Posted on Leave a comment

Can You Read the Dealer?

Playing Dealer Tells

By Steve Forte

(From Blackjack Forum Volume VI #1, March 1986)
© Blackjack Forum 1986

[Last year, Steve forte game me a copy of a 24-page handbook he had authored titled “Advantage Playing: the Ultimate Way to Play Winning Blackjack.”

“It’s not something that I’m selling,” he said. “It’s part of a seminar I’ve put together to teach blackjack players legitimate and powerful methods of beating the game without counting cards. I don’t know if you can get much out of this booklet without the seminar. Most of the topics in here are just sketchy outlines that coincide with the live demonstration I do.”

Within a week, I’d called Steve about the possibility of publishing a section of his handbook. “This chapter on tells is fantastic,” I told him. “I’ve never seen anything like this in print. Playing tells has always been a mystery to me. You’ve got more useable information on this subject in four pages than I knew existed.”

Steve was discouraging. He wasn’t at all satisfied with the material “as is.” “It’s just an outline,” he said. “I’ve got 40 pages of notes that explain that stuff. Maybe I could get my notes into some kind of legible form and send them to you.”

The first typed, single-spaced 22 pages of Steve’s “notes” arrived a couple of months later, with a promise of more to come. Reading this material, I felt that same way I had felt when I’d first seen Steve’s unparalleled Poker Protection – Cheating and the World of Poker books and videotapes on how dealers cheat. This was potent, hitherto secret information that had never before been made available to the general public.

Myths on Playing Dealer Tells

In his treatise on tells, Steve demolishes many of the long-held myths about the arcane subject of tell play.

Myth #1: You can’t be taught to recognize and exploit tells. Finding tells is a natural psychological ability that most people just don’t have.

Steve shatters that myth. “I learned a lot about playing tells from real pros who have been doing it for years,” he told me. “And I developed a lot of this knowledge from my own years of observation. This is a science like anything else. There’s nothing magical or mystical about it.”

Myth #2: Dealers with readable tells are hard to find, so only Vegas or Reno locals, who observe the same dealers day in and day out, can exploit tells.

“That’s just not true,” Steve says. “A good tell player can walk into casinos anywhere in the world, where the dealers check their hole cards, and exploit tells. Tell players create tells in dealers. They don’t wait for them to appear.”

Myth #3: You have to play at high stakes in order to get dealers involved enough so that they’ll exhibit tells.

Not so. Big money and tokes may be important factors in involving a dealer in the outcome of a hand. Steve won’t be the first person to tell you that. But dealers are just human beings. As long as a dealer either likes or dislikes you, he can become involved in your hand. It’s always the person at the table, not just the money, that involves the dealer.

Myth #4: You have to be an outgoing personality type to play tells. If you’re just a quiet, regular player, you’ll never run into sufficient dealer involvement to generate a tell.

Steve destroys that myth with a whole section on “Ghost Tells,” – tells that dealers are already subconsciously exhibiting because of some other player or players at the table. If the dealer is coddling up to some lavish-tipping high roller, or burning up about some obnoxious drunk, you’re liable to find “ghost tells.”

Myth #5: Tells are barely visible, subconscious, unique little quirks that are almost impossible to see.

Fact: tells may be subconsciously generated, but they are far from invisible, nor are they “unique.” Many tells are blatant. Most can be categorized and analyzed. Most players don’t notice even the most obvious tells because tells appear natural. If they were unusual postures or movements, everyone would notice them.

I expect to have the remainder of Steve’s treatise on this subject edited by next month. I’m very proud to present here just a small portion of what Steve has already sent me on this subject. Steve’s comprehensive report on tells, titled Read the Dealer, will be published next month.

[If you think tell playing is too esoteric and complicated for you, I suggest you read the following excerpt from Read The Dealer. –Arnold Snyder]

Definition of a Tell

A tell is a form of nonverbal communication. Tells are signs and body signals that tell us something about the person we are observing. You can use the science of body language in many ways to gain an advantage in the game of blackjack.

Tells can be used to detect a pit boss who is suspicious of your play. This could give you the opportunity to “pull up” (leave the casino) and possibly avoid getting backed off or barred. Tells will also let you know when pit supervisors are completely unaware of your presence. This will allow you to get away with bigger bet spreads and more aggressive playing strategies than normal.

You can use the proper body signals and actions to make dealers deal faster and deeper. You can also cause dealers to shuffle up the unfavorable decks if your body signals are strong enough.

The science of body language can even be used to get a player out of a favorable seat: a seat that might allow you a hole card play, a readable warp, or maybe just better position for the count game.

The most profitable way to gain an edge with tells is to read the dealer immediately after he checks his hole card. If you can learn to detect the various dealer body signals, if you can learn how to get a dealer emotionally involved in the game, and if you can understand what motivates a dealer to think and act the way he does, you can scientifically evaluate the strength of the dealer’s hand.

Some of these observations and principles come from playing poker semi-professionally for a number of years. Poker experts Oswald Jacoby, John Fox and Mike Caro have some great material on tells in print. In particular, Mike Caro’s new book, Caro’s Book of Poker Tells, is the most detailed book ever written on the subject.

All blackjack players are urged to study these authors, as virtually all the principles explained can be applied to the game of blackjack. Blackjack expert Stanford Wong’s Winning Without Counting and Ian Andersen’s Turning the Tables on Las Vegas both cover the art of playing tells, but they just touch the surface of what is available to the blackjack player.

Most of my ideas on tells were developed while using various advantage techniques that gave me hole card information. Playing warps, playing hole cards, applying key card location techniques and various card cutting ideas put me in a very unique situation. I often knew the dealer’s hole card before the dealer even checked it. I was able to study the dealer’s body signals to see if his actions agreed with or contradicted this information. This is probably the ultimate way to learn to read tells.

The biggest myth about playing tells is that they are difficult to find. Well, I have to agree that tells are extremely difficult to find. But the problem is in this approach: you don’t find good tell games, you CREATE THEM.

Bu causing a dealer to get emotionally involved in the game, you will get reactions. These reactions are the body signals or “tells” that can be read and exploited by the knowledgeable blackjack players.

Tells Come from Emotional Involvement

If the dealer is indifferent to whether you win or lose, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find profitable tells. The key is to force the dealer into rooting for you or against you. He must be on one side or the other; there can be no in between.

Remember, dealing blackjack can be an extremely boring job; probably one of the most monotonous and overrated factory jobs around today. In order to break a dealer out of his trance and his usual stone wall personality, you’ll have to be creative and a little offbeat. Try to do something a little different than a dealer is accustomed to seeing in an eight-hour shift. Let’s take a look at just a few ways to get dealers emotionally involved in the game.

When trying to get a dealer on your side and truly rooting for you to win, try:

1. Compliments on dress, jewelry, dealer ability, etc. Tell the female dealer that the ring or the watch she’s wearing is just like the one you bought your wife or girlfriend and she’s crazy about it.

If you’re playing with an obvious weak dealer who seems to be struggling, compliment him on his game. Tell him it’s nice to play with a good dealer who takes his time, etc.

The best way to compliment a dealer is in the presence of a pit boss, shift boss, or casino manager.

Try lines to the pit supervisor like, “If you had 100 dealers like Jeannie here you’d have the friendliest place in town,” or “I have a bunch of my friends from Minnesota staying across the street but if all the dealers here are like Jeannie, I’ll bring them over tonight.”

2. Let the dealer know up front that if you get lucky he will also get lucky and have the opportunity to earn some money. This gives him a reason to root for you.

3. Ask for advice. Make him feel like he’s the expert. Now he has to root for you or make himself look bad.

I like to take an easy-to-play hand like two 8s or two aces against a small card, turn them face up innocently so the dealer can see the total and ask “Do you split these?”

Although dealers are not supposed to assist players in playing the hands, most dealers will give you some friendly advice to make the correct play. They don’t know what they have in the hole and don’t feel like they’re out of line by helping you.

Naturally, if you win make a bet for the dealer for his “expert advice.” But even if you lose you should make a bet for him and say “Thanks. Anyway, at least I know I played the hand the best way.” You’ve now shown the dealer that his advice will be rewarded. Next time you need a little help in playing a tough hand, make sure the dealer has a ten up.

4. Be a good loser. This may sound crazy but it is by far one of the strongest approaches to get dealers on your side. When a dealer hits a miracle hand with a miracle card break up the tension and make him laugh. Try lines like “Did you ever work with Siegfried and Roy?” or “Keep this up and you won’t get a Christmas card from me this year.” Dealers don’t run into this type of player very often. The majority of players, including card counters, are sore losers. It is quite a relief and pleasure to deal to someone who doesn’t take losing seriously.

Here’s a great way to take a losing session and create a plus and possibly a big edge for your next play. One of my favorite plays is to always keep a couple of $5 checks in one pocket and my session bankrolls in other pockets. After losing the last bet in a session bankroll, search your pockets as if looking for more money but only come out with the two $5 checks. Toss the $10 to the dealer, and tell him, “Well, I guess I blew more than I thought, but if I have to lose all my money I’m glad it was to you. At least I had some fun.” Smile and walk away silently.

It doesn’t make any difference if you have $20,000 on you. Just walk away from the table like you just blew your life savings, then gave the dealer the last $10 to your name.

Later on in the shift, take your jewelry off, open up your tie, and mess up your hair. This gives the appearance of having gone through the worst two hours of your life. Walk up to the same dealer and tell him that you’ve just borrowed some money and put your jewelry up for collateral. But that’s okay because now you have a chance to win enough money to get back home to see your wife and son! You know the little boy, he’s the one that just had the leg amputated. He gets around pretty good though. The rubber leg works just fine.

Yes, I am laying it on a little thick but I want to show you how far this approach can be taken.

You Can Also Get Tells from People Who Hate You

Now, let’s take a look at a few ways to get a dealer against you and rooting for you to lose:

1. Complain about the hotel, restaurants, luck, etc. Dealers listen to players complaining all day and can become immune to it. It’s really nothing new to hear a player piss and moan. In order for this approach to work try complaining about things you never hear a negative comment about. Breakfast at the Horseshoe, quite possibly the best breakfast in town, or the buffet at the Nugget, quite possibly the best buffet in town.

If you are lucky enough to get comped into a presidential suite at Caesars, complain about the room décor, etc., even though it hasn’t cost you anything. Always complain about what the casino is most proud of and best known for. Don’t forget to mumble a lot, dealers hate players who are always mumbling.

2. Brag about how good you are. Tell everyone at the table how you won two million dollars last year. You should be betting from $5 to $15 when you make a statement like that. Tell other players how to play their hands. When a poor player would, for example, split tens, tell him, “Good play. About time someone knows how to play around here.”

If you see a player make an insurance bet tell him to take it back. Tell him you have been counting the picture cards and you know for a fact that they’re all gone. Naturally, your count should be about a true 10. On the next hand when picture cards start popping up all over the place, you can expect some strange looks. Not only will you have a dealer trying to beat you, but you’re liable to have three or four players rooting against you, too.

Ignore them and continue to be extremely overconfident. Let everybody know how unbeatable you are and how you beat this same dealer all the time even if you’ve never seen the dealer before.

3. Here are a couple of my favorites: Get change for a toke, then never make a bet for the dealer. This will leave him hanging and wondering why you asked for change in the first place. If you ever get questioned simply say, “That’s how I keep score.”

Try making a bet for the dealer that is small in comparison to your action. If you’re an aggressive green or black check player and start out a session $500-$1000 winners, bet $1 for the dealer. There’s no telling what kind of strange looks you’ll get but one thing is for sure, you will get a reaction as the majority of dealers would consider this toke an insult. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Casino Survival

What to Do if You are Barred or Backed Off by a Casino

By Robert A. Loeb, Attorney at Law

(From Blackjack and the Law by I. Nelson Rose and Robert A. Loeb)
© Blackjack Forum 1998

Before giving the answers to what a card counter should do if he is barred, some of which are obvious, let me ask the following question: Are you really going to talk them into letting you stay and play? Are you really going to convince them that if they let you stay, they will see that you are not counting cards? Of course not. There is nothing to do but cash in your chips and leave quietly.

If you are not a card counter, it may be worth it to try to persuade the casino of that fact, because the casinos do actually hassle non-counters who may be winning, or because of a faulty conclusion that you are counting cards. Even non-card-counters, however, do not want to be so adamant that they risk some of the consequences listed below.

If you really think that there may be legal action, brought by you or the casino, try to learn the names of the dealer, pit boss, security people, casino manager, or fellow players. It will be important if there are any further legal proceedings. However, you don’t want to make things worse. Therefore, what shouldn’t you do if the casino is barring you?

What Not to Do if You are Barred or Backed Off by a Casino

♠  Don’t admit you are a card counter. They don’t know for sure. You might deny that you are a card counter, but don’t get into a big explanation. It doesn’t matter that you bet big off the top of a shoe, or that you’ve been losing your shirt. And you don’t think that you’re going to persuade them to let you continue playing without heat, do you?

♠  Don’t wait long enough for your picture to be taken (or for more and better pictures to be taken). High stakes players are more likely to already have a picture on file, but there is no benefit to either the big or small player to have his picture on file.

♠  Don’t start an argument, or make a loud fuss. You don’t want to be arrested for being disorderly.Don’t go to the bar and have a drink. You don’t want to be arrested for public drunkenness, or have the casino follow you to the parking lot and tip off the police that you are driving drunk.

♠  Don’t go to the cage and cash out. That is the casino’s preferred time and place to snap a good close-up of you. Return to the casino on a different shift, when everyone’s forgotten about you, and cash out your chips quietly.

♠  Don’t show your identification, if at all possible. They don’t need it, nor under the typical trespassing statute, do they have a right to demand it. You may have to be very polite in your refusal to show an ID, but you don’t want your name in the Griffin book, which contains photographs and descriptions of card counters, alongside photos and descriptions of cheaters.

If you are actually being arrested, you probably will be legally required to produce identification. Don’t state that you forgot your driver’s license or that you don’t have a license. They may follow you to the parking lot, and tip off the police that you are driving without a license (I’ve learned of an actual incident in which a casino did this). You should merely decline to provide identification rather than making excuses for not having identification.

♠  Don’t touch any casino employee. You may find that they may exaggerate the incident and you may end up getting charged with assault and battery, or the equivalent in your state. Don’t let the heat of the moment cloud your judgment. Don’t escalate the tensions.

Regarding Confiscation of Chips when Barred

Even though confiscation of your chips should never be legal in the absence of illegal cheating, card counters have had their chips confiscated on occasion, and casinos have refused to redeem their chips on occasion.

Unless the issue is so important to you that you want to become a legal crusader, be practical and prudent. You are on their turf. With rare exceptions, you can’t do better than just getting your money and leaving.

If they confiscate your chips, get a receipt, get the names of everyone involved, ask for the basis of the confiscation (in writing if possible), and leave quietly. Then call your lawyer! ♠

[Note from Arnold Snyder: Professional gamblers who will be playing in Las Vegas carry the number of Bob Nersesian in case of confiscation of chips or rough behavior by casino personnel during a barring or any type of illegal detention by a casino. You can find Bob’s number in our Interview with Bob Nersesian.

If you will be playing in the Midwest, I’d suggest carrying Bob Loeb’s number. He’s in the book.

I would also add a suggestion to the advice given by Bob Loeb above. Don’t automatically assume that a casino barring will end your career. Every professional gambler has been barred repeatedly, and still manages to keep playing.

Although all casinos will share info on barred players within their corporate group, fewer casinos share information outside that group.]

For more information on your legal rights as a card counter or other type of professional gambler, as well as advice on how to handle the situation if you are barred or back-roomed, see Beat the Players: Casinos, Cops And the Game Inside the Game by Bob Nersesian, a Las Vegas attorney who has won difficult and huge lawsuits filed in recent years by professional gamblers against casinos.♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Blackjack Tournament “Experts”?

Self-Styled Tournament Experts Take a Bath in Reno

by Peter A. Griffin

(From Blackjack Forum Volume VI #4, December 1986)
© Blackjack Forum 1986

“Nice guys finish last!”
– Leo Durocher

The highlight of the 1986 Festival Reno was a city-wide blackjack tournament pitting 12 different casinos against each other. Each casino fielded a 12 man (correction: person) team. Every day, for three days, each player would play 52 hands at one of the casinos. Each casino would host 12 players for about one hour each day. Players were given $500 in non-negotiable chips at the beginning of each day’s 52-hand round, regardless of what they finished the previous round with. Play took place with two rounds dealt per shuffle to four players at each of three tables.

Among the entrants was Karl’s (Sparks) Hotel & Casino’s dirty dozen – a collection of lockmasters, first-basers, rodmen, theoreticians, card counters, spooks, advisors, hole-carders, basic strategists, couponomists – you name it, every kind of degeneracy was represented. The theme of this assemblage was “the cream will rise to the top.” Karl’s finished last.

The prize structure of the tournament was such that all the entry fees would be returned to the players in prizes: $48,000 to the team finishing first and $24,000 to the runners-up. The winning team was the one with the greatest total cash out from the three days of play. The rules required a $10 minimum bet per hand with a $500 maximum. A team whose members all broke even at every session would have cashed out with 3 x 12 x $500 = $18,000 as a final total.

Karl’s strategy going into the first round of play was to wager the table minimum on neutral or negative decks, 10% of bankroll on moderate advantages and 20% of bankroll on strong advantages. And with the choice of this strategy their fate was probably sealed!

The results of the first day’s play were depressing indeed: Karl’s had been unlucky, posting a total of $4600, well below the daily par of $6000. But more disturbing than this was the leading total: the Nugget had come in with almost $11,000! At Karl’s strategy session the next morning their consulting theoretician advised, “Gentlemen, the Theory of Blackjack no longer applies.” Little did they and their Strangeloveian hireling (three Heinekens an hour) realize it never had. It was decided not to panic, but to raise the previous day’s 10% and 20% to 20% and 40%.

On Friday, Karl scored another $4600, while the Nugget hit par, maintaining the lead with a second day total of $16,900, far in excess of Karl’s $9300. The final day was marked by the tapping out of all 12 Karl’s players, having committed themselves to Kamikaze tactics of each playing for a $10,000 table win. On the twelfth and final round, Karl’s representative mercifully and fittingly went out on the first hand – 16 vs. 5 succumbing to the dealer’s five card 17.

Surprisingly, the Nugget was overtaken on the final day by Western Village, the ultimate winner by $24,000 to $22,000, leaving Karl’s worthies with nothing to show for their weekend but three monogrammed t-shirts and a hat. Had these “experts” been the victims of bad luck?

Well, yes and no. “Yes” in the sense that considering the cards dealt to them they wouldn’t have won regardless of betting strategy. “No” in that the strategy adopted on the first day probably only had about a 2% chance of beating the average best score of the 11 other teams.

The crucial observation came from a bystander watching the carnage of Karl’s suicidal charge halfway through the final day: “Betting the way you were, you didn’t rate to win anyway.” Thus spoke Robert Etter, up in Reno for a weekend bridge tournament and some desert stargazing with his telescope. Etter, not really from Georgia, although his undergraduate degree is from one of their diploma mills, observed intuitively that if there were many competing teams betting big, then Karl’s team would have virtually no chance by betting small, regardless of their level of skill.

Post-tournament analysis confirms Etter’s observation by showing that the winning final total of $24,000 was not at all improbable and, in fact, was just about the expected result. It is difficult to mathematize precisely the 11 competing teams’ styles of play, but the assumption of a flat $150 bet with a 2% negative expectation per hand probably mimics well the drift (expectation) and volatility (standard deviation) of the typical opponent’s play.

Under these assumptions, the expected final result for a team would be to lose 2% of their 1872 bets overall, namely to finish 37.4 big bets below par. The standard deviation for a team’s play would be approximately 1.1 x Ö1872, or about 47.5 bets. Note that expectation is constant (.02) times n, the number of hands, while standard deviation is another constant (1.1) times the square root of n. In the very long run .02 x n will dominate 1.1 x Ön, but in the relatively short space of n = 1872 hands the standard deviation is the controlling factor.

To continue the analysis we dip into the theory or order statistics from a standard normal distribution, it being well known that the result of 1872 blackjack hands subject to a bounded bet is very nearly a Gaussian variable. Obscure sources reveal that the expected value of the largest of a sample of 11 normal variables (the competing, “inferior,” teams) is to be 1.58 standard deviations above the mean. For our blackjack scenario, this translates into a final score of –37.4 + 1.58 (47.5) = +38 big bets. In terms of the tournament, this would be 18,000 + 38 (150) = $23,700 as the typical result for the best of 11 teams.

Now, the questionable part of this analysis is the convenient assumption of a flat $150 bet. If, in fact, the average bet was $150 (experience at the table suggests this), then any deviation from flat betting of $150, but still averaging $150, would increase the fluctuation (standard deviation) of the team’s bankroll). So, if the expected loss of 37.4 x $150 is correct, then the presumed standard deviation of 1.58 x 47.5 x $150 is too small; if the standard deviation is correct, then the expected loss is less than assumed. Conclusion: as long as the average bet is close to $150, the expected winning total for 11 teams would be about $24,000, as it was.

With a bet spread of $10 to $100 what chance would Karl’s have to top $24,000? An overly optimistic analysis of their chances would restrict the discussion to the assumption of 468 large bets of $100, one for every other deck, on the average, with a presumed advantage of 2% on these wagers. Assume the remaining 1404 small bets have no effect. Then Karl’’ would have an expected final total of 18,000 + .02 (46800) = $18,936 with a standard deviation not much in excess of 1.1 x Ö468 x 100 = $2370. Their chance of topping a typical best of $24,000 would be the area under the normal curve to the right of (24000 – 18936)/2370 = 2.14 standard deviations, which is less than 2%.

Moral? The casino blackjack player counts on very large n with a small constant of proportionality, the blackjack tournament player on the square root of relatively small n with a large multiplier. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Blackjack Team Legal Issues

The Windsor Trial, and a Conversation With Tommy Hyland

by Arnold Snyder

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XVI #1, Spring 1996)
© 1996 Blackjack Forum

When we did our last major reader survey in 1994, three areas stood out as topics our readers wanted more information about: comps, shuffle tracking and blackjack team play.

We have since provided in these pages quite a bit of information on both casino comps and shuffle tracking strategies. We have continued to be inundated with requests from readers who want more information about all aspects of team play. Our reports on the successful Tommy Hyland teams in the past two issues of Blackjack Forum have especially cranked up these pleas for more team play information.

In this issue of Blackjack Forum, we’re going to focus on various crucial areas of blackjack team play, including legal issues brought up by the Windsor trial, and interview Tommy Hyland and two Hyland team members. Bear in mind that this is a mammoth topic, one that could easily extend through several issues of this publication. At this point in time, I’m envisioning this article as Part I of a two-part series. Reader interest and contributions could extend this series further.

I would initially recommend that players interested in this subject familiarize themselves with the late Ken Uston’s three major books: The Big Player, Million Dollar Blackjack, and Ken Uston on Blackjack. These books provide a solid framework for the concept of blackjack team play. Much of the common terminology used by professional blackjack players today in talking about team play comes from Uston’s books.

Al Francesco and the Birth of the Blackjack Team Concept

Ken is often credited as being the “founder” or “father” of the blackjack team concept because he wrote these books which initially defined the theory and methods. Anyone who has read his books, however, knows that Uston credits a man by the name of Al Francesco (a pseudonym).

Though Al Francesco has never written a book, never appeared on TV, nor ever tried to sell a blackjack system, he is a living legend among knowledgeable blackjack players. [Note from Arnold Snyder: Since the writing of this article, Al Francesco was elected as one of the seven original inductees into the Blackjack Hall of Fame.]

The dozens of players who know Al Francesco personally, through the blackjack team ventures he has put together through the past 30+ years, know him to be a good-natured gentleman, straightforward and honest, with an uncanny ability for perceiving and legally exploiting the weaknesses of casino games. What Keith Taft was to the high-tech electronic exploitation of the games, Al Francesco was to the psychological strategies for exploiting the casinos’ weaknesses in their blackjack games.

I first met Al in 1986; the first thing I did after meeting this man, who had told me he was the man who had literally taught Ken Uston how to play blackjack, was call Ken to find out if this guy was for real. I told Ken Al’s real name, described him physically, and told him where Al lived (he had been a Blackjack Forum subscriber for some time).

“That’s him,” Uston stated. “Still living in the same modest house. This man is personally responsible for more money being legally taken off the casino blackjack tables than anyone but Ed Thorp. Al invented the whole big player concept. Do you realize what that means, Arnold? Just about every blackjack team in existence today owes its existence to Al. Give him my best. I hope he hasn’t said too many negative things about me…”

Ken wouldn’t elaborate on this final concern, other than saying that he and Al had had a “falling out” some years back.

Al became a regular at the blackjack “round tables” I hosted monthly at my Oakland apartment in the 1980s. He was always among the handful of serious players who hung out into the wee hours, drinking coffee and swapping tall tales of intrigue at the tables. No one could match his stories. He knew everyone, had been everywhere, had done it all.

In 1992, I conducted a series of interviews with Al Francesco, and taped about four hours of conversations with him. I wanted to write a book about him — yet another unfinished project! I did learn his side of the story regarding the “falling out” with Ken Uston. It was not a subject Al cared to talk about much — he didn’t like bad mouthing people and Ken had passed away some five years earlier by that time, a legend in his own right, a hero to many.

The conflict was a direct result of Uston’s first book — The Big Player. Al was upset that Ken had written a book about the blackjack teams, exposing Al’s method of attacking the casinos to the world, describing in detail everything that Al had taught him — the blackjack team bank concept, the big player (BP) who was secretly signaled to the tables by small-betting confederates, the training methods, the security systems, everything.

Al didn’t learn about the book Uston was writing until the book was almost finished. There was virtually nothing in print about team play the way Al had been doing it. He felt Uston had no right to publish his secrets. As the mastermind behind the scheme, Al felt the big player approach would have remained a mystery to the casinos for many years more had Uston not written his book.

In putting together this article on blackjack team play, I have been fortunate to have been a confidant of Al Francesco, Ken Uston, and Tommy Hyland — and to have taped interviews with all of them. Most of what is known by the general public about team play is what Uston has published. In this article, I’m going to try to provide some of the secrets of team play hitherto unpublished — especially some of the innovative concepts developed and utilized by the Hyland blackjack teams, which Tommy has generously agreed to share with Blackjack Forum readers.

The Blackjack Team Legal Issue

Let’s start by getting the legal arguments out of the way. The trial of Zalis, Dancey and Conroy in Windsor last year was the first test of the legality of team play as an approach to beating the blackjack tables. The prosecution’s argument primarily revolved around the idea that secretly passing signals is inherently a fraudulent act.

Even before the judge’s decision on this issue, the same argument had been made to me by (guess who?) — our favorite devil’s advocate, John Leib. In a letter dated August 29, 1995, Leib wrote:

I must say that I have an unpopular (with the blackjack community) view of “team play.” I see no argument against its being made illegal. Surely, the observation that this would deprive current team players of their chosen livelihood doesn’t make the grade. That is only a reason why team players don’t want it to be illegal. It is hard to see how society gains by forcing casinos to support the fraud inherent in team play.

“Harsh words,” you immediately shout. Calling blackjack team play a fraud needs to be explained. It is not a fraud if you tell the casino management what you are doing, giving them a chance to elect not to play with you. Of course, you will not do this, because the response is a foregone conclusion.

To answer why I consider it a fraud, let me suggest a closely related situation: At various race tracks, an owner frequently runs his best horse under the name of his worst horse. He bets big on this entry and, over the long haul, makes a large amount of money at the expense of the other bettors. Is this fraud? Few of us would deny it. The opposition (in this case, the other bettors) was deceived about the skill (speed) of the horse and, by extension, the horse’s owner.

In blackjack team play, the opposition (the casino) is deceived about the skill (playing advantage) of the Big Player.

Now, I strongly defend individual card counting, altering bet and play in response to “the count.” I don’t think the player is obligated, either legally or morally, to announce his skill level to the casino management.

Blackjack, like tennis, is a skill game. The casinos know and understand this. Usually the casino has the legal right to decide, based on observation or reputation of the player, to decline his action. The player can also decline to play in the casino. Fair is fair.

But blackjack team play is exactly the same as “past posting” a race book. You may not win, but the odds are (illegally, in the case of past posting) skewed in your favor. (Yeah, I know that books susceptible to past posting are also illegal. It’s the similarity I’m pointing out.) Morally, both are frauds, by anyone’s standards. Lining up laws to match widely accepted morals is the way democratic government works (or is supposed to work).

Just because I think team play commits a fraud on the casino does not necessarily mean I wouldn’t do it. I pride myself in being able to recognize immoral behavior without feeling a compulsion to be constrained beyond the laws. While it is legal, I say “go for it” (team play, that is). But don’t cry “foul” if and when it is made illegal.

I strongly disagree with Leib’s argument, but it is nearly identical to the argument made by the prosecution in the Windsor trial. One argument against this perspective was presented by the blackjack team’s defense attorney, Don Tait, in his cross examination of the Casino Windsor shift manager, Ken Davenport. From the trial transcript:

Tait: All right, the wife’s sitting there and maybe the husband is standing behind her, right?

Davenport: Yes.

Tait: And she gets a pair of tens come out and she says, “Shall I split these?” and he invariably says, “Don’t be a damned idiot, you don’t split 20,” right?

Davenport: Yes.

Tait: And there’s a lot of that kind of exchange going on amongst players, too, isn’t there, who are sitting right at the table?

Davenport: Yes.

Tait: Like you know, “Don’t split that, don’t do this.” So people give advice while they’re playing the game?

Davenport: Yes.

Tait: All right. And that’s a common occurrence, would you agree?

Davenport: Yes.

Tait: Is there anything in the rules of the game that say you can’t get advice from other people as to the strategy of how you’re going to play that game?

Davenport: No, there’s not.

Tait: No. Now, have you ever played with people you don’t understand, foreigners, that speak a foreign language you don’t understand when they’re talking in a foreign language?

Davenport: Yes.

Tait: You don’t know what they’re saying to each other?

Davenport: No.

Tait: Could be giving advice to one another, right?

Davenport: Could be.

Tait: That’s not prohibited?

Davenport: No, it’s not.

Tait: Okay, and but you don’t know what advice they’re giving because you can’t understand them, right?

Davenport: That’s correct.

Tait: Have you ever played with mutes, people who can’t speak or hear, but they use sign language? Have you ever seen them?

Davenport: Yes.

Tait: And again, you wouldn’t have any idea what they were saying to one another?

Davenport: No, I wouldn’t.

Tait: So, it wouldn’t make any difference to you what they were saying?

Davenport: Well, it depends.

Tait: As far as giving advice as to the strategy about playing the game?

Davenport: That wouldn’t matter to me.

This brief exchange between Tait and Davenport is the crux of the argument against team play being labeled “fraud” simply because the players are excluding the house from their communications. Unlike poker, blackjack players are legally allowed to communicate with each other about their hands and their strategies.

(You can be sure that poker players would be gravely concerned about two players having conversations about their hands and/or strategies in a foreign tongue, or via sign language, as the rules of the game specifically prohibit such private communications.)

John Leib’s horse race analogy, to me, is poor. There are laws against running a horse under a phony name. The owner of a race horse cannot falsify the information which is being provided to the betting public. This would be illegal whether the owner did this in conspiracy with others (as a team) or acting entirely alone.

In seeking an analogous situation, I would look for an activity which is not illegal if done openly, but which could be done conspiratorially for financial gain. Let’s consider grocery shopping.

Manufacturers often use deceptive packaging. This is legal, provided the net weight and ingredients are listed on the package somewhere. Careful shoppers are legally allowed to read the fine print, and even use calculators, in order to make their purchase decisions, but most shoppers are not this astute. The store owners, distributors, and packagers, in fact, make lots of money by their deceptive packaging. Profit margins are estimated and prices are set by assuming that the majority will be fooled into making less cost-efficient choices.

Now, what if a group of little old ladies who couldn’t read fine print, and whose fingers were too arthritic to use a calculator — precisely the type of shoppers the store’s marketing experts expect to be victimized by deceptive packaging — hired a grandchild to come shopping with them every Saturday for the express purpose of doing a cost analysis on the corn flakes selections using a pocket calculator? Now, let’s say they don’t want the cashiers or stock boys to think they’re “cheap,” so they keep this child’s job a secret.

If the store owner discovers that these old ladies have been deceiving him by making more intelligent choices than his market researchers give them credit for, would he have a legal leg to stand on if he wanted to press charges against them for defrauding him by secretly conspiring with a child to decrease his expected profits? Could he sue for the moneys he believed he should have been able to profit from them, simply because they were deceptive in their shopping strategy?

I would argue that just because someone is secretly using a method to make more intelligent purchases, even if done conspiratorially with others, and even if it costs the store owner money, does not in itself make it an illegal act of fraud. If what a person is communicating secretly is perfectly legal when communicated openly, then it can’t be against the law to secretly communicate the same information.

Furthermore, there is a long history of card counters working in teams, utilizing secret signals, in their attempts to beat the game of blackjack. It is common knowledge in the casino industry that counters work in this way. Numerous teams of counters have been identified by casinos in the past few decades, yet none has ever been charged with committing a crime for these clandestine acts (prior to the Windsor case).

When Keith Taft’s computer team was first arrested in Nevada, and had their concealed computer confiscated (prior to Nevada’s anti-device law), no charges were pressed after the FBI determined that the computer being used was simply a calculating device. (A perfect analogy to the little old ladies shopping!)

When Einbinder and Dalben were arrested for secretly passing signals in a “first-basing” team effort, the Nevada judge found them not guilty because the dealer hole-card information being signaled had been legally obtained. There was never any suggestion at this trial that signaling itself was illegal — the not-guilty judgment was solely based on the fact that the information being secretly passed had been legally obtained.

I introduced into evidence at the Windsor trial twenty-five different books on blackjack, all of which described methods of team play using secret signals. The oldest book was Thorp’s Beat the Dealer (1962), in which Thorp describes sitting at a blackjack table and signaling plays to “Mr. X,” one of the anonymous millionaires who had bankrolled his play.

One of the more recent books entered into evidence, which described secret team signaling, was Henry Tamburin’s Blackjack: Take the Money and Run (1994), which had actually been purchased at the gift shop at Caesars World in Atlantic City!

Can a casino sell a book to the public that describes a method of beating their games which is illegal, especially considering that the book presents the method as valid and legal? Can you imagine buying a book at a race track on how to past post your bets, with this being offered to the public as a valid method of beating the horses, with no mention that such a strategy might be illegal? (And how far would a racetrack get in court if it attempted to prosecute a past-poster who had purchased his betting scheme at the racetrack gift shop?!)

I do not believe at this point in time any casino anywhere would be able to get team play declared illegal, except perhaps in the state of Nevada, where the casinos seem to own the court system, and can often get whatever they’re willing to pay the lawmakers for. But at the present time, blackjack team play is legal everywhere, and I expect it to remain so.

A Conversation with Blackjack Team Manager Tommy Hyland

Tommy Hyland may be the most successful blackjack team operator in history, and he is certainly the most successful to have been publicly exposed. The trial of three of his teammates in Windsor, Canada, last year (see Blackjack Forum, Dec ‘95, for the complete story), made public figures of Tommy and numerous of his players and business partners, who found themselves answering questions on TV news shows and for newspapers across Canada and the U.S.

Tommy Hyland has recently filed a class action lawsuit against the Griffin Detective Agency and 77 casino corporations for violating anti-trust, consumer fraud, and fair credit reporting laws for their discriminatory treatment of card counters. Here is my interview with him.

BJF: Let’s say this lawsuit goes through as filed, and all 77 corporations are found to be guilty of these violations of the consumer protection laws, do you imagine that this would have any immediate negative effect on the conditions of blackjack games?

Tommy Hyland: I doubt it. I don’t think it would be detrimental. I guess people might be afraid the casinos would make the rules worse because they would be bombarded by counters, or something. But I wouldn’t have filed the suit if I thought it would really cause harm to the blackjack games because I plan on making lots of money from blackjack.

What I’m trying to stop is the harassment of players and the all-too-frequent horrible incidents, like our Windsor thing. It just seems to me that the right thing to do is to try and stop this ugly stuff.

Griffin seems to be promoting this “us against them” mentality. They make it seem like card counters really hurt the casinos much worse than they do. They blow the threat that card counters pose way out of proportion, in order to promote themselves. Casino countermeasures that are prompted by the paranoid attitude Griffin encourages costs the casinos far more money than the card counters actually do.

BJF: How far did you go in school?

Tommy Hyland: I went through four years of college, but I didn’t graduate. I majored in political science.

BJF: Prior to being involved in blackjack and blackjack teams, did you have any normal jobs?

Tommy Hyland: I worked for three weeks as the sports director on a cruise ship. That was my only job.

BJF: Did they have a casino there?

Tommy Hyland: Yes, they actually did. Ironically, that was the first time I was ever told by a casino not to play blackjack. It wasn’t because I was too good. I was still a novice at the time, but it was because members of the cruise staff were not supposed to gamble.

BJF: When did you first start playing blackjack professionally?

Tommy Hyland: 1979. I was 23 years old. As I recall, I started with $1,000. This was in Atlantic City when Resorts was the only casino open. You’d have to wait outside in line to get in every morning. It was only open from 10 AM to 4 AM. I used to drive down a couple of times a week.

A buddy of mine from the golf course, Leo, was learning at the same time. We eventually started sharing our results. Basically, that was my first team, a two man team. In the first 5 or 6 months, this was with early surrender and everything, my bankroll increased from $1,000 to $4,000.

On our visits to Resorts, we met two other card counters, Doug and Dave, who were playing small also and we got friendly with them. After weeks of wrestling with the idea, we eventually decided to trust them. Doug and Dave had $8,000 between them, so we had a four-man team with a $16,000 team bank. By the end of December of ‘79, we ran the $16,000 to over $100,000.

We all purchased Wong’s Blackjack in Asia, [note from A.S.—now a collector’s item] and Doug and Dave decided to go to Asia to play. Leo and I decided to stay in the U.S. I started training other people from the golf course. Fairly soon we had a pretty big team, maybe 10 to 15 guys within about a year. Shortly after Doug and Dave went to Asia, we started making trips to Vegas. But Atlantic City still had early surrender, and our guys were all from the New Jersey area, so we were concentrating mostly there.

BJF: At that time, were you aware of Ken Uston? Had you read The Big Player?

Tommy Hyland: I’ve always been an avid reader, so I grabbed everything I could on blackjack. I read Uston’s book right away. I met Uston in Atlantic City, and had a couple of meals with him. But I didn’t know him that well, or any of his players. I remember that we used a lot of his ideas on our early team.

Blackjack Team Bankrolls, Targets and Compensation

BJF: The basic ideas that you find in Uston’s books with regards to divvying up the funds between investors and players, is that still the best way to go about it?

Tommy Hyland: That stuff’s complicated. I remember when we originally set up our teams — it was kind of a simple set up. It’s good to keep things as simple as possible, but it’s more important to make things fair and give all parties the right incentives. You can end up under some scenarios that can be real unfair if you don’t think of all the different contingencies.

In my early years of playing on teams, I made a lot of mistakes in bankroll agreements that cost both me personally and other members of the team lots of money. Since then, I’ve learned a lot about setting up bankrolls from some guys who tend to be good at those things. For example, say we agree to split the winnings 50% to investors and 50% to players. It doesn’t work. A set-up like that is fine only when the team wins steadily.

If the team loses a lot in the beginning, the players don’t have enough incentive to keep playing hard because it’s apparent it’ll be a long time until they see any money. Similarly, it is very easy to make other mistakes that either favor or harm players or investors dramatically.

There is also always the question of how much of the players’ share should be based on table time and how much on individual winnings. The bankrolls I’ve been involved with in the last ten years or so have been quite complicated in their set-ups, but they have been made that way so that the bank will run smoothly, and will continue to work regardless of what kinds of fluctuations — positive or negative — that we experience.

BJF: When you form a bank, do you generally use the formula described by Uston — either play until the bank dies or you double it?

Tommy Hyland: We do something similar. We don’t necessarily try to double the bank, but we play to a money target. Usually, our bank’s bigger than our target. We just play until we win a certain amount. Our bank might be quite large, but we might have a money target of one quarter or even one eighth of the bank. It’s hard to hit huge money targets. The prospect becomes daunting. It seems like it’s going to take forever to hit the target.

So, you want to have a target that’s reasonable. You don’t want to have a target too small because it would be kind of silly. But you want to have it where if you have a couple of good fluctuations, people get to split up some money. That way they can raise their investment for the next bank. We also always bet a small fraction of the optimal Kelly Criterion bet. Even when we were starting out, we thought one-quarter Kelly was pretty aggressive. Now, I don’t think we bet even one-eighth Kelly.

BJF: Have you ever run into a situation where you had to quit a bank because it was going so badly for so long? Or do you always stick to your decision to hit your target?

Tommy Hyland: I should emphasize that this target set-up and many of the other ideas our blackjack teams have used are not my inventions. Some guys that are really sharp have set these things up, and I just learned a lot from them.

The way we do it — where the players get some sort of reasonable compensation for all the hours they play, everybody’s committed. We always play till we hit the target. I don’t think we’ve ever dumped a bank short of a target.

In the last 10 or 12 years, I don’t recall stopping any bank short of target. We might have had some small projects or some side teams, and for various reasons we stopped them sooner than we’d intended. But the major efforts I’ve been involved in have always played till we hit the target. It’s just understood that you have to dig it out. And as players, we really don’t mind because we are getting a fairly reasonable compensation and as we’re usually also investors, we don’t want to lose our investment.

BJF: What’s the quickest you ever hit a target in the years you’ve been playing?

Tommy Hyland: In the old days, I remember we won a ton during a big heavyweight fight in Las Vegas, I forget which one it was. We had 20 some odd guys out there and 18 or 19 of them won. Just something ridiculous like that. Fairly recently, we hit a target in three weeks or something, quite a large target.

BJF: What’s the longest it’s taken you to hit your target?

Tommy Hyland: Probably a year, maybe even a little longer, a year and three months.

BJF: What’s the average length of time for getting out of one bank and into the next?

Tommy Hyland: The banks I’ve been involved with have generally hit 2 to 3 targets a year; so 4 to 5 months.

BJF: On the banks that have taken long, in the neighborhood of a year or more, is that usually because of some huge loss or losses that occurred over the course that you then had to dig out of?

Tommy Hyland: Yes, that’s happened. Sometimes we’ve had a few losses that have really buried us. Other times we’ve just kind of spun our wheels for awhile. Basically, we’ve pretty much had normal fluctuations, which, as you know, can be quite large.

Recruiting Blackjack Team Players

BJF: Regarding finding players for the team — how do you go about looking for players? Is there a big turnover?

Tommy Hyland: I certainly don’t have to look for them. I get asked quite frequently, “How can I get on your team?” and things like that. And I know a lot of other blackjack players do also. People are always asking about getting on the blackjack team.

Most of my players are people I’ve known for a long time, or friends of people that I’ve known for a long time that they’ve known for a long time. We generally never hire strangers. Other than my early experience, joining up with Doug and Dave, I’ve really known people for a long time before I was willing to share results with them. At this point in my life, I am even more careful about who I play with, and I am definitely not looking for new players.

BJF: Do you personally take part in training and testing your players?

Tommy Hyland: Yes. Basically, I do a lot of that. Usually, I make them learn a lot by themselves first. I give them a basic strategy chart and some hints on how to memorize it. I then show them how to keep the running count. They can call me with any questions, but I really don’t meet with them again till they know basic strategy and count down a deck in something like 35 seconds.

BJF: How do you go about maintaining honesty and trustworthiness? When you have a large team, even if you seem to trust people, it seems like there would always be others wondering if they can trust somebody else that they might not know.

Tommy Hyland: There are some people I trust so much that if I actually saw them stealing money I probably wouldn’t believe it. But you’re right. I haven’t known every single person I’ve ever played with inside and out. Certainly, one of the most important obstacles to having a successful team is the honesty/trustworthiness issue.

There are also some other things you can do to try to verify results. You have to really be pretty sure of the person beforehand. But there are a few things you can do to check on people’s honesty. The obvious one is the polygraph, and we do give those. You can watch them, but it’s tough. Eventually, you basically have to make a decision and not constantly worry about it. You have to take a chance.

There’s no foolproof way to make sure someone’s honest. There’s no way you can watch everyone, and verify their results on every play they make. They’re going to have money and they’re going to play, and you’re going to have to trust their results.

Big Players

BJF: How much of a problem do you have with your big players being recognized in the casinos?

Tommy Hyland: In recent years, this has been the biggest problem on the bankrolls I’ve played on. Most of the people I’ve played with are pretty “hot.” They’re either in the Griffin book, or are recognized by the bosses in the major casinos.

On my teams that has been the main reason why we haven’t made a lot more money. The honesty issue has really not been a problem. I’ve been fortunate enough to play with really solid people. Our main problem is being able to play. A lot of our players now have been playing for 10 or 15 years and they’re really well known. So, we have trouble getting the games down.

BJF: Do you have certain BPs who have become so well known that you can’t even use them at all anymore?

Tommy Hyland: In recent years, in the banks I’ve been involved with, we haven’t really used the big player technique, per se, that much, with several spotters and one big player. Most of the time we’ve just gone out and played as individuals. There are lots of casinos now, so everyone can usually find somewhere to play. Also, many of my associates do a number of other things, and don’t really want to play blackjack all the time. End of interview.

Key Factors in the Success of a Blackjack Team

For me, the most intriguing revelations from my conversation with Tommy Hyland were are the “mini-target” concept, as opposed to the old “double-your-bank” concept, combined with always betting a very small fraction of Kelly. Teams that typically play close to Kelly (in order to maximize expectation), while attempting to double the original bank, risk suffering losses that will decimate the bank, and may doom the team to failure.

Obviously, if you put together a $50,000 team bank, then try to double it, your chances of success will be less favorable than if you were to put together a $300,000 bank, then aim for a $50,000 target.

Hyland’s contention that in the past ten to twelve years of play his blackjack team has never failed to hit a target sounds fantastic, unless you consider the implications of fractional Kelly betting. Suppose two teams are each betting similar amounts, but one team has started with a $50,000 bank, and is betting full Kelly, while the other has started with a $200,000 bank, but is betting only one quarter Kelly. A drawdown of $30,000 would have little effect on the team that started with the $200,000 bank, but it would severely hinder the team that started with a $50,000 total bank. The latter would be facing an uphill struggle for survival.

Another sure factor in Hyland’s long term success must be his use of only trusted friends as team members. Many teams go out hunting for players, instead of allowing a team to form naturally among friends, close acquaintances, and relatives. And even within his group of trusted teammates, Hyland continues to utilize polygraph exams — a safety procedure first employed by Al Francesco.

Al recently told me: “I wouldn’t be on any team that didn’t use polygraphs. There’s just too much money involved. You need it for the peace of mind of everyone on the team.”

A Conversation with Hyland Team Member Barbara D.

[Barbara D. was one of the players arrested at the Casino Windsor in 1994, and was acquitted by the provincial court of Ontario. She has since filed a lawsuit against the province for wrongful arrest and malicious prosecution. Barbara is a grandmother, and works part time in a flower shop in a suburb of Detroit. She was a sheriff’s deputy for 17 years in Orange County, California. She also sold real estate in southern California for 4 years before moving to Michigan. She met Tommy Hyland through a close relative who was one of Tommy’s original team partners.]

BJF: In the Windsor incident, you were not actually playing blackjack, but passing signals to the player who was betting multiple hands of $2500 each. You and Karen were actually the “brains” of the operation. Have you ever played blackjack for large amounts of money, thousands of dollars per hand, yourself?

Barbara: No, but I think it could be done. I remember watching a wealthy woman playing at that level — she was the founder of a large corporation, or the CEO of it or something. The pit didn’t seem to pay any more attention to her than to anybody else. And she used to bet very, very big.

BJF: Would it appeal to you to do that, or do you prefer not to?

Barbara: I don’t know. I guess I’m a bit skittish about spending other people’s money to that degree, although I probably would get over it. I know when I first started, if we would lose $10,000 or $20,000, my God, my head would just swim. And eventually, I could walk around with lots more than that in my purse and not think anything of it.

So, I guess you do get accustomed to it. I think I could. If I were confident enough in my skills as a big player, which are different than my skills doing what I do… But I have complete confidence in my skills doing what I do — telling somebody else to bet big money. So, I think that if I worked on not only getting my counting down to perfection, but also all the variations that are necessary depending on the system you’re playing, then I probably would feel comfortable with it.

BJF: Do you have much interpersonal contact with the casino personnel, like the pit bosses and casino managers and things like that?

Barbara: No.

BJF: Don’t they try to talk to the players when there’s that much money being played?

Barbara: They do sometimes, but it depends. The host is the one who might come around and get into conversations with you, and then, if it stops your play, usually they say, “Well, I don’t want to interrupt you,” and go on their way.

It depends on how you receive them. If you start out very friendly with somebody there in the pit, be it the dealer or one of the floor people, and start chit-chatting, especially if they’re not extremely busy or they only have your table and maybe one other to keep an eye on, then they will go into lengthy conversations. But if you just kind of answer their question and don’t offer them any more, then they leave you alone.

BJF: Do you have any problems with being recognized in casinos right now?

Barbara: Not from walking in and being recognized, like Tommy would in some places.

BJF: But you have no problem with being recognized?

Barbara: I couldn’t walk into the Casino Windsor, to tell you the truth. As a matter of fact, I was out dancing last night, and a fellow asked me, “Gee, Barbara, let’s go over to the casino.” And I said, “I can’t.” He said, “Well, you don’t have to bet. I’ll bet. Just come over with me.” And I said, “I can’t.” I said, “They won’t let me in.” But they did rescind that order.

BJF: If someone told you he was interested in playing blackjack professionally, and really trying to make some money at it, what kind of advice would you have for him?

Barbara: Did you see the TV interview I did last month in Detroit?

BJF: No.

Barbara: Bill Bonds asked me if someone had $300 and was going over to the Casino Windsor to bet his money, what kind of advice would I give him? And I said, “Take the $300 and go play bingo at the church.”

I said that for the simple reason that I don’t care how much skill you have, how knowledgeable you are — if you don’t have the resources behind you to see you through bad times, let alone the knowledge and the skill to know that it will turn around because it’s just mathematics — the bankroll is the main thing — if you don’t have the resources behind you to see you through the bad times, you could go into a skid and not be able to come out of it simply because you don’t have the money to keep going. People don’t realize that. End of interview.

Arnold Snyder comments: Barbara D.’s remarks about her initial nervousness with the large sums of money being won and lost reflect a common problem team players have always had. It is one thing to work out a plan on paper, but quite another to maintain a cool head, and a natural act, when enormous amounts of cash are being won and lost, sometimes in the course of just a few minutes.

A Conversation with Hyland Blackjack Team Member Karen C.

[Karen C. was also arrested at the Casino Windsor, was prosecuted for cheating, and was acquitted of the charges. She too has sued the province of Ontario over the incident.]

BJF: What were you doing before you got involved with the Hyland team?

Karen: I was a sales rep for a small company. We sold items that other companies used for promotion, give away, that type of thing.

BJF: How did you meet Tommy Hyland?

Karen: One of his team members was a friend of mine, and he played with him for about a year, and kept telling me, “You should do this. It’s great. You’d be good at it.” And finally after about a year, I was looking to do something different and that’s how I got started.

BJF: Have you ever worked as the BP or the person who’s actually betting at the table?

Karen: Not the BP, no. I have not.

BJF: Have you bet big money at the tables as part of the team play?

Karen: I have. Yes.

BJF: Do you find that as a woman there’s any advantage, or disadvantage, to being a woman in that position?

Karen: There’s good and bad. The good to being a woman, I think, is that many casinos have the stereotype that you are someone’s girlfriend or wife or whatever, so it’s not really your money. You’re just there for fun and you don’t really know what you’re doing, because most BPs are men. You look a little bit less threatening, if you will.

The bad part is that there aren’t a lot of women betting like that, so you’re sort of remembered a little bit more. There just are not too many of them. On the other hand, I think you’re not taken quite as seriously, or perceived of as big of a threat, as a man is.

BJF: If someone told you they were interested in playing blackjack professionally, what kind of advice would you give them?

Karen: The first thing I would say is read as many books as you can, and just actually knowing how to play, knowing how much to bet, getting together finances. I would tell somebody it’s not as glamorous and as easy as it looks, and that you’re not guaranteed. Even if you’re a great player and you know every single strategy move, you’re still not guaranteed any type of win. But really do a lot of research before you get into something like that.

BJF: How long have you been doing this?

Karen: I guess I’m going on four years with the Hyland team.

BJF: Do you imagine you will continue going for a while yet?

Karen: In a limited capacity, yes. End of interview.

Arnold Snyder comments: Both Karen and Barbara point out that the stereotypes held by casino bosses can be used by intelligent women to their advantage at the tables. Also note that in our conversation with Chris Z. which follows, Chris Z. mentions a number of other stereotypes that perceptive players can capitalize on in attempting to pull off an act.

A Conversation with Hyland Team Member Christopher Z.

[Chris Z., another Hyland team member arrested at the Casino Windsor for cheating, was prosecuted and acquitted. He too has sued the province for damages. At the time he was arrested, Chris had been spreading his bets from $100 to two hands of $2500 each over a period of three days.]

BJF: What is your background?

Chris: Economics degree from the University of Delaware.

BJF: What kind of jobs have you had?

Chris: Cold sales jobs. I worked for a chemical company.

BJF: Are you a salesman now?

Chris: No, I’m trading stocks in Manhattan.

BJF: Do you think the same type of personality that would go with being a salesman is the type of personality that would go well for being a big player?

Chris: Yes.

BJF: How long have you been a big player?

Chris: Three years.

BJF: Has that all been with Tommy Hyland?

Chris: Yes, all of it with Tommy, though I was involved with blackjack team play seven years ago.

BJF: How did you meet Tommy Hyland?

Chris: Through golf 14 years ago. I was about 18.

BJF: In being a big player, would you say you are successful at pulling off that act?

Chris: Being a younger guy, I always acted like the rich, snotty kid — like I had money given to me. I always used to tell casino people I had family money. That was kind of my thing. I never really said I earned it. I just said it was all family money. We were dealing with such a large magnitude of cash. I was 28, 27. I was pretty young looking. When I still had all my hair, I was younger looking.

BJF: So being young you think would be a drawback to trying to play with that kind of money?

Chris: Yeah, it’s a drawback. You’ve got to really sell it. A few of the younger guys I don’t think work. I think I was pretty good at selling, a lot better than a few of the other younger guys that we had playing for us.

BJF: Do you get asked a lot of questions by casino personnel when you’re playing with that kind of money?

Chris: Yeah. When they’re with me, a lot of the guys… The older guys try to just keep anonymity. I kind of stand out with that kind of money. I always try to bring it out. Tommy always says don’t talk to the host. You can always come back again, they’ll forget you. I always say they’re never going to forget me, so I played it right through them. If I saw them walking by, I wouldn’t hesitate to grab them. “Hey, come over here. Look at this hand,” or something like that.

BJF: What kind of skills from being a salesman would be the same types of skills you would use with trying to sell an act as a big player?

Chris: Just that. You’ve got to take it, take it to them. Like anything else to make a sale, you’ve got to make the sales call. I think for being a young guy, it’s the same way.

If they start giving me attention, I make it look like I should get attention. That’s the attitude I took. Even if they were pit bosses, I’d say, “Hey, come over here. Check this out.” I used to have a big joke with them, especially if I knew they were bad guys, I used to say, “Man, since you got here, I started winning,” especially if I was winning, “Stand here, buddy. You’re giving me good luck. Don’t go away.”

Sometimes they would stand there for a half hour. It was great. They wouldn’t think anything of it. A lot of times it would throw them off. “If this guy was up to something, he wouldn’t want me to be here.”

I used to do all sorts of things. Stuff where I’d go to the pit bosses to get jackets and stuff like that. I’d say, “I’m a little cold. Will you get me a jacket?” They have to go to the gift store and get me a jacket or something like that… I’d do it to get rid of them.

One of our big players ran into a couple of guys in the Mirage. He had just been barred there, and he was cashing some chips out and ran into a couple of guys from another casino that were in Vegas from another town, and they were saying, “Hey, how you doing, buddy?” And he said, “Jerry, you want to go get a couple of drinks?” He acted like he was supposed to be there. He was using a totally different name at the other casino.

Me personally, I used to go up and have drinks with the hosts and the pit bosses. If they would have a drink, I’d have a drink with them. I used to do anything. “Okay, give me a massage.” I used to really take full advantage of it. I’d get them to do anything for me. I played like a real bratty kid. The girl I used to play with said I was a brat all the time. I used to get them to do things for me because I wanted to sell that.

BJF: What’s the most convincing act to pull off when you’re betting big money?

Chris: Depends on who you are. I think the older guys have a big advantage. I think they see an older guy betting big, it’s nothing. If you’re Asian, you’ve got the best act in the world. End of interview.

Arnold Snyder comments: Chris Z.’s camouflage technique as a young player is similar to that employed by Ken Uston. Instead of trying to blend in and be anonymous, he tries to be so obvious that he is considered more of a pain in the neck than a serious threat. His outgoing friendliness toward pit personnel, hosts, etc., is also reminiscent of Ian Andersen’s approach to acceptance, as Andersen describes in his classic, Turning the Tables on Las Vegas (Vanguard Press, 1976).

In forming a team, the major considerations are: (1) the size of bank; (2) the number of participants; (3) the financial arrangements; and, (4) the playing strategy. There are many conceivable ways to work out these details, and no one right way to do it. But there are also a lot of wrong ways to go about forming a team plan that should be avoided.

The Blackjack Team Bank

For safety, meaning minimum risk of tapping out, the Hyland team method of setting mini-targets, combined with a fractional Kelly betting strategy, is probably the best approach. Many players, however, would find it impossible to put together a sizable enough bank to make this approach feasible. Hyland himself acknowledges that he began with a personal bankroll of only $1,000, a substantially risky proposition in any casino blackjack game, at any level of play.

This does not mean, however, that the team concept is entirely useless for players with small bankrolls. If you’ve got $2,000, and you have a couple of friends who have $1,500 each, the three of you playing off a $5,000 team bank are immensely more powerful, and more likely to last, than the three of you playing individually.

It would also be very difficult to play at a small fraction of Kelly with a $5,000 total bank — at least from the practical perspective. There would be no difficulty limiting your max bets to $20, which would certainly allow you to play a fractional Kelly approach, but you would also very likely be limiting your bet spread, which would cut into your potential profits. Your expected hourly rate at this level may also be unacceptable, especially if you have expenses (travel, lodging, etc.).

Anyone considering a team venture, however, must start from wherever they are, and it would be far more dangerous to go out and find strangers to hook up with, just to increase your team bank. Remember, your team bank could be stolen by a dishonest teammate quicker than you could lose it at the tables. A prime purpose of forming a team bank is to avoid risk. This leads us to…

The Number of Team Participants

Rather than seeking a specific number of teammates, you should be looking to only those people you can trust. If you have only one trusted friend or relative who might be interested in this venture, then the perfect size for your team is two players.

It is far safer to look for people you already trust to join you in this type of endeavor, even if you must teach them how to play from scratch, than it would be to look for players who are already good card counters, then try to decide if you can trust them with your money.

The Hyland team today has dozens of players, and according to Tommy, he was up to 10-15 players (mostly his golfing buddies) within the first year. There is definitely power in numbers due to numerous factors.

If most players are bankroll contributors, the team bank also grows with the team size. The more players you have, the more hands per hour, per week, per month, etc., you will get in, and this translates to a higher $ expectation. More players also mean more brain power working on strategies, figuring out problems, etc. Some big player strategies require numerous counters/spotters, as do some advanced shuffle-tracking methods.

But these positive team factors do not necessarily mean that you should have a dozen or more players. A large team requires a lot of organizing ability, which many people do not possess. A two or three man team that functions smoothly will succeed far more often than a ten man team that is in a constant state of chaos, mistrust, etc.

Blackjack Team Financial Arrangements

With any large team, and especially if unequal participants are involved, the financial arrangements will be complicated, and must be figured out according to the precise situation. Two or three players who contribute equal $ amounts to the bank, and who agree to all play the same number of hours, should have little difficulty making an agreement as to how to divvy up profits. It’s an equal split.

The problems arise when various participants are contributing different amounts to the bank, are playing different numbers of hours, are utilizing different levels of skill, have different levels of expenses, etc. These complications are yet another reason to go into a venture like this slowly, so that you may figure out these details as they come up. Even with only two or three players, problems can arise based on factors of inequity in bankroll contributions, hours, talent, expenses, etc., and for any specific team, a fair agreement will be specific to that team only.

Other Considerations for Blackjack Teams

Will you have outside investors, i.e., investors who are not players? If so, they will want to know up front what the return on their investment will be based on.

Will you have players who are non-investors? If so, how will these players be compensated? Will they be compensated for the number of hours they play? If so, any extreme negative fluctuation which causes the bank to go an inordinate number of hours until the target is hit, could find itself eaten up by hourly “wages” to the players before the target is reached. But if you do not pay players who are non-investors, how will you keep them committed to the team effort when it appears it may take months until they ever see a penny in pay?

Will you have players at different levels of talent? Is counting/spotting a lesser talent than doing a big player act, or vice versa?

All of these types of things contribute to the complexity of devising equitable financial arrangements for a blackjack team. Again, my advice would be to start small and simple, and complicate the arrangement only as it becomes necessary.

Blackjack Team Playing Strategy

One of the real benefits of blackjack team play, mentioned by Tommy Hyland, is that multiple brains can do things strategically that a single player could never pull off. This is a big topic, and is one that we will address in Part II of this Blackjack Team series, in the June issue of Blackjack Forum. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Blackjack Computers

The Electronic Gambler’s Fuzz-Out Syndrome

by Bob Jenkins

(From Blackjack Forum Volume V #4, December 1985)
© Blackjack Forum 1985

[Note from Arnold Snyder: The following is a chapter from a blackjack book being written by Bob Jenkins. Bob was involved with several blackjack computer teams over a period of three years and is documenting some true experiences of these teams in a book to be titled Hot Wired to Win in Vegas.

The “Thor” system referred to in the chapter employed a blackjack computer program that tracks a multiple-deck shuffle and then determines where groups of cards (segments) end up in the shuffled decks. Bet levels and play decisions are determined by the blackjack shuffle-tracking computer on the basis of which cards remain in the segment currently being played.

The premier shuffle-tracking device was the Thor blackjack computer, which was employed by Bob Jenkins’ team. This blackjack computer was originally designed and developed over a period of years by three pioneers in the electronic gambling device field—Keith Taft, his son Marty Taft, and their associate Tom Shanks.

The Thor computers were first used successfully in 1980 and were in use by high-stakes players who purchased the devices directly from Taft until they became illegal. The Thor blackjack computer is actually an expanded “David” computer, which was designed for perfect-strategy card counting.

Shuffle-tracking computers made multiple-deck blackjack play as profitable as—and often more profitable than—single deck play. The Thor user first had to play through a shoe to establish a pre-shuffle “history” by entering the card values in the proper sequence as they were discarded to the discard rack. Computer to player communication is by coded buzzes of relays on the soles of the feet.

With this technical background, you should be able to follow Jenkins’ adventures.]

Introduction to Blackjack Computer Play

Sometimes in playing with a blackjack computer a phenomenon would occur that I have heard described as Electronic Gambler’s Fuzz-Out. After countless hours of sitting at numerous blackjack tables in equally numerous casinos, watching and entering every single card twice and in proper sequence, keeping a wary eye open for heat, gauging pit personnel perceptiveness, being constantly aware that the eye-in-the-sky is probably consuming reels of film recording your play while you surreptitiously determine who may be in back of you (watching your feet), knowing that a cocktail waitress who leans next to you on some pretext or other may be interested in more than the color of your shoes, interpreting the cryptic buzzes on the soles of your feet, wondering how a five-fold increase in the size of your bet will be received, continuously monitoring the reliability of your shoe switches, comparing what the computer tells you with what you see unfolding in front of you, watching for a battery dropout or a computer glitch, etc., etc., etc…. something happened that was almost surreal. That something that happened has been called Electronic Gambler’s Fuzz-Out. In other words, your brain makes a left turn after signaling a right. A few instances of this strange phenomenon are described in this chapter.

Blackjack Computers and the Tucked Cards Fuzz-Out Windfall

During a Fuzz-Out, all of the natural laws of the universe are suspended. In the grip of such a fugue, you are liable to violate the most basic precepts of security. I’ve seen it happen quite a few times. I’ve been guilty of it quite a few times. The first such event that I recall was early on in the training sessions at a downtown Vegas club. A teammate (I will call him Tom) and I were seated at a blackjack table. At this particular club the player’s first two cards were dealt face down. My blackjack computer output indicated that the next few cards were near the end of a segment (which is a crucial and powerful time) and I desperately wanted to tell the computer what all the outstanding cards were so that the accuracy of the play decision dictated by the computer could be greatly enhanced.

There were two cards on the table for which I did not know the value. Tom had quickly glanced at his cards and had immediately tucked them. A pat hand, obviously. But what were they? Maybe two face cards, maybe a nine and a ten; what were they? No problem. I simply reached over (to the unmitigated horror of the dealer), pulled Tom’s two cards from under his chips, entered the card values into my computer, and then replaced his cards. While the dealer reprimanded me in startled and no uncertain terms, the computer dispassionately informed me that I should most definitely take a hit. I took the hit, caught a five for 21, and serenely tucked my cards.

It wasn’t until then that the castigation by the dealer and the incredulous stare from Tom brought home to me the impropriety of what I had done. But I won the hand, and the sheer stupid brazenness of what I had done lulled the dealer into thinking (perhaps correctly) that I didn’t know the first thing about the game of blackjack. She didn’t even inform the pit boss.

Blackjack Computers and the Broken Wire Fuzz-Out Snafu

Later, months later, in a Las Vegas Strip club, another team member (I will call this one Dick) and I were seated at the same table and were doing well at controlling the pace of the game for the full table. Both of us were experiencing a fair degree of success and I was playing two hands, thereby almost doubling my dollar win rate. The dealer was nearly perfect in that his shuffle pattern was ideal for our needs, and by various hand (and other) signals, Dick and I observed that we were in constant agreement on the bet index, the optimum cut point, and several other significant parameters. Since we were the big bettors at the table and had been careful enough to avoid attracting any unusual amount of heat, either he or I almost always got the cut card, which is the same as money in the bank.

After about thirty minutes of these favorable conditions, I couldn’t resist going for the gold. I jumped by bets from $25 on each hand to $125 each. Neither the dealer nor the hovering pit boss batted an eye at this precipitous spread, although I observed that a raised eyebrow contact was made between them that carried the message, “Boy! Are we going to nail this turkey!”

But it was Dick who “nailed this turkey.” During the first round of my stepped-up bet level, he suddenly grew grave and silent and, after a long pause during which he seemed to be contemplating the very meaning of life itself, he tucked his cards and excused himself from the table. I’m sure that everyone else at the table, the dealer, and the pit boss watching the action, concluded that he had succumbed to the usual gambler’s excitement and felt an urgent need to make some sort of deposit in a different part of the casino. I thought otherwise, and was soon vindicated in this belief when I was treated to the most blatant display of Electronic Gambler’s Fuzz-Out that I have ever seen.

Out of the blue, Dick suddenly reappeared at my side and, even though we had previously agreed that we “would not know each other” in the casino, announced loudly, “I’ve broken a wire. I think we had better leave.”

I could physically feel the eyes of the dealer and the pit boss boring through my scalp as I intently studied the stack of chips in front of me, the table rail, my fingernails, and anything else that would provide an excuse for not looking up. To say that our cover had been blown was an understatement of gigantic proportions. Not only had our acquaintance (to put it mildly) been announced to the world, but a direct reference to the electronics we were both wearing had been made in near unmistakable terms. I could almost feel the hands of the security guards grabbing me by both arms and dragging me into the much-dreaded Back Room.

After a few seconds of eternity I turned toward Dick and exclaimed, “What! That damn air conditioner is out of order again? Next time let’s rent a car with decent wiring.”

Dick just looked at me like he couldn’t figure out what I was talking about, then his face lit up in belated understanding and he verified that, yes indeed, a wire on the air conditioner was broken. With that clever little exchange, we scooped up our chips, cashed out, and beat a hasty retreat.

I’ve often wondered what the dealer and the pit boss really thought of that.

Blackjack Computers and the Cut Card Fuzz-Out Disaster

Once upon a time in a land far away (Atlantic City), in a fabulous castle (Park Place Casino) there sat a prince (me) who wanted the cut card very (VERY) badly. Therein begins a tale that caused me extreme embarrassment.

One of the primary requirements of the Thor system we were using at the time was that the cut card should be placed at the optimum point so that the richest segment of cards would wind up at the front of the deck. This allowed for placing sizeable bets “off-the-top,” that is, before any cards were dealt out of the shoe, and therefore “prove” that we were not card counters. A typical card counter does not have shuffle-tracking capability and will start off with nominal bets and then spread, i.e., increase or decrease the size of his bets, as the cards played out from the shoe indicate that the remaining cards give a positive or negative count. Anyone who places his biggest bet before any cards have been played out from the shoe is apparently committing financial suicide because at the outset the house is supposed to have the advantage.

I had carefully played through several shoes under highly satisfactory conditions and was sure I was giving the blackjack computer nearly perfect card “histories.” All the shoes, till then, had been boring ho-hum affairs—i.e., the count never seemed to wander by more than two or three points on either side of zero. Then the fabulous thing happened. The dealer slowly finished up the shuffle and I entered the final shuffle data into the computer. I asked it where the cut point should be and then, since I was sure I was going to get the cut and, due to the relaxed nature of the game, I felt confident I could place it accurately, I entered that cut point in the computer and waited to hear what the opening count would be. I almost fell off the stool. The opening count would be plus 14. Fabulous! Money in the bank! A can’t-lose situation, and this dealer faithfully gave each player his turn at the cut card, in order, and I was next! Technically, I had violated one of our basic rules by entering the cut point before the cut card had actually been inserted, but during that session everything was ticking along so precisely that my confidence was sky high.

Ruefully I gazed at the measly single black chip that I had already placed on the spot (another rule violation) for the single hand I was playing and wondered what the pit’s reaction would be to my dropping three more blacks on top of that one. Such an action should have been perfectly acceptable because the cut card hadn’t even been inserted yet, but I would attract attention which might turn to heat when the first round of cards came out and painted the table in brilliant hues, i.e., almost all the cards appearing would be faces and aces.

Then the second fabulous thing occurred. The player to my left suddenly grabbed his chips off his spot and left the table, leaving me free to play his spot, which I eagerly did. In the wink of an eye I got carried away and dropped four black chips on the vacated spot and then, making some nonsensical remark about how two hands should be bet the same, I placed three more blacks on my original spot, resulting in a total bet of $800. That’s quite a jump from $100. But I felt I was set and fully expected this to be at least a $2000 shoe. Then the impossible happened.

Beyond all comprehension (to me, anyway) the dealer placed the deck on its side in front of the elderly lady to my right and handed her the cut card. I was devastated—until the Electronic Gambler’s Fuzz-Out took over control of my actions. Without the slightest hesitation I reached over, snatched the cut card from the startled old lady, growled at the dealer “It’s my turn,” and then deftly sliced it into the deck at precisely the 78% point the computer had told me. That all the more remarkable because the deck wasn’t in front of me, it was in front of the alarmed little old lady to my right. But I just knew that I had nailed it to within a card or two.

Not only had I been extremely rude and done something that you just do not do at a blackjack table, but my making it so obvious that I desperately wanted the cut card right after jumping my bet eight-fold was sure to mark me as counter of some sort or other, and thereby bring on the heat. Realizing this, I didn’t look at anybody and probably turned scarlet red. The only reaction from the dealer was a long silent pause and then a dry, “Sorry, sir. I didn’t realize that anybody could want the cut card that much.” Now all that was needed to get me barred as a professional was for the first round of cards to paint the table. I was dead certain that nothing but faces would show up.

Sure enough, the paint hit the table. All cards were dealt fact up and practically every player had a pat 20, and the dealer had a 10 showing. I groaned. Then groaned again when the dealer checked his hole card and, grinning broadly at me, turned over an ace for a natural 21. Without hesitation, I pocketed my remaining chips and left the casino, went for a long walk on the beach, and did not return to that casino for the remainder of the trip except to cash in my chips.

The Blackjack Computer Triple Fuzz-Out Ignominy

As a general rule the practice of more than one of us playing at the same table at the same time was avoided. Occasionally, however, this rule was temporarily suspended in order to get a really good game. One instance of this that I recall most vividly happened at a Las Vegas Strip casino where three of us locked up a table to do some serious shuffle tracking. Each of us played two hands and we discouraged civilians from coming into the remaining spot by crowding our stools in that direction and cluttering the vacant spot area with ash trays, glasses, chips, and anything else that happened to be on the table. This type of play was extremely effective for Thor because we could absolutely control the pace of the game, always got the cut card, could make sure that everybody saw everybody else’s cards, and by discreet signals, verify that we were all getting basically the same information from our respective computers.

During this particular session, my computer suffered a massive cardiac arrest and fell silent. But I didn’t want to leave the table and have civilians come into the game and screw it up. So I made my plight known to my teammates, reduced my bets substantially, and simply waved off the cut card whenever it was presented to me. I could play an almost even game by using basic strategy for play decisions and could tilt the odds slightly in my favor by increasing my bets during positive count periods, which was easily determined by observing my teammates’ bet variations (as well as noting the enthusiasm on their faces).

Everything was proceeding nicely. But after waving off the cut card several times (dealers like to give it to those who don’t want it) the first in this series of Fuzz-Outs appeared. I was offered the cut card and I took it. Not till I actually extended my hand to insert the card did I realize what I had done, and then I froze. I had no idea where the card should be inserted. My hand, holding the bright red plastic card over the proffered deck, simply remained motionless while I pondered what to do. Then a loud, clear, deep baritone boomed out from my left. My teammate, let’s call this one Harry, must have experienced his own inimitable brand of Fuzz-Out (number two in this series), because he told me where to cut the deck, loudly, clearly, and in front of casino personnel and everybody.

“I’d say about a quarter from the end.”

And now here comes Fuzz-Out number three in this sequence. I could not figure out which end he meant—the front end, or the back end? After all, everybody knows that a stack of cards, like a rope, has two ends. My hand, emblazoned with the card, remained embarrassingly immobile. I waited for Harry to figure out my dilemma and give me a clue. No further advice was forthcoming. The dealer stared at me quizzically, wondering, no doubt, if I had sunk into some kind of catatonic trance. With a belated flourish I slid the cut card in 25% from the front and glanced at Harry for confirmation. His scowl told me everything. I was completely unnecessary for him to add his final comment, loudly and clearly.

“Not THAT end, you dummy!”

Needless to say, for the remainder of that trip, our conversations revolved around the semantics of the word “end.” I wouldn’t admit that I agreed with him, after the event, that the word “end” correlates more closely with the back of something rather than with the front. Oh well, to live is to learn. A corollary to that might be, “To cut the deck at the wrong place can be expensive, and may invoke the wrath of other team members.”

The Surprising See My Wire? Blackjack Computer Fuzz-Out

As in all endeavors, some people are more adept than others. It’s easy to get into the habit of thinking that these people can do no wrong and to try to emulate them. A senior member of one of the teams I was on was this kind of person: always expert, composed, and self-possessed. He was so skillful and careful that we tagged him with the nickname “Ace.”

Then one day I saw Ace do something that brought home to me the fact that even he was only human. I caught him in the middle of a beautiful Fuzz-Out.

I was in a casino looking over the prospects when I saw him enter the gaming area. As always, he looked just like any other well-to-do tourist who was itching to gladly give money to the casinos. Halfway from the door to the tables he suddenly stopped stock still and just stood there for a while. Then, turning toward a nearby row of slots, he placed his foot on the base of the slot row and lifted his pants leg to knee level and proceeded to fish out a connector that had come loose and dropped down into his sock. Finally retrieving the errant wire from his sock, I watched in astonishment as he blissfully reconnected it to the wire hanging a good ten inches out from under his rolled-up pants leg. This was in full view of everybody. I almost expected him to stand up proudly and ask, “Hey! Did everybody get a chance to see my pretty little wire?”

A Blackjack Computer Fuzz-Out From An Unexpected Source

We had all heard that there were people out there who attempted multiple-deck shuffle-tracking without the aid of a computer strapped to their bodies, but we didn’t take that seriously. To do it right, you had to have a computer. But something happened one night that pointed out quite clearly that these people were active and that they could, at least, determine where the deck should be cut. I didn’t see this but was told about it from two other team members.

These two team members were seated at a table in one of the Cowboy Clubs. Directly between them was a young Asian man who seemed unnaturally alert. For reasons that only she knew, the dealer never gave the cut card to either of my teammates, but occasionally gave it to the attentive young Asian. Throughout the session my teammates were happy to see that whenever the young man seated between them got the cut card, he accidentally placed it approximately where it should be.

Finally, the dealer screwed up and gave the cut to one of my teammates, who promptly sliced it in at the most opportune cut point. Instantly the young Asian jumped up, grabbed my teammate’s hand to shake it vigorously, and loudly congratulated him on making a good cut.

Other Blackjack Computer Fuzz-Outs

I would suppose that fuzz-outs happened occasionally with all team members, but I rarely heard any being reported. Those which occurred during a time that they wouldn’t be witnessed by another team member stand a high probability of never being related, and even if the embarrassing debacle was witnessed, what really transpired would be downplayed to the extent that it would appear to be only a minor lapse.

During discussion, I’ve heard comments such as, “I’ve just had a case of fuzz-out, what did you say?” Or, “I must have fuzzed-out because I did such and such…,” and then a silly or minor case of absentmindedness would be related. Once, during one of our meetings, two team members arrived late and they seemed a trifle subdued. Finally, one turned to the other and caustically remarked, “Ya know, you just don’t do things like ask me at the table if I also got an 80% cut point call.” Nothing further about that was said.

I’m sure that many humorous, and some not so humorous, cases of Electronic Gambler’s Fuzz-Out happened that will never be revealed. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Blackjack Around the World

Interview with the Blackjack Traveler

by Richard W. Munchkin

(From Blackjack Forum Volume XXIII #2, Summer 2003)
© Blackjack Forum 2003

[Note from Arnold Snyder: Richard W. Munchkin is a member of the Blackjack Hall of Fame, and author of the book Gambling Wizards: Conversations with the World’s Greatest Gamblers .]

[Note from RWM: Who is Blackjack Traveler?

When I read the blackjack message boards I often see players bemoaning the state of blackjack. The casinos have gotten smarter, they have software to evaluate your play, and after only 25 years they have snapped to the “Big Player” approach.

The players who write these things have one thing in common—they’re Americans. It’s a big world out there, and there are about 100 other countries that have casinos. Blackjack Traveler would like to visit them all. You won’t find a copy of The Big Player in the casino gift shop in Rumania, or Blackjack Survey Voice in Cambodia. Blackjack is alive and well for this professional gambler, and living outside the United States.

Blackjack Traveler spends about 48 weeks a year on the road to get an edge. For this professional gambler, it’s an endless series of visas, plane rides, and customs stops.

Most of the time he finds games that are hardly worth playing. Still, the trip will provide material for the column he writes in a Taiwanese magazine. But every once in a while he will wander into a casino and find that they pay 2-1 on blackjack and have early surrender, and have a joker in the deck that gives you an automatic win, but if the dealer gets the joker they just burn it.

Games that will make any professional gambler salivate; these are games that will make you say, “That’s not possible. No casino would do that.” But they can, and do. BJ Traveler says, “It would be easy to visit 30 countries in a year, but when I find a good game I stay.”

All this travel is not without risk. In his pursuit of a higher edge, Blackjack Traveler has gone to countries I would consider quite dangerous: Russia, Columbia, Cambodia, Sri Lanka.

Is he not worried carrying 100 years salary for the average person in those countries? Even though he spent 76 days in a Southeast Asian prison, he laughs at me, “The higher the risk, the better the profit. In the end I think I am a risk lover.” I guess this answer comes easier to a professional gambler who has won more 1.5 million dollars playing basic strategy. – RWM]

Interview with Blackjack Traveler: A Professional Gambling Career Starts

RWM: Where did you grow up?

BJT: Taiwan.

RWM: How did you become a professional gambler?

BJT: When I was in my twenties I went to Las Vegas just for fun. I was afraid of gambling. I lost 25 cents in a slot machine. I like to read, so I went to a bookshop and found there was a section about gambling. I picked up one book, and took it to Taiwan.

RWM: Which book?

BJT: Beat the Dealer It was the second edition from 1966. I thought; this counting is very hard. There are no casinos in Taiwan. I went abroad to the Philippines, and America. I went to casinos and played very small. After several years I could play basic strategy.

My major in college was economics, and I have an MBA from the University of Chicago. After I graduated I went back to Taiwan. I worked at some banks and security companies. When I was 31 years old I became the president of a security brokerage company. This was a very early success.

Unfortunately, after one year the Taiwan stock market crashed, and I lost about two million dollars. My income had been good, but it was related to the market, so my income shrank. I had borrowed a lot of the money I lost. I owed $100,000 per month on the loans, and I couldn’t afford to make the payments. I needed a way to make money.

When I was working they opened many casinos in Korea on Cheju Island. Koreans can not play in the Korean casinos. Only foreigners can play there. They had to go to Japan and Taiwan for customers. They had a junket program for Taiwanese and Japanese, and someone invited me to play there. Since I knew basic strategy I thought, “Why not?” I didn’t think I could lose much.

At that time it was very difficult for them to get players from Taiwan, because the Taiwanese players were afraid they would be cheated. The casinos said that there was no cheating, I would be treated well, and if I would introduce customers to them they would give me a commission. The program was to go on Friday and come back on Monday. Everything was free—hotel, airfare, food—but they wanted you to play 12 hours. You had to bring $30,000 US dollars, and play $400 minimum. If you did they would give you $2,100 as a commission.

At that time they had ES10 [early surrender versus ten] and all the other good rules. The disadvantage was about 0.1% off the top. If I played 12 hours, that is about 1,000 hands. If you go to the toilet, maybe less. If you play 1,000 hands you expect to lose $400, but they will give you $2,100.

At that time I was president of the company, and I didn’t want to get people to gamble. In Taiwan that would be bad, because most people lose. I went to play, and had small wins, and small losses. When I lost my job I thought, if I bring six people with me and we all sit at the same table, I can help everybody play basic strategy. The seven of us will lose $3,000, but I can get $14,000 in commission. I got some friends. I told them, “Come on a vacation with me in Korea. Everything will be free.”

RWM: But you have to put up $210,000?

BJT: Yes. I would put up the money. Everyone would play under my instructions, and I would take all the wins or losses. Seven of us went to Korea. At that time there were about 10 casinos, and all the casinos had similar programs.

The first week we went and played. Wow, I made money. The second week I went—I made money. My friend had a trading company. I asked him how many employees he had. He said, “Ten.” I said, “Tell them to bring their wives, and have a company vacation in Korea.” I got twenty people.

Now I had three tables of people. I made a basic strategy manual, and I gave them to everyone. I told them, “You are going to be playing for 12 hours. It’s no fun unless you learn basic strategy.” Very soon many people wanted to go. When we went on the plane, I was sure many people had not learned basic strategy. I gave a quiz on the plane. People who scored best became table leaders. We had three tables, and I would jump around. Now with 20 people I could make $30,000.

RWM: How long did this go on?

BJT: Three years. Maybe 30 weekends a year.

RWM: How much did you take out in those three years?

BJT: $1.5 million. That was from Korean and Philippine casinos. The Philippine casinos learned from the Korean casinos how to recruit players, so I started bringing my people to the Philippines. Then I took my people on cruise casinos out of Singapore. I used over 400 people during that time.

Bringing Card Counting to the Casinos in Asia

RWM: When did you finally learn to count cards?

BJT: After a year I bought The World Greatest Blackjack Book by Lance Humble, and I learned Hi Opt 1.

After three years the casino found out. Every week those casinos would have about 30 customers from Taiwan. Maybe 20 would play baccarat, and 10 would play blackjack. So the casinos didn’t know they were losing money to me because the baccarat players lost enough money to cover the blackjack players.

But I was barred after the first year in Pusan at Paradise Beach. The Paradise Group is the largest casino company in Korea. They own six or seven casinos, including Walker Hill in Seoul. The reason I was barred was not for card counting. I took a group, and all my people played blackjack. Most other people play baccarat. I was worried that if we kept making money the casino would suspect, so I hid chips.

I took eighteen $1,000 chips back to Taiwan. We changed casinos every week. After two months I went back to that casino. When I got there I found they had changed all the big chips. I took out one, and changed it. They came and said, “How many of these chips do you have?” I said, “Eighteen.” They said, “Why did you take these chips out of the casino?” I said, “Because there is a currency control leaving Korea. If I win money I can not take it to Taiwan. I know I am coming back anyway so I just kept the chips.”

They said that 34 of these chips were missing. That is why they changed the chips—to find out who had them. They allowed me to cash my chips, but they now watched me very closely. By that time I knew how to count cards. I was playing two hands of about $120, and the count went good. I jumped my bet to two hands of $1,200. The dealer busted three times in a row. Then the count dropped, and I went back to two hands of $120.

They barred me. I had never been barred before, that is why I had just jumped my bet. I did not use any camouflage. The interesting thing is that they did not inform any of the other casinos within the Paradise Group. I played another two years in Korea at the other casinos.

At the casino in Inchon it was very easy to win. I won $50,000 each trip for three trips. Then they barred me. This was such a good game, so I still wanted to play there. I found two friends, both girls. We went to the casino, and we pretended we didn’t know each other. I took off my glasses, and I bought a fake mustache. We sat together and I signaled them how much to bet, and how to play. In one hour they won $10,000.

We stopped and went out to eat at a restaurant outside the hotel. The casino manager was suspicious, and came to the restaurant and saw us together. He was Korean/Chinese. He said, “Why are you here? You are not allowed to play.”

I said, “When you barred me you said not to come without other players.” That was because I had come before with a player who lost $100,000 at baccarat. He said, “These girls are not players. They are figureheads. They play for you.” They were two Taiwanese girls betting thousands of dollars. It did look strange.

He told me to look for him after my meal. I went to see him. He asked what I was going to do. I said that I wasn’t doing anything illegal, and it is my right to play. I was afraid they would inform other casinos. I said to him, “I’ll only take half of my win.” The owner and the casino manager went to discuss it. He came back and said, “We will give you all your winnings, but you have to show your passport, and we will make a copy of it.”

They had given me a deposit receipt for my $10,000 capital and $10,000 winnings. My passport was at Walker Hill in Seoul. I went to Walker Hill to get the passport, and I realized that I had the right to collect on the receipt for six months. I thought, “Why hurry?” I played a lot during that six months, and then went back to collect. When I returned to Walker Hill after collecting the money I was stopped at the entrance. They had received a fax from the casino in Inchon. I didn’t know how many casinos would get that fax, but after I was stopped at Walker Hill I was still able to play in Cheju Island.

After my barrings in Korea I started playing the Singapore cruises. I played a cruise for 11 days and won $110,000. After the cruise, the cruise manager barred me. Then I went to the Philippines, and the same cruise manager was running the VIP room at a Philippine casino. He recognized me and barred me again. The Philippine casinos are run by a government company, and he informed them so I was on a blacklist in all the casinos there. I didn’t know they had sent out a memo to all the Philippine casinos.

I went back to Taiwan and started working. After several months of working at a securities house a new casino opened in the Philippines. I went there, and no one recognized me.

At the same time, the job at the securities company was not working out well. I wanted to leave that job, and just play in the Philippines. I went back to the Philippines, and one casino manager recognized me. He asked me to go to the office with him. He was very polite. He said, “Give me face.” He didn’t want me to argue with him in the casino.

There were five security cops in the office with us. He showed me the memo, which said that when I played, the casino was at a disadvantage. Therefore they had barred me, and they recommended that all casinos bar me. The Pavilion Casino had issued the memo, and I was at the Silahis casino.

I asked if I could have a copy of the memo. He said, “No, because it is possible you will use this to promote yourself in some publications.” I said, “How about if you write a certificate to me so I can show my friends.” He said, “Okay.” He wrote that I had been barred in this casino on this date. Then he used the casino chop, and signed it. There was a picture of me attached to the memo, but it is very dark because it was taken from the eye in the sky. After that the security people said, “Okay, the official business is finished. Now will you please teach us how to count cards?”

Traveling the World to Play Blackjack

RWM: At some point you decided to travel the world.

BJT: After the first three years I was barred in Korea and the Philippines. At that time I thought that Las Vegas must be difficult. Card counting had been seen there for too many years. I went back to work at a securities company. I thought the fun was over. At that time I bought many books from Las Vegas, and one of them was The International Casino Guide.

I thought in other countries I could still play and profit. I thought that maybe there are some other casinos that will not be as sophisticated as American casinos.

RWM: I would think that the most natural place for you to go would be Macao.

BJT: Yes, I went to Macao many times. But Macao did not have a good game, or a good rebate program.

I looked in the book to pick which countries I should try my luck. I wanted to find a city with more than ten casinos. I also wanted it to be a country with medium economic development. I found Egypt and Turkey. I decided I would try the casinos in Cairo and Istanbul. If I could win money there, then I would try France and Britain. If I could not make money in Egypt and Turkey, then I would forget France and England.

RWM: Why?

BJT: Because the more developed the country, the more experience the casino has.

RWM: Don’t you think it is important that the casino is earning a lot of money? If they are earning well they can afford to lose to you. Isn’t that why Korea was good?

BJT: At that time I thought if the country was well developed, the casino would have more experience and be able to recognize card counters. I went to Egypt and Turkey. It was okay, but it was not so easy. In Cairo the casinos were very small. There were not many players, so they watched very closely. In Turkey there were too many players.

RWM: Did you have any problems taking money in and out of those countries?

BJT: No. I did not win much there. So I went back to my book, and said, “How about Romania and Hungary?” I went to Bucharest, and Budapest. In Bucharest I said, “Oh, early surrender against ace.” That was good, but after one week I was barred in most casinos in Bucharest. Then I went to Budapest to play. A German company ran the casinos, so the game was not good.

Then I read a newspaper that said there were 200 casinos in Moscow. I went to Moscow, and I said, “Wow, great games.” That was 1996. It was very difficult to get a visa because I’m Taiwanese. I went back to Taiwan, prepared the paperwork, and went back to Russia in 1997. I lived there in Moscow for a year, and played every day.

RWM: Did you feel it was dangerous when you were there?

BJT: Gypsies robbed me several times. I lived at the Kosmos hotel. First I was pickpocketed by Gypsies, and they got about $1,000. Now they knew I had money. Every time I would walk out of the hotel they would follow me.

I recognized them one time, and as soon as I saw them I went into a metro station. It was winter, so I was wearing a big coat. I I was waiting for the train, and when the train came, and the door opened. I couldn’t move. Two people grabbed my left arm, two people grabbed my right arm. I struggled, and finally they released me. I went into the train, and I saw eight or nine gypsy girls. They were all about 15 years old, and every one of them was carrying a baby. They got into the next car, but just before the doors shut they all got out. Then I realized my wallet was gone.

RWM: Weren’t you carrying a lot more money than $1,000?

BJT: Yes, but it was hidden under my clothes.

RWM: Did you feel in danger in Moscow?

BJT: No. In 1997 the casinos were not so alert at that time. I felt a bit protected because the Russian Mafia owned the casinos. Maybe they protect their customers.

RWM: Unless they don’t like you as a customer anymore. Did you eventually get barred?

BJT: I was barred by 12 casinos in Moscow. When I made the money in Korea I repaid my debts, so I wasn’t betting as much.

RWM: Your goal is to play in 100 countries. How many have you countries have you played in?

BJT: 32 so far. The reason for not playing more already is that when I find a good place I stay. It is easy to go to 30 countries in one year if you want. When I left Moscow I planned to go back, but I wanted to spend some time in Taiwan with my son. At the same time my father had a friend whose company was going public. He asked me to help him finance the company, so I went back to work. Also, my father hates that I have become a professional gambler.

RWM: Still? You are quite successful.

BJT: Kind of… still. He feels that a well-educated person should be doing something that would benefit society. My father is very uncomfortable with this profession. When he first recognized that I was a professional gambler he did not talk to me for one year.

My father never went on a trip with me, but my mother went maybe 100 times. He did not approve of what I was doing. So I went back to Taiwan to work for two years. I worked for the largest Cable Company in Taiwan. After two years I really did not like the job. Because I had been living freely it was very difficult for me to adapt, though many people thought I adapted remarkably well.

After two years I decided to go back to the gambling life. I went to live in Las Vegas for three years. I found that I could play hit and run. I formed a small team. I had given a speech in Taiwan, and two of the guys who heard that speech came to Las Vegas and asked if they could play with me. I said okay, and arranged for them to stay at my apartment. Every day we would go out, and they would watch me play.

RWM: Were they spotters for you?

BJT: Not yet. After several months of them learning, they were counting well. Then I formed a small team. We got a girl to be our big player. We would sit at three different tables and signal her to jump in.

RWM: How much was she betting?

BJT: From $1,000 to $3,000.

RWM: The casinos didn’t find it odd that a woman was betting that much?

BJT: I’m not sure. We had no problems the first month. She was young, pretty, and Chinese. We won $66,000 the first month. I thought we should give Las Vegas a rest. Then we went to New Orleans, Biloxi, and Tunica. Our BP couldn’t come because she was a student. She had to go to classes.

In New Orleans we would jump into each other’s tables. One day, before playing I checked their money, and it was gone. They lost it all playing roulette. I said, “Why would you do this? You can count cards now.” They said, “Counting cards is no fun now.” They thought roulette was more exciting. Especially with other people’s money. That is the end of my team story.

We went back to Las Vegas, and I was trying to get my money back from these two guys. The problem was that they started as gamblers. Good card counters are not gamblers. If I didn’t know how to count cards, I would not be a gambler. I still used them as spotters, but I didn’t give them any money.

I went back to Taiwan for a vacation for a week. When I returned one of the guys told me that the other guy had broken into my room and stolen my money. It was $10,000. He was afraid what would happen when I found out, so he called his sister in Taiwan. He told her that he had a car accident, and the guy he hit threatened him with a gun. He told her he needed $10,000 to pay for that. She sent him the money, and he replaced what he took. I didn’t know this had happened until the other guy told me.

Blackjack in South America

RWM: Last year you toured South America. How was that?

BJT: I went to Columbia, Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela. I have been to Columbia seven times. I first went there in 1996.

RWM: You didn’t feel Columbia was dangerous?

BJT: [laughing] Once I was interviewed by television. They asked me, “You go to so many dangerous countries. Don’t you have fear?” I said, “I was bankrupt in the stock market crash. I will do anything for money. The higher the risk, the better the profit.” In the end I think I am a risk lover.

RWM: I guess so. Did you go to Panama, and Honduras?

BJT: I went to Panama, but the game is not good. I haven’t been to Honduras.

RWM: Aren’t the limits very low in Columbia?

BJT: Yes, but they had very good rules. They had early surrender, and some casinos have a joker. [A joker makes the hand an automatic 21.] At one casino with a $50 limit I won $10,000 in one week. I have a friend that one time found a game on a small island. The table maximum was $50. He won $600,000 in two months. I don’t think low limits are a big problem.

In ’96 I went to Columbia for one week. On the second or third day I got very dizzy. The altitude is very high so I had a problem with a lack of oxygen. I canceled my Ecuador trip because Quito is even higher than Bogata. Two years ago I went again, and this time I went to Ecuador first. This time it was no problem. I don’t know why.

RWM: When you go on one of these trips, how much money do you take with you?

BJT: Usually I take about $30,000.

RWM: Some of these countries have currency controls. How do you deal with that?

BJT: I always declare the money.

RWM: And that has never been a problem?

BJT: Never in South America. It was a big problem in Asia.

RWM: Tell me about that.

Blackjack Traveling in Nepal

BJT: I went to Nepal. When you enter the country you are required to declare your money if you are carrying more than $2,000. There is a form to declare the money, and I did. When I cleared customs they asked me why I was bringing so much money. I said I came to gamble in the casino. The custom officer stuck his tongue out at me. Then he smiled and said I could go.

When I went out of the country they found my money. They asked if I declared it when I came in. I said, “Yes.” They said, “Where is your certificate?” I said, “What certificate?”

When you enter and declare, the customs officer is supposed to give you a certificate. On the form it didn’t tell me that, so I didn’t know. I had just come from Australia where there is no certificate. In America when you declare there is no certificate. I told them I was not given a certificate. They sent me to the police.

The police asked the customs people to get the certification book. The original declaration form from when I entered the country was missing. People who have a certificate, there is a copy in the file. They brought the file, and there was no record of my declaration. They said, “There is no proof that you declared.”

Because I was sure that I declared, and I was sure that I was innocent, I was afraid to propose a bribe. I was afraid that would get me into more trouble. I assumed that if the original form was found that everything would be settled. I was sent to customs custody. I was with my girlfriend, and she went back to the casino to find some help. This was on a Friday so the conditions in custody were very bad. It was one small room with eight people. They were there for drug cases, or drunk fighting. There were no beds, no blankets, and no lights.

RWM: Were there cots or something to lie down on?

BJT: No, just lying on the floor. After three nights, I counted 70 bug bites on just my right leg. On Monday I was sent to the big jail. I had played in the casino for one week and won $4,500. My friend had played baccarat, and lost. So in total I wasn’t trying to take more out of the country than I had brought in. The casino people came to see me in the jail, and they sent a lawyer to help me. The casino paid the lawyer, and they gave my girlfriend a room for three months while she waited for me.

RWM: You were in jail for three months?

BJT: I was there 76 days.

RWM: Did there ever come a point where the lawyer said, “If you pay a bribe you can get out.”

BJT: No. We found out later that if customs catches you with illegal money they can get 20% as a reward. I think when I entered the country the customs officer deliberately did not give me a certificate. When I was caught 18 officers put their finger print on my report. They could all share the money.

RWM: What was the prison like?

BJT: The big jail was designed to hold 150 people. There were 250 in the jail. There were five big rooms. In my room we had 70 people. It was not separate beds. They had a long wooden platform, and everyone slept next to each other.

RWM: Are there mattresses?

BJT: You can bring your own mattress, or buy one. There were eight Tibetans there—three were monks. They had gone to India to see the Dalai Lama. They were caught because they didn’t have passports. China will not issue passports to Tibetans to see the Dalai Lama.

They helped me. They gave me a sheet and blanket, but there was no space on the platform so I had to sleep on the floor. There were maybe a dozen of us who slept on the floor. There was a separate area for the toilet—four toilets for 250 people. There were no bars. When you enter the jail it is like a garden with the rooms around it. But there are no bars. While you are there you can do whatever you like. You can walk around the garden. The living conditions there are basically okay. The average income in that country is $230 per year. You can do some small jobs at the jail for 30 cents per day.

When I came in there was a big boss at the jail. He said that newcomers had to do some work. He wanted me to wash the toilets. I told him I didn’t want to do that. I asked what was my alternative. He said, “No problem. If you don’t want to do it just pay $12.” $12? Keep the change.

RWM: You had some cash with you?

BJT: Yes. When customs caught me they let me keep my small cash. My girlfriend had money also. After a week some people were sent to a bigger jail, so there was an opening on the platform bed. I got a spot on the bed, but each person only had about two feet of space.

I gave the boss some cigarettes, and then I got a bigger space—maybe three feet. If you have money you can do anything in this jail. There was a British guy with Cable TV. There was a Czech guy who was getting out shortly after I arrived. He left me his mosquito net, which was important. He also left me a small table light, so I could read at night.

There was a small library with some English books. I read some of the English novels, and I also started writing. I kept a diary, which is in my fifth book. I had so much time I didn’t know what to do. I would brush my teeth for 20 minutes. I lost 15 kilos while in there. [33 pounds] I was thinking that when I got out I would tell my story. Go to Asia if you want to lose weight.

RWM: I take it the food was not good.

BJT: The meal allowance was 30 cents per day. You don’t get money—that 30 cents went for rice and the people who cook. They would buy some vegetable, usually potato. You can have as much rice as you like, and some potato with garlic.

Every day my girlfriend brought food to me from the casino restaurant. She also brought me some English novels. Books were very cheap. I never read English novels before, because English is my second language. I read much faster in Chinese. I would finish a book every two or three days. My fifth book was written while I was there.

I was not allowed bail. The law said I could be sentenced to three years if found guilty. It was possible that I would be sentenced to one year. The casino lawyer fought for me, but every day I thought I might be in there for one to three years.

I went to court to fight my case, and I showed that I had a certificate from Australia. This showed that when I left Australia I declared my money. From there I came to this country. My argument was, if I declared my money coming out of Australia why would I not declare it coming here? They lost my original form, and I implied that they did that purposely. I was very lucky because during that period the director of customs from the airport was sent to jail. They searched his home, and found 200 years worth of his salary. Everyone knew the customs people were corrupt. Finally, after being there 76 days I was declared not guilty.

I got out of jail, and my visa expired. I had to go to immigration to get a new visa. The court ruling was at five o’clock, and the customs office closed at that time. I had to go back to jail one more day because I had to report back to immigration. The next day I went to get the new visa, but my passport was in the investigation bureau. I went to get the passport, but the officer wasn’t there. I went the next day, and now they fined me for being two days late. The first day was because the court ruling wasn’t until five o’clock. The second day was because the investigation bureau kept my passport. That is the way this country operates.

The casino was very helpful to me. I won money from them, but they were very generous and helped me.

RWM: Have you found that carrying money in the US is more of a problem since September 11?

BJT: It is not a problem for me. I always declare my money. I don’t look like a drug dealer. Many American counters don’t want to declare their money because they don’t want to explain their income source. There is no income tax for me.

RWM: Have you been to Cambodia?

BJT: I’ve been to Malaysia, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Sri Lanka…

RWM: Are there casinos in Vietnam?

BJT: Vietnam has three casinos in North Vietnam but I haven’t been there. One of my books has a map that shows all the countries I have visited.

RWM: What is it like in places like Cambodia and Laos?

BJT: There is only one casino in Laos. They give you a 1% rebate on your play, but the maximum is low—$20. The rules are okay, like Las Vegas, but no surrender.

RWM: What I was getting at is: Cambodia or Laos are places I would be nervous about going. My sense is that it would be dangerous to carry a lot of money in those countries. Is there any country you have gone to where you thought, “Oh, this is dangerous.”

The Dangers of Blackjack Traveling

BJT: When I played in Ecuador, in Guayaquil, I played with Bradley Peterson. There was one casino with great rules. Now it is burned out, but then they had early surrender including after doubling; S17, DAS, same suit bj paid 2-1, 7 card 21 paid 7-1, three 7s paid 3-1 and more. It was at least +1% off the top.

The maximum bet was $30. We played for one week and won $15,000. One night we won about $4,000, and we had started with $5,000. So we were carrying $9,000. The casino was very small and nobody played blackjack. Everyone knew we had all this money. It was three in the morning, and when we went outside there were no taxis. The casino security found us a taxi, but there was no sign. It was just an ordinary car, and in very bad condition. We got in the car, but we were both ready to jump out at the first sign of trouble. We got back safely.

In Bogata there was a new casino opening. For the opening ceremony they put two jokers in the shoe. If you got the joker it was an automatic win. If you got the joker with an ace or ten it was a blackjack and paid 3-2. If the dealer got the joker, they burned it.

It was only on Monday and Tuesday, and only until ten p.m. When I found the game it was Tuesday night at midnight. I had to wait one week for the game. I made a trip to Medillion, and came back on Monday. The first night I won $5,900. It was a $200 maximum. They didn’t have US dollars, so they gave me local money. This made a pile of money the size of a basketball. I left the casino about midnight with this money. The taxi waiting outside I didn’t want to take. I found another taxi.

I was in Moscow last year. One night I had about $10,000 and it was three a.m. There was a shopping center in Red Square that had an Internet café. I was a little nervous walking there with all that money, but I am a risk lover.

RWM: How much time do you spend traveling? Where is home now?

BJT: I return to Taiwan about 4 times a year. I stay at my parent’s house, usually for a week. Hotels are my “home” now.

RWM: How many books have you written?

BJT: Five. Traveling Around the World Gambling, Beat Macao, Beat the Casino, How to Win, and Blackjack Traveling.

My nom de plume is three Chinese characters. The first word is son. The name means, the gentleman who carries his son. I divorced when my son was three years old. He was with his mother, and I missed him very much. I put my son’s photo on some shirts. When I went to the casinos to play, I would often wear those shirts.

There is a Japanese comic book about a Samurai who carries his son wherever he goes, and he fights with many people. The meaning for me was that I carry my son to fight with many casinos. When I started writing, that is the name I took.

RWM: When did you write your first book?

BJT: When I was playing in Korea I read a lot of magazines. There was nothing new. Every issue had similar articles. I thought what I was doing was interesting. Professional gambling is interesting. I proposed to several magazines in Taiwan that I write a column about gambling. One magazine said they were interested, and I started writing a regular column called “Famous Gambler talks about Gambling.” The magazine chose that title. Every two weeks I wrote a column. That was in 1994.

RWM: Was this about all different games in the casino, or just about blackjack?

BJT: In the beginning it was about all the different games. That is when I started buying books. When I started I had maybe 30 or 40 books about gambling. Every time I went to Las Vegas I would buy 40 or 50 books. Now I have over 400 gambling books; 100 of them are blackjack books. I like to read.

I thought I would buy books with the money I was earning from writing. Using the material I read I could write more. If I find one thing in a book to write an article about then I have covered my cost. When I was in high school I wrote an article that was in the newspaper, and I was happy. But I didn’t write again until this gambling column. Then I went to Turkey, Rumania, Hungary, and I started writing about these trips.

RWM: I wish your books were in English. I’d love to read them.

BJT: I thought about that, but there are so many gambling books already.

RWM: But there aren’t many travel gambling books. The only one that comes to mind is Blackjack Autumn by Barry Meadow.

BJT: There is also The Gambler’s Guide to the World, by Jesse May. He learned a bit about card counting, but he is really a poker player. I asked Bradley Peterson to cowrite a book with me, but he is very busy. My writing in English is not very good.

RWM: Was the first book a collection of your columns?

BJT: All my books are collections of my columns.

RWM: You’re still writing your column?

BJT: Yes. It appears in Firsthand magazine in Taiwan. Now it is called, “Diary of a Gambler.” [He pulls out a Chinese magazine.] Here is a column about a casino. It has pictures of the beach, and the casinos, and this section is about shuffle tracking in that casino.

RWM: You write about that in your column?

BJT: Yes. That is what is good about Chinese writing. Here it says, “How to track shuffle in some casinos.” What is good about Chinese writing is that it does not spread the information to casinos. I can write about anything. Sometimes I tell my readers, “You are lucky. Here I write all the secrets without any disguise. If you read an American book they will not tell you this because it will burn the games.”

Blackjack Traveler’s Advice for Other Players

RWM: You read the blackjack message boards—what do you think is the biggest mistake people are making.

BJT: So many people are saying that blackjack is dying. Blackjack is alive and well in foreign countries. Why don’t people travel?

RWM: Do you think blackjack is getting better?

BJT: It’s not getting worse. When I was in Russia I thought, “This game is not going to last.” Well, it lasted. It’s alive and well.

When I left Moscow I left one of my books for a friend. He didn’t believe in card counting, so he gave it to someone else. That guy was a programmer. He ran some simulations and saw that it was real. He started playing, but he couldn’t count very well, and he only had $100. He had two people sit with him. One would count plus, and the other would count minus. He sat in the middle and added them together. He made $70,000 in one month. The big mistake is to concentrate on American games, which are dying.

RWM: You are here in Los Angeles for the Chinese Book Fair. Is this a yearly event?

BJT: Yes. Last year was the first time I came to give a lecture, and people were fighting to get in. Before that my books had in ordinary sales America. Last year my book became the best selling Chinese book in the U.S. Every year I will come for this.

RWM: What do you think you will be doing in ten years? Do you think you will still be playing?

BJT: I have become very fond of writing. I started writing a science fiction novel. I’m also working on a screenplay. There are a lot of Chinese movies about gambling. The people who write Chinese movies are not gamblers, so what they write is no good. What I am doing now is perfect for me. I like reading, writing, and traveling. When I go out I usually play four or five hours a day. Then I can read, and write.

RWM: You have been all over the world, so this is an important question. Where are the secret games?

BJT: Oh, for that you have to turn off the recorder. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Blackjack Tournament Strategy

By Stanford Wong

(From Blackjack Forum Vol. XV #III, September 1995
© 1995 Blackjack Forum

Arnold has asked me to write something on casino tournament strategy, so I thought I would share a typical application of my new Tournament Blackjack software.

Here is a situation I encountered in a mini blackjack tournament I entered at Isle of Capri in Biloxi, Mississippi, a few weeks ago. Only one person was advancing in the tournament from my table. The maximum bet was $300.

It was the 29th round out of 30, and I was BR1 (meaning I had the largest bankroll at the time) with $900. Several other players were still in close contention. I was betting second. I bet $300, and my opponents all made bets around $100.

Then we got our cards. The dealer showed 10, I got eleven, and the other players ended up with totals of eighteen to twenty.

The decision I had to make was should I double down? The argument for doubling down is if I won I would have a commanding lead going into the last round of the tournament, perhaps even a lock. A lock would be especially nice because on the last round I would be betting and playing first. The argument for not doubling down is that I would still have a chance to win the table if lost only one bet, whereas losing a doubled bet would knock me out of contention.

In the actual tournament I had to make a decision quickly, and could not ask for time out to run a simulation. I doubled down, ended up with a twenty for a push, and so achieved the same result as if I had hit instead of doubling.

But was my double down correct? Tournament Blackjack can give the answer.

Blackjack Tournament Solutions

I do not recall the rest of the details of the actual situation—how many other players were left, their bankrolls, their bets, or exactly what their hand totals were—so I will use numbers that seem reasonable. I will use five other players with bankrolls of 825, 800, 750, 775, and 850. I will give them bets of 100 each. I will give them hand totals of 20, 19, 18, 19, and 20.

I boot up Tournament Blackjack. In the rules I ask for six players, minimum bet of 10, maximum of 300, double any two cards including after splitting, and dealer stands on soft seventeen because those were the rules I faced in Biloxi. I ask for one winner only. Then I close the rules box. I set the game to play hand 29 of 30. I set the bankrolls to the appropriate amounts, putting my own bankroll in the sixth position. I put the puck by the fifth player, meaning that player bets first this round.

So now we are ready for the bets. I want to control the bets of all the players this round, and an easy way to do it is to set all the players to manual (as opposed to automatic). Then I press F5 to start. The computer asks how much the fifth player wants to bet. I type in 100. Then I type in a max bet for me, the sixth player. Then I enter bets of 100 each for the other players.

Oops! Placing a bet for player 4 is automatically followed by dealing of cards. (I could have specified the bets by a different method, in which case the computer would have waited for me to assign cards.

But, no problem. I use Deja Vu to pick up all the cards and bets, and go back to the beginning of the round. Then I hit F1 six times to reconstruct the six bets. Now the computer waits for me to assign cards.

Assigning cards is easy. I deal myself a 5 and everyone else a 10 as the first card, including the dealer. Then another 10 to the fifth player, a 6 to me, 10-9-8-9 to the first four players, and 10 for the dealer’s hole card. (What I give to the dealer for a hole card does not matter if I am going to run a simulation; a new hole card will be randomly assigned each pass through.)

OK, each player has two cards totalling what I want each player to have, and the dealer has a 10. Now I hit F5 to start live play. The computer asks me how I want to play hand 5, and I stand on it. Now it asks me how I want to play my eleven. I want to simulate both hitting it and doubling down on it. So I select Simulate from the Run menu. I select double for 300 and hit as my two options. Then I hit the OK button and the simulation is on its way.

The simulation works this way. First the tournament is finished with my hand doubling down. I win the tournament. Then it is finished with my hitting the eleven. I win the tournament again. Then it is finished with me doubling down. I win again. Then it is finished with me hitting. Player 5 wins the tournament.

And so it goes time after time, finishing the tournament with me doubling on my eleven alternating with finishing the tournament with me hitting my eleven. Each pair of finishes takes eight seconds on my 586-66. After 50 finishes with each play, doubling down has won the tournament 42% of the time and hitting has won 35% of the time.

The program tells me that difference is not significant, and that the standard error applicable to each number is at most .071. A much larger sample size is going to have to be run, so I leave the room to attend to other business. (Actually, it is 9:30 pm as I write this, and the other business is drinking a beer while I read Newsweek.)

…later…

Now it is 10:30 pm. The sample sizes are up to 500. Doubling down is ahead, 44.9% to 31.6%, and the significance box shows five stars. This means the difference between the two sample means is greater than four standard errors. The standard error applicable to each number is down to .022.

We can say with certainty that doubling down was the better thing to do in this casino tournament situation. ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

An Interview with Julian Braun

by Arnold Snyder

(From Blackjack Forum Volume I #2, June 1981)
© 1981, 2005 Blackjack Forum

Julian Braun, author of How to Play Winning Blackjack (Data House, 1980), IBM computer programmer extraordinaire, and blackjack pioneer whose programs have provided the strategies of numerous card counting systems since the early sixties, made a recent trip to California. I took the opportunity to meet with him over dinner, during the course of which I conducted and taped an interview. Right from the start, Braun cast aside my preconceived conservative notions of him. I arrived in coat and tie. He was in his shirt sleeves. I suggested a quiet restaurant where the subdued atmosphere would be conducive to an interview. Braun had other ideas, suggesting a Moroccan restaurant where our dinner would be accompanied by music and an exotic belly dancer. We ate Moroccan style, in dim lighting, seated on cushions on the floor.

AS: Can you tell us about your original contact with Edward Thorp and how you started your blackjack analyses?

Braun: When Thorp came out with his book, I was very fascinated that he was able to do this kind of work with a computer and come up with a counting system. At that time, I had relatively free access to high speed computers. I wrote to Thorp and told him of my interest and asked if he would be kind enough to send me a copy of his computer program, which he did — with absolutely no documentation whatsoever — just a program written in Fortran which he had developed and run at MIT. I studied the program and figured out exactly how it worked.

He had an interesting algorithm that he had built into his program for cycling through the various combinations of cards. The computers back in those days were comparatively primitive to what we have now. Thorp had written what he called an Arbitrary Subset program, where he could feed into the computer any combination of cards he wanted, and the computer would crank out ten pages of information — one for each of the ten dealer up-cards. It would list on each page each of the fifty-five two-card player combinations, and the expectation if you stood or hit until you achieved the indicated standing number that was also computed by the program. It also showed what would happen if you doubled down — even on ridiculous combinations like two tens. It gave a complete analysis regardless. It summarized at the bottom the best strategy for any combination, and what the expectation was for that combination.

I wrote an improved version of the basic strategy program which did essentially the same sort of thing, but with a lesser degree of approximation. That’s the program I used to develop some of the count strategies that were subsequently developed. It’s the program that was used to develop the data which was used by Revere to develop his strategies, and by Lance Humble to develop the Hi-opt strategies. That same program was used to develop quite a variety of count strategies. I also used it to develop the indices for the Hi-Lo strategy. I also wrote an exact program for any basic strategy situation in blackjack except pair-splitting.

AS: Peter Griffin claims he has computed an exact single-deck pair-splitting basic strategy.

Braun: I’m not sure how Griffin can say he has an absolutely accurate strategy — an absolutely accurate program for doing this. It can be done theoretically, but I’m wondering if he actually has that much computer time to run it. I think he probably has a nearly exact program, rather than a completely exact program. My guess is that he has developed his program to consider what happens with one card of each pair, analyzing precisely what happens with all the possible combinations of the cards that can be gotten on it, interactively with the dealer’s hand. He probably assures that the second hand would on average be about the same as the first hand. That’s a fairly accurate approximation, but it’s not completely accurate. To be completely accurate, you’d have to interact every combination of the first hand with every combination of the second hand with every combination of the dealer hand. That involves such an enormous amount of computer time, I’m somewhat dubious that Griffin actually did that. If you really want to be accurate, most casinos allow you to resplit pairs, so you would have to go down to the next level as well.

AS: Stanford Wong is one of the few systems developers who has computed a single-deck basic strategy using his own algorithms. His strategy differs from yours on one decision. You say to split 2-2 vs. 3, and he says to hit. Peter Griffin informed me that on this discrepancy, your decision is the correct one.

Braun: AH! Then I’ve been vindicated.

AS: Griffin sent me his data on this decision, which shows the player’s expectation from splitting 2-2 vs. 3 carried out to 4 decimal places. It seems to me that Griffin considers his strategy to be exact. A couple of casinos in Las Vegas have recently introduced a one deck game of double exposure. Do you imagine that if you use the multi-deck double exposure strategy for the one-deck game it would be similar to using a multi-deck strategy for regular blackjack in a single-deck game?

Braun: No. It would be close, but the differences are more significant.

AS: Do you know Stanford Wong personally?

Braun: I’ve met him. I happened to have a business trip to Los Angeles a couple of years ago. I told Wong that I was going to be there, and he drove up from La Jolla to meet me. We had dinner together and a fairly pleasant conversation. I would not say that he exactly interviewed me, but we just chatted about things in general.

AS: Why is Wong so negative towards you now?

Braun: Well, I think it’s just like anybody else in business; they don’t like competition, and that’s the way it is.

AS: Do you think it stems from your remarks in one of the versions of your “Development and Analysis” papers that Wong’s Hi-Lo strategy tables were not quite accurate?

Braun: Yes, that’s one bone of contention that seems to irritate Wong — the fact that I made a statement that he had a good system with good indices that were… “close enough” was the phrase that I used. Wong, in one of his writings, came back and said that they are not only close enough, they are better — or something to that effect. At the time, I thought I was trying to be kind by saying they were close enough. In some areas, I now think his figures might actually be better. I think his method for developing indices may have been better than mine. Whether his indices are more accurate or not is a debatable point. I still contend that neither set of figures are completely accurate. A closer result to complete accuracy might be obtained by averaging where the two figures differ.

AS: How long does it take you to run off a one million hand simulation in order to test a system, such as you used for your “Development and Analysis” paper?

Braun: With the program that I have, and an IBM 370 model 155 or 158 computer it takes approximately three minutes. There are faster computers that would do it in less than a minute.

AS: In the March issue of Gambling Times, Stanley Roberts published a reassessment by you of estimated win rates for various count systems, including Uston’s Advanced Point Count. Did you use your simulation program recently to obtain these results, which Roberts reported he obtained from you by phone?

Braun: I never evaluated the Uston count on the computer I think I just mentioned to Roberts what I thought the Uston count would do. I’ve never run it on the computer, so I don’t have precise statistics on it. I can evaluate what I think the Uston count would do simply by looking at Griffin’s work.

AS: Did you ever consider making money as a card counter?

Braun: There was a time when I was playing more frequently, and was even barred in one casino. Some years ago, I spent four weeks in Reno and played here and there. The Nevada Club had the best rules at the time. They were still dealing a single deck all the way down to the bottom. In addition, they allowed you to double-down on 9, 10 or 11, rather than just 10 or 11 like most of the other Reno casinos.

AS: How long ago was this?

Braun: At least ten years ago. I haven’t played any serious blackjack for years now.

AS: What sort of stakes were you playing for then?

Braun: Very mild. I generally bet from two to ten dollars. I played at the Nevada Club rather regularly. After about a week, even though I wasn’t betting real big or winning any tremendous amounts of money, they decided the fact that they weren’t beating me out of my money was indicative enough. So I walked in one day and a pit boss motioned to me and very politely said, “The owner has observed you playing, and he has decided that he doesn’t want your action anymore.” I didn’t argue.

AS: What system were you using?

BRAUN: I was using the Hi-Lo system.

AS: You wrote to me that the “Money Management” chapter in your book, How to Play Winning Blackjack, which advises the player to watch for “hot streaks” and use betting progressions, had been written by Harry Fund, your publisher. Were you aware, prior to its being published, of the contents of that chapter, and have you spoken to him personally about your feelings about it being included under your name?

Braun: Yes, but he wanted to get his two cents in and he was the publisher.

AS: In that chapter, he writes as if he were you.

Braun: I know. He was writing under my name because he’s using my name to sell the book. He wrote a lot of the other stuff too. I don’t claim to be a book writer, per se. He wrote all the colorful stuff and the background, and I wrote all the technical stuff for the book. The only thing I got in on the Money Management chapter was the footnote at the end.

AS: That footnote seemed to be the only intelligent part of that chapter.

Braun: I wrote the footnote because I was trying to play down what he’d written in the rest of the chapter. The thing is, there are a lot of people who like to play that way.

AS: Do you mind all the back-stabbing and name calling that’s going on in the blackjack scene?

Julian Braun: Not particularly, but I wish it wasn’t there. FLASH! Just received Ken Uston’s latest newsletter… As of May 28, 1981 the New Jersey Casino Control Commission will permit the A.C. casinos to abolish early surrender! Uston is organizing a group called CHIPS — Committee to Have the Industry Preserve Surrender. They will be leafletting, making bumperstickers, T-shirts, and picketing the casinos. Yes, marching! Is this the beginning of a card counters’ union? United Pit-workers Local 21? ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

Beyond Wong: Professional Casino Tournament Tips

by Anthony Curtis
(From Blackjack Forum Volume XV #3, September 1995)
© 1995 Blackjack Forum

One evening in late 1985, my phone rang. It was a call that I look back on as one of the most important of my life. Stanford Wong was on the other end, and as is his custom, he came straight to the point.

“I’m forming a tournament team,” he said. “There are four of us and I think five would make a nice, efficient group. You came to mind. Would you like to play with us?”

I was shocked. Wong was one of my earliest gambling heroes. We’d had a brief correspondence, and we’d met once. Now he was calling me at my one-bedroom apartment, asking me to join his team. It was like a football hopeful getting a call from the 49ers. A dream come true…

“N-n-n-o,” I stuttered.

“Why not?”

“I’m a good blackjack player, but casino tournament play is another world. I don’t know anything about it.”

“Neither do I,” said Wong, “but I have some ideas. We’ll all learn together.”

And so began an incredible experience that made me a lot of money (and even a little fame).

By now, many of you know the story. Recognizing an opportunity, Stanford Wong constructed a computer model to analyze the tournament blackjack end game. He compiled his findings in spiral notebooks and passed them out to me and the others on the team. (The information in those secret spiral notebooks can now be found in Wong’s 1992 Pi Yee Press book, Casino Tournament Strategy).

For about two years, we traveled extensively to play tournaments-Reno, Tahoe, Atlantic City, the Bahamas, and Aruba. Three highly successful years later, the team dissolved. It should be noted that Wong wasn’t the first to figure out tournaments. When we came on the scene, players were already utilizing these concepts. I learned later that they had dominated the tournaments for years, during a time when the prizes were much larger than they are today.

Wong knew going in that he would only devote a couple of years to serious tournament play. He wanted to write the great book on the subject, then go on to other things. I, on the other hand, saw tournaments as a deep well (of profits) that I would be able to go to for a long time to come. A few of the other guys and gals coming at the time saw it the same way. We formed friendships, talked a lot, played together, and elevated the art.

Being young and impetuous, my buddies and I wanted to rule the tournament world. We stayed up late into the night discussing the day’s rounds if we’d played, or general strategy if he hadn’t. We picked apart everything that might add up to our advantage, and the conversations got more esoteric as the free-drink tally rose.

Among the topics of discussion: end-game, middle-game, secret bets, playoffs, adjustments for format, positional considerations, pros and cons of correlating, creating swings, techniques for counting chips, tendencies of opponents, shuffle-tracking in tournaments, hole-carding in tournaments, tells in tournaments (by dealers and players), time-management in timed tournaments, how to exploit a player’s rules infraction, how to exploit a dealer’s error, how to exploit our reputations, how to play if we were unknown, how to play with more than one of us on a table, how to deal with another expert on the table, how to secure a good table position at the draw, how to make an opponent bet out of turn, how to influence opponents by betting out of turn, and of course, how best to get a date with the good-looking tournament director’s assistant (a skill I never quite mastered). Keep in mind that I’m talking blackjack tournaments only; there were whole other sets of topics for craps tournaments, keno tournaments, etc. The point is, we spent a lot of time outside the pages of Wong’s tournament manual.

These days, I don’t play the tournaments nearly as often as I used to, so I don’t mind letting you in on a few of our conclusions. Don’t get too excited, though. Compared to the value of the information in Casino Tournament Strategy, and the strength of the singular tactic of betting your money (see “Bombs Away” below), this information is of marginal value. Then again, you just might pick up a tidbit that will get you through an extra round or two.

Choose Casino Tournaments Wisely

One easy way to improve results (regardless of skill level) is to be choosy about which tournaments you enter. Several factors are involved here, but equity is the fundamental measure of playability. Equity is the percentage of entry fees collected that is returned in the form of prize money. It’s an important consideration. Any time the prize pool returns less than 100%, you have a decision to make. Namely, are you superior enough to the average player in that tournament to make up the shortfall? I don’t care who you are, there is always a point where the answer has to be “no.” The better you are at pegging that percentage, the better your results will be.

I find myself laying off of more and more tournaments these days because of the dramatic increase in the public’s skill level. If the average player is nearly as skilled as I am, then even a tournament that pays close to 100% equity offers too small a return on my investment to make it worth playing from a purely monetary standpoint.

Often there are ancillary considerations. In my case, I have the unique luxury of being able to play in tournaments where I have a small edge thanks to the publicity value I derive from winning. When I calculate equity, I sometimes assign double or triple value to the prize pool because of the increased credibility that winning the championship gives my career as a gambler-writer. A professional, for example, might assign added value for the hard-to-come-by practice he gets by playing. A novice might justify his entry by considering the vacation value-he makes up the difference with a free room, comps, parties, drinks, and other perks that go with tournament entry. I know of many people who just plain love to play tournaments. For them, the enjoyment factor lessens equity requirements.

Here are two other realities that literally leap out at you when you examine extensive records of tournament results. First, early-entry discounts are available. Be sure to plan far enough ahead to take advantage of the savings they represent. Second, over-the-table losses represent a huge cost of doing business. Tournaments contested with funny money are usually best of all.

Don’t Count Cards In Blackjack Tournaments

I always rub my hands together when I run into card counters on a tournament table. Why? Because they’re so predictable. A powerful play in tournament competition is to create the opportunity for a swing when you’re behind. That usually means betting big when your opponents bet small (or vice versa). This can be problematic when the key opponent bets after you because he can simply mirror your bets to the degree that he chooses. Since some card counters would rather be publicly caned than raise their bets into a negative deck, you can create the potential swing any time you want just by betting contrary to the count.

The most remarkable example of this I’ve come across occurred in a big tournament in the Bahamas. I was on a table of five and all of my opponents were dyed-in-the-wool card counters. A third of the way through the round, the shoe went positive and the four others jumped on it. Having already drifted a few maximum bets down, I was happy to let them go, hoping that a few good hands by the dealer would bring them back to me. But by the time the shoe was finished, I was too. The four were in a dead heat for the lead some eight max bets ahead of me. Given the one-person-advance format, I was all but sunk.

The next shoe, however, quickly went negative. I made a max bet while everyone else bet the minimum. I won and gained a bet. As we played on, I didn’t even worry about what I was dealt. I was busy praying that the count would stay negative so I would continue to be the sole big bettor. It did, I was, and on the last hand I had only to win my bet to advance to the four-man final for $250,000. (Alas, my remarkable comeback wasn’t consummated.)

After the round, one of the players who knew me as a card counter came up and said, “Nice comeback, but why were you betting so heavily into that huge negative count?” The question was even more ridiculous than is obvious-we were playing with funny money!

Though a vivid example, it’s by no means the main problem with counting cards in tournaments. If you know how to count, you’ll do it while you play, and there’s nothing wrong with that in the early stages. In fact, in one-advance formats where it’s almost certain that you’ll have to make at least one (preferably uncorrelated) big bet sometime during the round, making that bet early and according to the count will improve your results over the table. But in the last five to ten hands, you’re out of your mind if you maintain the count at the expense of all the more important things there are to be aware of, like an accurate accounting of the threatening bankrolls.

The Importance of Position In Casino Tournaments

Few players give position the consideration that it merits. It’s important to base your total game plan on the last-hand betting order, especially in the one-advance format. In a nutshell, the worse your position on the end, the more aggressive you need to be before you get there. If position is determined by a dice roll or a draw at the table, you must immediately calculate where you will bet on the last hand (if everyone makes it that far), then play accordingly. You must also be prepared to recalculate and switch strategies when players bust out and change the last-hand order. Positional considerations, by the way, are much more important (and complicated) in tournaments other than blackjack, like craps.

It’s Better When The Casino Likes You

The most successful card counters spend a lot of time making sure that the welcome mat remains out. You’d expect that tournament players would do the same, but they don’t. For some reason, the typical tournament expert can’t resist flaunting his talents, not so much to the casinos or other customers as to one another.

Tournament players congregate in groups and cliques, openly analyzing every move they and their cohorts make during play, and making not-so-subtle jokes about the non-optimal play of the less informed. The tournament pros need to realize that the very players that they’re exploiting are often the casino’s best customers. Antagonize them enough and they’ll eventually complain to casino management, and there goes the welcome mat. The casinos won’t risk losing their good customers for the sake of a few entry fees.

Some of those esoteric discussions I mentioned earlier had to do with how much leeway to give the regular casino customers when they make mistakes (rule infractions, receiving overpayments, etc.) before raising an objection that might make an enemy. Don’t underestimate this consideration. Some of the most successful long-term tournament winners I know are also among the most likeable people I’ve ever met.

Bombs Away–Casino Tournaments Are About Betting

If you’ve done any studying of tournaments at all, you’re probably already aware of what I’m about to say. But it’s so important that I just can’t imagine discussing tournament play without mentioning it. No other strategy is as powerful as this: Bet your money when you’re behind. A tournament is a gunfight, and the chips are your bullets. You must shoot those bullets until you either win the gunfight or run out of ammunition. If the heat is on and you’re not sure what to do, employ this rule: When in doubt, put it out. I do. Betting the max may not be the best play, but it’s rarely the worst.

I once played in a mini blackjack tournament where the whole table had the betting bug. It was a frenzied affair with five of us turning a $500 buy-in into more than $2000. When the smoke cleared in the tournament, I had advanced along with a young airman from Nellis Air Force Base who was playing his first blackjack tournament ever. The airman had caught on quickly, making max bets every time someone’s stack of chips exceeded his. After the round, the excited airman jumped out of his seat, ran over to his girlfriend and shouted: “That wasn’t about playing cards. That was about betting!” Truer words… ♠

Posted on Leave a comment

A Nevada Court Victory for Card Counters

By Robert A. Loeb, Attorney at Law
(From Blackjack Forum XX #1, Spring 2000)
© Blackjack Forum 2000

On March 9, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in favor of a card counter and ordered the return to him of $40,400 in winnings which had been seized when a casino discovered that he had used false identification at the blackjack table.

This is an extremely important case, because there are very few decisions from the Nevada Supreme Court that affect counters, and because it deals with many important issues related to card counting.

Ultimately, the court found that the player did not commit fraud, because he had not cheated in the play of the game, and so the court ordered that the seized chips be returned to him.

The Legal Facts of the Card Counting Case

In order to analyze what the case means and doesn’t mean, we have to go back, look at the facts, and review what happened at the blackjack table, at the cashier, at the gaming board and in the lower court.

Card counter Richard Chen bought in for $29,000 at a blackjack table at the Monte Carlo casino in Las Vegas in April, 1997. As a known card counter, his picture was already in the Griffin book, so when the casino asked for identification (presumably to fill out a cash transaction report, as required by the government), Chen presented a purported passport from Burma (which does not exist anymore) in another name. Later that evening he bought in for an additional $15,000, but no identification was requested at that time.

Chen then played blackjack, apparently for several hours. At some point, pit supervisor Dave Schugar recognized him as a card counter, stopped Chen from playing more, and asked Chen to accompany him to the cashier to cash out. At the cashier, Chen produced $84,400 in chips, and when asked for identification, produced the same false passport.

Schugar noticed the irregularity and notified casino security and the Gaming Control Board.

Chen admitted to Carl Vidano, the Gaming Board agent, that the passport was false; he provided his true identity and the casino filled out a corrected cash transaction report (the Nevada 6A version of a CTR). Vidano directed the Monte Carlo to retain the chips and to give Chen a receipt for the full $84,400, pending a review of surveillance tapes and a criminal investigation.

A few days later, the Monte Carlo informed Vidano that the tapes showed card counting but no cheating. Vidano directed the Monte Carlo to release the money to Chen, and the casino refused. Vidano initiated a patron dispute case and issued a formal decision directing Monte Carlo to pay Chen the $84,400. The casino again refused, and appealed the agent’s decision to the full Nevada Gaming Board. Vidano did note that Chen did not commit any criminal violation, other than the misdemeanor crime of possession of false identification.

Three months later, the casino returned $44,000 to Chen (the total of the buy-ins), leaving the $40,400 in winnings as the subject of the dispute before the gaming board.

On the Legality of Card Counting: The Gaming Board and Lower Court Decisions

After hearing the evidence, the Nevada State Gaming Board ruled in favor of the Monte Carlo, allowing it to retain Chen’s winnings.

The hearing examiner felt that both parties agreed that had Chen provided his true identity, he would not have been allowed to play, although, I think it would have been more accurate to say that Chen could have begun playing; his session just wouldn’t have lasted as long.

The Gaming Control Board found that Chen’s use of false identification was a fraudulent act to gain admittance to the blackjack game. The Gaming Board also found that if Chen had provided his true identity, he would not have been allowed to play.

The District Court in Las Vegas considered the briefs and arguments of both sides, and it upheld the Gaming Board’s decision to allow the Monte Carlo to seize and retain the winnings. Chen appealed the case to the Nevada Supreme Court.

The Player’s Side of the Case

The Nevada Supreme Court is a court of review. This means that, like most appellate courts, it does not hear testimony or substitute its own view of the facts of the case. Its job is to accept the testimony given in the lower courts and determine if any legal mistakes were made, such as improper admission of evidence or erroneous legal conclusion.

In this case, the primary issues were whether or not the District Court made a mistake in reaching its conclusion that the casino had the legal authority to confiscate the chips, and whether Chen had committed fraud in acquiring the chips.

Chen’s contentions are contained in the brief which his attorney (John Hawley) filed with the Nevada Supreme Court. They took the position that no law or administrative rule gave a casino the legal right to seize and confiscate chips in this manner, and pointed out that Agent Vidano agreed that there was no such statute or regulation to authorize impounding the chips by either the casino or by the Gaming Board.

Chen and Hawley also took the position that the profits resulted not from the use of the false passport, but rather from Chen’s legal blackjack play according to the rules set by the Monte Carlo. Finally, they pointed out that a CTR is not a prerequisite to playing blackjack.

The Casino’s Side of the Case on the Legality of Card Counting

In the brief filed by the Monte Carlo, the casino framed the issues in different and perhaps chilling terms.

The casino stated that the issues were: “Whether a gambler can present false identification under a false name in order to play blackjack? and Does the Nevada State Gaming Control Board have the authority to use common law principles to protect the integrity of gaming in Nevada?”

If the Nevada Supreme Court had ruled in the casino’s favor on the first issue, casinos would be allowed to compel legal identification from any player.

If the Court had adopted the casino’s argument in the second issue, it would be fraud to give the casino a false identification, allowing for the seizure of profits after detecting a fake ID.

In the absence of a statute or rule authorizing confiscation of chips, the Monte Carlo was asking the Court to rule that the commission of common law fraud gave the casino such authority.

The casino’s choice of words in its brief is interesting. For instance, the Monte Carlo claimed that Chen “is a self-admitted card counter.” (What a humiliating admission to make!)

The Monte Carlo then describes his play as “he would observe a blackjack game for a few minutes, then begin to play and bet heavily and win several hands in a row…This style of play is consistent with the techniques employed by card counters.” (If only it was that easy!)

Finally, the Monte Carlo would characterize Chen’s winnings as unjust enrichment because of the use of the false passport.The casino made its case by claiming that the commission of fraud would allow for confiscation even without a specific statute or rule, and that Chen’s actions constituted fraud.

The elements of fraud are discussed in the next section. The Monte Carlo’s brief ends by asking that the Nevada Supreme Court “send a message to casino patrons that the use of any type of fake identification when engaging in legal wagers will not be condoned.”

The Decision: Why Fraud Was Not Proven

While this case was pending, I feared that it had the potential to be the most catastrophic court finding ever for card counters.

That is because if this decision had gone the other way, it had the potential to allow the casino to seize the profits of a card counter using an alias but to let the player lose at his own risk. In other words, the casino could let that counter play; if he won, the casino would seize the chips he had won. If he lost, the casino would certainly not return any money to him. There would be no risk to the casino.

Conceivably, it might even apply to players who had been previously backed off under one name, played later under a different name, but never even used false identification.

It was with a great deal of trepidation that I awaited the decision in this case. The court noted that to establish fraud, the Monte Carlo had to show that (a) Chen provided a false representation of a material fact, which he knew to be false; (b) that Chen intended the Monte Carlo to rely on the misrepresentation; (c) that the that the Monte Carlo detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation; and (d) that the misrepresentation proximately caused damages.

It is pretty clear that Chen in producing the fake passport, provided a false representation of a fact which he knew to be false; that representation was material when made in that it helped provide him the opportunity to play. It can easily be inferred that Chen intended that the Monte Carlo relied on that misrepresentation. Thus, as the court found, the Monte Carlo successfully proved the elements in (a) and (b).

But the court found that the Monte Carlo did not prove element (c), that the casino detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation. The identification requirement was to comply with Regulation 6A dealing with the government requirement of cash transaction reports; the identification requirement was not a prerequisite to the purchase of chips.

In addition, the casino had no policy instructing casino employees to cross-check the player’s id with a list of counters who might not be allowed to play. If the casino had such a policy, and had taken that step in this case, then element (c) would have been proved, according to the court.

The most important element in this case was (d), and the court perceptively found that the false passport was not the proximate cause of Chen’s winnings. The court stated, “The false identification allowed Chen to receive $44,000 in chips, but it did not cause Chen to win. Thus, we hold that the Gaming Control Board’s determination that Chen committed fraud is contrary to law because the Monte Carlo did not establish all of the elements of fraud.”

Other Observations of the Case on the Legality of Card Counting

The issue of the legality of tendering a false identification was not before the court, and accordingly, the decision does not deal with that issue.

Instead, the court was deciding whether the seizure of the chips was proper or not.

No police agency brought a criminal charge dealing with the false identification, and the court did not discuss that aspect. It would be wrong for a player to conclude from this decision that the use of false identification is legal just because no charges were brought.

It is important to note that since March 9 when the decision came out, Hell has not frozen over, and there have been no sightings of flying cows. Both of these phenomena had been predicted to occur before the Nevada Supreme Court would ever rule in favor of a card counter, but the predictions were wrong.

Additionally, this case was not a slam dunk for the player, in that the casino came close to establishing the legal elements of fraud. But a different decision may have even been detrimental to Nevada casinos, because it could have given the appearance that Nevada games are rigged in favor of the casino, an image that would have been far more costly to the casinos than the $44,000 which was at issue.

In any event, a player-friendly decision from the Nevada court system is worthy of recognition.

Finally, a different decision in this case could have given semi-official status to the Griffin book. If the use of an identity different from that which was in the Griffin book had been found to be fraudulent, then Griffin book entries would gain the imprimatur of law enforcement to the point where it would be considered fraud to give identification different from that in a Griffin book, regardless of Griffin’s accuracy. This might have been a longshot, but it was not impossible that a court would so find.

Implicit in the decision is that the legality of counting cards is again recognized. It’s not that there was any question as to that issue, but it’s reassuring to see that reaffirmed.

Three justices of the Nevada Supreme Court recused themselves from the case; this means that they did not participate. Three justices joined in the decision.

The final justice (Maupin) disagreed with the decision, and wrote that “neither card counting nor the use of a legal subterfuge such as a disguise to gain access to this table game is illegal under Nevada law. I conclude, however, that the misrepresentation here, the use of a fraudulent passport for identification, was not a legal subterfuge and enabled [Chen] access to high stakes play for the purpose of frustrating legitimate attempts by [Monte Carlo] to prevent this from occurring.” ♠