Posted on Leave a comment

Stickin’ It to the Safari Club

by Nick Alexander

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XVII #1, Spring 1997)
© Blackjack Forum 1997

August 2, 1988, Tuesday. Read an article in the Sunday Times entitled, “SAFARI CLUB’S MYSTERIES MAY BE UNSOLVABLE.” The article details an account of Park Chong Kyu’s dealings with Northrop Corp. You may remember that Northrop paid him $6,250,000 to build a hotel in Korea and was bilked out of the money.

What this translates to is: Northrop paid him a bribe so he would convince the government to buy F-20 jets. The article goes on to detail that Park, who died in ’85, left behind an American Legion Post in Seoul known as the Safari Club. This was to be the site of the hotel.

This club and the rest of Park’s legacy now belong to his partner Ma Myong Dok. In the article, Ma is called “an elusive businessman with a checkered past.” The story tells how he was busted for illegal gambling at the Safari Post in ’85 and spent eight months in jail, which brings me to…

Ma is Not My Mother, and the 21 Card Grab

It was August of ’86, and my first trip to Korea. I had stayed at the one legal casino in Seoul for a week and it was time to give them a rest. I went to Inchon to play and lasted three hours before they told me that I couldn’t play anymore. They were very apologetic about the barring. Much nicer than they ever are in the States. So, I made my way back to Seoul and decided to try one of the illegal casinos. Yes, it had been closed in ’85 but after Ma spent eight months in jail, he opened right back up.

I had been told about the Safari Club by Woodpecker, but his directions were impossible, and pronunciation of a Korean word with an Australian accent left cab drivers stupefied… “Oxy dong… Take me to Oxy dong.” Well, that sure didn’t work.

Woodpecker was in Hong Kong so he couldn’t take me. I tried sidling up to Americans and speaking in hushed tones out of the side of my mouth. “Do you know where the Safari Club is?” No one seemed to know. I had visions of sneaking down a dark alley, rapping on the door and telling the guard, “Cho sent me.” Then I met a guy in Wendy’s one day who opened one of the magazines printed in English to a full-page color ad that said, “Come gamble at the Safari Club.”

As in the U.S., some things are more illegal than others, and it helps to have a brother in the Police Department.

One of the things I’ve learned traveling around the world as a professional gambler is that a casino that’s privately owned hates losing even more than a multi-billion dollar corporation. The smaller the club, the more careful you have to be.

The Safari Club had six blackjack tables and one baccarat table. It was a quiet little place and I was the only Caucasian there. Koreans are not allowed to gamble (even in the illegal casinos) so the other 25 or 30 players must have been Korean-Americans or Japanese.

I sat down at a table and noticed the limit was 300,000 Won, about $350 U.S. Not much compared to the two million limit at Walker Hill ($2500), but what the hell? After 20 minutes I was winning about $1,500 U.S. and the boss brought four new decks of cards to the table.

This is a common practice even in Vegas, although usually it’s stupid and unnecessary. This is also the time to be on your toes. The most common move at this point is for the boss to bring four decks that have a bunch of tens and aces removed, or four decks with lots of extra 4s, 5s, and 6s. The card counter in either case will start counting all these small cards coming out of the shoe and increase his bets, waiting for all those blackjacks that will never come.

This dealer carefully spread each deck face-up on the table as they are supposed to, and I carefully checked each one and found everything to be in order. But don’t relax yet. You never know what you might see if you watch that shuffle closely. And here it was…

The 21 Card Grab

After spreading the four decks the dealer placed two decks on her left, and two decks on her right, as is common when shuffling four decks. Now the procedure is to grab a clump of each stack and shuffle them together, working your way through all four decks. But what my dealer did is grab exactly 21 cards off each stack and shuffle them together.

How do I know it was 21 cards? Because she made the grabs very deliberately and then tilted both grabs exposing the 8 of diamonds on the bottom of both packets. Now to understand why this is important, we must look at a new deck of cards. They are arranged like this:

A2345678910JQK

A2345678910JQK

KQJ1098765432A

KQJ1098765432A

The suits are arranged clubs, diamonds, hearts, spades. So, at this point the dealer has shuffled the first 21 cards of two decks together… No big deal. Now she grabs 10 cards off each deck and shuffles them. So this clump is going to have 16 tens and four nines. Now she shuffles the rest of the cards and arranges them so that this clump is just above the middle of the four decks.

The reason for that is that most people, when they cut the cards, do it in about the middle. A cut like that will put these tens at the back of the shoe, behind the stop card. The same as if they had been removed from the deck altogether.

“Well… let me cut that deck. I feel lucky!”

The dealer smiled and handed me the cut card. I cut that little clump right to the front of the shoe. Now I knew that for 20 cards, there would be 16 tens and four 9s. I bet three hands of the limit…300,000. I got 19, 19, and 20. The dealer had a ten up. I surrendered my two 19s. (That means I gave up half my bet and surrendered the hand.) The dealer had 20 so I pushed the other hand.

I bet three more hands of 300,000. I got 20, 20, and 20. The dealer had a 9 up. Wait just a minute here… I think I’ll split this here pair of tens. I received another 10… split again, another ten, split again. I split out to four hands and got twenty on three and 19 on one.

Well, at this point the bosses went crazy. They weren’t sure what had happened but they knew I had just won another $2,000 U.S. with the most hare-brained play imaginable. There is one thing that all foreign casinos have learned… if an American starts winning, throw him out! This is true from Africa to Aruba, and from Monte Carlo to Macao. Well, I lasted less than two hours and won about $3,000 U.S.

The Wendy’s in Seoul

I was in Wendy’s the next day telling this story to Tom C. It’s very important for anyone visiting Korea to know about Wendy’s. If you’ve seen the movie Casablanca, Wendy’s is Rick’s and Tom C. is Sidney Greenstreet. Anything you need Tom can introduce you to the person who can procure it for you. Need a visa extension? Sure. Want to meet the ambassador from Samoa? No problem. Listen… I know a girl that’s perfect for you. See the one there with the eye patch… And so it goes, every day at Wendy’s.

Anyway, I told Tom the story and he asked me if I wanted to go back. I told him that I didn’t think they would let me back in, at which point he said, “I’ll introduce you to Ma.”

“I thought your Mother was in Maryland?”

“Not Ma… Ma. Ma is not my Mutha.”

Yes, he really says things like “Mutha.” Well, Ma is “a good friend of mine.” It turns out that almost everybody in Korea is a “good friend” of Tom’s. He explained that Ma owns the club now that Pistol Park is dead.

“Pistol Park?”

It seems they called him that because he loved guns and always wore a six gun with a pearl handle. He paid some outrageous amount of money for it because the American that sold it to him claimed it had belonged to Jesse James or Billy the Kid.

I was not keen on meeting someone that was a business associate of anyone with Pistol in his name, but Tom insisted. We went back to the Safari Club a few days later. As we entered, Tom greeted the three Sumo types in the lobby and they all bowed and scraped until they saw me. Their eyes got very wide and they started saying, “No, no. Ahhhh…no no!” and waving their hands back and forth. I think this was the only English word they knew.

One guy picked up the phone and started jabbering away. At this point, Ma appeared from the casino and the three men started pointing at me and a heated discussion ensued. Tom, who has been in Korea for 15 years and still doesn’t speak the language, jumped right in.

“What’s the problem, Ma? This is a very good friend of mine.”

Well, Ma had not been there the night I was barred but had heard the stories. He told Tom that there wasn’t any problem but would prefer it if I would only play for fun and not bet too much money. We stayed for about an hour. I played while Tom and Ma sat at the table talking. I never bet more than $10, and still felt conspicuous. So, Tom did get me back in, and I did meet Ma, but it was very clear that I would not be able to win any appreciable amount of money.

On my next trip to Seoul, Tom told me that Ma had been called by his brother at the police station, and told that he was going to be raided, so Ma shut down for a night, but the raid didn’t come. This happened four or five times and Ma got tired of his brother crying wolf.

The next time the call came, Ma stayed open and was busted. He was back in jail, but I now hear that he’s out, and the Safari Club will be open again soon. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

St. Louis Blues

An Ace Tracker’s Lament

By Darryl Purpose

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XVII #3, Fall 1997)
© Blackjack Forum 1997

[Note from Arnold Snyder: Since the writing of this article, Darryl Purpose has been elected to the Blackjack Hall of Fame. He is also a successful folk singer and songwriter. To check out his latest musical release, see DarrylPurpose.com.]

I’m playing some blackjack around St. Louis. Scouting and playing small stakes, trying to dig out this 50k bank that is now 10k. They have some special gambling law in Missouri designed to protect the players – you can only buy in $500 on any one “cruise.” Before I learned to be careful about that I had to walk away from a +20 shoe for lack of chips. Arghh.

At one point the dealer was a tad sloppy and exposed the card on top of the pack just before the cut. Clear as day, it was a big ol’ ACE. Also clear as day was a big ol’ Queen of Diamonds on the bottom of the pack.

There was one other player on the table and she cut the cards about 1 ¾ decks from the top. I’m thinking – if that Queen of Diamonds comes out as the last card of a round, this could be real interesting…

Tracking the Ace: Strategy

It’s a quarter game, and my strategy to this point, on a quarter game, has been to leave the table at any negative, but when this one goes negative, I stay. The woman sitting in the #2 spot is large, taking up a little of the #1 & #3 spots as well. This doesn’t leave much room for me to squeeze into first base, so I wait to grab the spot, because, after all, it’s a long shot that I’ll need it.

I’m hoping this woman leaves the table because that would increase the chances of the Queen of Diamonds falling as the last card of the round. Sure enough, my prayers are answered. She taps out, gets up… then with a grunt and a mumble reaches between her sizeable breasts and pulls out two sweaty hundred dollar bills, and the game continues. As we get to the middle of the deck, she says, “Mind if I play two hands?” That would certainly reduce the chances of the Queen falling on the last card!

I conjure up a sincere confidence and say emphatically, as if I know that this would bring us all kinds of bad luck, “Play one.”

The deck is down to about the two-deck level. I bet $50. I figure, that Queen might come out in the hit cards leaving me with the option of doing something really interesting and really profitable, like… doubling on a hard 20?! Maybe not, but certainly an A,9.

The possibilities are swimming through my head. I don’t bet too big because I only have $250 in chips and the chance to buy only $500 more, and if that Queen of Diamonds comes out as the last card of the round, I’d like to have some money to bet the ACE!

The dealer has a 6 up, 5 in the hole, hits it with a little card and Boom, the QUEEN OF DIAMONDS! Exactly what I was looking for! Exactly the place in the deck expected!

But…I didn’t really plan this whole thing out… I’ve got to get over to first base!!! I’ve got to buy some more chips!!! I’ve got to figure out how much to bet!!!

I say to the dealer, “Hold it up!” Then, turning to the other player, I say, “Mind if I play first base on this one?!” I speak confidently, just a little like a crazy person, a superstitious person, like a person who doesn’t care what the world thinks, but has a notion that this or that will bring him luck and is hell-bent on carrying that out. (Like your average casino-goer, maybe?)

I give the dealer $200 and announce, “I’m going to play first base!”

As I move over I’m quite relieved to see that the large woman isn’t miffed. She thinks it’s kind of amusing. I think she even feels a little sorry for me. The whole thing must seem a tad pathetic at this point.

How much to bet?! I’m thinking—save enough to double down. Bet half of what I have available (about $350). But as the dealer is changing my $200, I realize that the advantage from doubling (8%??) is nothing compared to the 50+% that I have for getting the ace, besides, since I’m getting the ace, it’s only soft doubles that we’re missing anyway.

Right?!

1/3 Kelly would call for a $3,000+ bet.

Right?

I bet everything.

It’s a big stack ’cause it’s got lots of $1 and 50 cent chips in it.

The floorman comes over and asks, “Is this a bet?!”

I haven’t bet over $100 in this place to this point… I figure the whole scene is already over the top, so I say with conviction, “Yes! I’m going to get a blackjack!! Give me my blackjack!”

I’m thinking hard about the appropriate reaction on my part when I do get my blackjack. I hadn’t really figured it out when the first card was dealt… the ace… but what’s this?!… it’s not the ace… It’s the FIVE of CLUBS!

A Bad Time for a Sad Lesson in Ace Location Technique

In that crack in time between worlds when everything is in slow motion, you have all the time in the world to understand.

I fully understand that I’ve got 7% of the bankroll out there, I can’t double down, and I’ve got the FIVE of CLUBS! The next card falls…

QUEEN of DIAMONDS to the player next to me!… and even before the next card comes out I understand even more… I’ve got 7% of the bankroll on the table and I’ve got the Five of Clubs and the dealer has the big ol’ ACE…

Of course, y’all being professional and all, you know that it doesn’t really matter how the hand turned out… ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Risk of Ruin for Video Poker and Other Skewed-Up Games

By Dunbar and Math Boy

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. XIX #3, Fall 1999)
© 1999 Blackjack Forum

Introduction

In the world of blackjack, the risk of ever going bust when starting with a fixed bankroll and a fixed game is well known. The formulas for predicting fluctuation and the risk of ruin in blackjack can be extended to any game where there is only one payout for winning bets. However, there are a multitude of games for which the risk of ruin (“RoR”) is not well understood. For games like video poker, Caribbean stud with high jackpots, certain advantageous slot machines, state lotteries with large payouts, and similar games little has been written. With this article we hope to remedy this situation.

With video poker and other lottery-type games, the large jackpot creates a substantial skew in the distribution of possible outcomes. This is very different from blackjack, where the payoffs are roughly the same size as the bets, and the possible outcomes from a single event are roughly symmetric. How can we calculate the risk of ruin for these lottery-type games?

The Risk Of Ruin Equation For One Lopsided Game

A few months ago, a Russian mathematician, Evgeny Sorokin, posted a remarkable solution to this problem on the website, bjmath.com. For an example that illustrates Sorokin’s solution., say we are playing this simple game: We bet $1 with the following possible results:

75% of the time we lose $1,

24.99% of the time we win $1,

and 0.01% of the time we win $5101.

Our expectation, or ev is:

75% x (-1) + 24.99% x (+1) + 0.01% x (+5101) = 1%

How much money do you think it would take to play this +1% ev game so that the risk of losing your entire bankroll was just 5%? Would $10,000 be enough? $100,000? Nope, still not enough.

We want to know the risk of ruin for various bankrolls. But what happens if we start with exactly $1? Our risk of ruin will be high, of course, but how high?

If we start with $1, we will be wiped out 75% of the time after the first round. So our risk of ruin is 75% plus the chance that we eventually get wiped out even after we win our first bet. We can write that as follows:

RoR = 75% + 24.99% x (risk of losing $2) + 0.01% x (risk of losing $5102) [1]

But how do we calculate the chance that we get wiped out after winning our first bet? Here’s how: Consider the 24.99% of the time that we win $1 Now our “bankroll” is $2. If we designate the risk of ruin for losing $2 as R(2), and the risk of losing $1 as R(1), then

R(2) = R(1) x R(1). [2]

This is just like saying that the probability of flipping 2 heads is ½ x ½ = ¼ . We want to know the probability of losing a $1 “bankroll” and then losing another $1 “bankroll.” Since the events are independent, we multiply the probabilities, just as with a coin-flip.

And what about the 0.01% of the time that we are lucky enough to win $5101 on the first round? Then our bankroll is $5102, and we need to know the risk of losing $5102. The risk of losing $5102 is the same as the risk of losing a $1 bankroll 5102 times in a row. We just multiply R(1) by itself 5101 times to conclude

R(5102) = R(1).5102 [3]

Let’s rewrite [1] as R(1) = 75% + 24.99% x R(2) + 0.01% x R(5102). Using [2] and [3], this becomes:

R(1) = 75% + 24.99% x R(1)2 + 0.01% x R(1).5102 [4]

Now all we have to do is find the value of R(1), between 0 and 1, which makes the left and right hand sides of [4] equal. That may look difficult, but it is an easy problem for any spreadsheet like Excel. The solution is R(1) = 99.999221%.

Now we can get the RoR for any bankroll. For $10,000,

R(10,000) = R(1)10,000 = 0.9999922110,000 = 92.5%

We can also answer the question we posed earlier: How much bankroll does it take to reduce the risk of ruin for this game to 5%? We’ll use a general expression for [2] and [3] which is good for any game,

R(b) = R(1).b [5]

In our case this becomes 5% = (99.999221%)b, and all we have to do is solve for “b”.

Taking logarithms, ln(5%) = b x ln(99.999221%). Solving this equation for b, we have that b = ln(5%) / ln(99.999221%) = $384,787. This is the answer to our earlier question; it takes $384,787 to play this game with a 5% RoR.

Once you know R(1), you can get the risk associated with any bankroll by using [5]. And you can get the bankroll, b, necessary for a desired risk level from:

b = ln(desired risk level) / ln(R(1)). [6]

The General Risk Of Ruin Equation For Games Like Video Poker

We can generalize [4] to other games. In general, the risk of losing a 1 unit bankroll in a game like video poker is:

R(1) = E [pi x R(zi)] [7].

In [7], R(zi) is the risk of losing a bankroll of size zi. Each zi is the payoff on outcome i which occurs with probability pi. For example, in full pay Deuces Wild video poker, there are 11 types of hands in the payoff schedule ranging from nothing to a royal flush. (see Table 1) Each summed term in [7] would refer to one hand in the Deuces Wild payoff schedule. For example, the 11th type of hand in the Deuces Wild payoff schedule would be a royal flush, and z11 would equal 800. Then p11 would be the probability of getting a royal flush; which will depend on the strategy you use. The value shown in Table 1, 0.0000221, is for perfect play, as listed in Dan Paymar’s Video Poker–Optimum Play (1998).

Table 1. DEUCES WILD PAYOFF SCHEDULE
Hand Payoff Probability
Zi Pi
1 Non-winner 0 0.5468
2 Trips 1 0.2845
3 Straight 2 0.05662
4 Flush 2 0.01652
5 Full house 3 0.02123
6 Four-of-a-kind 5 0.06494
7 Straight flush 9 0.004120
8 Five-of-a-kind 15 0.003201
9 Royal flush (deuces) 25 0.001795
10 Four deuces 200 0.0002037
11 Royal flush (natural) 800 0.0000221

We can use [5] to replace each R(zi) in [7] with R(1)Zi. We conclude

R(1) = E [pi x R(1)Zi]. [8]

This generalized risk equation can be used for any game with a constant set of payouts that occur with a prescribed frequency. If a game does not have a positive expectation, then the smallest positive solution for R(1) is 1, reflecting the fact that ruin is inevitable. Video poker is well suited for the above equations.. In the next section we will show how to use [8] to calculate the risk of ruin for the Deuces Wild version of video poker.

Risk Of Ruin For Deuces Wild Video Poker

Table 1 shows the payout schedule (z1, z2, …z11) for full-pay Deuces Wild. Also shown are the probabilities of achieving each hand (p1,p2,…p11), with perfect play. (Video Poker–Optimum Play, (1998) by Dan Paymar). Thus, for Deuces Wild, [8] looks like

R(1) = 0.5468 x R(1)0 + 0.2845 x R(1)1 +…+ 0.0000221 x R(1).800 [9]

The value of R(1) which “solves” this equation is 0.9993527.

How much money do you need to play Deuces Wild with a 5% RoR? Using [6], we get b=ln(5%)/ln(0.9993527) = 4,626.7 units.

Definition: A unit is the minimum bet on a video poker machine for which the full royal flush odds are paid. (Video poker machines must almost always be played for more than one coin, in order to get the maximum odds on a royal flush.)

Thus, to play with a 5% RoR on a quarter machine which requires 5 coins, we would need $1.25 x 4,626.7 = $5,784. A $1 machine would require $5 x 4,626.7 = $23,134.

Using Excel To Solve The Risk of Ruin Equation

If you are unfamiliar with spreadsheets, you may want to skip this section.

There are a few minor tricks to using Excel to find the correct value for R(1) in Eq 9. First, pick a cell which will end up being your R(1), and place an initial guess of 0.5 in the cell. In a second cell, calculate the right hand side of Eq. 9, using the 1st cell as R(1). Our goal is to find the R(1) which makes these 2 cells equal. So, multiply the difference between the first 2 cells by 1 billion, and place the result in a 3rd cell. (We multiply by 1 billion to force Excel to get a very precise answer.) Now use Excel’s Goal Seek command to force the 3rd cell to zero by adjusting the 1st cell. When Goal Seek is done, the value of R(1) which solves [9] will appear in your 1st cell. In the Deuces Wild example above, this value was 0.9993527.

By making our initial guess for R(1) at 0.5, we have avoided a potential problem. The problem lies in the fact that R(1) = 1 is a solution of [9]. In fact, R(1)=1 is a solution to every such game that has any negative payouts, including both positive and negative expectation games. By making our initial guess at 0.5 in a positive expectation game, we have found that Goal Seek always finds the desired value of R(1) which is between 0 and 1.

What About “Cash Back”?

Many casino slot clubs offer a “cash back”, in which a fixed percent (typically 0.1% to 0.7%) of the total amount bet is calculated and paid to the player after some accumulation. Cash back makes playing video poker more attractive. Even though cash back is paid in increments (after several hours, for example), the effect on RoR can be very closely approximated by assuming the cash back payout is instantaneous. Then we can write [8], the generalized risk equation, as

R(1) = E [pi x R(1)(Zi+C)]. [10]

where C is the percent cash back. Once we solve this equation for R(1), we can easily calculate the RoR for any bankroll, using [5]. This is what we have done in Table 2.

To maintain generality in Table 2, we have related bankroll to the size of the royal flush payoff.

Definition: A 1xRoyal bankroll is the payoff for a royal flush times the unit.

For example, for a $1 machine that requires 5 coins, a 1xRoyal bankroll is 800 x $5 = $4,000.

Table 2 RoR FOR DEUCES WILD WITH CASH BACK
B Cash Back
A in Royals in Units 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.8% 1.0%
N 1xRoyal = 800 59.6% 51.0% 43.2% 36.3% 30.2% 24.9%
K 2 1,600 30.4% 26.0% 18.7% 13.2% 9.1% 6.2%
R 3 2,400 21.1% 13.3% 8.1% 4.8% 2.8% 1.5%
O 4 3,200 12.6% 6.8% 3.5% 1.7% 0.8% 0.4%
L 5 4,000 7.5% 3.4% 1.5% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1%
L

Legend to Table 2: The values in the table give the RoR for various levels of cash back and for various bankrolls. Bankroll is given both as a multiple of the royal flush jackpot and also as the number of units. For Deuces Wild, the royal flush jackpot is 800 units per coin. Thus, “2xRoyal” is 1,600 units. For a $1 game which requires 5 coins, multiply the number of units by $5. For a $0.25 game, multiply by $1.25. So, 2xRoyal on a $1 machine would be 1,600 x $5 = $8,000.

The data in Table 2 are illustrated in Chart 1.

Legend to Chart: This chart shows how cash back affects risk of ruin. Each line represents a different initial bankroll. Bankroll is given as a multiple of the royal flush jackpot. (see, also, Table 2.)

Table 2 and Chart 1 show how valuable cash back is, not just for ev, but also for lowering bankroll requirements. With no cash back on a dollar machine, you need $20,000 (= 5 royals) to have an RoR of 7.5%. But a 0.4% cash back will get you almost the same RoR (8.1%) for only a $12,000 bankroll.

Other Applications

Any positive ev game with a guaranteed set of payoffs with fixed probabilities, including at least one losing outcome, can be analyzed using the generalized risk equation, equation [8]. If a game has a progressive jackpot, such as Caribbean Stud, some “reel” slot machines, and progressive video poker machines, then the generalized risk equation is still useful. If the equation is solved for what one considers the lowest playable jackpot, then the result will be an upper bound on the risk of ruin. If a jackpot almost never rises above a certain level, then solving at that level will give a lower bound on the RoR.

Even a lottery can be analyzed using these methods if one considers the chance the jackpot will be shared by more than one winner.

Comparison To Other Methods

An equation that is often used to accurately calculate the RoR for blackjack was published by George C. in “How To Make $1 Million Playing Casino Blackjack” (1988):

RoR = ((1-ev/sd) / (1+ev/sd)) ^ (b/sd) [11]

where sd is standard deviation and “^” signifies “raised to the power of”. If we apply [11] to the Deuces Wild game with no cash back, we can compare the RoRs to what we get from the generalized risk equation:

Bankroll
(in royals)
RoR approx
by [11]
RoR exact
by [8]
and [5]
5 9.6% 7.5%
6 6.0% 4.5%
7 3.8% 2.7%
8 2.4% 1.6%

So, on a 5-coin dollar machine, the exact RoR for a $32,000 (=8 royals) bankroll is 1.6%, versus the 2.4% we would get from [11]. To get the RoR down to 1%, you actually only need $35,600, instead of the $39,400 predicted by [11].

The differences are caused by the substantial asymmetry of video poker payoffs in comparison to a game like blackjack.

Summary

We have described a method for doing accurate risk of ruin calculations on profitable video poker (and other similar) games. The method involves:

  1. Solving [8] to get the risk of losing a 1-unit “bankroll”
  2. Using [5] to calculate the RoR for any bankroll.
  3. Using [6] to calculate the bankroll required to achieve a chosen level of risk.

In Table 2 and Chart 3 we have presented the results of using this approach to analyze RoR for full-pay Deuces Wild. In a future article, we intend to present similar RoR tables for various other video poker games.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Evgeny Sorokin for presenting and explaining the generalized risk equation which is the basis of this article. We are also indebted to MathProf for helpful discussions about the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the generalized risk equation. Thanks also to Arthur Dent, Bootlegger, JD, MathProf and “P” for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Poker Tournament Satellites

Why Skillful Satellite Play Cuts Your Bankroll Requirements More Than You Think

by Arnold Snyder and Math Boy

(From Blackjack Forum , Vol. XXVI #1, Winter 2007)
© Blackjack Forum Online 2007

This article will look primarily at how you should estimate the dollar value of a poker tournament satellite. It will look at the factors that make a satellite a good investment, and will discuss how skill at satellites can lower the bankroll you need to enter bigger, more costly poker tournaments, or lower your risk of ruin (RoR) for any given bankroll. We’re going to focus on specific satellite strategies in a later article. In this article, we’ll look at the dollar value of satellites to a player who already has the strategic skills necessary to beat satellites.

First, a definition: A satellite is a tournament that does not award money to the winner(s), but instead awards an entry to a tournament that has a bigger buy-in cost. In some satellites, a small amount of money is awarded in addition to a seat or seats into a bigger event, but this money is a secondary prize, awarded either to cover the winners’ travel expenses or to “round out” the prize pool.

It is the seat in the bigger tournament that is the main prize. There are some satellite pros who play satellites primarily for money, not seats into a bigger event. Many satellites, especially for big multi-tournament events, award tournament chips rather than seats in specific events, and these chips can be sold to other players who are buying into the big events. Our primary focus in this article, however, will be on players who want to use satellites to lower their entry costs into main events.

A single table satellite will usually start with ten players, and will typically award one winner a seat in a tournament that has a buy-in of about ten times the cost of the satellite. Some single-table satellites award seats to the top two finishers. A “super satellite” is a multi-table satellite that will award multiple seats into a major tournament, with the exact number dependent on the number of entrants in the satellite.

The “House Edge” on Poker Tournament Satellites

The first thing we need to consider when analyzing a satellite’s value is the house edge. By this, I mean the percentage of the total cost of the satellite that the players are paying to the house for hosting the satellite. Figuring out the house commission is pretty straightforward. We need only two factors: the total combined dollar cost to all of the entrants, and the total dollar value of the satellite prize pool.

For example, a popular World Poker Tour (WPT) single-table satellite has a buy-in of $125. One of the ten entrants will win two $500 tournament chips plus $120 in cash. The other nine entrants receive nothing. For big multi-event tournaments like the WPT or the World Series of Poker (WSOP), it is not uncommon for the hosting casino to run satellites that award tournament chips that may be used in bigger events, instead of seats into a specific event.

Although the series of tournaments may conclude with a “main event,” usually the event with the highest buy-in, there will be many events with smaller buy-ins that precede the main event. A player who wins two $500 tournament chips may use those chips to enter two $500 events, a single $1000 event, or as partial payment into an event that has a buy-in greater than $1000.

In this particular WPT satellite example, the house collects $125 x 10 = $1250, while paying out $500 + $500 (two chips) + $120 (cash) = $1120. So, the house profits $1250 – $1120 = $130 every time they run this satellite. The house edge from the players’ perspective is: $130 / $1250 = 10.40%. Which is to say, the house keeps 10.4% of all the money they collect from the satellite entrants.

At the 2006 Mirage Poker Showdown, a WPT series of tournaments with a $10K main event, there were seven different single-table satellite formats. All were ten-player/one-winner formats. The least expensive had a $60 buy-in, with the winner receiving a single $500 chip plus $50 cash. The most expensive had a $1060 buy-in, with the winner receiving twenty $500 chips (a total of $10K in chips) plus $340 in cash. The chart below shows the buy-ins of these seven satellites with their payouts, the house commission (in $), and the house edge (in %).

Mirage Poker Showdown (WPT)
Single Table Satellites, one winner format
Buy-in Payout in Chips Payout in Cash Total Payout House Commission $ House%
60 500 50 550 50 8.33%
125 1000 120 1120 130 10.40%
175 1500 120 1620 130 7.43%
225 2000 120 2120 130 5.78%
275 2500 120 2620 130 4.73%
810 7500 340 7840 260 3.21%
1060 10000 340 10340 260 2.45%

One obvious trend is that, in general, the greater the buy-in cost, the lower the house edge. The only exception among this group of satellites is that the house edge on the least expensive ($60 buy-in) satellite is smaller than the house edge on the second cheapest ($125 buy-in) satellite.

Poker Tournament Satellite Value for the “Average” Player

As a satellite player, what does the house edge mean to you? Consider your result in these satellites if you play with an “average” level of skill that gives you neither an advantage nor a disadvantage against the field. Some may be better players than you, and some worse, but in the long run, you will average one satellite win for every ten satellites you play.

This chart shows the value (in $ and %) of each of these seven WPT satellites for an “average” player:

Player Wins One Out of Ten Satellites Entered
Buy-in Dollar Value Player Adv. in %
60 -5.00 -8.33%
125 -13.00 -10.40%
175 -13.00 -7.43%
225 -13.00 -5.78%
275 -13.00 -4.73%
810 -26.00 -3.21%
1060 -26.00 -2.45%

Let’s first note that in all cases, the dollar value is negative. “Average” players will lose money in satellites over the long run. Computing the dollar value is simple. Consider the $60 satellite. If you play ten of these satellites, you will invest $60 x 10 = $600 in these ten plays. If you win one, you get paid $500 (chip) + $50 (cash) = $550 in dollar value. Collecting $550 for every $600 you invest is a loss of $50 for every ten satellites you play, which is an average loss of $5 per satellite. So, the dollar value of this satellite to the average player is -$5.00.

Likewise, the “Player Advantage in %” is negative for the average player in the other satellites, as we would expect. Again, the computation is simple. If I lose $5 for every $60 I invest, then my result (in percent) is: -5 / 60 = -0.0833, which is -8.33%. You might also note that if you look at the prior chart which shows the “house edge” on these satellites, the “player advantage” for an “average” player is always the negative of the house edge.

From the professional players’ perspective, this means that to play satellites with average skill is a waste of money. In the long run, it will cost the average player more to enter tournaments via satellite than it would cost him to simply buy-in to the big events directly.

A player who is short on funds might argue that he would never pay $10K to enter a major tournament, but that he is willing to gamble $1060 on a long shot to get into such an event. In fact, this is a good argument if you accept the fact that you are gambling on a negative expectation game. One of the reasons that tournaments have become so valuable to professional players is that so many amateurs are willing to gamble at a disadvantage on satellite entries.

Satellite Value for the “Better-than-Average” Player

Now let’s look at how satellite skill affects the value of satellites to the player. Let’s say you can win one out of every nine of these ten-player satellites that you enter. How would this affect both the dollar value and your advantage (in %) in these same seven WPT satellites?

Player Wins One Out of Nine Satellites Entered
Buy-in Dollar Value Player Adv. in %
60 1.11 1.85%
125 -0.56 -0.44%
175 5.00 2.86%
225 10.56 4.69%
275 16.11 5.86%
810 61.11 7.54%
1060 88.89 8.39%

Big difference. The cheapest satellites are still not worth the trouble, due to the high house edge. Few players at this modest level of satellite skill should be interested in entering the $60 satellite, as the $1.11 value is a pretty low payout for a lot of work. And the $125 satellite (which you may recall has a higher house edge) is still a negative expectation gamble. The player who can win one in nine of these has a notably superior result to the “average” player who can win only one in ten, as the more skillful player will be losing only 56 cents per satellite played, as opposed to losing $13. Still, in the long run, the player who expects to win just one in nine of the $125 satellites would be paying less to enter the bigger tournaments if he skipped the satellites and just paid the full buy-in price of the event.

With the $1060 satellite, the one-in-nine player advantage is 8.39%, which is a dollar value of $88.89. For many players, this modest level of satellite skill might make these satellites worth the effort.

The Satellite Professionals

As your satellite skill increases, the value of playing satellites goes up dramatically. A more talented satellite pro can do quite well in ten-player/one-winner satellites if he can win just one of every eight satellites he enters. Here’s how he would do in these seven WPT satellites with this level of skill:

Player Wins One Out of Eight Satellites Entered
Buy-in Dollar Value Player Adv. in %
60 8.75 14.58%
125 15.00 12.00%
175 27.50 15.71%
225 40.00 17.78%
275 52.50 19.09%
810 170.00 20.99%
1060 232.50 21.93%

At this skill level, there may be sufficient dollar value to warrant playing these satellites at any buy-in level. With the smaller buy-in satellites, you must decide if the expected dollar return is sufficient to spend, on average, about an hour of your time in satellite play. Many of us wouldn’t work for $8.75 an hour, which is the dollar value of the $60 satellite for the one-win-in-eight player.

But we must also consider that for every satellite we play, we gain more satellite experience, and this should translate sooner or later to greater satellite skill. Like all other forms of poker, you can’t increase your satellite skills without playing them. And this becomes more important as the dollar value increases with the satellite cost. For example, with a dollar value of $232.50, the $1060 satellite will gain you entry into a $10K event, on average, for a cost of just over $8K. That’s a substantial discount.

The Top-of-the-Line Poker Tournament Satellite Pros

The top satellite pros win, on average, about one out of every six to seven ten-player/one-winner satellites they enter. They accomplish this with a combination of skill at fast-play strategies, skill at short-handed play, and skill at choosing weak fields of competitors. No pro wants to enter a satellite and find himself facing a table full of other pros. The value of satellites to a pro is as much a function of his competitors’ lack of skill as it is of his own skill.

Let’s compare the dollar values of these seven WPT single-table satellites for players who expect to win one of every ten, nine, eight, seven, six, and five satellites they play:

Dollar Value per Satellite, if Player Wins Once per:
Buy-in 10 9 8 7 6 5
60 -5.00 1.11 8.75 18.57 31.67 50.00
125 -13.00 -0.56 15.00 35.00 61.67 99.00
175 -13.00 5.00 27.50 56.43 95.00 149.00
225 -13.00 10.56 40.00 77.86 128.33 199.00
275 -13.00 16.11 52.50 99.29 161.67 249.00
810 -26.00 61.11 170.00 310.00 496.67 758.00
1060 -26.00 88.89 232.50 417.14 663.33 1008.00

Let’s also look at the various players’ advantages in percent for these frequencies of wins:

Player Advantage (%), if Player Wins Once per:
Buy-in 10 9 8 7 6 5
60 -8.33% 1.85% 14.58% 30.95% 52.78% 83.33%
125 -10.40% -0.44% 12.00% 28.00% 49.33% 79.20%
175 -7.43% 2.86% 15.71% 32.24% 54.29% 85.14%
225 -5.78% 4.69% 17.78% 34.60% 57.04% 88.44%
275 -4.73% 5.86% 19.09% 36.10% 58.79% 90.55%
810 -3.21% 7.54% 20.99% 38.27% 61.32% 93.58%
1060 -2.45% 8.39% 21.93% 39.35% 62.58% 95.09%

The final column in both charts, which shows the player’s expectation if he is skillful enough to win one out of every five of the satellites he plays, is more theoretical than realistic. This may be possible for a skillful satellite player who always manages to face a very weak field, but most satellite players today are not this weak. Many players are aware of the necessity of taking risks in satellites as the field diminishes and the blinds increase.

Nevertheless, we can see from the charts that a satellite player who is skillful enough to win one out of every six or seven of these satellites will have an advantage in the neighborhood of 30% to 60%, and that is a big enough edge to interest any professional gambler.

Other Poker Tournament Satellite Formats

As mentioned at the beginning of this article, not all satellites are single-player one-winner formats. The two-winner format is also quite common. Typically, a player might pay $200 plus the house fee to win one of two seats into a $1K event. With this format, the average player would expect to win two out of every ten satellites entered, as opposed to one in ten. Likewise, a win of two in eight with the two-winner format would be equivalent to winning one in eight with the single-winner format. And the top satellite pros would expect to win two out of every six or seven played in the two-winner format.

The two-winner format is generally advantageous for both the players and the poker room. Satellites played down to two winners finish faster than satellites played down to one winner. This means that more satellites can be played prior to a big event, with twice as many main event entries generated per satellite. The two-winner format also reduces fluctuations for the players.

If you’re good with spreadsheets, you can easily set up a spreadsheet to calculate the dollar return and house/player advantages for the two-winner format based on the buy-in costs and payouts.

Multi-table satellites, often called super-satellites or mega-satellites, are also very common, especially for major events. For example, the WSOP typically has a $1060 super-satellite for the $10K main event. One seat to the main event is awarded for every ten satellite entries. Here’s a chart that shows the dollar values and player advantages based on the frequency of player wins:

WSOP Mega Satellite, $1060 Buy-in,
One Seat Awarded per Ten Entrants
Dollar Value and Player Adv. If Player Wins Once per:
  10 9 8 7 6 5
$ Value -60.00 51.11 190.00 368.57 606.67 940.00
Adv. (%) -5.66% 4.82% 17.92% 34.77% 57.23% 88.68%

Note that the house edge on this event is 5.66%. These multi-table satellites are a good value for a player on a budget who can only afford to enter one satellite for a shot at the main event. And this is especially true if the player is a good tournament player, but not really all that skilled at single-table satellite play. (And there are many players who are skilled at multi-table tournaments who do not fare well in single-table satellites, primarily because of a lack of experience with making the quick adjustments necessary for the speed and short-handed play.)

For a skillful single-table satellite player, however, super satellites have less value than single-table satellites. The higher-priced single-table satellites often have a lower house edge, and they play out much faster. Big multi-table satellites often take many hours to determine the winners, as opposed to the typical 60-90 minutes a single-table satellite lasts. Time is money.

Using Satellites to Lower the Buy-In Costs of Major Poker Tournaments

Let’s say you’ve been playing a lot of small buy-in tournaments and your tournament skills have increased to the point where you want to start playing bigger events where you can make more money. You don’t feel ready for the major $5K and $10K events that the top pros dominate, so you want to start playing in $1K events as a stepping stone to the majors.

Let’s also assume that you’ve been beating the small buy-in tournaments at a rate of well over 200%, and you believe you would have an advantage of at least 100% in these bigger $1K events. You’ve been building your bankroll with these small buy-in tournaments, and your plan is to start using the money you’ve won to advance. The main question you have: Is your bankroll really big enough to withstand the greater fluctuations you’ll encounter in these $1k events?

If you do not have a sufficient bankroll to enter $1K events at this time, that does not necessarily mean that you must resign yourself to smaller buy-in tournaments. In fact, if you are a skillful satellite player, you can start entering $1K tournaments via satellites with a smaller bankroll. As the charts above show, satellites can very effectively lower the buy-in costs of bigger events. And a lower buy-in cost means a smaller bankroll is required. But how much smaller?

Before we can figure out how much satellite skill can lower your bankroll requirements, however, let’s quickly review what your bankroll requirements would be for a given type of tournament if you pay the full buy-in cost.

Let’s say you would like to play a hundred $1K tournaments in the next year. If you live in Las Vegas, this is easily accomplished, as Bellagio has two $1K buy-in tournaments every week. $1K events are also popular preliminary events for WSOP Circuit series, WPT events, and many other special tournament series that poker rooms run throughout the year. In order to estimate the bankroll requirements for entering a hundred $1K events, assuming a player has a 100% advantage on the field, let’s use a real-world example.

At the recent WSOP Circuit Events that were hosted by Harrah’s Rincon in San Diego, the $1k event on February 13, 2007, had a total of 89 players who paid $1060 for a seat. Nine spots were paid. This was the payout structure:

Place Payout
1st $31,079
2nd $17,266
3rd $9,496
4th $6,906
5th $6,043
6th $5,180
7th $4,317
8th $3,453
9th $2,590

Now, we have something to work with. Obviously, every $1K tournament you enter will not have this payout structure, but for our purposes, we’re going to assume that you want to know the bankroll requirements for entering a hundred of these specific tournaments. Since we already said that you estimate that you have a 100% advantage in these events, we next have to make some assumptions as to how that 100% advantage will be realized.

When we say that you have a 100% advantage, we mean that for every $1K you pay to get into these tournaments, you will cash out $2K. That cash out will pay you back your $1K buy-in and provide a $1K profit, which is a 100% advantage. From looking at the payout schedule, we can see that there is no payout of exactly $2,120 (twice the buy-in/entry) for any finishing position. Even 9th place pays $2,590, which is a 144% profit. In order to realize a 100% advantage, we will accomplish this by having many finishes with no return, but a number of finishes that return greatly in excess of 100%. (And note that many tournament pros enjoy advantages in excess of 200% and even 300%. We are using this 100% example for a player who is just moving up to $1K events from smaller events, and who is still sharpening his skills.)

Assuming you play a hundred of these tournaments, let’s create a win record that would provide an advantage in the neighborhood of 100% overall. To do this, I’ll assume that you finish in the money 16 times, or about once every 6 to 7 tournaments. Here’s a set of finishes that includes 3 first places, 3 second places, 3 third places, 2 fourths, 2 fifths, 1 sixth, 1 seventh, 1 eighth, and 84 finishes out of the money, and would earn you 100.35% on your total investment:

Finish Payout # Cashes Total
1st $31,079 3 $93,237
2nd $17,266 3 $51,798
3rd $9,496 3 $28,488
4th $6,906 2 $13,812
5th $6,043 2 $12,086
6th $5,180 1 $5,180
7th $4,317 1 $4,317
8th $3,453 1 $3,453
9th $2,590 0 $0
10-89h $0 84 $0
Total Cashed: $212,371
Total Invested: $106,000
Total Win: $106,371
Win %: 100.35%

That’s close enough to 100% for our purposes. Obviously, no player could estimate that these will be his exact finishes in 100 tournaments. We’re just creating a set of finishes that would return approximately 100% profit to the player. There are many other ways that a 100% advantage could be realized. There could be fewer than 16 money finishes, but more with the higher payouts, or there could be more than 16 money finishes, but fewer with the big payouts and more low-end finishes. The above set of payouts is just one way that a player with a 100% advantage might realize this profit.

In fact, despite the assumed 100% advantage, over the course of these 100 tournaments, a player in real life would be highly unlikely to show a result this close to an actual 100% profit. His real-world result in a series of 100 consecutive tournaments would be subject to what statisticians call standard deviation. He may have an exceptionally good run of tournaments, or an exceptionally bad run, just due to normal fluctuations in the cards and the situations he encounters.

In the Appendix to The Poker Tournament Formula, pages 328-340, there is a discussion of what standard deviation is, what it means to a gambler, and how you figure it out for poker tournaments. I’m not going to reproduce that discussion here, so if you do not understand the concept of standard deviation, and especially how it applies to poker tournaments, read that chapter the book. Also, different payout schedules caused by different field sizes will have a major effect on standard deviation, so don’t assume that the discussion about this specific $1K tournament would apply to all $1K tournaments. This tournament is just an example from real life.

Using the method described in The Poker Tournament Formula, and applying it to the player with the 100% advantage in the $1060 tournaments described above, we find that although our expectation is to win (profit, after subtracting our buy-in/entry fees) a total of $106,371 over the course of 100 tournaments, one standard deviation on that result is $62,853. So, if we finish two standard deviations below our actual expectation (and 2 SDs = $125,706), we could actually finish these 100 tournaments with a loss of $19K, despite our 100% advantage!

This may sound impossible, but keep in mind that we only expect to win $106K and that $93K of our total return comes from just three first place finishes. A few bad beats and cold decks at crucial times at the final table, or before we get to the final table, can wreak havoc with our overall results.

Since we could conceivably suffer a net loss of $19K over the course of these 100 tournaments, and still be within the realm of what a statistician would consider a “normal” fluctuation, we might conclude that a bankroll of $20K would be sufficient to finance our play, though we could conceivably lose it all. In fact, a bankroll of $20K would usually be more than sufficient to finance this level of play, assuming we are correct about our 100% edge. The standard deviation on our expected results does give us a pretty good idea of the kinds of fluctuations that are possible due to bad luck in tournaments of this level over this period of time.

Technically, your $20K bankroll would probably be very safe if you cut back on the cost of the tournaments you entered if you started experiencing significant negative results. In other words, if you finish out of the money in the first ten tournaments you enter—and this is entirely possible—then you really would be wise to start entering $500 tournaments until you hit a few wins (or just one good win) to build your bankroll back up. Fluctuations of greater than two standard deviations happen all the time.

(Cutting back on the size of your bets after bankroll reductions is a method of “Kelly Betting,” another term that would be known to any serious blackjack player, but few poker players. I’ll discuss Kelly betting approaches for tournament players in more detail later in this article.)

If you are familiar with the statistical concept of standard deviation as discussed in The Poker Tournament Formula, you are probably aware of the fact that a statistician expects a fluctuation of greater than two standard deviations 5% of the time. Which is to say that if 20 players were playing these tournaments with a 100% advantage, 19 of them would expect to finish 100 tournaments within two standard deviations of their expectation, but one of them would expect to experience a fluctuation of greater than two standard deviations from his expectation.

A fluctuation of 3 standard deviations is extremely rare, as results this far from expectation have only about a 1/300 chance of occurrence, so it’s not really necessary to maintain a bankroll to withstand this much of a fluctuation. But to be safe, just based on the standard deviation, I’d advise a bankroll closer to $30K for these $1K events, assuming you have a 100% advantage.

But What About Different Levels of Aggression in Poker Tournaments?

Let’s consider the fact that we’ve created our hypothetical 100% advantage in this tournament by devising a specific set of in-the-money finishes that would result in this win rate. In the real world, there are many different ways a player could end up with a 100% advantage. He could be a very aggressive player who had fewer cashes but more top-end finishes, or he could be a more conservative player who had a greater number of cashes, but more low-end finishes. Might not the bankroll requirements for these player types differ from each other?

Let’s analyze and compare the requirements for these different player types.

The More Aggressive Hypothetical Tournament Player

To provide this player with a 100% advantage, let’s say he finishes in the money only 10 times in 100 tournaments (instead of 16 times as in our prior example), but with more high-end finishes. Here’s the aggressive player’s chart:

Finish Payout # Cashes Total
1st $31,079 4 $124,316
2nd $17,266 4 $69,064
3rd $9,496 2 $18,992
4th $6,906 0 $0
5th $6,043 0 $0
6th $5,180 0 $0
7th $4,317 0 $0
8th $3,453 0 $0
9th $2,590 0 $0
10-89h $0 90 $0
Total Cashed: $212,372
Total Invested: $106,000
Total Win: $106,372
Win %: 100.35%

Conveniently, this very different set of cashes provides this aggressive player with the same 100.35% win rate as the player in our first example.

The More Conservative Hypothetical Tournament Player

For further comparison, let’s also create a sample player who has more final table finishes (25, instead of 16 or 10), with more low-end finishes, but still, with a 100% win rate. Here’s this more conservative player’s chart:

Finish Payout # Cashes Total
1st $31,079 2 $62,158
2nd $17,266 2 $34,532
3rd $9,496 3 $28,488
4th $6,906 3 $20,718
5th $6,043 3 $18,129
6th $5,180 3 $15,540
7th $4,317 4 $17,268
8th $3,453 3 $10,359
9th $2,590 2 $5,180
10-89h $0 75 $0
Total Cashed: $212,372
Total Invested: $106,000
Total Win: $106,372
Win %: 100.35%

In order to compare the bankroll requirements of these three different player types, who all have the same overall win rate in the same tournament, let’s use a different statistical method of analysis, the Gambler’s Ruin Formula, or, as gamblers today more often call it, Risk of Ruin (or RoR).

First, here’s an explanation of what we’re trying to figure out here. A player wants to play tournaments that have a specified buy-in/entry cost, say, $1060. He knows from the above discussion on standard deviation that he could conceivably lose his bankroll due to negative fluctuations, even if he has a 100% overall advantage. The player wants to minimize his risk, so he wants to know how much of a bankroll he’d need to insure himself of a 90% chance of success, or 95% chance of success, or even 99% chance of success. Also, if the player could maintain his 100% win rate while using either a more aggressive or more conservative strategy, how would this affect his chance of success?

The Risk of Ruin Formula that was used to analyze the three sample players described above was first published by Math Boy and Dunbar in the Fall 1999 issue of Blackjack Forum. The article is titled, “Risk of Ruin for Video Poker and Other Skewed Up Games”. You may follow this link to get to the article in our online library, so we’re not going to print the Risk of Ruin formula here.

Let’s just look at the RoR data on our three player types. Remember, the conservative player makes it to the final table 25 times in 100 tournaments, but wins the fewest top-end prizes. The middle-of-the-road player has 16 money finishes out of 100 tournaments, with more at the top-end. The aggressive player has only 10 money finishes, but takes four firsts, four seconds, and two third-place payouts. These are their bankroll requirements for various levels of risk:

RoR Conservative Bankroll Middle-of-Road Bankroll Aggressive Bankroll
1% 37,213 45,449 55,853
5% 24,208 29,565 36,333
10% 18,607 22,724 27,926

We want to emphasize here that the “conservative” and “aggressive” styles we’ve created are for purposes of analysis—they are not meant to be realistic. With regards to the aggressive player, it’s unlikely that a player who was skillful enough to always make the top three when he finished in the money (with 80% of those finishes in the top two) would never finish in any other final table position. Even the most aggressive and skillful players will suffer bad beats and cold decks and hit lower payouts occasionally.

It’s really more likely that such a player would have a range of money finishes at all levels, even if he had more than his share of the top prizes. The problem we faced in creating this player, however, was that we were attempting to maintain that 100% win rate for purposes of risk of ruin comparison, and if we start scattering a more realistic set of smaller wins among his finishes, his win rate will climb dramatically (as it tends to do in real life with the best aggressive players).

The conservative player’s results were similarly skewed. It is highly unlikely that a player with so few top-end finishes would be able to hit the money often enough to have a 100% win rate. But the purpose of the example is simply to show that playing style does have an effect on a player’s bankroll requirement, all other things being equal. If we look at the middle-of-the road player’s bankroll requirement for a 5% RoR (95% chance of success), we see he needs a bankroll in the neighborhood of $30,000. The conservative player might get away with a bankroll of about $5000 less than this, but the aggressive player might need $5000 more.

These numbers may surprise many tournament players who have not read The Poker Tournament Formula, as there is widespread ignorance among poker players with regards to bankroll requirements. On one of the WPT shows, for example, a sidebar feature showed professional poker players being asked for advice on bankroll requirements for tournament players, and wound up providing the specific recommendation that tournament players should have a bankroll of ten times their buy-in cost. Don’t we wish…. In fact, that was potentially disastrous advice for serious poker tournament players.

One other thing we must note here is that this sample tournament we’re analyzing had a prize pool based on a total of 89 players. In fact, if you are entering $1K tournaments with 300 players, or 2000+ players as in some of the 2006 WSOP $1K events, the top prizes will be much bigger, and so will your fluctuations and bankroll requirements. We don’t want you to think that a $30K bankroll is sufficient for all $1K tournaments. Again, we ’ll refer you to the detailed discussion in The Poker Tournament Formula on how field size affects bankroll requirements.

Now let’s look at how we can use satellites to lower this bankroll requirement.

Lower Buy-In Costs Mean Lower Poker Tournament Bankroll Requirements

Since we’re discussing a specific $1K WSOP Circuit Event, let’s look at one of the actual satellites that was being offered at Harrah’s Rincon that allowed a player to win entry into this event. They ran ten-player satellites that cost $240, and the satellites paid two winners. Each winner received two $500 chips and $100 cash. So, if you were one of the two satellite winners, you’d have been able to cover your $1060 buy-in/entry to the $1K tournament, and still have $40 cash to put in your pocket.

Here’s a chart that shows this satellite’s dollar value and player advantage, based on a player’s expectation of winning twice out of every 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, and 5 satellites entered:

WSOP Circuit Satellite,
$240 Buy-in, Two Winners
Each Get $1000 (chips) plus $100 cash
Dollar Value and Player Advantage If Player Wins Twice per:
  10 9 8 7 6 5
$ Value -$20.00 $4.44 $35.00 $74.29 $126.67 $200.00
Adv. (%) -8.33% 1.85% 14.58% 30.95% 52.78% 83.33%

Now, let’s say the same three hypothetical tournament players (conservative, middle-of-the-road, and aggressive), all with the same 100% advantage in the $1K events, are also skillful satellite players, and they each decide that they will always enter these $1K events through satellites. And, let’s assume their levels of satellite skill provide all of them with an expectation of winning twice for every seven (or, essentially, one for every 3.5) two-winner satellites they enter. How does this affect the actual cost to them of entering the $1K events? Here’s the math:

3.5 of these satellites will cost $240 x 3.5 = $840. For that $840 expense, the player gets $1K in chips plus $100 in cash. Since the buy-in/entry for the $1K event is $1060, the player can buy-in to the $1K tourney and pocket the extra $40 cash, leaving him with a total buy-in/entry cost of $800 even, a discount of $260 from the full tournament price.

This lowered cost per tournament drastically reduces the risk of ruin for each player. You might guess off the top of your head that paying $800 per tournament on average, as opposed to $1060, might cut your bankroll requirements proportionately. Since 800 / 1060 = 75.5%, you might be tempted to take the 1% RoR bankroll requirement of $45,449 for the middle of the road player, and multiply it by 75.5%, for a bankroll requirement of $34,300.

But, in fact, the effect of the satellite discount entry is quite a bit stronger than that. What you must also consider is that although you are entering these $1060 tournaments for only $800, the prize pool does not change. This means that the same win record will increase your percent advantage from 100% to 165%. This increased percent advantage will lower the bankroll requirement for a 1% risk of ruin for the middle of the road player from $45K to $30K.

(Unfortunately, figuring out the RoR for entering these tournaments through satellites is not quite as simple as just using $800 as the entry fee. The situation is similar to a parlay bet at a sports book. The satellite has its own flux, and that must be included with the flux on the main tournament in order to correctly calculate overall flux and risk of ruin.)

Let’s look at the RoR bankroll requirements assuming these three players always enter these $1060 tournaments through these $240 two-winner satellites, with each winning two out of every seven of the satellites:

RoR Conservative Bankroll Middle-of-Road Bankroll Aggressive Bankroll
1% 19,358 30,380 42,905
5% 12,592 19,762 27,910
10% 9,679 15,190 21,452
What Risk of Ruin Should a Poker Tournament Player Consider Safe?

Many players might say off the top of their heads that they’d be comfortable with a 90% chance of tournament success. But bear in mind that ruin means ruin. If you have a $30K bankroll, and you find yourself in that unlucky 10% of players who would expect to lose it all if playing at this risk level, then you are flat broke. So, if this $30K represents your life savings, that would be a foolhardy way to play. If it represents money that is easily replaceable (say by cashing in a few CDs when they mature), then it may not be a bad gamble.

Most professional gamblers prefer to use a “Kelly betting” system. Those of you who have read any of my blackjack books know what this is. If you are not familiar with the term, it essentially means that you always bet proportionately to your bankroll in order ensure that you never go broke.

For example, if a player was playing these $1K tournaments with a 5% RoR, he could do so with a $30K bankroll. If this same player decided in advance that he would enter tournaments with smaller buy-ins than $1K if he lost a significant portion of his bankroll (until he built it back up), then his actual RoR would be quite a bit lower than 5%. This is why, in The Poker Tournament Formula, I advise: “…Should your bankroll go into a nosedive, be willing to start entering tournaments with either smaller buy-ins or smaller fields of players, until you rebuild your bank.”

In an ideal world, a player would create a chart of optimal entry fees to pay, based on his current bankroll, that would virtually eliminate any Risk of Ruin. For example, If he lost 40% of his starting bank, he would play in $600 events. If he lost 50% of his bankroll, he would play in $500 events. With a 75% loss, he would play in $250 events, etc. Unfortunately, in the real world, is that in the real world we can’t always find tournaments priced to our needs. If I lose 10% of my bankroll, can I find a $900 tournament?

For any poker tournament player on a limited bankroll, however, it makes sense to follow such a plan as closely as possible. If your bankroll drops by 10% from the amount sufficient for $1k tournaments, you have to decide if you are willing to accept the increased risk of ruin inherent in continuing to play $1k events, or if you had better drop to $500 events, if that is all that’s available below the $1k buy-in level.

Also, be honest with yourself about the actual size of your tournament bankroll. Your playing bankroll should not include your rent money, car payments, living expenses, credit card or installment loan payments, or the like.

Poker Tournament Satellite Frequently Asked Questions

Q: If I’ve already played a few satellites without winning, should I still buy-in to the main event if there are no more satellites?

A: If you have the bankroll to enter the main event at full price, and you have the skill to make money in these types of events, then by all means, buy-in for the full price. If the reason you are playing satellites is to cut your costs because you can’t afford to play the bigger events, then do not buy-in for the full price. Just keep developing your satellite skills and play only in the big events when you win your seat through a satellite.

Q: If I’m just an amateur but I really want to get into a WPT main event just to play with the pros and take my shot at fame and fortune, but that $10K buy-in is a bit steep for my wallet, should I set a limit to the number of satellites I’ll play in an attempt to enter the event?

A: If you are not a skillful satellite player and you are simply attempting to enter a major event cheaply on a long shot gamble, then you should definitely decide beforehand exactly how much you’re willing to spend on satellites, and quit if you hit your limit.

Q: If I’m skillful at both satellites and regular tournaments, should I limit the number of satellites I’ll play for any one event?

A: For a skillful player, it’s a different situation. First of all, if you fully intend to enter the main event regardless of your satellite result, then there is the practical consideration of time. If an event starts at 2pm, and satellites start at 8am, it may not be in your best interest to play satellites for six hours prior to starting day one of a tournament that might go 12-14 more hours.

Some pros always play a satellite or two before major events, even when they can afford the full buy-in price, because the satellites are a good value and can be used to lower their overall tournament expenses. If a pro can win one out of seven $1K satellites in order to enter $10K tournaments, and if he plays just one satellite before each major event, then six times he’ll be paying $11K for his seat, and once he’ll pay just $1K. If he plays 21 of these $10K tournaments per year, his three satellite wins will lower his overall tournament cost (and raise his overall profit) by $9K.

If time constraints and guarding against fatigue aren’t part of the equation, and you have an edge at satellite play, there is no reason to limit the number of satellites you’ll play to enter any one event. During big multi-event tournaments like the WSOP, there are satellite pros who virtually camp in the satellite area, playing one satellite after another, day after day.

On some days, they may play ten satellites without a single win, then they’ll win three or four the next day. They use the tournament chips they win to buy-in to the events they want to play, and sell the rest to players for full value. Obviously, these pros pay no attention whatsoever to limiting the number of satellites they’ll play for any one event. Nor should they. They’re in it for the long run, and if they have the skill to beat the satellite fields and the house edge, they’ll come out way ahead in the long run.

Conclusion

If you are serious about playing in major tournaments with big buy-ins, there is a huge value to developing satellite skills. At the 2006 WSOP, I overheard one player commenting to another that he was surprised at how many of the big name pros were entering satellites, since they could so easily afford the full buy-ins. If you look at the value of satellites as shown in the charts provided in this article, you can see why many pros are attracted to satellites.

If you play a lot of major events, and a lot of satellites to enter these events, you can substantially lower your overall annual tournament costs while increasing your percentage return. I don’t care how much money you have. If you’re paying $10,000 for an event that you could get into for $8,000 (or less), you may be a great poker player, but you’re not that great at financial planning.

Notes and Acknowledgments

Much of the material in this article will be unfamiliar to poker players who have not read The Poker Tournament Formula, because bankroll requirements are estimated using statistical methods that are not taught in your everyday high school math courses. Professional gamblers really need to understand this math, or they will condemn themselves to many years of going broke repeatedly, no matter how skillful they are. As I put it in The Poker Tournament Formula (Chap. 28, “How Much Money Do You Need?”):

It’s the rare blackjack book these days that doesn’t provide at least some information on such topics as standard deviation, the Gambler’s Ruin formula, risk-averse betting strategies, the Kelly criterion, and various related topics, in addition to simplified charts of data that card counters can use to estimate their bankroll requirements.

Most poker books, by contrast, stick to strategic advice exclusively. Blackjack players learn early how to manage their bankrolls; poker players learn early how to hit up their friends when they go broke.

Thankfully, some five months after I published those lines in The Poker Tournament Formula, another poker book has been published that does deal seriously and intelligently, and in much greater depth for cash game players, with the topic of bankroll requirements. This book is The Mathematics of Poker , by Bill Chen and Jerrod Ankenman. This book is to poker what Peter Griffin’s The Theory of Blackjack is to that game.

Unfortunately, like Griffin’s book, much of the material in the Chen/Ankenman book is not readily accessible to a player who has not taken some college level courses in probability and statistics. I still urge any serious poker player to get this book, just as I have always recommended Griffin’s book to all serious blackjack players. The Chen book is essentially a book for math heads, but there’s a lot of discussion on a wide range of topics I haven’t seen elsewhere for serious players. He even delves into risk of ruin when you don’t know your advantage.

Risk of ruin is a statistical measure that blackjack players would be familiar with, but that has been long absent from the poker literature. There is an excellent explanation of RoR in Dr. Allan Wilson’s classic text, The Casino Gambler’s Guide (1965). But neither Wilson’s description of risk of ruin, nor any of the descriptions that have been published in many blackjack texts since then, allow for the formula’s use in a game where there are multiple possible payouts, ranging from a loss of the bet (buy-in), to a modest win (low-end finish) to a very large payout compared to the size of the initial bet.

The first published discussion of RoR that I know of for games with multiple payout possibilities was an article by Russian mathematician Evgeny Sorokin that appeared in the March 1999 issue of Dan Paymar’s Video Poker Times newsletter. In response to Sorokin’s article, professional gamblers Math Boy and Dunbar developed an Excel spreadsheet method of applying Sorokin’s generalized risk equation to virtually any game with a skewed payout structure, and I published their method in the Fall 1999 issue of Blackjack Forum, in their article, “Risk of Ruin for Video Poker and Other Skewed Up Games”. Now, Math Boy has helped me to adjust his method for analysis of poker tournaments (or any other gambling tournaments).

I am especially indebted to Math Boy for creating an Excel spreadsheet for me that would not only estimate a tournament’s standard deviation and risk of ruin, but would automatically recalculate these values based on entering the tournament via satellite, at any satellite cost, and with any selected percentage of satellite wins. The spreadsheet is not currently user-friendly for anyone who is not familiar with some of Excel’s advanced statistical functions, but Math Boy is working on a simpler version, similar to his Patience Factor Calculator, that he plans to make available to players at this Web site in the near future.

Incidentally, a number of players have asked me where I came up with the standard deviation formula that appears in The Poker Tournament Formula as they had never seen a method for calculating standard deviation for a game with a tournament payout structure. My method was simply to modify a formula originally created by Doug Reul, which first appeared as the “Volatility Index” in one of Dan Paymar’s 1996 issues of Video Poker Times, and can currently be found in his book, Video Poker: Precision Play.  ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Off TARGET

Jerry Patterson’s New Blackjack System

by Arnold Snyder

(From Blackjack Forum III #3, September 1983)
© 1983 Blackjack Forum

Q: What measures does a pit boss take when he discovers a team of TARGET players?

A: He comps them all to a room for the night, and orders the cocktail waitresses to stop emptying the ashtrays.

Okay, gang, dust off your collective sense of humor. Here comes the TARGET system! I’ll say right off I have no faith whatsoever in Jerry Patterson’s new TARGET system as a winning strategy. The system assuredly has some basis in fact, and what Patterson has attempted to do with TARGET is original, creative, and, on the surface, might be convincing to less sophisticated players. But the success of the system, as a winning strategy, depends on flawed logic, and the acceptance as “facts” of a myriad of old gambling myths.

This is a difficult review for me to write. My difficulty in reviewing this system comes from my deep respect for Jerry Patterson, who is selling the system, and my valued correspondence with a number of the franchisees and instructors with Patterson’s Blackjack Clinics.

Some of these instructors, like Jerry Patterson, believe in the TARGET system, and are teaching it to their students. Some of Patterson’s instructors lack faith in the TARGET system, and have spoken out against it. It is much to Patterson’s credit that he has allowed some of his individual franchise holders to decide for themselves on this issue, and to publicly reject the system.

Jerry has always struck me in the past as honest, fair, and genuinely concerned for his students. I hope he’ll consider my objections to TARGET with his students’ welfare in mind. I’m not going to pull any punches. In my opinion, TARGET is worthless.

A Brief History of the Target System Controversy

I would like to thank all of my readers who sent me TARGET information, in response to my request for same in the last issue of Blackjack Forum. For those who have not been following the TARGET controversy, let me give a brief history:

Last year, Jerry Patterson, author of Blackjack’s Winning Formula and Blackjack: A Winner’s Handbook, (both Putnams, 1981) announced a breakthrough in blackjack systems, which he called the Table Research, Grading, and Evaluation Technique, or TARGET. In his promotional material, Patterson was making what seemed to many knowledgeable blackjack players incredible claims about this new TARGET system. He said that players using the TARGET system could win at a 4% rate in multi-deck games, without counting cards, and that TARGET players would win 80% of their sessions.

In the past year, since introducing the TARGET system, dissent has arisen in the Patterson camp. Jerry has produced neither computer simulation data nor mathematical proof to validate the TARGET system, and he has expressed doubts about the possibilities of finding computer or mathematical analyses which would validate TARGET.

Patterson’s New York Blackjack Clinic franchise, run by Don Schlesinger and Ken Feldman, has publicly refused to offer the TARGET course to their students because of Patterson’s inability to provide any proof that the system works. Mike Schiff, who operates Patterson’s Boston franchise, wrote to me that he also was refusing to offer the TARGET system in his area, for the same reason.

Stanford Wong, long a supporter of Patterson, has recently come out against Patterson’s incredible TARGET claims. Although Wong admits he has neither attended a TARGET clinic nor examined the complete course materials, he labels the TARGET system “nonsense” on the basis of Patterson’s promotional materials, which describe the theory behind TARGET, and also because Patterson has no mathematical nor computer data to back up his claims.

Wong has done extensive computer simulations in search of the “biases” upon which the TARGET system is based. In his recent newsletters he presents his data which indicates that predictable biases do not exist in the way Patterson is attempting to predict them.

In his August issue of Blackjack World, Wong presents convincing computer data that shows that one of Patterson’s major TARGET theories is invalid. Patterson claims that a shoe which favors a player will continue to favor the player, even through subsequent shuffles, because human dealers do not shuffle well enough to destroy the “card flow bias.” Wong tested this hypothesis by not shuffling at all through one million shoes, and instead dealing the cards for the next shoe in the order that they would have been picked up and placed in the discard tray by the dealer. Winning shoes did not beget winning shoes, even with no shuffle.

In the 3 years since I began publishing Blackjack Forum, I’ve rarely gotten more mail on any subject than TARGET. Patterson is reputable, yet the claims for TARGET seem incredible. The price ($450 for the class, or $250 for the mail order course) is high, but, perhaps not too high if the claims are legitimate. Everyone wants to know: Does TARGET work? Has Patterson discovered a truly new and incredibly powerful winning system?

If you’ve been following developments on this for the past six months, you know that in the March Blackjack Forum, I announced that Patterson had invited me to attend a TARGET Clinic, in order to judge TARGET for myself. Then in the last (June) issue of Blackjack Forum, I announced that Patterson had rescinded my invitation because he was displeased that I had referred to the TARGET system as “controversial,” and because some TARGET players were unhappy about the fact that I would be reporting on TARGET.

Since I’d received dozens of letters from my readers who wanted advice on whether or not to invest in the TARGET course, I solicited information from any of my readers who might have taken the complete TARGET course. I have since received photocopies of 2 complete sets of TARGET course materials (slightly different from each other, as one is apparently an older version of the course), plus a number of letters from TARGET course graduates describing everything from the TARGET classroom teaching methods, to the casino experiences of TARGET players, to personal theories and evaluations of TARGET.

For my evaluation of the system, I’m using the more extensive 38-page course, which is more recent and more descriptive of the terminology, etc. The major difference between the newer and older TARGET course materials is that the older one advises the player to use a card count as a factor in grading a table, with a high count being a positive factor. One of my readers who wrote to me about the TARGET classroom instruction said the instructor told the class that the card counting aspect of the TARGET system had been eliminated from the “table grading” technique, and to ignore this portion of the written materials. In the newer course materials, this card counting advice has been eliminated.

The Difficulty of Analyzing the TARGET Blackjack System

TARGET is not a card counting method, though a card counter may use the TARGET system simultaneously with his count. The system most definitely poses problems for computer programmers who would want to simulate it exactly. How do you program a computer to base betting decisions on such factors as the presence of pit personnel, the “disposition” of other players at the table, how much other players are toking,,, and, yes, the condition of the ashtrays?

On the other hand, none of these unprogrammable factors strikes me as necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of the system. The table grading factors are used to determine only one basic factor in whether or not the table is on a winning streak. If so, then the TARGET system says that the winning streak will likely continue, until certain other factors indicate otherwise, most notably, the players start losing.

As I have stated in pervious issues of Blackjack Forum, I am not going to reveal the specific methods of the TARGET system. I will limit my discussion to the theory behind it. If you want to learn the TARGET system, in spite of my warnings, you’ll have to take the course from one of Patterson’s Blackjack Clinics which offers it.

The TARGET Blackjack System in a Nutshell

To play the TARGET system, you must evaluate numerous factors, which have varying degrees of importance, both in selecting tables, and in determining whether or not to continue playing. There is a lot of new lingo introduced by Patterson for the TARGET system—”table grading, ” “table biases,” “trending tables, building tables,” etc.

Much of the TARGET theory strikes me as a bunch of old gamblers’ myths, which have long ago been discarded by mathematicians, now updated with impressive sounding terminology. There is an attractive “logic” to TARGET, as most players would see it, and that “logic” is the same basic “logic” which has been proposed by Charles Einstein in his “rhythm betting” system (Basic Blackjack Betting, GBC).

This “logic” says that (a) cards are not randomly ordered during a shuffle, so, (b) “streaky” clumpings of cards will cause wins and losses to clump together rather than randomly distribute themselves and so, (c) winning hands indicate a winning streak, and losing hands indicate a losing streak. In other words, the player need only rely on the fact that wins and losses are “streakier” in blackjack than in other games, and the player can win by riding the streaks.

Analysis of the TARGET System

It all sounds good, but, in fact, it’s based on false logic, and not logical at all. (See Peter Griffin’s comments on this in the “Letters” section.)

Although it is true that cards will clump together in non-random orderings, and that wins and losses will be influenced by these orderings of cards, it’s impossible to predict the order of the wins and losses to come based on the previous wins and losses.

It’s also impossible to predict the length of the winning or losing streaks based on previous winning or losing streaks. There is no way that a single win, or five consecutive wins, or even twenty consecutive wins, would predict that more wins are on the way. Streaks can only be seen after the fact.

Some “streaks” only last one hand; some last many hands. But you cannot predict that a current streak will continue (or end) based on the results of previous hands.

Card counting is based on an entirely different theory. Betting more when the deck is favorable because of knowledge of the remaining cards provides the player’s advantage. During those times when the counter has his advantage, and is betting on it, winning and losing streaks continue as always, but the counter ignores them. The counter is in it for the long run. His profits acrue slowly from his small, but mathematically provable edge over the house. He’s betting on winning an average of just one extra big bet out of every few hundred hands. He is not playing “streaks” that would be discernable over the short run.

Some aspects of the TARGET system are, to be sure, radically different from Charles Einstein’s “rhythm betting” system. One particularly strange idea, as far as the accepted mathematical theory of blackjack goes, is what Patterson calls the “integrity of the shoe (or game)..” This is defined as “things happening the way they’re supposed to…” If a player draws a low card when he doubles down on 11, this is “bad integrity…” If the dealer busts when he has a stiff, this is “good integrity.”

“Stability of the game,” is another factor Patterson claims is important in maintaining a bias. He says that with a “card flow bias,” as opposed to a “clump card bias, ” you might maintain the stability of the game by playing a second hand if someone leaves the table, or, if necessary, by discouraging new players from entering a game.

This strikes me as nothing more than the old gamblers’ myth that when things are going well you shouldn’t change “the order of the cards.” Ian Andersen, in Turning the Tables on Las Vegas (Random House, 1976), describes this old myth, and points out how card counters can use it for camouflage purposes. Andersen used to ask dealers to shuffle up (when the count was low, of course) so he could “change the order of the cards…” And (when the count was high) he would discourage new players from entering the game, in reality so he could keep those advantageous hands for himself, but explaining to them that he didn’t want to “change the order of the cards…”

But Andersen was describing a camouflage trick he employed to get more advantageous games while appearing to be a superstitious gambler. Patterson is talking about the order of the cards, or as he labels it, “a card flow bias,” as if this has some real meaning in the mathematics of blackjack. Yet many players have a gut feeling that there is some logic to this “order of the cards” nonsense, as evidenced by the fact that so many players believe that poor players at the table hurt good players because poor players “take cards” that “by right” should go to some other player (or the dealer).

I don’t know how Patterson came to believe that TARGET was a valid system; it’s not just one bad idea—it’s a conglomeration of bad ideas, pasted together with pseudo-scientific terminology. I know Jerry didn’t make this whole thing up out of thin air. He credits a man by the name of Eddie Olsen as one of the inventors of the system.

In my opinion, there has never been such an eloquently presented heap of gambling misinformation as the TARGET system. Most phony systems are simple, one or two pages at most. Many can be described in one or two sentences. With TARGET, it’ll take you a couple hours just to comprehend the lingo.

The night I got together with Sam Case to get his input on the TARGET system, he attempted to invent, on the spot, a phony blackjack system more complex than TARGET. He calls it Sam Case’s Winning Ouija System; and, yes, you do have to carry a Ouija Board to the tables. I won’t go into Sam’s definitions of such terms as a “double Ouija whammy parlay, ” or the “integrity of the table lint,” or the “stability of the hunch,” but suffice it to say that, all in all, I think Sam’s Ouija system would work just as well as TARGET.

Every blackjack expert from Thorp to Uston to yours truly has made numerous errors in judgment and analysis. Patterson’s biggest TARGET error, in my opinion, was in selling this system so soon after it’s development. It seems to me he’s testing the system by selling it first, then collecting data from the players to find out whether it works.

Obviously, you cannot obtain objective results in this way, since both the players and the system sellers have such a big stake in the success of the system. What you get is the “Swami Pastrami” effect. (See the link at the left.) The only players who continue to report results are those who stick with the system. The only players who stick with the system are those who are winning.

Data from losers just doesn’t come in proportionately, or objectively. I wish I had a buck for every crap shooter who’s told me he’s been winning for years by “riding the streaks,” and for every roulette player who insists he always goes home a winner by “playing with the house’s money.”

I should point out here that many of the premises upon which the TARGET system is based are true. It is a fact that a human dealer does not shuffle the cards well enough to put them into a truly random order. Richard Epstein, in The Theory of Gambling and Statistical Logic (pp. 160-171), points out this fact. According to Epstein, a “random shuffle” is “an operation equivalent to scattering a deck in a high wind, and having the cards retrieved by a blindfolded inebriate.” This is not standard operating procedure in most casinos.

It is also true that “biases” will exist in any shuffled deck(s) which will affect the player’s advantage as the cards are dealt. Card counting would not work if this were not true.

The illogical leap in the TARGET theory occurs, as I have already stated, with the premise that a player (or house) bias will continue. Just because a bias has been identified as occurring over some length of time, this fact in no way predicates a continuance of that bias. In fact, the opposite is true. Unless Patterson can offer convincing mathematical evidence that Bayes’ Theorem is in error, which would stun mathematicians the world over, I cannot accept “streak-based” blackjack systems as having any validity.

Looking back on my own experiences at the tables, other TARGET factors seem to appeal to reason. My biggest losing streaks have occurred, as TARGET would say, at “player breaking” tables, and my biggest winning streaks have occurred at “dealer breaking” tables. The TARGET system is flawed, however, in advising me to seek out “dealer breaking” tables, because you cannot predict that this bias will continue just because this trend has been observed up to any given point in the game.

Prior to this TARGET system, Patterson’s work in blackjack was primarily aimed at simplifying the proven systems of others. He was very good at this, and his students and franchise holders have always praised his work. He’s a good teacher.

I see TARGET as a big mistake for Jerry Patterson. He took a chance and put his faith in an unproven system someone convinced him was a winner. Believing him to be an honest man, my heart goes out to him, because I don’t think he means to sell trash to trusting students.

There is a strong temptation to blame Patterson personally for TARGET. Let’s face it; his name is on it. But I do believe he is a victim as are all those who are putting their faith in TARGET. In his excitement over the possibilities of TARGET, Patterson, I believe, rushed into selling it too soon. He should have sought some outside experts’ opinions first.

There is a lack of fundamental knowledge of the mathematics of gambling systems that Patterson displays in portions of his TARGET course. One section of the TARGET material which, I must say, appalls me, is Patterson’s explanation of the “Reverse Labouchere” betting progression as having some validity.

Patterson recommends this betting progression, modified with “stop-loss” points, for less serious “action” players. He claims that in his 25 years of gambling research, this particular strategy is the only progressive betting method he has found that actually works. He credits Norman Leigh, author of a book titled Thirteen Against the Bank (Morrow, 1976), for devising this betting system.

Actually, the Reverse Labouchere has been around a long time. Richard Epstein, again, in The Theory of Gambling and Statistical Logic (Academic Press, 1977), referred to it as the “anti-Labouchere” system, lumping it together with the other betting progressions and money management systems which gamblers have tried over the years.

I read Norman Leigh’s book, which describes the exploits of a team of professional roulette players (really!?) who demolish casino coffers using the Reverse Labouchere system. What a fantasy!

Again, the (non-reverse) Labouchere progression has been around for hundreds of years. Like all betting progression systems, it has been proven worthless. Leigh’s brilliant idea was that if you play the progression in reverse you would force the casino to play the Labouchere system against you. What utter nonsense. Any betting progression system could be played in reverse, but it would still be a worthless progression system.

Leigh figured (and this is Patterson’s “logic” as well) that since the Labouchere progression didn’t win for the player, that by reversing the progression, the casino would find that the progression didn’t win for the house either! Brilliant! So logical! And it’s true that if the system won’t win for the player, it won’t win for the casino. But the casino doesn’t need the progression to win. The house has the edge.

What Leigh didn’t realize in devising (or, at least, resurrecting) this old scheme, and what Patterson also seems ignorant of, is that betting progression systems don’t win, nor do they lose. Whether you’re using a Labouchere, or a Martingale, or a D’Alembert, or the reverse of any of these, you’re going to lose 5.26% of your money on a double-O roulette wheel, same as any flat-better. The progression system doesn’t affect the player or house advantage in any way.

Patterson, by the way, does not advise using the Reverse Labouchere at Roulette, but only at blackjack. For more “serious” TARGET players, Patterson advises various building progressions which parlay a portion of the wins, also with stop-loss points for getting out.

I suspect most TARGET players follow one or more of the betting progression systems that Patterson advises since he recommends these progressions even for card counters. This helps to explain one of Patterson’s seemingly incredible claims—namely, that players are winning on 80% of their sessions. Using stop-loss betting progression systems which build on partial parlays, this is not at all inconceivable, especially since many TARGET players are probably card counters also, who will be using some amount of intelligent playing strategy.

Such progression systems do win far more often than they lose, and this is why they have always attracted gamblers. All those “testimonials” you read in cockamamie craps systems ads are not necessarily phony. You can win 80% or even 90% of your sessions with some betting progressions, depending, of course, on your bankroll.

But all progressions really do is delay the inevitable. If you’ve won S10,000 in the past 6 months with such a system, don’t be surprised if you suddenly lose S12,000 in a week-end, “stop-loss” or no “stop-loss.” That “impossible” losing streak is actually inevitable. Computer simulations have shown time and again that the house advantage will prevail.

Progression systems that size bets by parlaying wins, or portions of wins, as Patterson advises, will also cause some players to experience phenomenal winning sessions on occasion, far beyond what any card counter would ever experience. Card counters strive to reduce fluctuations by sizing bets according to bankroll and advantage. There are thousands of dice players who use various parlay progressions who could tell you stories about turning a couple dollars into a couple thousand dollars in one hot night of craps.

Such experiences encourage systems players to believe in their systems. These same parlay progressions, however, ultimately spell doom for these players who are constantly over betting their bankrolls. It’s too bad Jerry Patterson did not recognize the TARGET betting structures as useless betting progression systems, which, by their nature, will instill in players a false optimism in the effectiveness of the TARGET system.

In Million Dollar Blackjack, Ken Uston suggests that some sort of “board” should exist for the purpose of “certifying” the curricula of blackjack schools. The existence of such a board would have saved Patterson a lot of grief.

I’m hopeful that Patterson will eventually discontinue offering the TARGET system through his Blackjack Clinics, but so much time and money could have been saved if Uston’s idea were a reality. Is there any feasible approach to getting something like this off the ground? I think Jerry Patterson owes his students an apology and his franchise holders an explanation.

This may be just human error on Patterson’s part, but unless he has some sort of factual evidence for the TARGET system, other than his personal playing records and those of his students, he should throw in the towel on this TARGET nonsense. I don’t see how Patterson can continue selling this science fiction as fact. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

ONLINE GAMBLING

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

by Arnold Snyder
© 2005 Arnold Snyder

Q: Is it legal?

A: Online gambling and poker are legal in most countries. In the U.S., the current administration is very hostile to online gambling and poker. However, though the Congress recently passed a law that may make transferring funds to and from online casinos and poker rooms less convenient, it did not pass a law that makes playing in online casinos and poker rooms illegal in the U.S.

According to gambling attorney I. Nelson Rose, the 1961 Federal Wire Act made betting over the telephone wires on races and sporting events illegal in the U.S., but federal courts have repeatedly ruled that the 1961 Wire Act applies only to sports and race betting, not online casino or poker play. The new law does nothing to change that.

Some online casinos and poker rooms have decided to stop accepting U.S. players for now, while they work out other deposit and withdrawal arrangements. A number of others have contacted us to tell us that, after a thorough review of the new law, they have decided to continue accepting U.S. players, and have already worked out new deposit and withdrawal methods.

See our Recommended Deposit Methods and Offshore Banking Options for more information. Deposit methods accepted at various online casinos and poker rooms are included in the casino listings on our Top Rated Online Casinos and Bonuses page and our Online Poker Bonuses and Deposit Methods page.

We will report on further developments.

U.S. players should also check their local state law before playing online. There’s a lot of legal debate on whether state law applies to online gambling and poker, since the actual betting occurs outside of the state. We don’t really know the answer to that, since no player has ever been charged. For players’ information, the states that have passed anti-online-gambling laws are: Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Washington, Indiana, Nevada, Oregon, Louisiana, New Jersey, New York and South Dakota.

Free games are available at every casino and poker room we list for any players restricted by law from playing with real money.

Q: How much money do I need to do this?

A: Anyone with $500 that he or she can afford to gamble with can afford to get into this venture. $1000 would be better, for a quicker start, but $500 you can afford to risk is sufficient. Most of the deposits you’ll make will be smaller than this, usually $50 to $200. You need the extra funds because you may wish to have money on deposit at more than one Web casino simultaneously. It sometimes takes days (and even weeks) to withdraw your funds from a Web casino. Ideally, it would be best to have $5,000 to $6,000 in order to take advantage of some of the more lucrative bonus offers that allow larger deposits and pay bigger bonuses. But you can build up your bank as you play and take advantage of these bigger bonuses when you have the funds.

For more information on bet sizing and bankroll management for Internet casino bonus play, see Blackjack Betting and Risk for the Basic Strategy Player in the Blackjack Forum Gambling Library.

Q: Do I need to know any special strategies for the games?

A: Absolutely, but the strategies are not that difficult. One nice feature about gambling on the Internet is that you can have your strategy right out on your desk as you play. For blackjack, you simply need to know basic strategy.

Q: How much time is required for this?

A: That’s another nice feature about Internet gambling. The Web casinos are all open 24/7, and you can play sessions of any length you desire, whether a few minutes or a few hours. The actual amount of time it will take you to earn your bonuses will depend on various factors that I can’t analyze precisely for all players. If you have a dial-up modem, the games will be slower than if you have a DSL connection. If you already know the basic strategy for a game, you will play faster than someone who must consult a chart to make decisions. Some casinos’ software is fast, and some software is slow. How much you are betting per hand to meet your WR is also a factor. Depending on all of these factors, you may spend from 30 minutes to many hours playing for each bonus you collect.

Q: How much will my hourly win rate be?

A: Your rate of profit will depend on all of the time factors described above. You will also be spending time on the clerical chores of reading the bonus offers and T & C, figuring out the bonus values, copying the necessary information, and bookkeeping.

Q: If I have $1,000 exactly to try this out, what is the chance that I would lose my whole $1,000 just due to bad luck?

A: I would put the chance of this at slim to none providing you are careful about choosing reputable casinos and bonus offers (lists of reputable Internet casinos are provided through the links at the left), you play the accurate basic strategy for the games you enter, and you follow the advice on this page and on the Traditional vs. Sticky Bonuses page for sizing your bets according to your bankroll and the type of bonus you are playing.

With a small bankroll, you must play more conservatively—which will lower your hourly win rate—in order to protect yourself from simple bad runs of cards (which occur in all casino games). You should never deposit all of your bankroll in one casino. If your bankroll is small, you should be making many small deposits and withdrawals at numerous Web casinos over time.

Players do lose money on individual bonus plays even when the bonus provides them with a significant advantage over the house. If you use an extremely conservative betting strategy—say making all bets of $1 to $2—then I would have to say that your chance of losing all your money would be close to zero if you avoid playing in rogue Web casinos with cheating software. With such small bets, assuming you are playing for the most generous bonuses, you would be extremely unlikely not to show a decent profit for your dollar investment. The bonuses really are that advantageous. But you must decide how much risk you want to assume by playing at a higher level, and what your time is worth to you if you play at a lower level.

I advise any person considering this venture to not play with money that is dear to her or him. You do not gamble with the rent money. If you have only $500 or $1,000 that you can afford to gamble with, then I would suggest starting out very conservatively. Go ahead and play with $2 bets for your first few bonuses. Just take the hours it takes to do this and keep your peace of mind while you’re learning and building confidence. When your bankroll gets up to $1500 or $2000, and you can see the process is working for you, then get a bit more aggressive. Make bets of $4 or $5. Always play at your own comfort level.

For conservative players on small bankrolls, there are certain types of bonuses (called “sticky” bonuses) that will have little value to them until their bankrolls have grown to at least $1500 or $2000. This is because the sticky bonuses must be played more aggressively in order to extract their value, and aggressive play is always more risky. Wait to play these after your bankroll has grown a bit. The traditional (non-sticky) bonuses, and “pseudo-sticky” bonuses, however, will still have value for you, and need not drain your funds with bad fluctuations. For specific advice on bankroll requirements for sticky bonuses, see the Traditional vs. Sticky bonuses link at the left. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Online Casino Sticky Bonuses

The Sticky Bonus vs. the Traditional Bonus and How to Play Them

By Arnold Snyder
© 2005 Arnold Snyder

The Traditional Online Casino Bonus

Online casino owners offer cash bonuses to players to entice them to try out their casinos.

Traditional bonuses, also called cashable bonuses, may be withdrawn in full after fulfilling the terms and conditions of the bonus, which usually means after meeting a wagering requirement on permitted games.

But never get hung up on labels when evaluating any gambling situation, even a traditional bonus. Try to understand the underlying concepts, so you can apply the ones that best fit any particular situation.

The Sticky Bonus and Other Non-Traditional Bonuses

You can tell that a bonus is a sticky bonus when the online casino’s terms and conditions specify that the bonus is “for wagering only.” But, again, don’t get hung up on labels. If you understand the underlying concepts, you may apply them to a variety of gambling situations.

Technically, a sticky bonus is worth roughly the same to a knowledgeable and well-bankrolled gambler as a traditional bonus, even though you can’t withdraw the actual sticky bonus itself. But you have to play a sticky bonus differently from a traditional bonus to extract its full value.

Here’s a very simple example to illustrate why.

Imagine that an online casino has offered you a $100 sticky bonus for a $100 deposit to entice you to check them out. You deposit $100 and receive the $100 bonus to play with. If you then make a bet at blackjack of $200 (the entire balance in your account) you will either win $200 or lose $200 (or, you may push, in which case you’ll bet the $200 again). (For this simple explanation of the logic, let’s ignore splits, double downs, the 3:2 payout on a blackjack, the house edge, etc.)

If you win and then decide to quit play (let’s leave aside for a moment the wagering requirement, if any, on your deposit), you can withdraw the entire balance in your account minus the $100 bonus. This means you can withdraw $300, for a win of $200 on your $100 deposit.

But if you lose and quit play, all you have really lost is the $100 you deposited.

Since you will win roughly 50% of the time and lose roughly 50% of the time, you will win $200 half the time and lose $100 half the time.

$200 win – $100 loss = $100 profit for two plays

So, if your betting strategy was to place one bet then quit the game, win or lose, your $100 bonus played this way would be worth $50 to you in the long run.

But what if you don’t withdraw your money right after you win that first hand? What if you continue to play on your bonus?

You now have $400 in your account (your $100 deposit, your $200 win, and the $100 sticky bonus). Of this total, $300 belongs to you—only the $100 sticky bonus may not be withdrawn. If you bet all $400 on your next blackjack hand and win, you win $400. If you bet it all and lose, you lose $300 (your $100 deposit plus $200 prior win minus the $100 sticky bonus).

$400 – $300 = $100 profit

Now, stay with me here. Assuming you win half the time and lose half the time when you play a hand of blackjack, you will win two hands in a row only 1 out of 4 times. One time you’ll win twice, one time you’ll win the first time and lose the second time, and twice you’ll lose the first time and never get to the second bet. Therefore, if you choose to bet it all 2x in a row, 3 out of 4 times you will lose your $100 deposit, and 1 out of 4 times you will turn it into $600. $600 – $300 = $300, so you have a $300 expectation on 4 plays, for $75 per play.

That means the bonus was worth roughly $75 to you if you used the two-bet strategy. The bonus was worth roughly $25 more using this strategy.

So, how do you get this sticky bonus to be worth $100? You just keep doubling your bet and gradually the value approaches, but never quite gets to, $100. The only problem is, with each bet you have to keep betting more to win less.

So the real value of a sticky bonus depends on your tolerance for risk. That is, it depends on your tolerance for risking money you’ve already won in order to get smaller and smaller further increments of bonus.

Please note that the exact value of a bonus and the best strategy for using it is complicated by such things as the house edge and variance on the game you play, the wagering requirement for the bonus, casino betting limits, and other factors. Consider this just a general guideline.

So, how should you bet a sticky bonus? Simply set a win goal and go for it. Here are some guidelines:

Sticky Bonus Play: All-Purpose Advice for Beginners

1) If your total bankroll is less than $2,000, ignore most sticky bonuses until you have built up your bankroll some more by playing the non-sticky and pseudo-sticky bonuses. You do not need big fluctuations right now.

2) If your total bankroll is more than $2,000 but less than $4,000, never play any sticky bonus of less than 100% of your deposit. Set your win goal at twice the value of the bonus. That is, if you are getting a $100 bonus for a $100 deposit, then set your win goal at doubling your total playing bank for that play, that is, turning the $200 total in your account into $400.

Bet aggressively off the top, at least 1/8 of your starting account total, until you hit your goal. That is, with a deposit-plus-bonus total of $200 in your account, come right out with at least a $25 bet.

The actual best amount to bet for any particular bonus is based on a number of factors, including the wagering requirement, the house edge on the game, camouflage, your bankroll and other factors. Consider this a general guide for beginners playing sticky bonuses with wagering requirements. Pros with large bankrolls should bet the maximum amount possible for the greatest variance. Pros who can take the fluctuations want to go for as much of the bonus as possible while giving as little action to the house as possible.

Do not lower your bets if you start losing. In fact, most pros would raise their bets as they got down into the house’s money, as your advantage actually goes up at this time.

If you lose everything, so be it. If you win your goal (making your total bank $400), then use a conservative betting strategy to get through the remainder of your play. Any time you go below your $400 target, raise your bet to at least $25 again, until you either lose it all, or come back up to your $400 goal.

In deciding whether or not to play the bonus, estimate the dollar value as one-half of the bonus total–in this case, one-half of $100, or $50. Over the long run, you’ll lose your $100 deposit about half the time, and win $200 the other half of the time. In the short run, you could lose your $100 quite a few times in succession (which is why you don’t want to play sticky bonuses with a bankroll of less than $2,000). By the same token, you could also win quite a few sticky bonuses in succession. And that’s never a problem.

3) If your total bankroll is more than $4,000 but less than $6,000, again, never play any sticky bonus of less than 100% of your deposit. But set your win goal at doubling up twice. That is, if you are getting a $100 bonus for a $100 deposit, then set your goal at turning your $200 (D + B) into $800.

Bet aggressively off the top, at least 1/8 of your DB, until you hit your first double up. That is, with a starting DB total of $200 in your account (as in this example), come right out with at least $25 bets. (Again, the actual best amount to bet for any particular bonus is based on a number of factors, including the wagering requirement, the house edge on the game, camouflage, your bankroll and other factors. Consider this a general guide for beginners playing sticky bonuses with wagering requirements.)

Again, do not lower your bets if you start losing. If you lose everything, so be it. When you have doubled your starting bank once (so that your account totals $400 in this case), then raise your bets again to at least 1/8 of your new account total (or $50 in this case—again, the optimal bet depends on many factors), and shoot for that ultimate $800 total in your account. If you hit this total, then grind out the remainder of your play at small bets.

Any time you go below that $800 mark, raise your bets to $50 again, and keep betting this amount until you either come over the $800 mark or lose all of your money. In deciding whether or not to play the bonus with this strategy, estimate the dollar value as 75% of the bonus total, which would be $75 in this case. With this strategy, you can expect to lose your $100 deposit about three-quarters of the time, but you’ll profit $600 about one out of four times.

4) If your total bankroll is more than $6,000, then either follow the sticky bonus advice directly above for players with bankrolls between $4,000 and $6,000, or study the intricacies of Kelly betting principles and risk management that professional gamblers use. (See my book Blackbelt in Blackjack for an in-depth discussion of Kelly betting and bankroll risk management.) With a big enough bank, you can often afford to go after a sticky bonus that adds less than 100% to your deposit, provided you do the math and figure out the optimal bet size, dollar value and percentage advantage for the play.

In fact, the way to extract the most money from any online casino bonus, whether traditional or sticky, is to bet on the bonus with absolute maximum aggression. The goal is to either tap out fast (giving the house as little action as possible) or make a bundle. Believe it or not, you’ll collect all that bonus money you lose on the tap-outs on your few big wins.

The advice above is for new players on very small bankrolls who can’t ride out the swings inherent in such aggressive betting. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Marked Cards in Casinos?

Don’t Be a Mark for Marked Cards

by Steve Forte

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. XIV #1, December 1994)
© 1994 Blackjack Forum

[Note from Arnold Snyder: This article is useful not only as an introduction to cheating methods involving marked cards, but also to some of the highest-edge legal advantage plays available to professional gamblers. The legal plays involve cards marked through natural wear and tear or in the normal design and printing process.]

Marked Cards in a Casino or Cardroom Near You

In September a player named David Whitehill uncovered a marked cards cheating scam in one of the California Indian Reservation casinos. The blackjack games at the casino in question are played in a format where the bank passes from player to player. The casino generates revenue from a mandatory ante paid for each hand played.

In another recent incident, a professional poker player found marked cards in use in a major Las Vegas casino poker room.

A number of players have expressed concern that casino and poker room cheating of this nature may be widespread, and that casinos and poker rooms are either too incompetent or too corrupt to stop it. They fear that the lack of regulatory oversight may make the blackjack or poker games in some venues too dangerous to play.

Here is a different perspective that I hope will provide some insight on the controversy while offering possible solutions to the problem.

As a general rule, marked card cheating scams in casino poker rooms or on face-up blackjack shoe games start with a loophole in the casino’s card control. Inadequate card control is not a California Indian gaming problem but a problem with casinos and cardrooms worldwide.

For example, New Jersey is considered to have exceptionally tight card control which continues even after the cards are used. All decks are sealed in bags and picked up by the Division of Gaming Enforcement. Marked cards, however, have surfaced in every New Jersey Casino.

In the last month marked cards have been discovered in two major Las Vegas casinos and one in Reno. A closer look at the card controls suggest that the cheating scams may have been going on for some time. Virtually every cardroom, including those in and out of California, has had to deal with this cheating scam at one time or another. I have also seen systems of card control used on California Indian reservations that parallel those used in a more “regulated environment,” and even some that provide more accountability.

Marked Cards: How It’s Done

Stanford Wong, in his newsletter, reported that the cards were “professionally marked, probably with a laser.” Having had the opportunity to analyze these marked cards, I doubt seriously that the cards were marked with a laser, and I hesitate to call them “professionally marked.”

The work is very common and is known as two-way line shade. “Shade” is made with, primarily, pure grain alcohol and a minute amount of the most permanent, fade-proof ink or dye available, preferably aniline. Shade is almost colorless but provides enough of a tint to slightly shade the card, and is most commonly used to gray the white areas of the card. Shade can be applied by hand (brush) or mechanically with the help of an air brush and templates to accurately position the marks.

This image has an empty alt attribute; its file name is markcard-2.jpg

If a “line” of circles, diamonds, squares or any part of the card’s back design is shaded, the eye sees the marks as a darker line. Cheaters prefer the shoe game when playing shade because the top card is a consistent, stationary target (unlike single & double decks), and the action of dealing the top card creates a contrast with the next card to be dealt. Both factors are important as the eye tries to discern a light shade or tint that is virtually colorless. Reading line shade from different angles facilitates the “read” and sharpens the line, bringing the shaded areas together. The following illustration should help.

Cheaters refer to marked card scams as playing paper. These scams historically have been the most difficult to detect, and this is especially true when shade is down. In more than one casino scam, frustrated bosses have sent the suspected cards to the FBI laboratories for examination. Only after spectrum analysis could the marks be seen. The work usually turns out to be shade.

There is little or no quality information on the art and science of marked cards. There is also no easy way to discuss the subject intelligently without writing a book. Let me just say that I have seen marking systems that were infinitely more sophisticated than the marking system discovered by David Whitehill.

Everything from IR phosphors that were “read” with lasers, optic systems that utilized a combination of both contacts and glasses, daubs that oxidized after a period of time and shade that required hundreds of hours of practice training the muscle of the eye to see the marks, and I’m just touching the surface. Quite frankly, if the cards were “professionally marked,” we would all still be looking for the work.

After the cards are marked they must get to the game. This can be accomplished in many ways but most include the collusion of a casino employee — a boss, security guard or janitor. In rare cases cards have been stolen during the delivery process and even from the manufacture.

If the cards have to be resealed, this is no problem. Top hustlers can get in and out of a factory wrapped card case in just minutes, without ever breaking the seal. Some controls even allow the decks to be opened prior to transporting them to the blackjack game.

Given the sophistication of today’s cheaters, it probably seems difficult, if not impossible to protect yourself. This is not the case, and the irony of this controversy is that professional players are almost always better equipped than those working in the industry when it comes to evaluating suspicious play.

What to Watch For

The biggest mistake most professional gamblers make is that when a player plays a hand incorrectly versus basic strategy or a card counting strategy, the player gets chalked up as just another “sucker” donating his time and money. You should always take a strange play one step further and correlate these deviations with the dealer’s hole card and/or top card, especially when the money hits the layout. A consistent correlation with information not yet available spells trouble!

There are numerous tests you can use to help detect a marked deck. Black lights, certain filters, angled light, and the “riffle” test, to name a few, can all be helpful at times. There are even tests that might help detect the marks during play (provided the work is on strong), such as looking to the right or left of the shoe, throwing your eyes out of focus, and reading from a distance — all designed to stop the eye from focusing.

But there is no test more valuable than to simply evaluate the play. This test is your best chance to ever detect sophisticated card marking systems in play.

I have been asked numerous times to look at suspected marked decks. I always respond by saying, “Can you tell me something about how the hands were played?” or, “Don’t send me the cards, send me the surveillance footage.”

I know from experience that after assessing the video footage I can give an accurate answer as to whether marked cards were in play. How they’re marked is of secondary importance. What’s important is to find out if you’re being cheating, not how you’re being cheated. Although there are literally hundreds of ways to mark cards, there are only three basic ways to exploit this information. In all instances, the play is fairly transparent.

Marked Cards and Top Carding

Beware of any player who acts first, bets big, and always seems to start the hand with a ten or ace. The nine is a break even card and is sometimes included in the combination for cover.

The cheater may also be the second player to act with the first player (an accomplice) sitting out when the top card is read big. Just playing the topcard for betting strategy, a decent spread with little or no deviations from basic strategy is very strong. When the top card is used to help play the hands as well, the cheater’s edge is insurmountable.

Also, don’t assume that the aces must be marked in a way that indicates big card. Betting the ace in early position can be obvious, so most cheaters prefer the ace marked in a playing combination such as : (Aces, 2’s, 3’s) — (4’s, 5’s, 6’s) — (7’s, 8’s, 9’s) — (Tens, J’s, Q’s, & K’s).

Marked Cards and Hole Card Play

Almost all pros are familiar with the typical hole card plays: player stands with stiff against a big card and dealer turns out to be stiff; player avoides a routine double down and dealer turns out to be pat; and so on. Perfect insurance decisions could also be a big gain but insurance is not allowed on most reservations at this time.

Anchors and Card Steering

Anchors are player-cheaters who will alter their play according to the marked cards in an attempt to strengthen or weaken the dealer’s hand. To cheat the player-banker, anchors will attempt to leave the dealer with bad cards and take off (hit with) the good cards.

This aproach is strongest when more than one cheater is the player to act last. A classic example is where the last player(s) stand with stiffs against a big card because the hole card is read small and the top card is read big. This results in a dealer bust. It’s also possible to have a take-off man bet the limit in middle position, without ever making a suspicious play… the player(s) acting last do all the work!

In CBN, Wong stated: “Marked cards benefit the player, who has control over how his or her hand is played, but not the banker, who plays a fixed strategy.” This is a common misconception. The reality is, players can be cheated with marked cards too. Here, the player-banker is in cahoots with the anchors taking off bad cards and “playing short,” leaving the good cards.

Another variation is where the player-banker teams up with a cheater that sits in front of a targeted player, usually a high roller. The cheater takes off good double down cards and overall attempts to leave the player with as many stiff drawing totals as possible. This variation is known as an “early anchor.”

That’s it. Top carding, playing the hole card, and the anchor (with steering) are the three basic playing styles used in conjunction with marked cards.

What can be done to stop this scam? First, two of the most common misconceptions:

Misconception #1: A “brush,” “door,” “curtain,” or any cover designed to hide the top card of a choe will prevent a marked card scam.

Not true. If the dealer must deal a hole card, a split second is all that’s needed to read the hole card. This is probably what happened in the Whitehill play. The 9-10 combination suggests a hole card play that would work even with protection to the shoe.

Misconception #2: If the player-banker does not take a hole card until all players have completed their hands (European no hole card style), marked card scams are eliminated.

Wrong again. Cheaters have plenty of control over the dealer’s hand when the hole card is dealt after the player hands are completed. Just watch how often the player-banker gets blackjack, twenty or even nineteen when the dealer’s second card is predicated on how the cheater(s) play.

Although independently, neither procedure provides absolute player protection, a combination of these two procedures is the answer. The strongest protection possible against marked cards in a player-banker format is no hole card until all players have acted, combined with a cover to hide the top card of the shoe.

One simple procedural change would virtually wipe out any future marked card scams. I say “virtually” because I know of one system where the top card does not have to be seen or touched and the shoe is completely legit, yet its value is known to the dealer who then signals to the cheaters to play according. But confronting this scam is unlikely.

There are many Indian reservations throughout the state of California that take the integrity of their games very seriously, and to date have not had any major problems or incidents. Don Speer, CEO of Inland Casino Corporation, managing the Barona Casino in Lakeside; Murray Ehrenberg, Casino Manager at Table Mountain Rancheria in Fresno; and Bill Taylor & Tom Elias from the Santa Ynez Casino in Santa Ynez, are just a small sampling of top management throughout the state. Their games are good, honest and fun for players, profitable for professional player-bankers, management teams and tribe.

The opportunity for the professional player in California is enormous. I know many players making money. Professional players are welcomed (if you can fight through the syndicates that have established ground) and are the major element supporting and banking these games.

The working relationship with management is unprecedented in the world of blackjack, and more clubs are scheduled to open in the very near future. The choice is yours. You can learn to protect yourself and continue to take advantage of the opportunities, or choose to play in a more regulated environment where the only down side is unbeatable games, sweat joints, preferential shuffles and getting barred.

The professional players will have as much impact on keeping these games honest as any management team or law enforcement agency. When the hustlers stop saying, “Hey, these guys are suckers,” the isolated incidents will become even more isolated.

After experiencing the game’s unnerving fluctuations, it’s no wonder that many blackjack players have a paranoid nature. But if a few incidents — even a handful of suspicious plays — is justification for avoiding the game at all costs, then add a few more games to the “too dangerous to play”‘ list. You can start with poker, and avoid playing the game anywhere in the country!

Poker can be treacherous considering that the simplest scams are also almost impossible to detect. Look at crews “playing from the same pocket,” “playing cousins,” or “playing top hand,” of which there is reasonable evidence suggesting these scams occur on a day to day basis. You should also avoid any player-banked Asian game and for that matter stay away from casino blackjack. Even the big stores have had incidents of players getting cheated.

If you decide to wait for California to form a Gaming Control Board, you might miss the opportunity altogether with the legality of these games still open for interpretation. The real motive for forming a GCB may be to generate tax dollars from the cardroom industry. In instances of cheating GCB’s are after the fact agencies. They won’t stop you from being cheated, they’ll just give you someone to scream to after you’ve been to the cleaners.

California Indian gaming is a strange animal in a jungle of impressive gaming revenues, legal controversies and hidden political agendas far beyond the scope of this article, but they continue to flourish in much the same way as the California cardroom industry has without a gaming control board. It’s even money that the Indians will continue to prosper with little regulatory intervention.

I realize that marked cards in the California player-banker format can be devastating to the unsuspecting player as the scam doesn’t figure to be a one shot deal. If a cheater and “inside man” get marked cards to the game once, you can assume that the cards will be marked day after day until some player “tumbles.” But, with a bit of common sense and a little street smarts, no knowledgeable player has to worry about getting cheated with marked cards!

The Whitehill incident is unfortunate, and not for a second am I down-playing its seriousness. I know that the publicity has already made a few management teams more aware, has forced some of the clubs to tighten up their card controls, and opened the eyes of many players. The biggest fear for most players is the unknown, but if you follow some of the guidelines detailed here, the unknown can’t hurt you.

In theory, player protection should come from the policies set forth by the management teams, security, surveillance and the appropriate law enforcement agencies, but in the end, the only protection you should ever count on is your own knowledge. Awareness on both sides of the table will keep the games honest, popular and lucrative for everyone. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Is Spooking Legal?

Can a Hole-carder Utilize an Off-table Accomplice??

by Arnold Snyder (with comments by Stephen R. Minagil, Attorney at Law)

(From Blackjack Forum VII #2, June 1987)
© Blackjack Forum 1987

As reported previously in Blackjack Forum (Vol. V #3), on December 18, 1984, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada ruled conclusively that certain types of hole-card play are legal at Nevada’s casino blackjack tables. The specific hole-card case they ruled on was the State of Nevada vs. Einbinder and Dalben.

Steven Einbinder and Tony Dalben are professional gamblers who had been arrested at the Golden Nugget Casino in downtown Las Vegas on November 22, 1983, and charged with violating the State’s cheating statutes. Specifically, they were observed and videotaped to be playing in a manner whereby Dalben sat in the first base position at a blackjack table, placing table-minimum bets, from where he was apparently able to view the dealer’s hole card whenever the dealer checked under an ace or ten for a possible blackjack.

The videotaped evidence supported the State’s claim that Dalben was then signaling this hole card information to Einbinder, who sat on the third base side of the table placing bets of up to $700 per hand. The State claimed that Einbinder was playing his hand according to the hole-card information signaled to him by Dalben.

A few definitions of some of the various types of hole card play that might be affected by this case:

“First Basing”

This is precisely the type of blackjack hole-card play described above, as engaged in by Einbinder and Dalben.

“Front-loading”

This is a type of play in which a player views the dealer’s hole card, not when the dealer checks for a blackjack, but when the dealer “loads” the hole-card beneath his up-card. This type of blackjack play is made possible by a dealer who tips the card up towards the players to slide it beneath his up-card, and a player who is either short, or slouching at the table, such that his eye-level is low enough to read the value of the card.

“Spooking”

This is a play where the player has an agent — a “spook” — positioned behind the dealer, most often seated at another blackjack table on the other side of the pit, which enables the agent to view the dealer’s hole-card when the dealer checks for a blackjack. [Note from Arnold Snyder: If you watch the movie Casino, the players who got backroomed by Ace Rothstein were spooking.]

The “spook” then signals the player at the table with the hole card information, so that the player may play his hand accordingly. Another type of spooking employs an agent in front of the dealer, but far enough away from the table so that his angle of viewing allows him to see the dealer’s hole card as per typical front-loading, except that this type of play requires yet another agent to signal the player or players at the table of the hole-card value.

The Las Vegas District Court where Einbinder and Dalben were tried found them not guilty, based on the fact that it was the dealer’s sloppy dealing style that enabled them to obtain an advantage over the house. The players were merely using their powers of observation to obtain information that would have been available to any player in Dalben’s seat.

The State appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, and the not guilty verdict was ultimately upheld on the appeal.

Tony Dalben was kind enough to send me complete transcripts of the court proceedings. I’ve been studying these transcripts for some months now — 133 pages in total — to determine exactly what the Nevada Supreme Court found to be legal.

The actual order from the Supreme Court dismissing the State’s appeal is brief and to the point:

Respondents were charged with cheating at gambling and other related felonies. The facts of the alleged offenses were essentially undisputed In particular, the evidence showed that respondent Dalben was lawfully seated at his position at the blackjack table, that he did not use any artificial device to aid his vision, and that he was able to see the dealer’s “hole” card solely because of the admittedly “sloppy” play of the dealer. Respondent Dalben then communicated his information to respondent Einbinder. The district court ruled that respondents’ conduct did not constitute a violation of the cheating statutes. We agree.

Cheating is defined as the alteration of the selection of criteria which determine the result of a game or the amount or frequency of payment. NRS 465.083, see Sheriff v. Martin, 99 Nev.. 336, 662, P.2d 634 (1983). We have considered the briefs and the record, and we have heard the oral arguments of counsel. We conclude that in this case the district court correctly found that respondents’ conduct did not constitute cheating at gambling. Accordingly, this appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed.

This decision indicates that the Supreme Court considered it significant that Dalben “did not use any artificial device to aid his vision, and that he was able to see the dealer’s ‘hole’ card solely because of the admittedly ‘sloppy’ play of the dealer.” (emphasis added).

This wording of the decision explains in part why the Nevada Supreme Court may have been prejudiced against Taft and Weatherford (Blackjack Forum VI # 1), who were convicted of using a video device to view the dealer’s hole card — though I still believe that Taft and Weatherford should have been found not guilty. At the time of their “crime,” April 1, 1984, Nevada had no anti-device law, they were not touching or in any way altering the cards and their potential advantage was also derived from sloppy dealers.

At the time the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the district court conviction of Taft and Weatherford, January 28, 1986, I had not seen the transcripts for the Einbinder/Dalben trial. I was unaware of the fact that the Supreme Court had specifically mentioned that no “artificial device” had been used by Einbinder and Dalben. I can see now the difficulty this must have posed to Taft’s and Weatherford’s attorneys in defending their clients. The Einbinder/Dalben decision may have provided only weak support, if any, for hole card play as practiced by Taft and Weatherford.

Prior to receiving materials from Tony Dalben, I was also unaware of the fact that Taft’s attorney — John Curtas — and Weatherford’s attorney — Stephen Minagil — were the same attorneys who had initially represented Einbinder and Dalben, respectively. And although Curtas and Minagil were dismissed from the case prior to the final decision, it is apparent from the preliminary hearing transcript that their arguments in the Einbinder/Dalben case were what ultimately won this case for the defendants.

My criticism of Curtas and Minagil (Blackjack Forum Vl #1) for not defending Taft and Weatherford on the basis of the Einbinder/Dalben decision was short-sighted. It’s apparent to me now why Curtas’ and Minigal’s defense of Taft and Weatherford was a brand new ball game.

So, does the Supreme Court’s decision in the Einbinder/Dalben case protect hole card players other than “firstbasers”?

Does it protect “front-loaders?”

Does it protect “spooks?”

The Supreme Court decision does not directly refer to spooking, but direct reference to this playing style was made during the District Court preliminary hearing, the transcript of which the Supreme Court used to form their decision. The date of this hearing was February 17, 1984, and at that time Tony Dalben was being represented by Las Vegas Attorney Stephen R. Minagil.

On page 48-49 of the court transcript, Minagil is arguing for his client’s defense:

Minagil: ” . . . I would use the analogy that two people, a husband and wife, maybe unsophisticated in gambling, and the husband is standing next to the wife and turns to her and says, ‘Gee, I saw she had a ten. Maybe we shouldn’t hit this one.’ Is that cheating?”

Court: “We don’t have a husband and wife here that we know about. Let’s say someone is sitting on the other side of the pit, slouched down in the chair and when the dealer looked at the dealer’s card, the person sitting there could see the card and the person flashed the signal to the person. Is that cheating?”

Minagil: “I think so in that you have a person behind the table. That would be cheating. But these gentlemen, they sat where they are supposed to sit. They didn’t use devices. And this dealer made a mistake.”

Does this reference in the hearing transcript make it ill-advised for a player arrested for spooking to cite this Supreme Court decision as a legal defense of his action? Nowhere does the Nevada Supreme Court state that having an agent behind the dealer is illegal. And it could certainly be argued that such an agent, like Tony Dalben, might be “lawfully seated at his position” — albeit at a different table from the dealer, and that such an agent may be using no devices other than his powers of observation.

It seems to me that a “front-loader,” who obtains his information to play his own hand, or to signal information to another player or players at his table, would likely be protected by the Einbinder/Dalben decision, assuming no “devices” — mirrors, “shiners,” video, etc. — were being used to obtain hole-card information.

A front-loader who was not seated at the table, however, acting as a “spook,” could be a different story. What about a front-loader who is seated at the table, but who is obviously slouching, or laying his head on the table to peek at the dealer’s hole card? Part of the testimony considered by the Nevada Supreme Court, from the same hearing transcript, contained this line of questioning of Golden Nugget Director of Surveillance, William McDonnell (p. 34-35):

Minagil: “Mr. Dalben, who I believe you testified was sitting at the first base position, to observe the hole card of the dealer, he just sat there, didn’t he?”

McDonnell: “That’s correct.”

Minagil: “He didn’t get up and make any physical movement to peak at the card, did he?”

McDonnell: “Not on this occasion, no.”

Minagil: “All he was using was the power of observation; is that right?”

McDonnell: “That’s correct.”

Minagil: “You’re not aware of any rule that requires players to look away from the dealer when she’s looking at the hole card, are you?”

McDonnell: “No.”

Minagil: “So it’s the dealer’s responsibility to shield that hole card, is it not?”

McDonnell: “That’s correct.”

Minagil: “And if the dealer allows a player to see a hole card, she’s making a mistake; is she not?”

McDonnell: Yes.”

I called Dalben’s former attorney, Stephen Minagil, and asked him, as a Nevada attorney, exactly how he would expect the courts to interpret the Supreme Court’s Einbinder/Dalben decision, and just what obstacles this decision might present to an attorney who had to defend a player who was arrested for either spooking or front-loading.

I taped Minagil’s response, and have transcribed it here with his permission:

Steven Minagil: I’m concerned that there is not much protection provided by the Einbinder/Dalben decision with regards to “spooking,” i.e., employing agents not at the table. Each decision rendered by the Supreme Court is limited to its facts. In the Einbinder/Dalben decision the facts were that they were lawfully seated at the table and used no artificial devices to aid their vision. I believe those are the key facts upon which the decision is based.

I see the Court making a distinction between those facts and a situation where a person is assisting a player, and the assisting person is not at the table. I’m concerned that the Court would use the rationale of Taft and Weatherford, wherein they said that using the equipment put the player in a position of superior knowledge, and therefore altered crucial characteristics of the game.

As to “front-loading,” that is a person you have defined as obviously slouching or laying his head on the table to feign drunkeness, etc., in order to see the dealer’s hole-card. That is a tougher question. Even though one is obviously slouching, I believe that those facts are within the parameters of Einbinder and Dalben, because that person would be lawfully sitting at the table and not using artificial devices.

I’m concerned about a court still using the rationale of Taft and Weatherford, that is, by doing something in addition to merely sitting and playing, that the player is placed in a position of superior knowledge, thereby altering the crucial characteristics of the game. But I think the front-loading question is a lot tougher, that is, that the possibility of the Einbinder/Dalben decision applying to front-loading is greater.

I have a real problem with the spooking example, but not so much with the front-loading example. I think the defense counsel would have a much easier time in getting the Court to sit down and think about applying the Einbinder decision in a front-loading situation than in a spooking situation.

So, if you’re under the impression that the Einbinder/Dalben decision protects you as a hole-card player, be aware of the limitations of that protection. Cheating is a felony in Nevada. Don’t take unnecessary chances. ♠

[Note from Arnold Snyder: There have been significant court cases regarding blackjack hole card play since this article was written, and each has increased the case for the legality of hole card play when the player is merely taking advantage of a sloppy dealer.]

Posted on Leave a comment

Interview with Bob Nersesian

An Attorney Fights Casino Abuse of Professional Gamblers in the Nevada Courts and Wins

by Richard W. Munchkin

(From Blackjack Forum XXII #4, Winter 2002/03)
© Blackjack Forum 2003

[Bob Nersesian is a partner in the Las Vegas law firm of Nersesian & Sankiewicz. He specializes in representing players in lawsuits against casinos. Richard W. Munchkin is a member of the Blackjack Hall of Fame and the author of Gambling Wizards: Conversations with the World’s Greatest Gamblers.]

RWM: Why is it that attorneys don’t want to take cases in which card counters have been manhandled by casinos?

Nersesian: Number one, there isn’t enough money in those cases. Number two, and this is really bizarre to me, people in our community don’t understand that the casinos are invading someone’s rights when a card counter is back roomed or handcuffed. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve talked with other attorneys about this stuff and the reaction I get is: “Well for god sakes, he was counting cards. What do you expect them to do?” My answer is, “I expect them to follow the law, not falsely imprison the guy, not hold him out there and walk him through the casino and embarrass him in front of the world.”

The law says that if they suspect him of a felony or if he is suspected of committing a misdemeanor on premises, they can detain him. It does not say they can detain him because he is winning, and that is what they are doing. The public accepts that, and most of the lawyers do, too. Across this country professional gamblers are vilified as far as perceptions are concerned. What we are faced with is a private company who says, “We don’t like what you’re doing. You’re hurting us, so we are going to get back at you.”

The general perspective when I approach other lawyers and upper management of casinos about counters being handcuffed, which does occur regularly, they are as aghast as I am. The policy has been changed, and been put out in writing at some properties, after lawsuits that I’ve been involved in.

RWM: That’s good to hear.

Nersesian: They know they can’t do that. I’m giving the upper management some credit here. It’s the way business works. They put out a dictate that says, “We’re supposed to make money.” Then you get down to the functionary level where they don’t deal with management decisions or the overall policy decisions. They just get the directive, “Your job is to make sure we make money.” They don’t know the ins and outs and niceties about it.

The next thing you know they are handcuffing honest people. When the upper management finds out about that, they are pretty straightforward about changing their policies and seeing that it doesn’t happen again. Historically, few lawyers have been willing to sue, and nothing happens because of it. The casino management isn’t even aware there is a problem.

RWM: What is a case worth when a card counter is handcuffed and maybe pushed around?

Nersesian: I don’t want to put down hard numbers, but the patron generally walks away with $5,000 – $15,000. That is provided all the i’s are dotted and t’s are crossed. What I mean by that is there aren’t other reasons for what happened.

The story that comes from my client in the first place is very rarely the story that you can see from the facts once things develop. For example, someone might assume they were back roomed for card counting, when in actuality they were back roomed because the casino suspects them of using a counting device. If that is the suspicion, and it’s arguably supportable, the detention can be found appropriate.

There are usually videos of that back room, and the cases where I have been successful usually show the casino security lambasting my client and stating, “We saw you in the book. We know you’re a card counter. We don’t want your business.” The client is calmly standing there saying, “I told you outside that I didn’t want to come back here. Put away that camera. You are not going to take my picture. You have no business holding me here. You can ask me to leave. You could have done that out in the casino. Let me out right now.”

RWM: Is that what someone should do if detained?

Nersesian: First inform them firmly, but not physically, that you have no desire to accompany them anywhere.

RWM: Should you attempt to walk to the door?

Nersesian: Your call. I’ve had it both ways. Firmly state, “If you want to throw me out, tell me I’m 86’ed or trespass me. Do it now and do it quickly, because I intend to walk out that door.” If they say, “You’re not going,” or “You have to come with us,” don’t fight them, because they may beat the living daylights out of you.

Do I want to see that kind of lawsuit? Not really. You get hurt on those. If they have determined that they are taking you to the back room, they will probably do whatever it takes to restrain you. Your firm statement that you desire to leave and they should not take you back there is all that is needed.

RWM: Unfortunately, the surveillance tapes don’t have audio.

Nersesian: No, they don’t. Once you get in the security office, say it again. That room is recorded with audio.

I want to give you an example of the way the attorneys here look at this stuff. I have a case going to trial on the 23rd. I’m suing a Gaming agent for what he did to a card counter. The court originally dismissed the action. This card counter spent a whole night in jail. He didn’t do anything illegal.

When the court dismissed it, I had to go to the Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco, and that court reversed the dismissal. Now we have a judgment of liability. I am $80,000 into this case. What do my friends who are lawyers think when I describe the events to them? The guy spent a night in jail. He has never been arrested in his life. He is a wonderful father of two.

The question to me is, “What was he doing?” He was counting cards. When I ask them what they think it is worth, they tell me, maybe $2,000. I ask, “Why only $2,000?” I was talking to two lawyers just yesterday and they said, “Because he was a card counter.” I said, “So, that’s legal.” They said, “It might be legal but it doesn’t garner any sympathy.”

There might be some truth to that. I don’t think it’s a $2,000 case. If it ends up being a $2,000 case, so be it. I still proved my point.

RWM: What was their excuse for keeping him in jail?

Nersesian: He was actually arrested because he refused to give this cop his name.

At the same time I am trying to sue six other Gaming agents. The courts keep throwing them out. I’m going to take these cases to the Nevada Supreme Court. If that doesn’t work, I will try for the United States Supreme Court.

I can’t believe what these police officers think they are allowed to do. In one instance, and this one blows my mind, I have a client who plays video poker. He found a machine that had an edge and he played the heck out of it. It turned out the machine was misprogrammed. After he won on the machine, two police officers held him in custody for well over an hour and a half, and repeatedly requested that he return the money before he could leave, or alternatively go to jail. He did not do anything illegal.

Here you have the Nevada State Police acting as collection agents for casinos. Isn’t that special?

RWM: Nevada is a very special place.

Nersesian: That one will be going to the Supreme Court for darn sure. Are they going to confirm the court throwing it out? They might. But I have been very impressed with the Gaming Control Board itself and the Supreme Court on gaming issues. Those three guys who make the big decisions. Or, the Nevada Supreme Court. The games tend to go out the window, and they are very judicious, both the Board, and the Supreme Court, about applying the law.

RWM: Really?

Nersesian: Yes. You hear people say that they are rubber stamps for the casinos—not true. From what I can see, at the agent level, those guys seem to have a perspective that they’re working for the casinos. However, the Supreme Court and the Gaming Control Board seem very guarded about their perspective, and that they are working for Nevada. That includes the taxpayers and the people who play in the casinos, as well as the properties.

You might be familiar with another case I handled, which happened at another casino. There was a programming error on a 50-cent video poker machine. A progressive jackpot for four of a kind, which would normally pay $250, instead paid $100,000. My client hit it.

A Gaming agent, in a throwaway off-the-cuff opinion, effectively stated, “There is no liability here on behalf of the casino. The patron loses.” The Gaming Control Board unanimously held that the casino had to pay. You see the distinction? The Board recognizes that the integrity of our system is reliant upon expectations being met. That sure was no rubber stamp decision for the casino.

RWM: If it were a PPE [Park Place Entertainment] or MGM/Mirage property, do you think the decision would have been the same?

Nersesian: Yes, in my opinion that would not make a difference. You see some similarities in this case with the other slot case where the agents held him and tried to get him to give back the money.

One thing that is most curious is the video of that incident. The police officers were citing the Nevada tax base, and implying that injury to that tax base was something they weren’t going to allow to happen. If you take that in context, and expand it out to its logical conclusion, what they are saying is, “We will not allow casinos to lose in this state.” There is a voiced attitude of the agents that patrons have to deal with every day.

I have a client who was back roomed and we tried very hard to get Metro to prosecute the casino for false imprisonment. We showed up at the station and requested they take a report. They wouldn’t take a report. I actually spoke to a police officer who said to me, “Well, he was card counting. Of course they put him in the back room. That’s cheating.”

This is a police officer in the state of Nevada who thinks it is cheating to count cards. No, sorry, the Supreme Court of Nevada has said three times it is not cheating. Reason tells you it’s not cheating. Maybe so, but the guy on the street doesn’t view a professional gambler with any sympathy. It might be jealousy. Whatever the rational might be, there just isn’t a depth of sympathy for card counters and other legal advantage players.

If the cop on the street thinks that is the case, how are you going to get lawyers or the general public to look at these people as anything other than dreck? Are they dreck? Not the ones I know. My clients include business leaders, mathematics professors at national universities, and noted authors. They are not dreck.

This whole concept of treating them as less than upstanding citizens is particularly curious when you balance against it the idea that the casinos are allowed to use their skills to make money, and they are the stellar citizens of Nevada. But a player who uses his skills should be persecuted. Isn’t that a curious perspective?

RWM: It certainly is. Do you have any other advice to the player when confronted by the casino?

Nersesian: Don’t show a fake ID. I know a lot of guys are carrying them. If you use another name, one thing that might add some protection is to go down to the Clark County Clerk’s office and register that name as a “registered assumed name.” The law regarding identification is ambiguous and I believe unconstitutional. The law says,

NRS 205.465 Possession or sale of document or personal identifying information to establish false status or identity.

1. It is unlawful for a person to possess, sell or transfer any document or personal identifying information for the purpose of establishing a false status, occupation, membership, license or identity for himself or any other person.

Nersesian: Pretty broad, isn’t it?

RWM: Wow. So if my wife uses my player’s card in the slot machine, she’s committing a crime under that law?

Nersesian: There is an argument that she is. I don’t think this statute passes constitutional muster. It’s vague and fails to include a scienter element, but do you want to be the guy who spends two days in jail before being bailed out for $5,000 to see if that is true?

There is also a statute, or ordinances, that deal with doing business under an assumed name. The argument will be when this statute is popped on someone who has filed that DBA certificate is that this is not a “false” identity. This is a legal, fictitious identity, and there has to be a distinction between the two, else the assumed name statutes would not exist.

If you are going to use fictitious ID, file an assumed name certificate in the county where you are using it. Even then you can’t be sure you are not committing a crime, as far as Nevada defines one. Isn’t this fun?

Gamblers have gone to great lengths to avoid being noticed. Often the simplest diversion will add hours to the play. For example, I know of a case where a Gaming agent, a professional security officer, and a chief of security watched the wrong guy on the table for hours before they figured out he was getting signals. They were dumbfounded as to where his information was coming from.

Then they watched the other guy at the table, since the first guy was not doing anything to get information. They watched the other guy for hours to figure out what the signals were. The signals were blatantly obvious. My point is not that surveillance is inept. My point is that players think all this stuff is known, and as soon as you do something they are going to see it. The simplest stuff can take years for them to decipher.

On the other hand, I have another case where a guy was popped twenty minutes after he sat down. He was 86’ed. He somehow was in Griffin. His spread was $50 to $200. He’s relatively an amateur.

RWM: Why is this a case?

Nersesian: He was back roomed. And he did everything right. He said, “I don’t want to go there.” They entered the back room. “I don’t know why I’m here. Let me go.” Then the beautiful part, the security guard says, “You’re here because we found you in the book. We know you’re a card counter.” Talk about handing it to me.

To add insult to injury, he asks the security supervisor who says, and this is cute, “You’re here because you’ve committed a gaming violation.” He asked, “What violation?” The security chief essentially says, “I don’t have to tell you.” And he walks out.

Then he kept telling the other security officers, “Let me go right now. You have no right to hold me. You know that I have done nothing illegal. Let me out that door.” They told him to calm down and he said, “I’m perfectly calm. I just don’t want to be here.” Then the supervisor comes back in and my client said, “Let me go.” The supervisor said, “First, I want to ask you some questions.” My client again said, “Let me go right now.” Eventually when it became clear they would get nothing, he was allowed to leave.

RWM: Should he have said, “Call the police.”

Nersesian: That’s the case where we did call the police. They said, “So? You were card counting.” I’ve got a letter from Metro saying, to paraphrase, “We choose not to investigate or prosecute. Our scarce resources cannot be used on such claims.” No, but if a casino calls them up and says they have a disorderly person, how long before they are over there hauling that guy away?

RWM: My first question to you was: Why don’t lawyers take these cases? Now I’m wondering: Why do you take them?

Nersesian: I do this because what is going on in this community is not some minor infringement in everybody’s day-to-day life. To be thrown into a back room against your will, and be told that you have to do whatever they tell you for however long they want—that is imprisonment. It is traumatic beyond what you or I could ever fathom.

Those lawyer friends that I told you about, and they are dear friends, they think I’m tilting at windmills like Don Quixote. I get very angry with them. If you’re a lawyer, you took an oath. When I tell my friends that this is what I do to give back, their reaction is, “Well, that’s pretty silly. You’re giving back by making things worse.” The kind of cases I am talking about, the casinos think they can treat patrons as chattel, as pieces of property. These people are not chattel, and they have not done anything illegal. For a casino to think that they have some special position in society that allows them to do this to innocent people cannot be reconciled with the country we live in.

That’s why I do it. Because it angers me that much. I don’t make money at this. It has been a money loser for years, but it is a matter of principle, and a wrong that needs righted.

Bob Nersesian can be reached c/o:

Nersesian & Sankiewicz
528 S. 8th Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101
(702) 385-5454

Background: Casinos and Nevada Politics

The Nevada Gaming Commission and the State Gaming Control Board comprise the two-tiered system charged with regulating the Nevada gaming industry. The Commission and Board administer the State laws and regulations governing gaming for the protection of the public and in the public interest in accordance with the policy of the State.

The Nevada Gaming Commission is a five-member lay body appointed by the Governor, which serves in a part-time capacity. The primary responsibilities of the Commission include acting on the recommendations of the State Gaming Control Board in licensing matters and ruling in work permit appeal cases. The Commission is the final authority on licensing matters, having the ability to approve, restrict, limit, condition, deny, revoke, or suspend any gaming license.

The Gaming Control Board is made up of three full-time members, appointed by the governor to four-year terms. The gaming statutes require the board to include: one person with a minimum of five years experience in public or business administration; one person who has been a certified public accountant for five years or more, or who is an expert in finance, auditing, gaming, or economics; and one person with a law enforcement background.

The Board’s purpose is to protect the stability of the gaming industry through investigations, licensing, and enforcement of laws and regulations. They also insure the collection of taxes and fees, and maintain public confidence in gaming. The Board implements and enforces the state laws and regulations through seven divisions. Those seven divisions are: Administration Division, Audit Division, Corporate Securities Division, Electronic Services Division, Investigations division, Tax and License Division, and Enforcement Division.

If a card counter or other casino patron were to have an interaction with someone from Gaming, it would most likely be someone from the Enforcement Division. The Enforcement Division is the law enforcement arm of the Gaming Control Board. It maintains five offices statewide and operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

Primary responsibilities are: to conduct criminal and regulatory investigations, arbitrate disputes between patrons and licensees, gather intelligence on organized criminal groups involved in gaming related activities, make recommendations on potential candidates for the “List of Excluded Persons,” conduct background investigations on work-card applicants, and inspect and approve new games, surveillance systems, chips and tokens, charitable lotteries, and bingo.

For an in-depth look at the Gaming Commission, read License To Steal: Nevada’s Gaming Control System In The Megaresort Age, by Jeff Burbank. ♠