to get me to say that shuffle trackers removed the element of chance from the game, and made other players at the table lose more.

Aside from the fact that he was mistaken about these concepts, I could not understand why he even pursued them, since the whole issue of legality, as I pointed out, should be decided on whether or not the players did anything more than observe the game and use their brains to made decisions. How can making a decision based on your intelligent use of the information provided by the casino be illegal?

Even if a player could remove all element of chance from a game, and win every hand, this could not possibly be illegal if he accomplished this by simply using the information available by observing the game to make his decisions. By the time Harrison had finished grilling me, and Tait completed his cross-examination, I felt confident that the defense had made every point that needed to be made.

On the last day of the trial, as I had done all week long, I had lunch with Tommy at a cafe across the street from Don Tait’s office, a few blocks away from the courthouse. We had met briefly with Tait and we were all feeling cautiously optimistic. Walking back to the courthouse after lunch, eager to see Don Tait’s closing arguments, we were stopped in front of the courthouse by a uniformed Ontario police officer. I was about to learn what it meant to play hardball with the casinos.

‘Are you Thomas Hyland?’ the cop asked Tommy.

‘Yes, I am,’ he acknowledged.

Even now, we were surrounded by cameras and reporters. A plain clothes officer flashed a badge at Tommy.

‘You’re under arrest for violating Canadian immigration laws,’ he said.

Tommy protested. ‘What are you talking about?’ he asked, incredulous. ‘I’m a U.S. citizen. I have my passport. I came here legally. I’m due in court in about five minutes.’

The immigration officer pulled out his handcuffs. ‘You can explain it to immigration officials at your trial,’ he said. ‘I’m under instructions to place you under immediate arrest.’

The front page of the Windsor Star on the following day had a huge photo of Tommy Hyland being led from the courthouse in handcuffs, with the headline: ‘Blackjack Team Leader Arrested.’

Tommy learned from Canadian immigration officials that afternoon that he had been arrested because it was discovered that he was a ‘convicted felon’ in the Bahamas ten years earlier (1985). As an alleged ‘ex-convict’ in another country, he was not allowed into Canada.

Tommy explained that in 1985, while playing blackjack in the Bahamas with a concealed computer, he was arrested. There was no law banning blackjack computers in the Bahamas at that time, but the casino refused to drop the charges. They offered Tommy two options: pay the $2100 fine and leave the country, or go to trial and tell it to the judge. The trial date would be set six months later and bail would not be allowed, as Tommy was considered a ‘flight risk.’

Tommy paid the fine and left the Bahamas on the next flight out. He was not about tosit in a Bahamian jail for six months to save $2100, all of which would undoubtedly be spent on legal fees anyway. Now, Canadian immigration officials had dredged up this ten-year-old fiasco to prosecute Tommy Hyland as an illegal immigrant to their country!

Hmmm, was it possible that the casino powers had anything to do with this new harassment against Tommy Hyland? Was it curious that Tommy was arrested in front of the courthouse where his attorney had been shredding the prosecution’s cheating arguments for 3 Ω days?

Don Tait was quoted by reporter Roseann Danese in the Windsor Star the following day as saying, ‘Tommy Hyland is being held captive in Canada. It’s another means of trying to harass these people.’

According to Tait, Canadian immigration laws state that a person can only be deported if the action for which he was convicted in another jurisdiction is also illegal in Canada.

‘They’re trying to deport him from this country for something that is not an offense in this country,’ Tait said, adding: ‘I’m embarrassed to be a Canadian right now. I’m asked by the defendants, and I keep telling them we are basically a gracious people. Yet, ever since these people stepped into the casino, they have been continually harassed. The casino and prosecutor are trying to convict them because it’s an offense to use your brain. That means it’s cheating to think. Because that’s all you’re doing with card counting or shuffle tracking, using your brain.’

Tait added that Tommy was arrested ‘.because casino don’t want people to come in and play intelligently.’ He pointed out that Tommy’s arrest occurred the day after Tommy had appeared on local radio and TV news shows explaining the concept of professional blackjack play.

The following morning, the judge announced that he would render his decision on September 8, some six weeks in the future. I couldn’t get a flight out that evening, but I felt I wanted to get out of Canada as quickly as I could. The arrest of Zalis, Dancey and Conroy in May of 1994, and their subsequent indictment and prosecution for cheating, were not technically actions of the Casino Windsor, but of the provincial police and government of Ontario. This new arrest of Tommy Hyland was not technically a casino action, but an action of Canadian immigration officials. It stunned me.

It appeared that the Casino Windsor, which was netting more than a million bucks a day, was running the local Canadian government. Were the interpretation and enforcement of laws in Ontario being dictated by three casinos in Las Vegas? Were the Ontario Police, the provincial court system, and even the border guards now taking orders from Circus Circus?

As I write this article, Tommy Hyland has been officially deported from Canada and is not allowed into that country. He has appealed this decision of the immigration authorities, and has retained Don Tait has his attorney. I have been retained as an expert witness, should this matter go to trial.

On September 8, 1995, Judge Saul Nosanchuk rendered his decision on Zalis, Dancey and Conroy.

To quote from his judgment:

The accused, Christopher Z., Barbara Josephine D. and Karen C., are charged with the offence of cheating at play while playing blackjack at the Casino Windsor.

To reverse the odds that favour the Casino the concept of card counting was introduced in about 1962. Card counting systems have been written about extensively since 1962 in many books on sale in casinos and elsewhere throughout the world. A card counter uses his or her powers of observation during the play of the game to assess the probability of a ten valued card or an ace being dealt. The card counter places a larger bet when he or she believes that it is more likely that an ace or ten will be dealt. The prosecution in this case concedes that card counting is not cheating.
On May 28, 1994, the date of the alleged offence, the accused, Chris Z., was involved as a player in a game of blackjack at Casino Windsor. The accused, Karen C. and Barbara D., sat on either side of him and appeared to be simply watching him as he played.

In fact, Barbara D. and Karen C. were members of a professional gambling team trained to observe the cards as they were dealt, played and shuffled. Their purpose was to try to predict the arrival of aces and to give covert signals to their team member, Chris Z., at the appropriate time.

What they were doing has been described as key-carding or ace-locating. Key-carding or ace-locating involves carefully observing the shuffling, playing and discarding for the purpose of keying in on where the aces are expected to be located. Zalis, Dancey and Conroy were operating in accordance with a team manual that was located in a Windsor hotel room in the course of a search that followed the arrest of the accused.

The manual confirmed that the members of the team had to operate under the utmost secrecy. They were required to camouflage their identity and purpose. Each team member had to pass proficiency tests in basic strategy and card counting. Each member had to understand shuffling techniques. Each member had to take a lie detector test.

Extracurricular activities were restricted, with financial penalties for their violation. There were rules in the manual as to casino comportment; betting guidelines; accounting; security and quality control; scouting the casinos; scouting key games, cutting of the decks and shuffling.

Nowhere in the manual were there any instructions to suggest that the members become involved in any collusion with any dealers. There were no suggestions that there should be crimping or marking of cards; there were no instructions as to the use of any devices in the course of participating in the game or as to any other deceitful activity to be exercised in relation to the cards to be dealt or the play of the game. The camouflage of the members was of course part and parcel of their team instructions, as were other techniques involving the exercise of skill.

Each team that went on the road had a player called the big player, or B.P., and two keygirls, called K.G. Chris Z., at Casino Windsor, was the B.P., and Barbara D. and Karen C. were each K.G. players.

The prosecution argues that Chris Z., Dancey and Conroy were cheating by camouflaging the identity of Barbara D. and Karen C. as simply observers when they were indeed assisting Chris Z. as a member of the gambling team. Counsel for the Crown argues that keying the cards and signaling the information secretly with a view to having Chris Z. increase his bets constitutes cheating.

The defense, on the other hand, contends that Chris Z., Barbara D. and Karen C. were not cheating, but in fact were skillfully observing the shuffling and discarding in order to obtain an advantage, and in order to implement the key-carding tactics successfully.

The question to be determined is whether the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused were cheating within the meaning of the Criminal Code of Canada. Section 209 of the Criminal Code of Canada provides that, ‘Everyone who, with intent to defraud any person, cheats while playing a game. or in betting is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not to exceed two years.’

Section 197 of the Criminal Code provides that game means ‘a game of chance or mixed chance and skill.’ It is common ground that blackjack is a game of mixed chance and skill.

In R. v. McGarey, 1974, 6 C.C.C. (2d), AT P. 525, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the gist of the offence of cheating was perpetrating some fraud or ill practice or making use of some unlawful device in the act of playing.

In Lyons v. The State of Nevada, 1989, 1065 N.R., p. 317, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada overturned a cheating conviction against an accused who had been handle-popping a slot machine. Handle-popping involves a process of handle manipulation that enables a player to exploit a mechanically vulnerable slot machine.

The Court of Appeals referred to Nevada Statute, N.R.S. 465.015, which was enacted to prevent persons from taking unlawful advantage of Nevada’s Gaming Industry by cheating. That statute declares that, ‘To cheat means to alter the selection of criteria which determine (a) the result of the game or (b) the amount of frequency of payment in a game.’ The Court of Appeal in Nevada stated at page 121 that the Nevada Statute addresses, ‘Knowing, purposeful, unlawful conduct designed to alter the criteria that determine the outcome of any lawful gambling activity.’

The Court pointed out that the statute clearly applied to a person who tried to enhance his chances of winning by any activity such as crimping cards, which made it possible to identify certain cards. By doing this, the player was able to supplant elements of chance with actual knowledge that substantially altered both the nature of the game and the criteria for winning. At page 321, the Court of Appeal of Nevada pointed out that examples of conduct that fall within the definition of cheating involved conduct such as,

‘Resorting to mirrors, confederates, electronic equipment, magnets, tools or other devices that alter the play of the game or alter a machine to increase the prospects of winning.’
On the other hand, the Court stated that, ‘Gaming patrons who are especially gifted and can increase the odds in their favour by card counting, or perhaps a patron who notices and takes advantage of a dealer’s habit of play that will occasionally provide an unintended view of the dealer’s cards, are not cheating. The casino management might take measures to deny them the right to play but no criminal offence of cheating would have occurred. In either case, the players are simply exploiting what their skills and the play of the game afford them.’

In the case before the court the accused, Chris Z., Barbara D. and Karen C., were doing nothing to alter the character or play of the game. They were trained members of a professional gambling team making an effort to exploit the weaknesses of a dealer. They were trying to obtain an advantage for which there was no guarantee. Indeed, there is evidence that in one two-hour-and-45-minute session the team lost $15,000.00.

The court agrees with the contention of the defense that the advantage that the accused could gain was not caused by any physical act or dishonest conduct that caused the cards to come out in any particular way.

The court accepts the testimony of Mr. Arnold Snyder, a world-famous blackjack consultant and writer on the subject, who testified that key-carding or ace-locating is a form of card counting. According to Mr. Snyder, the advantages to a player from key-carding or ace-locating are generally the same as those gained from card counting, except that the camouflage aspect will allow the player to remain in the game longer.

Mr. Snyder testified that key-carding is a difficult and risky business and is always done in the context of a team. It is a discipline that takes an immense amount of study and patience. In the opinion of this Court, the fact that Zalis, Dancey and Conroy operated as members of a team camouflaging their identity does not constitute cheating, within the meaning of 209 of the Criminal Code.

It must be noted that the team concept was first written about in 1962, and in fact teams have operated extensively since that time all over the world. Mr. Snyder placed in evidence excerpts from 25 books on blackjack, each available through public distribution and each of which dealt with various aspects of team play tactics. Mr. Snyder was not aware of a single prosecution in any jurisdiction anywhere in the world against card counters or team players.

Of course, that fact does not oblige this Court as a matter of law to conclude that cheating did not occur in this case. It confirms to the court that what counsel for the accused aptly described as a ‘cat and mouse game’ is expected to occur at a casino. While the players are covertly signaling in the course of a team play, and using their card counting and key-carding strategies, the casino is operating is own surveillance on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

It must also be observed that it is open to the casino to take countermeasures against the card counters and key-carders or team players. The use of an automatic shuffling machine would probably solve the problem card counting presents to the casino. But, of course, such a machine is not an attractive proposition to many players and the casino would lose such players.

Cutting the deck in a different place could reduce the player’s advantage. Taking more time to riffle the deck would cut the advantage. Reshuffling the deck at any time would of course destroy the advantage. But none of the foregoing approaches are attractive to the casino because of the time that would be lost in implementing them. And, of course, time means money to the casino.

Finally, the casino may exclude card counters if authorized by the Gaming Commission in the jurisdiction of the casino. The exclusion of card counters is the procedure used most often by casinos.

In conclusion, this Court has determined that the accused were not cheating contrary to Section 209 of the Criminal Code. They were indeed highly trained professionals using highly developed skills in an extremely risky venture. The court finds considerable astuteness and wisdom in the testimony of Mr. Arnold Snyder that the explosion of the casino industry and growth of casinos came about because of the publication of so many books on casino skills. Many people have read the books but few have had the patience or determination or bankroll to implement the skills.

Finally, the Court accepts as valid Mr. Snyder’s testimony that the Casino will make much more money from players attempting card counting or key-carding than it will ever lose from such tactics.

The charge against the accused, Chris Z., Karen C. and Barbara D., is dismissed.

According to Ivan Sack, in the October issue of Canadian Casino News, an industry trade journal, the province is not planning to appeal Judge Nosanchuk’s decision. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Casino Tournament Strategy: Stanford Wong Spills the Beans on his Casino Tournament Team

by Arnold Snyder
(From Blackjack Forum Vol. VII #1, March 1987
© 1987 & 2012 Blackjack Forum

Serious blackjack players are about to enter a new era of play. The Age of the Professional Tournament Player has been ushered in with the publication of a new book by Stanford Wong—Tournament Blackjack[Editor’s note: Wong’s book has since been revised and expanded, and is now titled Casino Tournament Strategy.]

Don’t underestimate the importance of this book. In my opinion, this text will become a classic in blackjack literature, standing tall alongside Beat the Dealer and The Theory of Blackjack. Stanford Wong addresses his subject matter with thoroughness, accuracy, practical experience, and uncanny perception for the important details. This is the first and only text to provide accurate tournament strategies.

In the June ’86 issue of Blackjack Forum (Vol. VI #2), I presented an article titled “Blackjack Tournaments: The Next Attack.” In this article, I pointed out that high stakes gambling pros had been reaping great rewards from tournament play while there was virtually nothing available in print on the subject.

One of those high stakes gambling pros that I was referring to was Stanford Wong. In December of 1985, Wong secretly formed a six-man (actually 5-man/1-woman) team of tournament players. He bankrolled most of their efforts with his own money and was the primary force behind the devising of their strategies. They played in blackjack tournaments, craps tournaments, Keno tournaments and handicapping tournaments.

Proving A Casino Tournament Team Could Be A Success

To call this casino tournament team a success would be an understatement. Within one year’s time, the six members of this team had taken no less than eight major tournament prizes totalling well over $200,000. Considering the relatively few hours of table play involved—compared to the typical Uston-style blackjack team where players often hit the tables 10 to 12 hours per day, every day of the week, sometimes for months on end—Wong’s tournament team must be viewed as one of the most successful legal team gambling ventures in history.

All of this prize money was not won at blackjack tournaments. Much of it was taken from the craps tournaments, Keno tournaments, and so on. However, when I reported in the September issue of Blackjack Forum (Vol. VI #3) that Anthony Curtis, BJF’s own “Las Vegas Advisor,” had taken the first prize of $76,000 at the Las Vegas Hilton’s Matchplay Blackjack Tournament on June 22, 1986, I didn’t mention that Curtis had, in fact, entered the tournament as part of Wong’s team, and that Wong had developed the playing and betting strategies that Curtis had used. Curtis told me about it later over the phone.

“I had a date that night with a cocktail waitress,” he said. “I told her I had to finish playing in this tournament first, so she said she’d just come to the Hilton to watch the final round, and we could go out from there. She got there just in time to see me win my table and finish in first place. They gave me the prize money in cash. Did you ever see $76,000 in cash, Arnold?”

“Sounds like a good start for a date, Curt,” I commented.

He laughed. “I was just glad she wasn’t watching a few minutes later when I was unloading it all into Wong’s hands.”

Also in the June issue of Blackjack Forum, I mentioned that in July, less than a month after the big Hilton win, Anthony Curtis took third place in the Sam’s Town Blackjack Tournament. First prize of $20,000 in that tournament went to former Las Vegas Advisor staff writer Blair Rodman. Blair too had learned to play blackjack tournaments from Stanford Wong.

In his book, Tournament Blackjack, Wong lists his five teammates as Anne Amster, Anthony Curtis, Blair Rodman, Ernie Amore and Doug D’elia. He acknowledges that they “deserve credit for helping develop, refine and test the ideas in this book.” You may recognize Doug D’elia’s name if you’ve been in Caesars Tahoe lately. They’ve got his picture up in lights because he stunned them by taking first prize in two of their tournaments— handicapping and Keno—just one month apart from each other.

Tournaments have taken casino games, which have always been players vs. the house, and turned them into games like poker, where it’s player vs. player.

I asked blackjack math whiz, Peter Griffin, author of The Theory of Blackjack, what he thought of Wong’s tournament venture. Griffin had played in a team effort with a few of Wong’s teammates at the big 1986 Festival Reno tournament, which Griffin wrote about in the December Blackjack Forum. (See the link to “Self-Styled Experts Take a Bath in Reno” at the upper left of this page.) That team was not sponsored by Wong, nor did Wong devise their strategy.

“I went to see Curtis and Blair play in a craps tournament,” Griffin told me. “It was fascinating to watch the way they squeezed out the other contestants, who had no idea of what they were up against. The other players were like lambs going to the slaughter.”

Wong on Casino Tournament Strategy

In the September issue of Blackjack Forum (Vol. VI #3), I published a “Letter from Las Vegas,” which read as follows:

What would you do in this tournament situation?

Last hand of the first round, count minus 2. I had just under $1000 with three other players all around $500. I was last to act. They all bet to catch me, I bet $5.

Dealer shows a seven. Player A doubles on 11, catches garbage. Player C is pat and will catch me if he wins. However, two people per table advance. I’m stiff.

The only way I cannot advance is for the dealer to break. If the dealer makes a pat hand, beating Players A, B, and myself, I will still advance to the next round with Player C, because I’ll still cash out second at our table.

But if the dealer breaks, then Players A, B, and C will all beat me. My turn to act, the count is +1. Hit or stand.

Since I want the dealer to make a hand, I reasoned that if she’s stiff, I want the big cards out, so she doesn’t break. Sinice the count’s plus, I hit, hopefully to take her bust card. I catch a five and make a pat hand. Dealer, sure enough, is stiff and catches a 10. She breaks. I’m out.

Let me tell you something about the author of this letter. He is one of the very few people who makes his living playing high-stakes blackjack. He’s a former teammate of Ken Uston’s. He’s won a number of blackjack tournaments himself. I’m revealing this so that you’ll realize the caliber of players who are entering tournaments.

I’m also revealing this so you’ll realize that the types of problems that present themselves in casino tournaments are unlike any problem faced by card counters in regular casino blackjack play. It takes an entirely new view of strategy to beat casino tournaments professionally.

Wong’s book is devoted precisely to this new type of strategy. A whole chapter of Casino Tournament Strategy is devoted to “Final Round, Two Winners Per Table.” And a lengthy section of this chapter deals precisely with the betting situation described by this player: “Last Round, Four or More in Contention.”

Wong first analyzes how to calculate your best bet in this situation when you must bet first, then he analyzes how to bet when you are not first to bet, as was the case in “Letter from Las Vegas.” Wong sums up this betting situation very simply in his book (p. 64): “My rule of thumb is to keep the second largest pile of unbet chips, and bet the balance of my bankroll. Thus, if the dealer gets a natural and wipes us out, I finish second, and if the dealer does not wipe all of us out, I’ve got a large enough bet going to have a good chance to be one of the top two if I win the hand.”

In other words, Wong calls for a large bet in this situation, not a small one. Letter from Las Vegas was protecting himself from personally losing any significant amount of money on this hand, but he’d left his bankroll wide open to attack by three other players in the case of a dealer bust, which is exactly what occurred. By betting large, as Wong’s strategy requires, he would have protected himself from both a dealer bust and a dealer blackjack, while still maintaining a fighting chance in the play of his hand.

If Letter from Las Vegas had bet large, he would have won the table when the dealer busted instead of losing it.

More On Casino Tournament Strategy from Wong’s Book

One thing you might note here is that card counting makes absolutely no difference whatsoever to the player’s optimum bet. In fact, Stanford Wong states in his introduction to Casino Tournament Strategy that “…counting cards is so unimportant in a blackjack tournament that often I don’t even bother with it, even at single deck.”

Do you think you know how to bet in a tournament situation? Wong presents 51 different “end play” examples, with his concise analysis of the best bet. See how close you can come on two of these possible situations:

Example 13: Last round of play; three players left at the table; only the top player will advance to the next round. You are currently in second place at your table with $500; your opponents have $540 and $490 respectively. You must bet first. What do you bet?

Example 27: Last round of play; three players left at the table; the top two will advance to the next round. You are leading your table with $600; your opponents have $510 and $500 respectively. You must bet first. What do you bet?

Take a moment to try to figure these out right now. In an actual tournament, such decisions must be made quickly, so study the situations described briefly, and jot down your bet. At the end of this article, I’ll provide you with the answers from Wong’s book.

Casino Tournament Strategy is not a book for beginners. Wong does not describe the rules of blackjack. He assumes that the tournament player already understands basic strategy. If you have never played in a tournament, you may find this book difficult.

Don’t expect to purchase this book a few weeks prior to some tournament and enter as an expert. There is a lot to learn, and not all of the strategies are easy and/or obvious. Wong devised many of these strategies by running computer simulations of the possibilities, then comparing the results. This is a text for advanced players and players who are willing to dedicate themselves to some hard studying to get in on this opportunity.

One thing I can tell you about tournaments from personal experience is how much fun they are. So much rides on so few cards. Your whole strategy, and your whole chance of winning, depends on just a few key betting and playing decisions.

Wong does his best to cover all types of blackjack and casino tournaments.

Did you take time yet to try and figure out your best bets in the examples given earlier? In Example 13, your best bet would be $250, according to Wong. In Example 27, Wong says your best bet is $85. Now, do you know why? ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

The Cat and Mouse Game, Part II: Is the Game Over?

By Bill Zender

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XXIV #4, Fall 2005)
© 2005 Blackjack Forum

[Editor’s Note: In this article, Bill Zender, a former Gaming Control agent and successful co-owner/casino manager of the Aladdin Hotel and Casino, discusses the resistance of casino managers to objective lessons in casino math he provided at a recent seminar at the University of Nevada, Reno.

Any poker player knows that to get action, you have to give action–and that means, give your opponent a chance to win. But casinos seem to want to sit there like the tightest players in the world and give absolutely nobody any chance to win. Bill Zender provides an excellent casino-side analysis of the flaw in this kind of thinking. –Arnold Snyder]


Several years ago I wrote an article on blackjack, published in Blackjack Forum, that detailed the card counting “Cat and Mouse” game that went on at the old Aladdin Hotel and Casino in the mid 1990’s. The article outlined what our pit management at the Aladdin were doing to triage the potential risk to our bankroll; identify advantage players in blackjack that posed a real monetary problem, ignore knowledgeable players who did not wager enough to present an immediate risk, and loosen procedures, especially game protection procedures, that would be beneficial to the profit potential of the games.

During this time I concluded, in agreement with several other gaming experts and even a number of professional players, that an ongoing atmosphere of cat versus mouse was necessary to extend the health and wealth of the casino game of blackjack for all parties involved, including the casino operators, the professional players, and the gambling public. It has always been obvious that the success of blackjack from the 1960’s onwards was primarily due to the fact that casino blackjack can be beaten. Other casino games did not attract anywhere near the same numbers of new players, despite the fact that they provide the customer with the thrill of a gamble.

A healthy balance of customer playability and house profitability was quite successful for the Aladdin Hotel during the middle 90’s. This player-casino ecological equilibrium provided many players with a reasonable blackjack game of decent rules and consistently superior deck penetration, while at the same time providing our casino management at the Aladdin some of the highest drop/win hold percentages in the state. Obviously, players and casinos could pleasantly coexist under certain gaming conditions.

However, blackjack success and happiness seemed to end with the beginning of the new millennium, and have actually taken several steps backwards in the process. Today casino blackjack games are less player friendly while being less productive for the casino, with drop/win hold percentage drifting lower then they have ever been, dipping below 10% several times in the Las Vegas Strip properties over the last twelve months.

Why has this happened? Didn’t the Aladdin experiment provide enough information to establish the proper course for blackjack procedures throughout the gaming industry? Why in today’s highly competitive gaming market have casino management deserted procedures that have been productive in the past for those that consistently provide only lukewarm returns?

Today there is no longer a balanced cat and mouse game. The casinos have gravitated to the position of trying to kill off the mouse and destroy the profitable blackjack eco-system. This situation didn’t happen overnight. It has occurred for several reasons over the last several years due to casino management’s need to increase win percentage without taking into consideration a statistical feature of gambling known as fluctuation.

In an attempt to preempt natural mathematical variation into the negative regions, casino executives have turned their backs on time and motion issues that are the bread-and-butter of all service and manufacturing business, and have opted for more disruptive and pace-inhibiting game protection procedures.

Casino Management Goes Down the Wrong Path

Why would any member of management in any business field establish rules and procedures that retard productivity and cost their operations thousands of dollars over the period of a year, while not providing substantiated positive returns from discouraging professional card play?

One of the best examples of this phenomenon was recognized during a casino mathematics seminar I was conducting last spring for the University of Nevada, Reno’s Extended Education program. After providing examples of how decreasing deck penetration will actually lower blackjack revenue production as well as lower the game win/drop hold percentage, and how greater deck penetration would increase the casino’s overall profitability (even after taking into account the possible increase of losses to card counters), members of the seminar were reluctant to go along with this analysis. Their reason? It had nothing to do with the mathematical explanation or examples; it had to do with their own job security.

Several members of the seminar agreed that deeper penetration in blackjack would produce more revenue for their casino; however, they felt that this type of thinking, radical to the blackjack industry at this time, would place them personally in an unsecured position. If changes made to the existing procedures coincided with a negative swing in the games’ normal fluctuation, i.e., a lower drop/win hold percentage, the attendees believed that they would more than likely lose their jobs.

“A deep deck penetration would be more beneficial for the house, but what good does that do me and my family if by doing the right thing I have an increased chance of losing my well paying position?” they asked. Unfortunately, with the beginning of the second millennium the gaming industry is still recognized as an industry that believes in “management through termination” when actual numbers don’t fit with management’s expectations.

A number of game protection procedures have become more prevalent in recent years–becoming, in fact, more the rule then the exception–which have been highly problematic for blackjack time and motion issues. These protection procedures are costing the casinos more in blackjack revenue then they save from potential advantage players. I’ve taken the liberty of listing some of these procedures and how I feel these procedures are hurting the casinos while reducing the games’ attractiveness to customers and producing–let’s face it–very boring games.

Game Protection That Actually Costs Casinos Money

No Mid-shoe Entry: This procedure was established to prevent professional players from back counting and jumping into games. The casinos also support the use of this procedure by explaining that it makes the seated players on the table happy because other customers can’t “jump in” and disrupt the “run of the cards”. Unfortunately, although I’ve asked to see findings from customer polls, comment cards, or focus groups that support this assumption, I have yet to see anything of material substance.

Yet, the use of “No Mid-shoe Entry” has not only seemed to be on the increase in multiple deck shoe games, it has spread to the double deck blackjack games as well. In some instances I’ve seen casinos that have “No Mid-shoe Entry” only on their hand held games; why, I have no idea.

Personally, I find implementing a procedure that tells players “I do not want you to play on my games”, seriously wrong. Consider the extreme although still possible example of synchronized dealers shuffling at the same time on every six deck game in a small to medium size casino. If a player were to walk into the casino immediately after the shuffle and the first round of cards had been dealt, that player may have to wait up to fourteen minutes (plus through the next shuffle) to make a blackjack wager.

Based on a model designed to illustrate the effects of time and motion on blackjack, this procedure could cost the casino between two and three rounds on all opened tables per hour. For a medium size casino “No Mid-shoe Entry” could cost around $400k to $500k in blackjack win annually with nowhere near the parity gain due to increased game protection. I doubt “bus loads” of card counters back counting blackjack games would cost the casino anywhere near this much.

Decreasing Deck Penetration Points: Now here’s a big killer for casinos utilizing hand shuffling. The intention of casino management is to decrease the percentage of cards dealt so that the card counter will have less chance of winning money from the house. Several years ago I was contacted by an executive from the Flamingo Hilton in Las Vegas and asked if I thought anyone could beat their six deck blackjack games if they cut off three of six decks. I explained that the procedure change would all but eliminate attacks from possible card counters, but the amount of revenue he would lose from decreased productivity would dwarf any expected savings; i.e., the cure worked but the patient died.

In this case, the management’s concern wasn’t about what they wouldn’t win; they were concerned with having their boss believe they were doing everything possible to protect the bankroll. I guess you could say that management was doing what was best for their job security.

However, based on a model created to illustrate time and motion issues with blackjack, the increase or decrease of the shuffle point by one half a deck (26 cards), adds or subtracts between four to six rounds per hour from normal round production. This will result in substantial revenue gains if penetration is increased and substantial losses if penetration is decreased. In almost every model example utilizing a hand-shuffled blackjack game, estimated gains from tightening game protection by decreasing shuffle points fails to overcome revenue losses from decreased productivity.

Triple Pass Shuffles: Some casinos still utilize a triple-pass shuffle in an effort to prevent shuffle tracking. In most situations, casinos are probably successful in eliminating shuffle tracking, but at the cost of greatly increasing the amount of time wasted shuffling cards, and decreasing the time cards could be in front of the player.

The more time spent shuffling, the more potential revenue-producing rounds wasted for virtually no expected savings from discouraging card counting. This also becomes a problem when casinos utilize a “wash or scramble” before each shuffle. Casinos concerned about shuffle tracking should spend their dollars on batch shuffling machines or better training for their floor supervisors and surveillance operators.

Paying Six to Five on Blackjacks: At the gaming show last fall in Las Vegas I jumped all over Howard Grossman about using a 6 to 5 blackjack payoff with his game of Superfun Blackjack. I was wrong. Grossman explained that his original game did not include the reduced blackjack payoff, but that this was the brain child of Park Place Entertainment management of that time.

They wanted a better house advantage on their single deck games and wanted to incorporate the 6 to 5 blackjack payoff rule. While 6 to 5 increases the casino’s house advantage by approximately 1.3% and makes the single deck game more profitable theoretically, it becomes a double edged sword.

Six to five will produce more revenue for the casino over the short run, but it will create ill will when the players figure out that they are being shorted on their blackjack payoffs. It doesn’t take long for most players to realize that one casino might be shorting their blackjack rewards while another is giving the players their proper amount due. From what I understand, the customer backlash has already started.

And here’s one aspect that will surprise most people on both sides of the blackjack table…

Continuous Shuffling Machines: At first I was a big proponent of the continuousl shuffling machine. I actually fell in love with Shuffle Master’s Shuffle King machines when they first became available for use in the casinos. These machines eliminated the total amount of time wasted for shuffling cards, which greatly increased total hand production, which in turn created greater profit potential for casino blackjack.

Then I realized that continuous shuffling machines eliminated card counting, which all but eliminated the possibility that any knowledgeable player could beat the game. For a casino person like me this was a good thing–right? Maybe in the short run, but I no longer think that is the case over the long haul. Why? Because the game of blackjack cannot be promoted as a casino game that can be beaten by the player if the casino is using a continuous shuffling machine.

If we examine the reason blackjack became an extremely popular game we will realize that it achieved this status due primarily to the fact it could be beaten. Immediately after Dr. Thorp’s book, Beat the Dealer, became a top selection on the New York Times best sellers list in 1962, blackjack took off like a shot, and continued to climb in popularity throughout the 60’s, 70’s, 80’s, and 90’s. My new concern: If blackjack becomes an unbeatable game will it fall from grace?

The cat has largely closed the trap on the mouse, and the fine balance once achieved between casino revenues and skilled players is quickly vanishing. Soon the public will no longer be romanced by the idea that they can learn how to play blackjack so well that they can live the glamorous life of the professional player, even though only a faction of those people would ever be able to beat the game in the long run.

Maybe this is another reason, besides televised tournaments, that poker has become more popular; it is a game pitting player against player, but with profit potential if one learns the intricacies of the game and masters the ability to seek out and crush the weaker adversary. I believe casino management should learn the lesson being taught by poker.♠

Posted on Leave a comment

The Case of the Missing $7K

From the Journals of Nick Alexander
(From Blackjack Forum Volume XVII #2, Summer 1997)
© Blackjack Forum 1997

Now as you may know… or maybe you don’t, professional gamblers travel around and often need large amounts of cash. Because we’re a closely knit fraternity professional gamblers loan each other this cash without a second thought. A quick aside. I went to England to play, and called a professional gambler I had never met and said, “Hi, I’m a friend of Kathy’s and I need 10,000 British Pounds (at that time about $15,000).” He called Kathy, who vouched for me, and the next day handed me the money, no questions asked.

So… a few years ago the Woodpecker and the New Zealand Blowfish (two professional gamblers) were in the States to play some blackjack. They happened to be up in Reno while my blackjack team was in Reno and we were having a great time together while not working.

Now, they were working the Canadian currency move, which works like this. (Professional gamblers never miss an edge.) They go to Canada and buy a Canadian dollar for 93 cents. Then they take it to Reno and bet it. If they win the bet the casino pays them one U.S. dollar.

Now seven cents on every dollar is no small potatoes when you bet them a thousand at a time. The casinos do this to try to bring the Canadian tourists down to Reno to gamble. After about 10 years the casinos figured out that they might be taking the worst of it on this proposition. Especially when guys like Woodpecker and Blowfish would turn $500,000 in a week. Now you may ask, “Why would it take 10 years for the casinos to catch on to this?”

I’m glad you asked.

Axiom: Casinos are one small step above brain-dead.

So the first night in town we all have a Chinese dinner and Woodpecker and Blowfish are saying that they may not be able to work this move anymore because the casinos are catching on. Just in case they can’t use the Canadian dollars, they need some U.S. dollars to play with while counting cards. At this point, one of my teammates, Bill, gave Woodpecker $7,000 under the table.

Jump to one year later. Woodpecker is in town again for the summer, and we decide to update our books which are slightly out of date (like 14 months). In doing so we find some money missing and someone vaguely remembers giving $7,000 to Woodpecker in a Chinese restaurant.

Woodpecker vaguely remembers giving it back during a backgammon game in the hotel room two days later. Then Bill remembers that after Woodpecker went back to Hong Kong, Blowfish was losing like a pig in Vegas and Bill gave him more money… maybe? Now what do you do?

Now, I know you’re saying, “Wait a minute. How can somebody misplace $7,000 in cash?” You have to realize that for a professional gambler, cash is our stock in trade. We win it, lose it, pass it around in large amounts every day. If we were mechanics all working in the same shop, you might not remember who you gave a certain wrench to.

How do professional gamblers handle these situations? We go to arbitration. We select some other professional gamblers who are impartial, they listen to both sides of the case, and come to a settlement they think is fair.

WOODPECKER’S CASE

Woodpecker remembers receiving money in the Chinese restaurant. This is one thing that everyone agrees on, although none of us really remembers what the amount of the transaction was.

Two days later he remembers playing backgammon in our hotel room with Blowfish, Bill, and Craig. He remembers throwing the $7,000 on the bed, but doesn’t remember anyone in particular picking it up.

The crux of his argument is this: Woodpecker is known as a meticulous record keeper. We all know the story of him as a young man, taking a girl out for coffee and pulling out a small pad and writing…coffee 50 cents.

He claims that the only way there would be no record of this transaction in his books is if he repaid the loan within a couple days. Otherwise, he updates his books every week, and in counting his money he would have noted the extra $7,000 and entered it in his books as a transfer from Bill.

My team, on the other hand, has a reputation for keeping the worst books. When we tried to update them with Woodpecker in August of ’87, we were originally off $80,000. Through 48 hours of painstaking work, we accounted for all that except $7,000 which we thought went to Woodpecker, and another $7,000 that we chalked up to currency fluctuations. (During the 14 months in question we were shuffling money around in four different currencies.)

Woodpecker also brought up the fact that Bill has no records at all because he burns them at the end of each bankroll. (So he’s a little paranoid.) Woodpecker claims that as poor as our records are, we could have misplaced the money anywhere.

BILL’S STORY

Bill remembers the money in the Chinese restaurant, doesn’t remember getting money in the hotel, although admits that they had all been rather stoned that night. He remembers having to meet Blowfish in the Desert Inn in Las Vegas. He thinks to give him money, but he’s unsure.

BLOWFISH

Remembers the restaurant, not the money in the hotel, and doesn’t remember meeting Bill in Las Vegas. Blowfish’s records are very well done and he has many transfers to and from people, but no transfer of $7,000 from Bill or anyone on our team.

At one point Blowfish stands up and says (in his best Perry Mason imitation), “Mr. Woodpecker, isn’t it true that when suffering a big loss you have been known to go back to your hotel room, and, shall we say, pleasure yourself?” Woody acknowledged this to be true. “And isn’t it true that on one occasion you found yourself insufficiently aroused and to remedy the situation you plunged your John Thomas into a bucket of ice?”

“Yes, but what does that have to do with anything?”

“Nothing, I just love telling that story.” So you can see that Blowfish was treating this proceeding with the respect he thought it deserved. After all, it wasn’t his money.

ME

I was in the restaurant and remember Woodpecker receiving money. I wasn’t in the hotel room or in Vegas.

CB

Ahh, the missing evidence. CB, who was keeping our books at the time (or not keeping them), has a scrap of paper with the amount of cash each of us had at the beginning of that bankroll. Bill’s figure has been scratched out and a new figure is in its place that is $7,000 less than the old one. Over on the other side of the page is a scribble that says… “loan to Woodpecker.” Down in the lower left corner is written “$7,000 Korea.”

Craig claims we may not write things down very often, but when we do… it must mean something! He claims this means that Bill gave $7,000 to Woodpecker, and Woodpecker would pay us back in Korea. No one else would figure that out from this scrap of paper, but he is the guy who wrote it.

At this point I must add that this is an honorable profession, and nobody would make up false records or lie just to get this money. Now our arbiters adjourned to make a decision.

I told CB at this point that I thought our case was pretty bad and maybe we should just withdraw our case. If they come back and say Woodpecker owes us $7,000, I’m going to feel bad and not want to take it. I don’t think he owes it. I think Bill felt pretty much the same way, but Craig felt that we had come all this way and spent the time, so we might as well hear the decision. He felt the strongest because they were his records.

The arbiters decided that it was pretty much up in the air whether or not Woodpecker had paid us back, but decided slightly in his favor.

They awarded us 45%, or $3,150, and admonished us all to keep better books. It’s been over a week since Woodpecker transferred the money to Bill. As far as I know, no one has written it in their records.

[It should be noted that this journal entry is over a dozen years old and the Canadian dollar is worth nowhere near 93 cents anymore. Some casinos will still give a small premium on Canadian dollars, but it is nowhere near as profitable as it once was.] ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Your Options When You Are Cheated in a Casino

by Sam Case
(From Blackjack Forum Vol. III #2, June 1983)
© 1983 Blackjack Forum

It’s time for more comments about dealer cheating in general. I’ve said before that I rarely suspect dealers of cheating. I used to play only low-stakes. Since that time, I’ve logged in quite a few hours with Crazy Bob’s team, at high stakes. I must say, some of the dealers I’d played nickels against would change their style (and not for the better!) when big money was out on the table. I suspected more cheating at higher stakes levels. I’d like to comment on the several courses of action a player who thinks he’s been cheated might consider. I admit to having experimented with all of these options:

Make a scene. I tried this. I would call over the pit boss and explain the problem. He would, of course, assure me that I was mistaken. In order to get some action taken, I knew I would have to say that I was capable as a card cheat, and that I knew when I was being taken. Then I’d get action all right, but not the kind I’d want. So, forget this option.

Leave and report it. Call the Nevada Gaming Commission. They’ll need all the specifics: date, time, place, dealer’s name, your name. No thanks!

Just leave. This option is very attractive, but boring. First, a little fun…

Cheat them back. I’ve given up on this and I don’t advise it. Getting corrected about how to hold your cards or tuck them under your chips is embarrassing. Besides, if they ever could prove something, you’d be in real trouble. You’d have to guard your moves from the cameras. Although counter catchers are almost as easy to spot as Griffin agents, they’re only half as stupid. People do get caught cheating. Don’t try this one.

Try to turn the game honest. For this you’ve got to be on guard at all times. Just bully the dealer and sometimes he will be forced to deal honestly. If you suspect a second deal, ask for “the top one for a change.” One dealer at Foy’s Tall Beaver Casino would do a peek by bringing his deck hand up to his nose to scratch it. A good comment to make is: “I don’t care if you scratch, rub, or pick your nose, as long as you do it with the other hand.” This is a good option, because it might scare the dealer into reconsidering how smart and slick he is.

Have fun, then walk. Hand the dealer a one dollar chip and say, “This is for you. We both know you need more practice, but do it at home. I wanted you to make at least one honest buck tonight.” Or say, “If your moves are that sloppy in bed, you’ll be getting a divorce soon.” Then walk. This option is good for the same reason as #5.

Whatever you do, tell other players about your experience with a cheating dealer. You may be able to save some of a fellow player’s bankroll.

One final comment: Just because you play low stakes doesn’t mean you won’t be cheated. Inform yourself, and always keep an eye open! ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Blackjack Cruise, Auto-Shoes, Lotta Blues…

From the Journals of Nick Alexander
(From Blackjack Forum Volume XIX #1, Spring 1999)
© Blackjack Forum 1999

I’m reading the paper in Hong Kong and see that there have been three more shootings as part of the gang war going on in Macau. Last week there were two people actually shot inside the casino, and bombs are going off there every other day. When I consider this coupled with the fact that the Macau casinos are the only places worse than the Cal-Neva in Reno, I decide to forgo a trip there. So where to get my gambling fix?

I remember a few years back there had been a post on a gambling message board about blackjack cruises out of Singapore, Malaysia, and maybe Hong Kong, so I decide to check it out. I ask around and sure enough there are blackjack cruises to nowhere that go out every day. Once they are in international waters, viola—casino open.

Now my friends think this is a crazy idea. “Who controls them? Who oversees them? What’s to prevent them from just stealing your money? They may be nothing more than pirates, villains, and thieves. Almost as bad as… say… Internet casinos! But being the fearless blackjack reporter that I am, I slog on. If you want to travel the world looking for a gold mine, sometimes you have to get the shaft.

I continue my research and find www.starcruises.com. These are not pirates at all. It’s the lovely people who brought you Genting Highlands in Malaysia and put up the money to build Foxwoods Casino in Connecticut. Of course, they are completely ungoverned so I wouldn’t go crazy yet. I find they have cruises from Taiwan, Singapore, and yes, Hong Kong. They go out five afternoons a week and return the next morning, at a cost of about $90 US for one person. (Although you can spend much more if you want a suite.)

Next step, the junket manager. Many Asian casinos have some kind of rebate program and sure enough, they did too. The deal is, you put up 1 million Hong Kong dollars ($130,000 US) and you receive 1.1% bonus all in non-negotiable chips. I ask about the limits and the junket rep tells me that the baccarat limit is 800,000 HK (a little over $100,000 US). Wow, what about blackjack? When I ask, she now gets very confused. She doesn’t know what the blackjack limit is and will have to call me back. This isn’t a good sign. It seems that none of the junket players play blackjack. I decide the best plan of action is to take the cruise, bet small, and find out whether the game is even worth playing.

As I walk down a long hallway that leads to the gangway, I am handed a flyer listing all the features and attractions of the cruise. Unfortunately, it’s entirely in Chinese. Normally in Hong Kong things are written in both English and Chinese so I take this as a sign that they are probably not catering to round eyes on this ship.

[A quick aside: during extensive traveling over many years in Asia I have never once been referred to as a “round eye” by an Asian person. This is entirely a fabrication of American movies. I was called “cow eyes” once by a young Korean woman, gweilo (devil person) by the Chinese, and gaijin (ghost person) in Japan, but never round eye. Mostly we are referred to as “white people.”]

So I peruse this flyer and being the world traveler that I am I have picked up a Chinese character or two. Okay, I’ve learned exactly two Chinese characters; person and water. Hmmm. Well, I’m boarding a big ship so it doesn’t take a genius to know that “person” and “water” will be involved.

As I board the ship there is a Filipino band, dressed for carnival in Brazil, playing Spanish music and singing in Chinese. Ah, the world gets smaller all the time. Every crew member on the boat has mastered three words of English, “Good evening, sir,” and you are bombarded with this greeting everywhere you go. I’m then escorted to my cabin, which I find out in a brochure is 6.8 meters. Can you say closet? 6.8 square meters is about 73 square feet. Packed into this 7’ x 10’ space is a bed, desk, and bathroom with toilet and shower. The bed is fine if you are short and skinny. (Unfortunately, I am only one of the above.) But hey, I’m not here to sleep. Give me some action. But that will have to wait until we get to international water.

I head to deck 7 to find the reception desk. I am told they will have a copy of the boat’s activities in English and sure enough they do. Up first: Compulsory Passenger Safety Drill. I head to my muster station and watch beautiful Chinese girls show me how to put on my life preserver. Now, I am the only person at my muster station so I think the translation of “compulsory” must have been a loose one.

I also grew up during the cold war when we had compulsory “bomb drills” in grammar school. The class would file out in the hall and sit on the floor, and then tuck your head between your knees. This was in case someone was dropping a nuclear bomb on us!?! Even in second grade I knew that we were really tucking our head down there to kiss our asses goodbye. Now my muster boss leads me outside to show me all the life rafts, rescue boats, and canisters packed with food and flares. Listen, I saw Titanic. If I’m floating around the South China Sea, I won’t be saying, “Pass the powdered eggs and the flare gun.” My muster boss assured me that there were no icebergs in this part of the world, and recommended I go to dinner.

The ship has three buffets: Chinese on deck 8, Thai on deck 11, and Western food on deck 7. I decide to try the Western. On the buffet I find: chicken feet, ox tail, steamed rice, Chinese broccoli in Oyster Sauce, Szechwan scallops and a few other dishes. Over to the side I find “Lamb Nirvana.” Aha! Well, India is west of China, right? I mean, after you go a few thousand miles south. The buffet was better than Circus Circus but not as good as the Mirage. Call it one step below MGM. 1 ½ stars, Joe Bobb says, “Next time try the Thai.”

An hour and a half out to sea the casinos open. Yes, casinos. There are four. First stop, Casino Royal, the VIP high roller room. There is a guard at the font door with one of those wand metal detectors like they have in the airports.

“This is a private room. Members only.”

“Well, how do I become a member?”

“Invitation.”

“Hmmm. Well see, I’m writing an article about the ship for a magazine. So maybe I could just go look around.”

“What magazine?”

“Uh, you don’t want to know.”

“Okay.”

Well, that was easy. The Casino Royal has one roulette wheel, one long table of Tai Sai, which is a dice game similar to Sic Bo, and about 20 baccarat tables. As advertised the posted limit on some tables is $800,000 HK. There was not one blackjack table in the place. Next stop, the Dragon Room on deck 3. The Dragon room has four Pai Gow tables and some slot machines. Also on deck 3 is the Star Club. This is the main casino and has two mini baccarat, two “no commission baccarat”, two roulette wheels, two casino war games, and six blackjack tables.

The blackjack game on the cruise is this: S17, DAS, ES v. 10 (no surrender v. ace), Euro no hole (meaning they take all doubles or splits when dealer blackjacks), three decks dealt from a continuous shuffler. My quick and dirty calculations make the game approximately –0.2%.

The limits on the games were 100-2000, 200-4000, and 300-6000, which equals approximately $13-$260, $26-$520, and $39-$780 in US dollars. Since they have an $800,000 HK limit at baccarat, I’m sure they would raise the limit if asked, but I really wasn’t interested.

The last casino is the Phoenix Room on deck 11. It is basically the same as the Star Club but this one is non-smoking. So I stumble back to my cabin (did I mention choppy seas?) and am gently rocked to sleep in my 5 by 1 ½ foot bed. We arrive safe and sound back in Hong Kong at 8 am. No richer, no wiser, but at least no iceberg.

Star Cruises (as a cruise): 2 stars

As a casino: 1 star

Still better than Macau. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Counting Cards in Comp City

By Max Rubin

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. XIV #2, June 1994)
© Blackjack Forum 1994

[The first part of this article on Las Vegas casino comps is excerpted directly from the first edition of Max Rubin’s Comp City: A Guide to Free Casino Vacations, Second Edition. The second part of this article, subtitled Comp City Outtakes, is a Blackjack Forum exclusive.]

Comp Counters Who Count Cards

Do you know how to count cards and win? If the answer is yes, then you, my friend, have the absolute nuts from this day forward. Think about it. If the casino pit bosses ignore you all night long, you can combine comp counting with card counting and win the equivalent of two bets an hour (one in money, one in stuff).

If there’s heat, cut your bet spread down to a level that’s breakeven, and you’ll still earn great comps. If you want deep cover, how’s this? You can pound booze and never look at anyone else’s cards all night long and still be an overall favorite because of the comps.

Meanwhile, no one on that shift will ever suspect you’re a counter, and you’ll be welcome forever. This book was written to show basic-strategy-level blackjack players how to crush casinos by earning comps valued at ten times their gambling losses. Every tactic portrayed in Comp City can also be used by an accomplished card counter, and you won’t even have to fade the losses.

Although I’ve played my share of winning blackjack, I don’t pretend to be a world-class blackjack player on a level with the legendary counters who earn hundreds of thousands a year. But based on my extensive experience on both sides of the table, I believe I have some insight worth discussing here. Some of these tips you’ll be familiar with and some may be new to you. A few of them threw me off when I was working the floor. If they’re not already in your repertoire, incorporating them might gain you years of card-counting longevity.

Laying Cover to Score Comps

You know all about cover, while most bosses don’t even know what it means. But that’s not to imply that you should underestimate the enemy. A few bosses in every casino have read the books and a handful of them can actually play a winning game. Although their numbers are few, you should assume that at least one sharp boss lurks in every joint.

This is paramount. Don’t take your money back when the dealer shuffles. You’re giving up a little, but pulling the money back confirms all of the boss’s worst suspicions, especially if the shuffle was prompted by your big bet.

Watching the Pit Boss

If a boss catches you looking at him, smile and call him over. Ask him for something-a comp, directions, a recommendation for a show, anything, but don’t ever let him see you divert your eyes away from his. It’s a dead giveaway that you’re up to something.

Tipping the Dealer

Tip the dealers. You should budget at least 5% of your expected win for the dealers. If you’re a big player with a high hourly return, it’s almost imperative that you give the dealers at least 10% of your expectation. So what if your profit is reduced by a little blood money? I’ve had hundreds of conversations in pits about counters and 90% of the bosses believe that counters don’t tip. Tipping will buy you years of playing time.

By the same token, if you’re betting more than $100 a hand, tip the cocktail waitress $5, no matter what. The bosses will think you’re a sport and they know that counters are anything but.

Cover Bets

If a boss is watching, you want to look like a sucker. When you win a hand and he’s watching, bet it up no matter what. If you lose, you can go up or down. (If the count’s good, bet it up. If it’s bad, bet it down.)

A boss only has to see you do this two or three times in a session to be convinced that you’re a negative-progression or money-management player, not a counter. It will reduce your expected win by a few bucks. But I see it as a valid expense of doing business. Unless you’re the type who plays till you’re barred, it’s the only way to go.

There are people in this country who play solo, live in penthouse casino suites, and make half a million dollars a year because they’re not afraid to tip and lay cover. Some of these guys lay $500 in cover during a $1,000 session. Guess what the net result is here? $500 an hour, after hour, after hour, after hour.

Sucker Plays That Work

If you want to get a boss thinking you’re a stone sucker, slam that first shot of whiskey and bet a quarter for yourself and a quarter for the dealer on the first hand.

Take insurance when you have a natural. You might even insure your twenties when the boss is watching. Do it with conviction and without hesitation (you know you have to protect those good hands). It’ll come up infrequently so it won’t cost too much overall, but it leaves a lasting impression with the bosses. A move with similar value is not hitting a soft 18 against a nine, ten, or ace. The word is out on this play; hitting the 18 identifies you as a player in the know.

There are other plays. It’s fun to use Stanford Wong’s Blackjack Count Analyzer software program to discover those that cost you only a few dollars in expectation for hundreds of dollars worth of cover. If you’re a comp counter first, and only use card counting to defray your over-the-table losses, these moves are inexpensive indeed.

Appearance

I never trusted a guy who looked like he woke up just to play blackjack. Don’t come in on graveyard shift between 4:00 and 7:00 am rubbing the sleep out of your eyes. No true degenerate gambler (which is what you want them to think you are) ever had to set an alarm clock to tell him when it was time to play.

Most graveyard bosses are on the lookout for the ghouls nesting upstairs who descend on the tables before sunrise. If you’re playing the graveyard shift, stay up all night or make your plays later in the morning when you can wake up naturally.

Don’t drink mineral water. Don’t ask me why, but an inordinate number of counters drink mineral water. Get juice, coffee, tea, Dr. Pepper, but stay away from the bottled waters. As far as the bosses are concerned, anyone sitting in a casino drinking anything that smacks of health is not to be trusted.

Card Counter Conduct

Introduce yourself to the boss and give him your VIP card. Talk to him. A lot. If you want to enlist a co-conspirator for the weekend, buy your favorite floorman a $25 three-teamer for Sunday’s games (Monday if you’re staying that long). The boss will be your buddy for the next couple of days. If you win big, yuck it up. Until you’ve established a pattern of winning (five or more sessions), if your cover is good enough, there’s no way they’ll throw you out of the casino for counting. When they like you, some bosses will even warn you if the heat is on upstairs.

Hiding Chips (Ratholing)

As a pro, you know you’re doing well if you win an average of one big bet an hour. All you have to do is hide one big bet an hour and you’ll be doing great in terms of preserving your welcome. Unless you’re playing head up, where the boss can determine exactly how many chips are missing from the rack, you can swing with up to two bets an hour and you’ll look like a loser forever. Most places are reluctant to bar “losers,” unless they’re blatant scufflers.

Buying In

If you’re a cash player, don’t ever buy in with a lot of currency. Don’t buy in for $500 and make $15 bets, for example; gamblers don’t do it that way. If your eventual big bets will be $100, buy in for $100 and start by playing quarters. Win or lose, you’ll be able to move your bets into your normal spread within a few minutes. If you’re losing, it looks natural for you to come out of your pocket, especially when you want to bet big. If you’re winning, it looks like you’re making a parlay play, also very natural. If you bet $5 for the dealer and $25 for yourself early on, you’ll look real easy!

When you come out of pocket, let the money play. I haven’t seen five counters in my life who let money play (unless they were trying to get around Regulation 6-A).

Drinking at the Blackjack Table

Buy an O’Douls or a Sharps at the bar. Pour it in a glass. Take it to the table with you. When the waitress comes by, ask for a shot of whiskey, making sure the boss hears you. Slug it down when the boss is watching. Then chug the O’Douls.

The next time the waitress comes by, order a real beer and sip it slowly. Time for a break. Take the beer and get rid of it. Buy another fake beer, pour it into a glass, mosey back to the table, and chug it while you’re talking to the boss. Order another real beer. Then you sip again.

When it’s a quarter gone (half an hour or so), order another cold one. By now you’ll have to go to the bathroom again and, yep, go get some more fake stuff. In a two-hour session you’ll consume the equivalent of a drink and a half and look like you’re getting smashed. It works.

Wonging

Start your play with the best of it. Wong into a rich shoe and make those important big bets when you have a big edge. If you’re good, you can back count the game next to you (make sure you’re in a position to watch the other layout) and pop into that one when it gets juicy. Just let the boss know you’re moving.

Getting Rid of Pit Bosses

If a boss is hawking your game, get in his face. Be nice, but bombard him with requests. Ask him for reservations for the show. He’ll have to do it, even if he doesn’t want to. If he comes back to your game, ask him for reservations for dinner. If he comes back again, ask him for a comp for the coffee shop. Keep this up long enough and he’ll stay as far away from your game as he can get. The problem is, he’ll also get mad, which will probably have an adverse effect on your rating. If you are playing primarily for the comps, you’ll have to tolerate a boss’s scrutiny.

Comp City Outtakes:

Beat the Heat

How can you tell when there’s heat? It’s pretty simple. If a floorman who’s been gunning your game gets on the phone, and another boss comes over to watch your play (and they both talk while trying not to move their lips), it’s getting warm. If either of them picks up the phone after that, you got heat!

Sometimes the second boss will go over to the computer terminal and pull up your “profile.” The first thing he looks for is a history: how long you’ve played (lifetime!), how much they should have won, how much they have won, and the difference between the two.

It you’re somewhere within the normal range, they’ll surmise that you may not be that dangerous a blackjack player.

Theoretical Casino Win$10,000
Actual Casino Win$ 8,000
Difference$ 2,000

If they see that you’re only losing about 10% of what is expected, their radar switches on and they’ll surely tell the eye to watch what you’re doing.

Theoretical Casino Win$10,000
Actual Casino Win$ 1,000
Difference$ 9,000

What you don’t want them to see, although it’s sometimes impossible not to if you book an extraordinary winner, is any kind of winner at all, especially if you have 100+ hours of play.

Theoretical Casino Win$10,000
Actual Casino Win($ 1,000)
Difference($11,000)

They know they should have won $10K, but they’ve lost $1K. What does that mean to them? Something’s wrong, no doubt. What does that mean to you? If you want to play over a long period of time in one particular house for comps, monetary profit, or both you’d better learn to hide two units per hour.

But the issue here is heat detection and what to do about it. Most card counters really sweat the boss’s scrutiny, but they don’t need to. If a floorman is standing over your game and watching every hand, he probably suspects that you’re counting, but it’s highly unlikely that you’re already being watched from upstairs. You still have time to implement some damage control.

If you keep moving your money, and he goes to the phone, it’s time to go on red alert. (Floormen can’t order a surveillance check. The order must come from a pit boss or higher.) Here’s what happens in most places:

Floorman agitated, calls bigger boss ==>

Big boss watches you and/or pulls up your computer file ==>

Big boss notifies surveillance ==>

Floorman “gives you air.” (Acts disinterested so the “eye” has time to evaluate your play.) ==>

Eye tries to match your face to mugs in Griffin Book. If no match, they do a “skills check” (30-60 minutes). Reports to management. ==>

If you are labeled as “counting,” you will be barred and possibly photographed. If you are labeled as “not counting,” your name is logged as such, and you have a free pass (until you win a lot of money).

So what do you do when you know you’re under the microscope? At this point you have three options: leave, keep counting, or lay some cover.

Leave

If you beat a hasty retreat, every time a pit clerk calls up your computer file (marker, rating input, comp request, etc.), SKILLS CHECK! flashes on the screen. That means you’ll be branded as a potential counter for at least the duration of this trip and maybe for a whole lot longer. Your counting life expectancy in that joint has just been reduced.

Keep Counting (And Moving the Money)

Sure, it takes anywhere from 30 minutes to an hour for a good surveillance expert to tag you properly. You should be able to win at least a piece of a big bet before they take your picture, post it in the security office, give it to Griffin, pass it around to other casinos, bar you for life and terminate your comps. Nice move.

Play Like a Chump

If not for the rest of the trip, at least for the next couple of hours. You’ll still get your comps and you’ll still be a slight favorite, but you can’t move your money with the count, unless it’s real, real natural. What you must do is keep moving your money randomly, with no consideration of the count. If all of a sudden you turn into a flat bettor, you’re going to embarrass the boss who alerted surveillance, and he’s going to follow you like a dog in heat forever.

I know this play’s going to crumble your corks, but the heatiest play you can ever make is not insuring a natural. It’ll cost you about eight bucks every time you do it (assuming a $100 bet), but if you have a snapper and don’t insure, the other players will get bug-eyed, the dealer will stop the game and ask you why you didn’t, and the boss will head straight to the phone and put Big Brother on your butt, especially if the dealer doesn’t have the ten. You’ll only get a natural against a dealer’s ace once every four or five hours, so give up the two bucks an hour and you’ll live to play another day (or swing).

If you choose to play like a chump, you can decide for yourself how to alter your play depending on how much you’re willing to give up in expectation. Here are some examples. None of these plays will cost you more than $4. (The following were derived using Stanford Wong’s Blackjack Count Analyzer, assuming a $100 bet on a six-deck shoe.)

PlayerDealer Up-CardCover PlayCost
    
144hit$0.40
146hit$1.80
123stand$1.80
11Adouble$3.10
A710stand$3.50
1010double$3.60
122stand$3.90
133hit$4.00

Card Counting Index Plays

The real savvy guys upstairs know the index plays. If you suspect you’re being watched, don’t use them. Either stick to basic with a few cover moves or vary from them on things that look natural, like standing on 16 vs. 10, etc. Do not hit stiffs against stiffs when you should. It’s a dead giveaway.

Spotters

If you get spooked by someone on your game who appears to have a keen interest in what you’re doing, remember this: spotters do not sit on blackjack games. Period. They stand behind or beside the game. They try to remain invisible, but they can’t. If you want to spot one (or freak him out) stand up when you play. If you suspect he’s trying to see your cards, move your body so he has to move his. Very few disinterested game watchers will contort themselves to watch your cards. If he’s squirming like the snake that he is, he’s a spotter. Gaming agents and coppers are a different matter (they will play on a game), but if you’re just counting, you don’t have to worry about them.

Counter Catchers

Most clubs have a designated “counter catcher” (who’s called to confirm the suspicions of spotters, other bosses, etc.). They usually work in the pits or upstairs.

The technology they use to catch counters is getting more sophisticated every day. Suffice it to say (and it’s always been this way): It’s much more important to have a world-class cover than a world-class card counting system.

The only way they’ll catch you is if they suspect something in the first place. Don’t let them think that you’re smart. Don’t be a stiff. Don’t be a nerd. And don’t move your bets up and down precisely according to published guidelines (counter catchers read the same books). If you play with a casual and relaxed style, bosses aren’t compelled to surveille you.

Comp Notes for Team Players

If you’re calling plays for a Big Player, always get rated, but not necessarily with the same name every time. You’ll be amazed how much money you’ll save the team’s bankroll if you keep expenses down by getting free rooms and food.

If you’re calling plays and the BP scores a big gourmet room comp, you can’t go. How would you like for your (un)favorite shift boss to saunter in to say hello to the BP and see you, a measly $25 bettor, swilling $100 wine with him? You wouldn’t. If you want to feast together, do it with room service. The same goes for other members of your teams. If you want to party together, do it when you make bank. And do it in a joint other than where you went over the top.

For the same reasons, don’t ever use a BP’s gourmet comp for yourself in a Las Vegas casino. The shift bosses often cruise the big rooms at least once a night. They look at the maitre ‘ds comp log and then exchange pleasantries with the RFB customers. You might wind up exchanging blows if you’re the wrong guy in the wrong chair. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

The Second Deal, Part I – The Strike Second Deal

by Sam Case
(From Blackjack Forum Vol. I #3, December 1981)
© 1981 Blackjack Forum

The most devastating, and unfortunately, the most common, cheating technique in the single-deck game is the second deal. In essence, the dealer appears to deal the top card, when actually the second card from the top is dealt. The second deal most often is used when the dealer knows the top card (by peeking), and wishes to withhold it to increase his chances of winning.

The deck is held in the mechanic’s grip (Fig. 1). This is the grip used by most dealers (including honest ones) since it exposes no cards and offers great control. There are two types of second deals – “strike” seconds, and “push-off” seconds. The mechanics grip is used for both types. A “perfect” second appears to be dealt in exactly the same manner as the top card would be dealt. If the mechanic is good, no one can tell the difference. But there are tip-offs you can watch for which would indicate the possibility (or impossibility) of being dealt a second.

The Strike Second Deal: The deck is held in the left hand, using the mechanic’s grip. The right thumb appears to be sliding the top card off the deck, while the left hand remains stationary. Actually, the left thumb has drawn the top card slightly back toward the dealer, exposing the front right corner of the second card. (Fig. 2). The right thumb strikes this exposed corner and slides the second card out. Simultaneously, the left thumb slides the top card back to its original position.

If you watch an expert execute this deal, you cannot possibly tell when he is dealing the top card or the second card. Both his speed and the Bee design (standard diamond pattern on most casino cards) prevent you from perceiving any “flash” of the exposed seconds’ corners. You will be unlikely to detect the very slight movement of the left thumb as it draws back the top card, because of the arcing motion of the left hand as it swings around to aim the deck at the player. What you may notice is that the left thumb never leaves the top of the deck.

You will not frequently encounter a strike dealer (honest or dishonest) at any casino blackjack table. Strike dealing is quite vigorous. The right hand rips the card from the deck. There is no reason for an honest professional dealer to work this hard. Most dealers just push off the top card with the left thumb, and then deal it with the right thumb and forefinger. I would suspect and avoid any dealer who uses a strike dealing style. He may be honest, but I wouldn’t chance it. Since strike dealers are uncommon you will not be eliminating many potentially profitable games by avoiding all such dealers.

An excellent example or strike second dealing may be viewed on the Rouge et Noir “Cheating At Blackjack” videotape (available from Rouge et Noir, Box 6, Glen Head, N.Y.. 11545). Joe Baseel deftly executes the deal in segment #9. It’s smooth. It’s fast. It appears natural. But look again. He’s employing that uncommon strike style. On the tape, they refer to this deal as the “pitch out” deal. This is the fast deal which Mr. Baseel demonstrates by turning up the ace on top of the deck.

Unfortunately, the second type of second deal, the pushoff second, closely mimics the dealing action of the majority of honest single-deck blackjack dealers. Like the strike second deal, the push-off second deal is undectable by a player, when executed by an expert. But there are tip-offs you can watch for which will indicate with a fair amount of certainty that a dealer is not capable of dealing push-off seconds. In the next issue of Blackjack Forum, I will describe and illustrate the push-off second deal, and explain the big tip-off. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Part 2: The Push-Off Second Deal

by Sam Case
(From Blackjack Forum Vol. II #1, March 1982)
© 1982 Blackjack Forum

[Ed. Note: In “The Second Deal, Part I” Sam Case described what a second deal was, explaining the difference between the two types of second deals, the strike second deal, and the push-off second deal. The strike second deal was described in detail so that a player could detect the tip-off that a dealer might be employing this uncommon method of cheating. In this article, Sam Case describes the push-off second deal. –Arnold Snyder]

What the Push-Off Second Deal Looks Like

To facilitate dealing the push-off second, the deck is held in the left hand in the Mechanic’s Grip. As illustrated in Blackjack Forum Vol. I #4 this grip alone is not a tip-off that a dealer might be cheating. This is the most common method of holding the deck for any single-deck dealer. Likewise, most dealers, and almost all honest ones, are push-off dealers. By this, I mean that they push the top card slightly off the deck with the left thumb, so that the right thumb and forefinger can easily deal the card.

The push-off second dealer appears to be using the same dealing style, when in actuality he is pushing off the top two cards, perfectly aligned. The right thumb and forefinger then pinch the two cards, as if they were a single-card to be dealt. However, the left thumb now draws the top card back to its original position on top of the deck, while the right (dealing) hand simultaneously whips the second card out from under the top card, and deals it.

Push-Off Second Deal Tip-offs

You cannot visually detect whether the top or the second card is being dealt. The motion is too quick to see. There are a number of tip-offs you can watch for that would indicate that you may be in the presence of a push-off second dealer.

Tip-off #1: Some push-off second dealers hold the deck slightly fanned or spread in the left hand. This makes it easier to push off two cards with the left thumb.

Tip-off #2: The push-off second dealer must make precise contact with his left (push-off) thumb and the top two cards only. He can only do this by pushing the cards with his thumb from the outer edge or the left side Or the deck. Most honest dealers push off the top card with the left thumb on top of the deck, away from the edge. Pushing from the edge is a tip-off that a dealer may be pushing two cards. See Figures #1 and #2.

Tip-off #3: The left thumb never leaves the top of the deck. This is the most obvious tip-off.

An honest dealer, after pushing off the top card, most often lifts his thumb to facilitate dealing the top card. The push-off second dealer must control the top card as he deals the second.

Many honest dealers lift their “push-off” thumb an inch or more above the top of the deck in order to deal the pushed-off top card. Honest dealers also frequently describe small “circles” with the push-off thumb as they deal—pushing, lifting the thumb, and circling back to the top card after the pushed off card is dealt.

The push-off second dealer cannot do this, as he must use his left thumb to slide the top card back into its original position on top of the deck. If you observe most dealers closely, you can easily see that the left thumb does not clamp down on the top card as (or after) the card is dealt.

If you clearly see that the dealer’s left thumb never lifts off the deck, beware. If the dealer’s hand motion coincides with the deal in such a way that you can’t be sure whether or not the left thumb is lifted off the top card during the deal, beware. Card mechanics often disguise their work by using unnecessary hand motions, such as well-timed tilting, swinging, arcing, etc.

Finally, some tip-offs of a “sloppy” second are: Hesitation during the deal; re-squaring a pushed-off card and starting the deal over; dealing two cards as one, especially a dealer who winds up with two hole cards. If you see any of the tip-offs described above, beware, especially if you’re losing. You may or may not be in the presence of a second dealer, but don’t take chances. Once you know what to look for, you’ll see clearly that most singledeck dealers you encounter are probably not dealing seconds.

Joe Baseel performs a push-off second deal on the Rouge et Noir “Cheating At Blackjack” videotape*. Note the awkward grip that the right hand uses to grip the pushed-off cards fingers at the far end, thumb at the rear end. Never play against a dealer who does this. Joe Baseel is an expert, and you cannot “see” the push-off second being dealt, but you can see his unnatural dealing style when you know what to look for. [Note from Arnold Snyder: For a more recent demonstration of second dealing, see Steve Forte’s excellent Gambling Protection Series, Volume 2.]

Summary of Second Dealing Signals

Any “strike” deal (see Blackjack Forum Vol. I #4).

The dealer holding the deck slightly fanned, not squared.

The left (pushoff) thumb contacting the edge or end, instead of just the top card.

The left thumb never lifting from the top of the deck during the deal.

Unnecessary motion of the left hand during the deal,which may be camouflaging any of the above tip-offs. ♠

Posted on

Interview with Darryl Purpose

Interview with Darryl Purpose – Grizzled Veteran of the Blackjack Wars

by Richard W. Munchkin

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. XXIV #1, Winter 2005)
© 2005 Blackjack Forum

[Richard W. Munchkin is an inductee into the Blackjack Hall of Fame and the author of Gambling Wizards: Conversations with the World’s Greatest Gamblers.]

[Comments from RWM: Though Darryl Purpose is only forty-something, he is a grizzled veteran of the Blackjack Wars. He started playing blackjack almost thirty years ago at the ripe old age of 19. He moved to Las Vegas and learned just enough about counting cards to lose all his money.

He says, “I was the kind of counter that made Las Vegas.” He went from sleeping in his car to a job in a boiler room selling pens. He fell into a familiar pattern in Las Vegas—working a job, and blowing his paycheck. At the same time he must have been learning something about blackjack. A year later he was one of the best players on the Ken Uston team, driving down the Las Vegas Strip in a Rolls Royce with thousands of dollars in his pocket. “Isn’t that why we came?” he says with a smile.

The last bet Darryl made as part of a Ken Uston team was in December of 1979, yet he says that reputation haunts him to this day. In Two Books on Blackjack, Ken Uston named Darryl as one of the four best blackjack players in the world, but playing with Ken “was not a badge of honor,” says Darryl. “Still, the reason you want to interview me is because I was part of the Ken Uston team.”

It’s true. That is why I wanted to interview Darryl. But then I heard the stories of what happened after 1979. Stories that will take you from Moscow to Sri Lanka. Blackjack tales of the Sicilian Mafia, the Russian Mob, the Japanese Yakuza, and the Tamil Tigers, who invented suicide bombing.

Matter-of-fact stories of running over to Caesars Palace to play a hole card because they needed a down payment on a house, or winning a million dollars with Thor, a shuffle-tracking computer. For Darryl it was his job. “My job was to play until they didn’t allow me, and then take the money home. I really didn’t consider whether it was dangerous.”

Darryl is also a talented musician, who now does 150 concerts a year as a touring singer/songwriter. I’ve seen him in concert, and his audience is mesmerized by his tales of traveling the world playing his guitar, and yes, blackjack.]

RWM: How did you first get interested in blackjack?

Darryl: My mother put a copy of Beat the Dealer in my Christmas stocking when I was 16. I was interested in cards and games, and I had a natural affinity for math, so it appealed to me. I’ve since forgiven her.

RWM: You couldn’t play at that age. [Legal gambling age is 21.]

Darryl: Right. I was a little bit lost when I got out of high school, but I signed up for college. I was a classical guitar major. My left hand started to hurt for some reason, and they put a splint on it. I had only one hand to use so I practiced finger picking. Then my right hand went. So there I was, a classical guitar major at Cal State Northridge, with splints on both hands. I dropped out of school, got in my ’62 Chevy, and headed to Vegas. I had $50, a couple of shirts, and my guitar.

RWM: Were you 21?

Darryl: I was 19. I spent the $50 to get a room for a week downtown. I wandered around living off the free breakfasts and other freebies. I landed a job selling ballpoint pens in a phone room.

It was cold calling. I’d call Joe’s Auto Parts in Fargo, North Dakota. Joe, this is Jack Baker at DD Enterprises here in Las Vegas. We’ve got a problem here, and I’m hoping you can help me out. We got a regular customer down in Texas, Joe’s Auto Parts in Fort Worth. Now Joe put in an order for those Deluxe Writograph Pens, with the printing on them. They last forever and have a lifetime guarantee. Anyway, so what happened is my secretary put an extra 0 on the order, and instead of 500 pens we got 5000 pens. Now I’m willing to…

It was like that. Of course they didn’t pay you right away. They paid you a commission the following week. I was on the street for a little while. Then I was offered a room with one of the other guys who worked there. I think my first paycheck was $20. The next week was $50, and the next week was $200. I went to the Stardust and gambled with $50. I turned it into $500. I thought, “This is easy.”

RWM: You had learned to count already?

Darryl: I had read Thorp’s book. I was a bad counter like thousands of other people. I thought I knew something about counting, and I thought that maybe it was enough. That night I was the kind of counter that made Las Vegas.

From there it was a year and a half of working this phone job, and regularly losing my paycheck. I was living week to week, and never making any money. One day I was in the Horseshoe spreading 1 to 4 in dollars. I was counting the Hi-Opt I with a side count of aces. There was another guy at the table, and he was going 1 to 4 in nickels. I noticed from his play that not only was he counting cards, but also I could tell he was using a side count of aces.

I followed him when he left the casino. Somebody at the phone room had told me that there were professional teams out there. At that point to me they were very dark and mysterious, and not something I thought I would ever have any access to.

RWM: Where did you get the Hi-Opt I?

Darryl: That came from a guy I worked with in the boiler room.

RWM: What year was this?

Darryl: Probably 1976. So I followed the guy out of the Horseshoe, and he thought I was from the casino. I followed him into the Fremont coffee shop. I said, “Hey, you’re a card counter.” He said, “I don’t know what you’re talking about.” I told him, “I’m a card counter, too. I count the Hi-Opt I with a side of aces.”

That player was a guy named Art. We became friends. He lived in Berkeley at 21 Channing Street. He would say, “My age is 21. My address is 21. And my profession is 21.” He knew more than I did about professional teams because he had met a guy from the Bay area who was one of the big players on the Ken Uston team.

Art and I formed a little team with a $2,000 bankroll. We ran around playing single-deck betting up to $20. I was losing, and Art was winning, but overall we were down. It was all Art’s money, so it was not fun.

You know the problem with blackjack? It is that the bankrolls that are no fun drag on forever. The bankrolls that are really great are over really quick. You spend most of your career down.

One day Art said he knew one of the top BP’s on the Ken Uston team was living in the same apartment complex as me. It was a crummy little complex called Enchanted Gardens on Swenson. I went around the corner in my complex, and knocked on this guy’s door. I said, “Hi, I’m Darryl. I’m your neighbor, and I play blackjack.”

His name was Ron Karr. Ron is a nice guy and he invited me in, even though he didn’t know me from Adam. I asked him about cheating, because we were losing and I didn’t understand why. He offered some advice, and I went on my way.

A week later I knocked on the door a second time. I had more questions. That second time he offered me a job. The team would pay me $25 per shift to count down decks and call in the big player. I pulled Art into that also. So we counted down decks for players on Ron’s team. I called my mother and said, “Mom, I’m a professional.”

RWM: Ron was not playing with Ken at this point?

Darryl: No, he had split from Ken. I remember the first time we got barred was at the Marina. They knew everything. We had just started, and this pit boss comes up and points at me. He said, “You,” then he pointed at Art, “And you,” and he pointed to the BP, “And you. If you guys don’t want to end up in the desert, you get out of here right now, and don’t come back.” That was exciting, so I called my Mom again and said, “Mom, it works.”

At some point during that time I quit my job selling pens, and that was the last real job I had. Ron’s team was trying to make a little money counting while they worked on developing a shuffle-tracking computer. Art and I were calling BP’s into hot shoes not knowing that this R & D was going on. Apparently it wasn’t going so well.

At one point one of the players wanted to put up $10,000 to form a counting team to bet up to $100 on single deck. He invited Art and me to be part of that. There were six of us. I wasn’t even 21 yet, and it wasn’t so long ago that I had arrived penniless in Las Vegas, and I remember thinking, “Bet $100!”

My apartment was $200 a month. I was earning $200 a week at the boiler room. The idea of walking into a casino and betting $100 made me very nervous. We were going to play single-deck 1 to 4 in quarters. We won some money, and they raised the top bet to $200. I thought, this is too much, I would have to quit and go back to Los Angeles. I don’t remember the transition exactly, but soon after that I was the guy who always wanted to bet more.

RWM: How much did that team win?

Darryl: We ended up winning about $60,000 which was a great win back then, especially considering we started with a $10,000 bank.

RWM: How did it end?

Darryl: Well, I guess they were ready to focus on the non-random shuffle machine they were building. Art and I hadn’t known anything about it, but we were invited to a big meeting where we were told about it, and invited to participate.

They were going to split the money according to pre-arranged percentages based on how valuable a player was deemed to be to the project. Down at the bottom of the list were Art and me who would each get ¾ of 1% of the win. On the one hand, it was not much, and on the other it was a generous offer they made to two green wanna-be counters.

RWM: But you were going to have to put in hours.

Darryl: Yes. We were good counters, but we were 20 and 21 at that point. At the end of this one of the players said, “You have another option. I happen to know that Ken Uston’s team is looking for players. You can try out for them, or you can stay here with the shuffle-tracking computer team.” True to our personalities, Art picked the computer team, and I picked the Ken Uston team. The Ken mystique was pretty compelling to this twenty year old, at least for a while.

RWM: Did that computer ever come into existence?

Darryl: No. So I made the right decision as it turned out.

RWM: So, now you must go meet the great Ken Uston.

Darryl: Exactly. He was already the world’s most famous blackjack player. Of course, that was because none of the real blackjack players want to be famous. That didn’t matter to me. I was totally in awe of him. It was like hearing that Stevie Wonder needed a player in his band, and getting an audition. I counted really well at the time. I quickly made my place on the team because I tested so well.

RWM: Tell me about the first meeting.

Darryl: I might have just met his partner Bill first. Bill and Ken were running the team. They were operating out of the Jockey Club. I met him, and then there was some testing. The stories of Ken and the Jockey Club were mythic. All the debauchery and excellent card playing combined in this mysterious scene. I got to the Jockey Club, and it was just as advertised.

RWM: Debauchery and card playing?

Darryl: Drugs and women and really good card counting.

RWM: Do you remember what the test was?

Darryl: It’s not clear in my mind, but I’m sure it was counting down shoes. Also, they would flash hands at you on a slide projector, and you had to tell them the index number. Then they would deal hands to you, and check the cards left at the end of the shoe.

What they were looking for were people to call plays for a big player. That began my training for calling plays. I’ve probably called more plays than I have played myself. There were some classic BP’s on that team. Jimmy, the southern gentleman—we were worried about heat at the Hilton and had told him to wade into the play, not to bet so much that it would attract their attention. But when he sat down they asked him for ID and he was furious. He said, “Here’s my ID!!” as he whipped out $20,000 cash and threw it on the table.

Ike was a cool one. He always had a girlfriend, and he always called her “George,” so he wouldn’t slip up in front of his wife. The downside of playcalling at that time was that they sent me out on my first plays into incredibly steamy situations with BPs that were already very hot. I was barred right away, and they knew I was part of the Ken Uston team. Within weeks I was completely Griffinized for life.

RWM: Did you have any hard barrings?

Darryl: I had a hard barring at the Hilton shortly after the Jimmy incident. This was shortly after Mark Estes [a card counter] got beat up there. I had just lost $10,000 with a BP and they dragged me to the back room. They 86ed me and trespassed me.

RWM: Did you call your mom?

Darryl: No. At that point it wasn’t fun anymore. I didn’t like getting thrown out. I took it personally. One time I was calling plays on the single-deck at Caesars. I was betting quarters while the BP was betting thousands on the other side of the table. At some point I hear the pit boss say, “Oh, there’s Purpose. He must have lost his bankroll. He’s down to betting quarters.” They never caught on. Caesars at that time had a no-barring policy. They were the classy joint back then.

RWM: I’ve read that you were the fastest card counter on the team.

Darryl: I got really good at counting down a single-deck. Part of it was smoke and mirrors, and didn’t translate into play on the table. I got to a point where it was really about how quickly you could spread the cards.

Someone would say with a stopwatch would say “Go” and I’d spread the cards and be looking at about 10 cards at a time. I’d look at the last cards and say, “stop,” and fold the deck up in one big motion. What they didn’t know was I was still counting because I had taken a mental picture of the last quarter of the deck. I could regularly count a single-deck in 10 seconds.

RWM: Weren’t there races or contests with substantial money bet?

Darryl: There was one legendary contest between the West Coasters and the East Coasters. This was shortly after the Atlantic City no-barring period. We were in Las Vegas. One of the East Coast guys had brought in a ringer. Although this guy never did that well in a casino, he could really count down a deck, especially six decks. We had an all-night session, and we had bet a lot of money on this. I was the reigning deck-counting champion, and Joe was the ringer newbie.

RWM: When you say you bet a lot of money, are we talking thousands?

Darryl: Yeah. Of course our pride was more important than the money. This happened at four in the morning. Who knows what debauchery had gone on before that, and we hadn’t slept. It was going to be a best two out of three. I won the first round, and Joe won the second. We both thought we were counting slow, but we thought it was because it was late and we had been drinking. After the counting of the first deck I went to my friend Craig and said, “I counted 26 aces.” Craig said, “Oh shit.” This was six decks and we were counting Hi-Opt I with a side count of aces.

RWM: Didn’t you have to give a count?

Darryl: I gave a count but I said there were two aces left. I figured I would be off by a whole deck not just two. I didn’t tell them what I actually counted. I told them what I thought were left, and I won the first round.

RWM: How many cards were they holding out?

Darryl: It was six decks so they would take out six cards. The second round I count 28 aces. I went to Craig and said, “There are seven decks there.” Joe was doing the same thing. He was getting the wrong ace count, but he wasn’t admitting it to anyone.

Going into the third round I knew there were seven decks. I knew why the times were slow, so I wasn’t trying to push it. I won the last round because I had the correct count and he was off by one because he was rushing so much. We finished, and we were celebrating. I turned to Joe and said, “Joe, how many decks are there?” “That’s it!” he screamed. “There are seven decks there!!” It was quite funny.

RWM: When you started with Ken, was he still using hidden computers?

Darryl: I think I came in right as the computer project using George ended. [George was the first blackjack computer developed by Keith Taft. Some of the details of his teaming with Ken Uston were discussed in my interview with Al Francesco in the Summer 2002 issue of Blackjack Forum. You will find the interview in the Blackjack Forum Gambling Library on this Web site.]

When I first joined we had BPs [Big Players], and we just called plays for them. They had just come up with this idea where they would have the BP signal what his hand was. The counter had to count the cards, bet and play his own hand, and take the signal from the BP from across the table by the way he held his cards. This was supposed to give you exactly what he had in his hand so you could count it.

RWM: Rather than just show you his cards.

Darryl: There was some heat on that, so they thought this was a good idea. But what happened was that all the counters started making a ton of mistakes. We weren’t winning any money, and they stopped that idea and got rid of all the counters except for me. I was testing really well at that time.

RWM: I’ll bet that made the players really like Ken.

Darryl: A lot of players didn’t like Ken–certainly anyone who wasn’t willing to overlook Ken’s gratuitous self-aggrandizement. I had a soft spot, and mostly forgave Ken all that. But that led to a lot of problems for me, because one of the fired players became a counter catcher for the casinos. He really came after me.

RWM: Why would the firing make him mad at you?

Darryl: I was an easy target. He knew me, and I had a look that I couldn’t disguise well. The fact that I was a member of the Uston team made me a good catch. He could show off to the casinos by nailing me more so than some guy who didn’t have an association with Ken.

Craig joined in August of ‘78, which was right after this mass firing. They decided to do things differently, and it was basically a sham business model they came up with.

Ken got big players who were willing to put up money. Ken and his book, The Big Player, impressed them. He had this team of expert card counters. We would call plays for these big players and then split the money 50-50 at the end of every trip. One of the BPs that won a lot of money rented a Rolls Royce. He gave us the Rolls for the last week of the rental. It was 1977; I was 20 years old and driving around Las Vegas in a Rolls Royce with thousands of dollars in my pocket. Isn’t that why we came?

RWM: This was a pretty sweet deal for you guys. You take no loss but get half the win?

Darryl: This was how I split from Ken the first time. There was one BP who lost money on a trip, and he talked Ken into carrying the loss over onto the next trip. Bill was really running the team at that point. Bill went for that for a couple of trips but we ended up stuck. At that point Bill said, “That’s it. We aren’t going to work with you anymore.”

RWM: Because he didn’t want to make up the loss?

Darryl: Right. In fact, the deal was that it was per trip and Bill had gone much further than the original deal called for. Of course the deal he had cut in the first place was not good for the BP. [See Beyond Counting, pages 59-60.]

At that point Craig and I said to the BP, “We’ll make your money back for you. And we’ll make 50% after that.” Again, we were 21 or 22 with a chance to really make some big money. We did that. We got them even and then started using a strategy of betting half of what we were up.

Most of our plays were first-basers, so you had an edge all the time. We made some good scores that way. [A first-baser is a dealer who reveals his hole card when checking under a ten or ace for blackjack. Casinos stopped checking under tens in the mid ’80s because of advantage players exploiting this weakness.]

Craig and I decided to buy a condo from a friend. We had to come up with $20,000 as a down payment. We needed the money on a Monday, and come Saturday night we had about $1,500 each. We hadn’t really played on our own. We had only worked with teams.

“Where can we get $20,000?” we’re asking ourselves. It occurred to both of us, “Let’s go play a first-baser at Caesars.” There was a problem because Craig had been calling plays there a lot, and one of us had to BP. Craig went out and got a dark wig and a pair of glasses. He came over to a friend’s house where I was staying. He knocked on the door, and our friend let him in. I said, “Hi, I’m Darryl.” I did not recognize him. We went out and won the down payment.

At one point we brought Art in to BP for us. We were still using the “Bet half of what you are up” strategy. Art was a very “by the book” kind of guy. We were a little concerned about his willingness to bet it up. We wanted to do this now with our own money. In the past it was the BP’s money.

So three of us and Art went to play first-basers for a weekend at the MGM in Reno. Art was going to BP, and the other three of us were going to read. [The “reader” is the person who spots the hole card, and then relays that information to the Big Player.] We each put in $2,500 so we had a $10,000 bank.

Until this point Art was very systematic, scientific, and conservative about the whole thing. We had to remind him that we wanted to really bet it up. Going into the very last play we were even. I wasn’t going to be playing the last session, and I went by the game to see how it was going. Art was betting five hands of the limit, which was $1,000. He won $40,000 on that play. I think this was the weekend where Art really found himself, because he later went on to set new standards for betting ridiculous amounts of money.

RWM: When did you get back together with Ken?

Darryl: Ken called and told me about the first no-barring period in Atlantic City. I’m really drawn to colorful people, and Ken did have a lot of charm. He called and said, “Come to Atlantic City. There’s a game here.” I went and joined the team. This was the team he wrote about in Two Books on Blackjack.

I was out there for two weeks. I was 22 years old and sharing a hotel room with Ken Uston and Ron Karr. Two years earlier I was homeless on the streets of Vegas. Now I’m sharing a hotel room with Babe Ruth and Joe Dimagio. I was on a rollaway and they had their own beds. Ken and I were friends, as best as someone could become a friend with Ken. He was in a constant battle with chemical dependency. He eventually died from it at 53, overdosing on heroin in Paris.

I saw Ken in many weak and vulnerable moments. He cried in front of me a number of times. I ran into him right after he had been beaten up in Reno. Several bones in his face had been broken. I did care about him, but I also spent most of my life trying to get over the heat I got from being on the Ken Uston team. I also wanted to prove myself to other blackjack players. Being a member of the Uston team was not necessarily a badge of honor.

We accomplished a lot, and did a lot of innovative and interesting things after my association with Ken. Still, the reason you want to interview me is because I was part of the Ken Uston team. Ken Uston is still the world’s most famous blackjack player.

RWM: Let’s talk about that first trip to Atlantic City in 1979. How many people were on the team?

Darryl: Well, both the no-barring periods actually happened in 1979, the first in January and the second in December. I met Ron, my neighbor from the Enchanted Gardens, and Mark Estes at the Philadelphia airport. Mark was notable for getting beaten up by a security guard at the Hilton in 1977. That was a big deal because they hadn’t gotten physical with card counters (that we knew of) before that.

We were all college dropouts who were good at math. We were not tough guys in any way. That was a big deal. [Mark Estes successfully sued the Hilton.]

We went to Atlantic City together from the airport. We stayed in a crummy little $23 per night motel. Ken was trying to come up with maybe $25,000 as a bankroll. The world’s most famous blackjack player, and here he was trying to scrounge together a bankroll. I remember it was cold. I’m from Southern California, and it was colder than anything I had ever experienced. I didn’t understand why people would live in a place that got that cold. We had to walk from the motel to the casino.

RWM: Why was there no bankroll?

Darryl: I didn’t have any money. Mark and Ron didn’t have any money. In the book Ken claims his money was all invested in this and that. The fact was that none of us put any of the talent that we had, to squeeze every last hundredth of a percentage point out of a blackjack game, into our personal finances. Over the course of my career that never changed. I made a lot of money, and pissed it away. When I got into music I had less than nothing to lose.

RWM: Was it just the four of you, or were there more on the team?

Darryl: There were others. There was a guy in Philadelphia who had told Ken the no barring policy was coming. He had a full-time job in Philadelphia, and was a part-time counter. Ken wanted to believe that our team members were better than anyone else.

At that time a lot of people still used the Revere Advanced Point Count, a three-level count. A lot of people believed that using this stronger count was a lot better than any one-level count could be. Over the years this was revealed to be not true, particularly with the shoe game. As it turned out, simpler was better.

Anyway, this guy wasn’t testing that well, and someone had seen him make some mistakes. We were considering whether or not to let him play on the team. We were having a meeting in the hotel room. Ken and Ron decided they needed to talk in private, so they went into the closet. Then they called me in, and then Mark went in the closet. At some point the entire team was in the closet, and he was in the room with the bankroll spread out on the bed in cash. We all started laughing, and that was bad. [In Two Books on Blackjack Uston relates this story of the closet on page 42. He calls the player, “Ty.”]

RWM: Did he end up staying, or being voted out?

Darryl: He was voted off that bank, but then we made a bankroll and he was allowed to play on the next one. He had some restrictions on his earnings. I forget exactly, but I think it was based on him winning. Eventually he was brought back in, and did win some money. All along he was allowed to invest in the bankroll.

RWM: Sure, you guys needed the cash.

Darryl: Well, at some point Ken hooked up with Peter. Now there was an interesting match. Those guys had polar opposite ways of doing everything. I was caught in the middle. I had met Peter in Las Vegas through the Czechs, and I had run into Peter in Europe in 1978. [Cathy Hulbert talks about this bankroll in Atlantic City in the book Gambling Wizards.]

By the way, I read what Cathy said about this bank in Gambling Wizards, and I don’t think it’s true that Ken didn’t want her to play because she was a woman. He didn’t want her to play because of the power balance. I really think that was the case. That doesn’t make him any better of a person, but that’s the way I remember it.

Cathy was Peter’s girlfriend, and if they were both on the team, that might have upset the tenuous balance of power. We had some power structure on the team that was some democracy and some dictatorship, so if Cathy were a player, to the extent we were democratic, Cathy would have had a voice. Then Peter and Cathy’s voices together, well… Peter’s voice alone really threatened Ken. They had incredible clashes.

RWM: What were the arguments over?

Darryl: Anything. Peter liked to do things by the book. When you went to dinner with Peter he would break the bill down to the penny. He thought nothing of getting change for that nickel. He insisted on it. That couldn’t have been farther from the way Ken did things. They both needed to be in control, but they couldn’t. They both saw an advantage to working together to build a larger bankroll and bet more money. I wonder what was in it for Peter really? For Ken it really was about not having any cash.

RWM: In Two Books on Blackjack there was a big rivalry with the Czech team. Was this just in Ken’s mind, or was there competition there?

Darryl: Oh yeah. It was a friendly rivalry for the most part. In the book he talks about a four o’clock meeting that he called with the heads of all the teams. That may be true, but there were a lot of other things going on that didn’t involve him in such a pivotal way. He doesn’t mention any of those other things. The thing I loved about the Czechs at that time was, whenever someone made some large bet, the dealers would call out, “Checks play.” It was hilarious.

It was on this bank that I won my first 15 sessions, which pretty much puts to rest all the argument of, who is the best blackjack player in the world. [laughing]

RWM: You said this bank lasted two weeks.

Darryl: Yeah.

RWM: What was your payday? Did you make a bunch of money?

Darryl: It says in the book I made $11,000. I can’t argue with that since I don’t remember.

RWM: He put that in the book?

Darryl: Yeah. I had no investment. I went down to the Honda dealership with a friend, and we both bought Honda 750s. I had barely ever ridden a motorcycle, but we bought them and drove to Los Angeles.

RWM: After Atlantic City did you and Ken play hole cards?

Darryl: I don’t think Ken ever got into hole cards.

RWM: He talks about it in his book.

Darryl: He heard something about it, but he didn’t play them a lot, as far as I remember. I’ve been talking to a screenwriter in Hollywood who is interested in doing a screenplay, partly on blackjack, and partly on the story of my life. Because of that I reread Two Books on Blackjack, and I just read Million Dollar Blackjack for the first time.

One of the most amazing things I discovered in reading these books is that, the fact that I played with the Ken Uston team, that I was a friend of his, has colored my entire blackjack existence. I did the math, and the last time I placed a bet as a member of a Ken Uston team was December of 1979. Yet it is a huge part of my blackjack identity.

History is not what happened. Ken wrote the books. I had never read Million Dollar Blackjack, even though I knew I was in the book. At the time I was trying to distance myself from Ken for a lot of reasons.

So I start reading it recently, and he was saying that blackjack is the only game where you use your skill to change the odds. He’s explaining this, and I’m thinking, “Yeah, this is really solid. I guess this is a good blackjack book.” But the best lies have a large element of truth in them. He started talking about the history of blackjack, and he mentions the paper in 1956. Then he starts talking about Revere and the Advanced Point Count, and I was thinking, “Wow, this is really comprehensive.”

Then boom, he leaves out Wong and the Hi-Lo completely, and inserts Stanley Roberts into the history of blackjack counts and how they developed. I was amazed. I’m guessing the Stanley Roberts count he mentions is the Hi-Lo. It was so well-written it almost fooled me. He left out the 1959 Dubner paper, and he left out Wong’s book. Most professional blackjack players consider themselves counters of that “Hi-Lo.”

I read the story of what he calls Team Six. This was the second no-barring period in Atlantic City in December 1979 and the few months leading up to it. At that time I was living with Ken in a small studio apartment on the boardwalk in Atlantic City.

This place was no bigger than most people’s kitchens. It had two Murphy beds, and we ran a team out of this place and lived there for months. In the book he was talking about the Casino Commission, and all the work that he was doing to try to make everyone happy. But nobody was interested in a game where skilled players could play alongside bad players and everyone, including the casinos, would be happy. In the book he’s trying to create this, and it very much colors the whole story.

I read about the team, and I read about how we had these big wins in the beginning. I remembered it so well. With the early surrender we had a slight edge off the top. We were betting half Kelly. Our bankroll got so big that we were able to bet table max, $1,000, off the top. Then he starts talking about how the casinos were over-reporting counters’ wins, and how all that played out. Then he said that we thought about under-reporting our wins, but then decided against it.

He goes on to say that we lost most of our money, and people began to drift away even before the barrings were allowed again. The game wasn’t that good anymore because they were only dealing half a shoe. He says we ended up breaking even. I was reading this thinking, “God, I thought we won a lot of money.” Then I realized—he made all that up! Of course we won a lot of money. I think we won $680,000.

I think Ken learned some lessons from Two Books on Blackjack, because Million Dollar Blackjack is much better written. The self-aggrandizement in Two Books on Blackjack is so on his sleeve. It makes it a horribly written book and I cringed when I read it. At one point I thought I couldn’t finish it.

RWM: After Atlantic City did you go back to Vegas?

Darryl: I went back to playing with Craig in Vegas. Craig and I worked together for most of fifteen years. I think we went to Aruba in April of that year. They had early surrender, and it was another counter convention. We started saving our chips. We weren’t cashing them because we didn’t want them to know how much we had won.

At some point they changed the chips, and announced that if you didn’t cash the old chips in the next 24 hours you wouldn’t be able to. The heat was coming down. Craig was the guinea pig to go cash out the chips. He got the cash, and came back to the room. I was in the bathtub. He said, “Darryl, we have to go now.” He just told me this story recently. He said I got out of the bathtub, did not dry off, and threw on my clothes.

We grabbed our things, my guitar and suitcases, and took the elevator down to the basement. We walked out to the beach, down the beach half a mile, and caught a taxi to the airport. Two months later I ran into a guy who was there when that happened. He said, “Where were you guys? The security guards were looking all over the island for you.”

RWM: How much money was it?

Darryl: I don’t remember, but the limits were much lower then. I remember that was the first time I played shuffle tracking. That was April of 1979.

RWM: I wanted to ask about that. I remember hearing that Ken threw people off the team for attempting to shuffle track.

Darryl: That was the second trip to Atlantic City. He just didn’t believe it was the same as counting down a deck and knowing exactly what was left. There was a guy named Q who worked with the team. His thing was a little more exotic than shuffle tracking. He tracked shuffles of new decks. He thought there were clumps, so if he saw a bunch of fours and fives, he believed there were more fours and fives coming and would adjust his play accordingly.

In Million Dollar Blackjack there was one style of play that was notable for its inclusion, and one notable for its absence. Front loading was notable for its inclusion. Nobody had really talked about it to the extent that Ken did in that book. That didn’t make a lot of people happy. The thing he left out was shuffle tracking.

RWM: How long before the phone call came again to go back to Atlantic City?

Darryl: So much happened during that time. We played some first-basers, some front loaders, we counted cards, we called plays for BPs. It seems like we had a million different little bankrolls. Craig and I bought the condo in Vegas, which was our team place for many years.

Then Ken called again, and that was when I had the little apartment with him on the boardwalk. We played some blackjack, trained some people, and ran the team out of there.

RWM: How long were you there this time?

Darryl: I would say from August to December of ’79.

RWM: Was this the same group of guys on this team, minus Peter?

Darryl: No, it was a different group. We invited a lot of players out. I invited my uncle; we trained a guy named Jack from Cherry Hill, New Jersey. He made enough money to go back and buy the pool hall he had been playing in his whole life.

I think Ron was there, but Mark wasn’t. Craig and Matt came. We remembered how we won like pigs in January. We were going to be ready for December 1st. When December 1st came we had a large group of experienced guys, and a good-sized bankroll. It was at least $100,000, which was good sized for that time. We won a ton of money.

RWM: Do you remember how much?

Darryl: I’m guessing $680,000, but Ken lied in the book so we may never know. I think it lasted nine days, or maybe thirteen days.

RWM: I heard that although you won a ton of money, you somehow managed to lose three cars.

Darryl: Well, it was over a period of five months.

RWM: How exactly did that happen?

Darryl: Remembering how that happened would require the same brain cells that would have prevented it from happening in the first place. I do remember one situation. There were two casinos open at the time. Caesars had opened in addition to Resorts International. At that time, these were the only casinos in the United States outside Nevada.

I had a safety deposit box at Resorts. I wanted to play at Caesars. I pulled up to the door at Resorts because there didn’t look like there was any place to park. It was really cold there, so I just left the car running with the heater on. I went in to get my money, and I thought as I went in that I would go check the game. I went around, and sure enough there was an empty table in the high limit pit.

The high limit pit generally had fewer decks and better penetration. I sat down to play, and ended up staying there for eight hours. I went out and got a taxi back to the apartment, which was team headquarters. At some point someone said, “Where is the car?” I didn’t even think about it. Then someone said, “Didn’t you take the car this morning, Darryl?” “Oh, that’s right.” It turned out the valet had it.

RWM: Were all three of the cars recovered? The three you lost?

Darryl: I don’t think I lost any cars for good. That would be irresponsible. [laughing]

RWM: When the no-barring policy ended, they went to the three-step barring policy. After the third step people were getting arrested for trespassing. Did you suffer many of these arrests?

Darryl: No. I think I left before that. They never barred me. Some time later I was back in the club, I don’t remember why, but I wasn’t playing. They asked me to leave, and I said, “No, you can’t ask me to leave. The rules say you must first ask the person not to play blackjack. If they play, then you can ask them to leave.” We disagreed over this, and they carried me out.

RWM: You’re a big guy. How many of them did it take to carry you out?

Darryl: One on each limb. It was a passive resistance on my part.

RWM: Sort of like lying down at the Nevada nuclear test site?

Darryl: Exactly. It was all training for my future anti-war activism.

RWM: You lay down, and they picked you up and carried you through the casino.

Darryl: I didn’t lie down. I was standing. Two guys grabbed my arms, and two guys picked up my feet.

RWM: Was anyone saying anything as they carried you through the casino? Or was this just a normal day in Atlantic City?

Darryl: You know how oblivious people are in the casino. It would take a lot more than that to get a gambler’s attention.

RWM: What did they do once they got you out the door?

Darryl: They dropped me on the sidewalk.

RWM: You were injured from this, right?

Darryl: Yeah, I hurt my shoulder.

RWM: You did sue, and win. How much was the settlement, or are you not allowed to say?

Darryl: I did win, but I can’t say.

RWM: So the team did really well, do you remember what your paycheck was this time?

Darryl: I think it was thirty or forty thousand.

RWM: What did you do then?

Darryl: I probably pissed it away as fast as I possibly could. Actually, I gambled. One of the handful of times in my life. I decided to blow $500. I went to the craps table, and bet $100 on the pass line and took odds.

I turned the $500 into $1,000 and went to the baccarat table. I bet $500 per hand, and kept betting more as I won. They all knew that I was Darryl Purpose, professional card counter. They also knew that professional card counters don’t play baccarat or any other game unless they have an edge. It drove them nuts.

I won 13 consecutive hands in baccarat. My last hand I lost some huge bet. Maybe the limit was only $5,000. I lost a hand and said, “Thank you very much,” and walked with $20,000.

RWM: They are probably still studying those tapes trying to figure out what you were doing.

Darryl: They probably are.

RWM: What kind of testing did you guys have for that team in Atlantic City?

Darryl: We had them count down single-decks and six-deck shoes. Single decks we wanted them to count in thirteen seconds.

RWM: That’s quite fast.

Darryl: Then I would deal to them and count along, and ask them about how they were playing. They would have to make bets according to some prescribed bet plan. If I found it interesting to do so I would ask them how much they would bet if there were another deck in the discard tray. I knew that not only could they make the right play, but also that they could easily calculate whatever the right play was at any time. They might make a play, and I would ask how close a call that was. They would describe the way they thought about calculating the true count.

Part II

RWM: If you were to go back to blackjack, do you prefer working with a few people or a big team?

Darryl: I guess I’d prefer a small group of guys that I was tight with. In the old days I lived with teammates. Now it wouldn’t be like that. If I were to play blackjack again, I’d like to work with a small group of guys who had known each other for a long time. I was on one team or another for over twenty years, but it’s been many years now since I’ve played a hand of blackjack in a casino. Why leave home when you don’t have to?

RWM: You have been on big teams, and small teams. A question that comes up all the time is how do you compensate the people on the team?

Darryl: It was simple in the beginning. Half the money went to the investors in proportion to the amount they invested, and half went to the players, according to some combination of hours played, and money won.

There were two schools of thought; one that the win should be distributed according to hours played and that players shouldn’t lose out because they had a bad run. I always liked crediting a player for their win, partly because some players would consistently win more.

In those early days I was fairly naive. I was a team player, and in the beginning assumed that everyone else would be that way too. When I realized that wasn’t going to be the case every time, I looked for guys to work with where you didn’t have to worry about those things. Most of the bankrolls I’ve been involved in were like that. The few that weren’t, where people tried to take advantage of each other, were huge disappointments and eye openers for me.

RWM: I interviewed Keith Taft and he told me about his shuffle-tracking computer, Thor. How did you get involved with Thor?

Darryl: Oh, two of the sleaziest guys I’ve ever known. [laughing] Do you know who I’m talking about?

RWM: Well, the name Rats Cohen has come up in a number of interviews.

Darryl: That’s him. The other was Bob W. We paid Cohen a lot of money for Thor.

RWM: How did you know Cohen?

Darryl: Hmm, I don’t remember. He got a hold of us, and we bought Thor from him. We set out to learn Thor, and play it. We also bought technical support. I learned first, and then my teammate learned.

I think at that time I was living on the Balboa Peninsula in Newport Beach, California. We had a house on the beach. Ken Uston lived there for a short time. He brought Harry Reasoner over. He was doing a piece for “60 Minutes” about Ken. It was a big bachelor pad with five bedrooms. I also had a place in northern Nevada, and the condo in Vegas.

RWM: Tell me about learning to use Thor.

Darryl: Thor used a binary code system. We had two switches on each foot, one up, one down. On the left foot the up switch was one, and down was two. On the right foot up, four; and down, eight. We entered the exact value of the cards, and the order that they went into the discard rack.

Before we started we would tell the machine what the rules were for that particular game, what kind of shuffle they were doing, and how many decks. When it was time to shuffle the dealer would take the unplayed cards and we had to tell the computer where they were placed. If they were placed in the middle, we had to tell the computer where in the middle.

Then we would tell the computer that the dealer took 51% of the cards and put them on the right. Then the dealer would grab cards from each pile, and we would tell the computer how many cards were in each grab. If the dealer used four “grabs,” you would have four distinct segments of about one and a half decks each in the shoe.

Thor would have a good idea what cards were in each of those segments. The computer would give you an option of cutting the best segment to the front of the shoe, or the worst segment to the back. For cover you would cut the best section to the front so you could bet big off the top. For the best overall game you cut the worst section to the back. Then it would tell you how much to bet, and how to play each hand. It would occasionally make some very bizarre plays.

There was another nonrandom shuffle computer out at that time which was far simpler. It just used the Hi-Lo, and in hindsight I would have used that if I had the option. The people using this other machine only played basic strategy. They never varied their play except for insurance.

Because of that, they didn’t risk the huge negative value of a basic strategy deviation that went wrong due to an inputting mistake or something else. With these NRS computers you were betting big off the top all the time, and you didn’t have to spread that much to have a good edge.

RWM: How long did it take you to learn to use Thor?

Darryl: I was focused and a quick learner. I think I was probably casino ready at it within 100 hours. Because I had some heat in Nevada, we decided to first try it out in European casinos.

RWM: What happened when you got to Europe?

Darryl: We started out in Germany and Belgium but found that the games were unplayable because the machine couldn’t handle those shuffles. Then we went to England. In England, the casinos are private clubs. You have to join, and then wait 48 hours before you can enter.

We joined a bunch of clubs in London, and while we were waiting our 48 hours, we decided to go north of London to a town called Leicester. We signed up for the two casinos in Leicester, but then still had to wait 48 hours. There was a tiny town near Leicester called Enderby. We read in the local paper that they were having a folk festival, so I grabbed my guitar and off we went. I played at the festival, which was held in a large garage. My international debut.

I remember it was the middle of February, and snowing. This wasn’t your typical tourist destination. There was a sock factory in Leicester, so we decided if we got pulled up we would tell them we were businessmen, there to go to the sock factory. What were we thinking?

We bought a book on walks around central England, and I think we may have taken a walk. We went to a play at the Haymarket Theater in Leicester. It was rare that we got time off like this on blackjack trips. For some reason we decided to kill the two days in Leicester rather than London. What was that about? Can I have those two days back?

When you sign up for these casinos, some of them require you to show a passport and some don’t. Our policy was, if they didn’t ask for the passport we would give a fake name. In the first casino we went to in Leicester they didn’t ask for a passport, so we gave a fake name. At the second casino, named Annabelle’s, they did ask for passports, so we used our real names.

Finally we started playing at Annabelle’s. The shuffle was very simple and Nick was sequencing aces while I operated Thor. Everyone in the place was betting two pounds per hand, and I was betting three hands of the maximum, which was either two hundred or five hundred pounds. There was no one betting in between.

We won about 10,000 pounds. Unbeknownst to us, the owner of Annabelle’s called the other casino and asked if two Americans named X and Y had been in there. The owner of the other casino told him that two Americans had signed up but under different names. Anyway, after we were up 10,000 pounds they changed the shuffle and Thor couldn’t handle it, so we quit. We went to cash out and they told us they’d have to give us a check, but would be happy to cash the check if we came back tomorrow. This was the first time that a casino told me they didn’t have enough money to cash the chips. We were from Vegas. We had never heard of such a thing. They told us they would go to the bank the next day, and we could come back and get cash in the morning. Right.

The next morning we had a big discussion about what to do with Thor while we went to the casino to cash out. Should we hide it, or should I wear it in and see if we could maybe play some? We decided I should strap up and consider playing depending on how I was received at the casino.

We got to the casino, and I went to cash the chips while Nick went to check if the game was good. The game wasn’t good anymore, and when my partner came to the cashier to find me, I was gone. They directed him up some stairs to a bar that was closed. When he came up, he found me talking to Scotland Yard.

Now, we had talked about the possibility of being pulled up. Our plan was, if this happened, we would ask for a lawyer and not say anything. But when they separated us for questioning, somehow we both knew that we should break that code and talk to them. They kept saying, “You’re a professional gambler.” I kept telling them I was in real estate. He asked for my business phone number. I gave him a fake number, and he actually picked up the phone and started dialing this number I gave him.

Then he hangs up. Several times they were very close to the evidence they were looking for. They wanted us to admit we were professional gamblers, which we never did. Well, they knew we were professional gamblers. So what? My partner kept saying, “Are you accusing us of doing something wrong?” The police would say, “No, we just want to know you are who you say you are.” They knew we had given different names at the other casino. We gave them our passports.

Eventually they said they wanted to look at our hotel room. So Scotland Yard takes us back to our hotel. They start looking through everything. They look under the towels and take the mattress off the bed. They look in my guitar case. All we are worried about is a briefcase sitting on the end of the bed. In the briefcase are extra toe switches, a soldering iron, lithium batteries, and membership cards in dozens of names for casinos in London, Belgium, Netherlands, and Germany.

We try not to look at the briefcase, but we also are trying not to not look at the briefcase. This whole time we are talking to them, and we are winning them over. They knew this was a roust. We thought they were going to pass up the briefcase entirely. The last thing, he lifts the lid of the briefcase and says, “Well, I guess that’s it then.”

He didn’t look down into the briefcase. He opened it, and didn’t look. In the end, my ankle was the only thing that wasn’t searched. They searched the car, the hotel room, my guitar case, but never searched us. As it turned out, my ankle, where Thor was strapped, was the only place they didn’t search. Then they drove us back to the casino, and the casino cashed our chips. We got the cash, packed our bags, and headed for the next ferry out of Dover.

RWM: Did you go back to Vegas?

Darryl: After I came back from Europe, I went to great lengths to change the way I looked. I lost weight, died and curled my hair, wore brown contact lenses. At the time I couldn’t grow facial hair, so I had a little goatee I put on with spirit gum. I bought it from a makeup guy in Hollywood. I started wearing three-piece suits, which I had never done before. I used makeup, and I got clear glasses. I had a mole removed, and had veneers put on my teeth. Then I legally changed my name. My old identity was history and I was remaking myself.

I wish I could remember some of the bizarre plays Thor would have you make, because Thor didn’t have any discretion. If it felt you could gain half a percent by hitting a hard 18, it would tell you to hit it. There were some very interesting plays. In practice sessions, when it told us to hit a hard 17 we spread the deck, and there would be a bunch of threes and fours.

One of my favorite stories from that time involves us as Shoesmiths. We built our own Thor shoes. We’d buy shoes with a thick rubber sole and cut a hole in the padding in the front of the shoe. We had our tools, and our glue, and Exacto knives. We became little handymen in putting this stuff together.

One of my teammates was working on his shoes with an Exacto knife. It was pointed at his chest and it slipped. It went hard, right into his sternum. There was a loud thwack, and the knife was sticking right into the center of his chest. The funny thing was that the two other teammates that were there didn’t want to drive him to the hospital because they were about to go out on a hole-card play. They didn’t want to miss getting the seat.

He said, “I can’t drive. I have to hold something over my chest so I don’t bleed to death.” They were miffed, but they did drop him off at the emergency room.

RWM: Did you play in the islands with the computer?

Darryl: When I was playing Thor, I was a young twenty-something trying to bet thousands of dollars. We sort of understood this was a difficulty and wished we were older, or Chinese or something. But we didn’t really get it the way it is so obvious now. Looking back, we must have stood out. We tried to dress up, but we weren’t very good at it. We’d buy an expensive pair of shoes, but there was always something a little off. We would pick the wrong tie or something. We tried our best to look like a tourist and not a professional gambler. One of the ways we did this was to get women to go along with us.

The first time I took Thor to St. Martin, I took Sabrina. I knew her through a friend. For her it was just a free vacation. She was a buxom blond. We stayed in one room at the hotel, and my teammate, Bob, came with me on that trip for no other reason than to be my bodyguard. He would watch from afar and move into action if I was pulled up. (I don’t remember what it was he would have done—call the U.S. embassy? Is there a U.S. Embassy in St Martin?). He was staying in the next room. He would have all the equipment, and we never told Sabrina that I was going into this Sicilian-run casino completely wired.

We would play every night from eight o’clock until two or three in the morning. Before we would go out, I would tell Sabrina I was going to Bob’s room to talk about strategy. I’d go over there and suit up with Thor.

Now, as a young blackjack player I had to have a story as to why I had so much money to gamble with. I always had my guitar, and my story was that I was a songwriter, and the reason they hadn’t heard of me was that I wrote commercials. I would bring my guitar down to the casino. There was a bar adjacent to the casino, and the waves would lap up on the sand. There was no wall. The bar was right on the beach.

I have pictures of Sabrina and me sitting there with the owner of the casino and his wife. I was playing guitar for them. They had no idea I was completely wired with this blackjack computer. I think back on that and wonder what would have happened if they had discovered this?

At the beginning of the trip, I lost and lost. In fact I had lost all the money we came with. I had gone down there with $40,000, and it was gone. The casino owner offered to loan me $5,000.

Bob and I called back home and said, “These guys also own a casino in Sicily. Check it out and see if you can find out if they have any reputation for cheating or anything bad.” The word came back that they did have a bad reputation. Our connections told us we really didn’t want to play there. For some reason we decided to take the $5,000 anyway, and try to get our money back. I honestly can’t remember why.

It was the last day of our trip. I was flying out at five the next morning. I start winning, and then I won some more. As it got later there weren’t many other people in the casino, so they closed it down. This meant that Bob, who was always at the next table, was no longer there. I’m winning all this money back, and there is no one else in the casino.

There is the dealer, the pit boss, and the owner of the casino has taken a seat at the table on my left. The casino manager is sitting at the table also, and he’s on my right. Sabrina and I are sitting in the middle of the table between them, and I can’t lose a hand. I wanted to quit, but I thought, if I quit they were really going to be pissed. I remember being scared to quit. This is odd because I had been through a lot of things without being scared. But this scared me.

I ended up getting all my money back plus about $20,000. They knew about my morning flight, and about three a.m. I said, “Guys, I have to go.” They were very deliberate, but they were gentlemen about it. They slowly counted out my money and we were on our way with a big Phew. This was not what I imagined when I was learning to count Hi-Opt on the kitchen table.

RWM: Didn’t you once have a disguise where you became black?

Darryl: It was not my intention to look black. That’s just how it turned out. I wanted to look foreign. I was using skin tint, and a lot of people thought I was Mulatto.

I remember one play with the Mulatto look at the Cambridge Hotel in Atlantic City in 1983. A friend had loaned me a man’s full-length mink coat. Under it I was wearing a black three-piece suit. There was a beautiful young woman on my arm and I had a black doctor’s bag with $100,000 in cash in it.

I went in and dumped the cash out on the table and said, “I came to play.” I won $150,000 that session. At that time it was the largest session win of any of the professional blackjack players we knew. They gave me a limo to take us to New York. It was stocked with Dom Perignon, and we went to a Broadway show and had dinner, all paid by the casino.

I tried various disguises at different times. Sometimes they’d work and sometimes they wouldn’t. I remember once coming up with an elaborate disguise, and the first time I walked into a casino, the Holiday Inn on the Strip, I got the tap within 15 minutes.

RWM: Was that $150,000 your biggest session win ever?

Darryl: Yeah.

RWM: Do you remember your biggest loss?

Darryl: $80,000 at the MGM in Las Vegas, also with Thor. It was graveyard. Graveyard was always kind of surreal. Walking out of the MGM with nothing as the sun was rising.

RWM: How did Thor end?

Darryl: At some point the combined effect of our team and the other computer teams put heat on the move. They were looking for players with their feet flat on the floor. They realized people were tracking the shuffle with computers. It was time to move on.

I talked to Bob recently, and he said we won a million dollars with Thor. I don’t remember.

RWM: What did you do when Thor was over?

I fell in love, rented an apartment on Venice Beach, and pissed away my money. Then the Great Peace March happened.

RWM: What was that?

Darryl: The idea was that 5,000 people were going to walk from Los Angeles to Washington, DC, for peace. Madonna was doing commercials for this, and Sting was going to do the going away celebration at the Rose Bowl. There were portable shower trucks and laundry trucks. Club Med for peace.

I signed up for that. It wasn’t what it was advertised to be. Instead of Sting at the Rose Bowl, it was Mister Mister at City Hall. We walked anyway. We walked 15 miles through east LA, where my mother had told me never to go. We got to our first campground, which was a parking lot at Cal State LA. There were 1,200 people. One of the volunteers from the organizers came to me and said, “Stay vigilant. You guys are on your own.”

All these people had given up their lives to do this, and the whole thing was going to fall apart on the first day. We kept walking anyway. We got to 25 miles outside of Barstow, and the organizer flew in on a helicopter and told us to all go home. There was no more money. We looked at the helicopter and knew where the money had gone. People drifted away, but there were a few hundred left. Someone got up and said, “If you want to finish this meet tomorrow morning at the kitchen truck.”

We decided to go for it, and people did what they could to contribute. People who knew how to remove distributor caps did so on major support vehicles so they wouldn’t be repossessed. The people who could cook did that. The musicians formed a band. We started performing as we went across the country. We raised money for the marchers. We performed at rallies, at clubs, at benefits.

We walked into Washington on schedule eight months later. One of my distinct memories was marching down the Las Vegas Strip with my guitar around my neck. I just looked at all those casinos I had been thrown out of months earlier.

The next year I did a walk from Leningrad to Moscow. Our band played in the first outdoor rock concert in the history of the Soviet Union. We played in a show with James Taylor, Bonnie Rait, and Santana.

RWM: Did you play blackjack while you were in Russia?

Darryl: I didn’t play any blackjack in 1986. There was no blackjack in Russia at that time. Rock and roll was still illegal at that time.

I did go back to Russia to play blackjack later. On the peace march I met a Lithuanian cameraman. I trained him to count cards, and he went to Russia with me. It was the Wild West there. This was maybe 1993.

Vlad was at a bar in the casino and the guy next to him turned and said, “You’re going to give me all your money.” He said, “What do you mean? There are pit bosses right over there.” The guy said, “The pit bosses are with me. You’re going to give me all your money.”

Vlad pauses and the guy turns his back, and my friend takes off running. He hit the door and kept going. We did not stop our trip at that point. We kept playing. It took a little morning chase through the streets of Moscow by the Russian Mafia to actually convince us to leave.

RWM: How did that happen?

Darryl: I’m still a little unclear on the details. Maybe they wanted to rob me. I had finished my play at a casino late one night. I dropped my Russian girlfriend off at her apartment. I came back to the taxi, and the taxi driver said, “Who are those guys?” I said, “What guys?” He said, “They came and asked me about you. They’re following us.”

It was about five in the morning and I looked back and I couldn’t see them. I said, “Lose them.” He drove on and he said, “I can’t lose them. They’re good drivers.” I said, “Who are they?” He said, “The Russian Mafia.” I said, “Well, drive faster. Go to the embassy, or the police station.” He said, “You don’t understand.”

He was going faster and faster, and they were going faster. I put my money under the seat. At some point my driver stopped and they pulled up along side us, about ten feet away. They started to talk in Russian. At some point I heard my driver say, “Please, I don’t want any trouble with my family.” They talked some more and my driver turned to me and said, “They just want to talk to you.”

It was a small sedan with four big, burly guys. One of them got out and started over to my car. Just as he was reaching for the handle of my taxi I screamed at the driver, “GO!” Somehow the driver found it in himself to put his foot on the gas and we were off again. These taxis were old cars that seemed to be held together by wire and glue. We’re going up to 90 miles an hour, I’m guessing, through the streets of Moscow.

At one point we reached a big intersection and another car was coming right at us head on. There were screeching tires and everyone came to a stop in the middle of this big intersection. There were three cars; me in a taxi, the Russian Mafia, and a police car. We’re all at a stop sort of facing each other. I thought, “Whew, we made it.” I just blinked, and the police car was gone. They just took off.

We were back on the road and back to this 90 mile an hour chase. At some point I said, “Go back to the casino.” He drove to the casino, and either they didn’t want to do their dirty work near the casino, or maybe by then it was getting light and there were too many people out. I don’t know, but they left when we got to the casino. I really didn’t feel all that secure in asking the casino for a ride back to my place. That was the last time I played in Russia.

RWM: In retrospect, do you think you did a lot of dangerous things in your blackjack career?

Darryl: At the time I was very focused and I wanted to be good at what I did. I did my job, and I didn’t really consider that it was dangerous. Looking back I see where over and over I made these odd decisions that really didn’t have anything to do with my safety or my welfare, or anybody’s welfare really. They had to do with—this would make a good story.

RWM: Or this would make me some money?

Darryl: There was some of that I suppose, but not in the way you’d think. It was more of a workmanlike attitude of getting the job done. If it was about the money, I might have saved some of it.

RWM: I heard about a trip you made to Sri Lanka. What made you go there?

Darryl: We had tentacles around the globe and we would hear about games. At that point I was pretty steamy in Nevada and I was hard to disguise. We ended up playing in a lot of far away obscure places. We had heard that Sri Lanka had a significant advantage off the top. I forget the exact rules, but it probably involved early surrender and 21 pushes versus blackjack. It had all the standard rules, plus a few things that were pretty weird. It had maybe ½ to 1% advantage off the top. I went with Art, and it is such an odd place, even for a globetrotting blackjack player.

On the way to Colombo in the plane I opened a tourist book about Sri Lanka. It said in the book that one of the odd things about the people in Colombo is that when they want to say “yes” they shake their head from side to side, the way we say “no.” I thought that was the strangest thing, so I turned to the guy next to me on the plane. He was from Colombo, and I said, “It says in here that when you want to say yes, you shake your head from side to side. Is that true?” He shook his head from side to side, and I thought, “Of course not. That’s ridiculous.” It took me a while to catch on. I went up to a taxi and said, “Can you take me to the casino?” He would shake his head from side to side and I looked for another taxi. An elevator would open, “Are you going up?” They would shake their head from side to side. “Okay, I’ll get the next one.”

When we first got there it was Buddha’s birthday, so all the casinos were closed for two days. We decided to have a little vacation in Kandy, which is one of the spiritual centers for Buddhists. It was a beautiful country but at that time there were two civil wars going on. The Tamil Tigers, who invented suicide bombings, were battling from the north.

It was fierce and ugly, and bodies were turning up every day. At the Colombo Hilton where we were staying, they had about 15% occupancy. There is a picture of me at the Colombo Hilton pool and I am the only person there. I’m reading a newspaper, and the headline says, “Parties to Replace Slain Candidates.” We would read the paper every morning just to check if the place we ate lunch was still open—that it hadn’t been bombed.

RWM: Were there many people in the casino?

Darryl: The casinos were very small, maybe three or four tables at the most. There were other players, but not many.

When we started playing I won a bit and got the tap on the shoulder. The casino owner invited me to the back room. The owner was part Dutch and part Indian. He spoke English very well. He accused me of being a professional blackjack player. In his mind that was the equivalent of cheating. He kept repeating in a slow, Mafia Don kind of way, “It’s a very dangerous game you’re playing.”

He was basically telling me to leave without my chips. I had between $5,000 and $10,000. My attitude was, “No way. I’m not leaving without the chips.” Then he wanted me to give up half the chips. Again, I was, “No way.” We had this 45-minute conversation and I ended up giving him $200 and keeping the rest. I declined his offer of a ride back to the hotel. I got on the phone and called Art. I let him know the situation I was in. He said, “Do you think they might kill you?” I said, ”I’m not sure.” He sent a taxi. We got on the next plane out of there and never went back.

On the way to Sri Lanka we were in Korea. Somehow we ended up playing blackjack at the Disabled American Veterans Club. There were no disabled people, no Americans, and no veterans. As I understand it, this place was a front for a Yakuza-run casino and meeting place.

Art and I went in there and lost, and lost, and lost. It was a $300 limit, and we got stuck $20,000. We had a video camera with us. It’s the only time I’ve ever had video inside a casino, and it was just Art and me in there. I was on one table and he was on another. We lost all this money and then went to Sri Lanka. After Sri Lanka we came back to Korea to win our money back. One day we just could not lose a hand. We started cashing out a few thousand at a time. That worked for a while, but then all of a sudden they didn’t have any more money. They owed us maybe $14,000. Art and I left the casino being owed this money.

RWM: Did you take the chips, or a check? Or was it, “We’ll pay you the next time we see you.”

Darryl: It was exactly that—we’ll pay you next time. What were we going to do? We insisted on the money; they insisted they didn’t have it. Art and I had a reverse auction to decide who would stay and collect the money from the Yakuza. It started off with Art saying he would stay for $1,000 per day plus expenses. This would be paid by our bankroll. I said I would stay for $500 per day plus expenses. I think it was bid down to me staying for $300 a day plus expenses.

RWM: It sounds like this was more about the inconvenience of staying in Korea for three days, than fear of the Yakuza.

Darryl: That’s right. I went back to the casino on Monday, and they gave some story about their bank and said I should come back on Wednesday. I went back on Wednesday, and this time it was, “Call us tomorrow.” I called on Thursday and they still didn’t have it.

I made a couple of trips down there. One of them ended with the casino manager grabbing me and ripping the buttons off my shirt. I was trying to be a bully as best I knew how, which is not very well. My job was to collect the money they owed us. Fair is square, right?

I came back the next day, and was asking for their superiors. They wanted to deal with me in the front room and have me go away. I wasn’t going to let that happen. I started opening doors. I ended up bursting into some Yakuza meeting. There were all these Japanese guys sitting around a conference table and I started talking in English about how I wanted my money. I did leave there alive that day.

A couple of days passed, and they called me and said, “We’ve got your money. Come on down.” I’m like, Right, you’ve got my money and you’re just going to give it to me. So before I went down there I called another blackjack player named Jake. He was the only guy I knew in Seoul at the time. I told him what was going on and that I was a little worried. There was no explaining the casino’s apparent change of heart. I told Jake, “If you don’t hear from me in an hour, do whatever you can. Call the embassy, or the police, or whatever.”

I went out and got in a taxi. I got into one of those remarkable Seoul traffic jams. They have billions of these tiny little cars. They have wide streets with no lanes, and everyone is trying to go their own way. Everybody uses their horns.

We’re sitting for 10, 15, 20 minutes in this sea of cars. It occurred to me that I wouldn’t be able to call Jake within the hour. In the distance I saw this barbed wire and a chain-link fence. It was an American Army base. I told the driver, “I’ll be right back.” I got out of the cab and maneuvered through all the other stopped cars, and I found a little hole in the chain-link fence where the guard was standing.

I said, “I’m an American citizen, and this is an emergency. I need to make a phone call.” He said, “Right this way, sir.” I remember that was one of the first times in my life where—I had always been the young person dealing with adults, but here was this 19-year-old soldier treating me like the American businessman. I got to the phone and called Jake. I said, “Give me another hour.” He said, “Okay, I was starting to wonder.” The end of the story was, I got there and they gave me all the money.

RWM: One of the people I interviewed said, “How did we ever play blackjack before there were cell phones?”

Darryl: Right. How did we live before cell phones? A lot of people got lost going from one play to another. There are some interesting stories about that. There was a guy who didn’t know about the Sahara in Vegas, but did know about the Sahara in Lake Tahoe. He got the signal to go to the backup club, which was the Sahara, and he went to the airport and hopped a plane for Tahoe.

RWM: You’ve told me now about being chased by the Russian mob, sitting in St. Martin with the Sicilian Mafia, and collecting money from the Japanese Yakuza. At some point did you ever stop and say, “This is dangerous, and I don’t want to do this anymore.” Or are you still ready to hop a plane and play in Iraq?

Darryl: There are casinos in Iraq? ♠