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An Interview with Julian Braun

by Arnold Snyder

(From Blackjack Forum Volume I #2, June 1981)
© 1981, 2005 Blackjack Forum

Julian Braun, author of How to Play Winning Blackjack (Data House, 1980), IBM computer programmer extraordinaire, and blackjack pioneer whose programs have provided the strategies of numerous card counting systems since the early sixties, made a recent trip to California. I took the opportunity to meet with him over dinner, during the course of which I conducted and taped an interview. Right from the start, Braun cast aside my preconceived conservative notions of him. I arrived in coat and tie. He was in his shirt sleeves. I suggested a quiet restaurant where the subdued atmosphere would be conducive to an interview. Braun had other ideas, suggesting a Moroccan restaurant where our dinner would be accompanied by music and an exotic belly dancer. We ate Moroccan style, in dim lighting, seated on cushions on the floor.

AS: Can you tell us about your original contact with Edward Thorp and how you started your blackjack analyses?

Braun: When Thorp came out with his book, I was very fascinated that he was able to do this kind of work with a computer and come up with a counting system. At that time, I had relatively free access to high speed computers. I wrote to Thorp and told him of my interest and asked if he would be kind enough to send me a copy of his computer program, which he did — with absolutely no documentation whatsoever — just a program written in Fortran which he had developed and run at MIT. I studied the program and figured out exactly how it worked.

He had an interesting algorithm that he had built into his program for cycling through the various combinations of cards. The computers back in those days were comparatively primitive to what we have now. Thorp had written what he called an Arbitrary Subset program, where he could feed into the computer any combination of cards he wanted, and the computer would crank out ten pages of information — one for each of the ten dealer up-cards. It would list on each page each of the fifty-five two-card player combinations, and the expectation if you stood or hit until you achieved the indicated standing number that was also computed by the program. It also showed what would happen if you doubled down — even on ridiculous combinations like two tens. It gave a complete analysis regardless. It summarized at the bottom the best strategy for any combination, and what the expectation was for that combination.

I wrote an improved version of the basic strategy program which did essentially the same sort of thing, but with a lesser degree of approximation. That’s the program I used to develop some of the count strategies that were subsequently developed. It’s the program that was used to develop the data which was used by Revere to develop his strategies, and by Lance Humble to develop the Hi-opt strategies. That same program was used to develop quite a variety of count strategies. I also used it to develop the indices for the Hi-Lo strategy. I also wrote an exact program for any basic strategy situation in blackjack except pair-splitting.

AS: Peter Griffin claims he has computed an exact single-deck pair-splitting basic strategy.

Braun: I’m not sure how Griffin can say he has an absolutely accurate strategy — an absolutely accurate program for doing this. It can be done theoretically, but I’m wondering if he actually has that much computer time to run it. I think he probably has a nearly exact program, rather than a completely exact program. My guess is that he has developed his program to consider what happens with one card of each pair, analyzing precisely what happens with all the possible combinations of the cards that can be gotten on it, interactively with the dealer’s hand. He probably assures that the second hand would on average be about the same as the first hand. That’s a fairly accurate approximation, but it’s not completely accurate. To be completely accurate, you’d have to interact every combination of the first hand with every combination of the second hand with every combination of the dealer hand. That involves such an enormous amount of computer time, I’m somewhat dubious that Griffin actually did that. If you really want to be accurate, most casinos allow you to resplit pairs, so you would have to go down to the next level as well.

AS: Stanford Wong is one of the few systems developers who has computed a single-deck basic strategy using his own algorithms. His strategy differs from yours on one decision. You say to split 2-2 vs. 3, and he says to hit. Peter Griffin informed me that on this discrepancy, your decision is the correct one.

Braun: AH! Then I’ve been vindicated.

AS: Griffin sent me his data on this decision, which shows the player’s expectation from splitting 2-2 vs. 3 carried out to 4 decimal places. It seems to me that Griffin considers his strategy to be exact. A couple of casinos in Las Vegas have recently introduced a one deck game of double exposure. Do you imagine that if you use the multi-deck double exposure strategy for the one-deck game it would be similar to using a multi-deck strategy for regular blackjack in a single-deck game?

Braun: No. It would be close, but the differences are more significant.

AS: Do you know Stanford Wong personally?

Braun: I’ve met him. I happened to have a business trip to Los Angeles a couple of years ago. I told Wong that I was going to be there, and he drove up from La Jolla to meet me. We had dinner together and a fairly pleasant conversation. I would not say that he exactly interviewed me, but we just chatted about things in general.

AS: Why is Wong so negative towards you now?

Braun: Well, I think it’s just like anybody else in business; they don’t like competition, and that’s the way it is.

AS: Do you think it stems from your remarks in one of the versions of your “Development and Analysis” papers that Wong’s Hi-Lo strategy tables were not quite accurate?

Braun: Yes, that’s one bone of contention that seems to irritate Wong — the fact that I made a statement that he had a good system with good indices that were… “close enough” was the phrase that I used. Wong, in one of his writings, came back and said that they are not only close enough, they are better — or something to that effect. At the time, I thought I was trying to be kind by saying they were close enough. In some areas, I now think his figures might actually be better. I think his method for developing indices may have been better than mine. Whether his indices are more accurate or not is a debatable point. I still contend that neither set of figures are completely accurate. A closer result to complete accuracy might be obtained by averaging where the two figures differ.

AS: How long does it take you to run off a one million hand simulation in order to test a system, such as you used for your “Development and Analysis” paper?

Braun: With the program that I have, and an IBM 370 model 155 or 158 computer it takes approximately three minutes. There are faster computers that would do it in less than a minute.

AS: In the March issue of Gambling Times, Stanley Roberts published a reassessment by you of estimated win rates for various count systems, including Uston’s Advanced Point Count. Did you use your simulation program recently to obtain these results, which Roberts reported he obtained from you by phone?

Braun: I never evaluated the Uston count on the computer I think I just mentioned to Roberts what I thought the Uston count would do. I’ve never run it on the computer, so I don’t have precise statistics on it. I can evaluate what I think the Uston count would do simply by looking at Griffin’s work.

AS: Did you ever consider making money as a card counter?

Braun: There was a time when I was playing more frequently, and was even barred in one casino. Some years ago, I spent four weeks in Reno and played here and there. The Nevada Club had the best rules at the time. They were still dealing a single deck all the way down to the bottom. In addition, they allowed you to double-down on 9, 10 or 11, rather than just 10 or 11 like most of the other Reno casinos.

AS: How long ago was this?

Braun: At least ten years ago. I haven’t played any serious blackjack for years now.

AS: What sort of stakes were you playing for then?

Braun: Very mild. I generally bet from two to ten dollars. I played at the Nevada Club rather regularly. After about a week, even though I wasn’t betting real big or winning any tremendous amounts of money, they decided the fact that they weren’t beating me out of my money was indicative enough. So I walked in one day and a pit boss motioned to me and very politely said, “The owner has observed you playing, and he has decided that he doesn’t want your action anymore.” I didn’t argue.

AS: What system were you using?

BRAUN: I was using the Hi-Lo system.

AS: You wrote to me that the “Money Management” chapter in your book, How to Play Winning Blackjack, which advises the player to watch for “hot streaks” and use betting progressions, had been written by Harry Fund, your publisher. Were you aware, prior to its being published, of the contents of that chapter, and have you spoken to him personally about your feelings about it being included under your name?

Braun: Yes, but he wanted to get his two cents in and he was the publisher.

AS: In that chapter, he writes as if he were you.

Braun: I know. He was writing under my name because he’s using my name to sell the book. He wrote a lot of the other stuff too. I don’t claim to be a book writer, per se. He wrote all the colorful stuff and the background, and I wrote all the technical stuff for the book. The only thing I got in on the Money Management chapter was the footnote at the end.

AS: That footnote seemed to be the only intelligent part of that chapter.

Braun: I wrote the footnote because I was trying to play down what he’d written in the rest of the chapter. The thing is, there are a lot of people who like to play that way.

AS: Do you mind all the back-stabbing and name calling that’s going on in the blackjack scene?

Julian Braun: Not particularly, but I wish it wasn’t there. FLASH! Just received Ken Uston’s latest newsletter… As of May 28, 1981 the New Jersey Casino Control Commission will permit the A.C. casinos to abolish early surrender! Uston is organizing a group called CHIPS — Committee to Have the Industry Preserve Surrender. They will be leafletting, making bumperstickers, T-shirts, and picketing the casinos. Yes, marching! Is this the beginning of a card counters’ union? United Pit-workers Local 21? ♠

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Beyond Wong: Professional Casino Tournament Tips

by Anthony Curtis
(From Blackjack Forum Volume XV #3, September 1995)
© 1995 Blackjack Forum

One evening in late 1985, my phone rang. It was a call that I look back on as one of the most important of my life. Stanford Wong was on the other end, and as is his custom, he came straight to the point.

“I’m forming a tournament team,” he said. “There are four of us and I think five would make a nice, efficient group. You came to mind. Would you like to play with us?”

I was shocked. Wong was one of my earliest gambling heroes. We’d had a brief correspondence, and we’d met once. Now he was calling me at my one-bedroom apartment, asking me to join his team. It was like a football hopeful getting a call from the 49ers. A dream come true…

“N-n-n-o,” I stuttered.

“Why not?”

“I’m a good blackjack player, but casino tournament play is another world. I don’t know anything about it.”

“Neither do I,” said Wong, “but I have some ideas. We’ll all learn together.”

And so began an incredible experience that made me a lot of money (and even a little fame).

By now, many of you know the story. Recognizing an opportunity, Stanford Wong constructed a computer model to analyze the tournament blackjack end game. He compiled his findings in spiral notebooks and passed them out to me and the others on the team. (The information in those secret spiral notebooks can now be found in Wong’s 1992 Pi Yee Press book, Casino Tournament Strategy).

For about two years, we traveled extensively to play tournaments-Reno, Tahoe, Atlantic City, the Bahamas, and Aruba. Three highly successful years later, the team dissolved. It should be noted that Wong wasn’t the first to figure out tournaments. When we came on the scene, players were already utilizing these concepts. I learned later that they had dominated the tournaments for years, during a time when the prizes were much larger than they are today.

Wong knew going in that he would only devote a couple of years to serious tournament play. He wanted to write the great book on the subject, then go on to other things. I, on the other hand, saw tournaments as a deep well (of profits) that I would be able to go to for a long time to come. A few of the other guys and gals coming at the time saw it the same way. We formed friendships, talked a lot, played together, and elevated the art.

Being young and impetuous, my buddies and I wanted to rule the tournament world. We stayed up late into the night discussing the day’s rounds if we’d played, or general strategy if he hadn’t. We picked apart everything that might add up to our advantage, and the conversations got more esoteric as the free-drink tally rose.

Among the topics of discussion: end-game, middle-game, secret bets, playoffs, adjustments for format, positional considerations, pros and cons of correlating, creating swings, techniques for counting chips, tendencies of opponents, shuffle-tracking in tournaments, hole-carding in tournaments, tells in tournaments (by dealers and players), time-management in timed tournaments, how to exploit a player’s rules infraction, how to exploit a dealer’s error, how to exploit our reputations, how to play if we were unknown, how to play with more than one of us on a table, how to deal with another expert on the table, how to secure a good table position at the draw, how to make an opponent bet out of turn, how to influence opponents by betting out of turn, and of course, how best to get a date with the good-looking tournament director’s assistant (a skill I never quite mastered). Keep in mind that I’m talking blackjack tournaments only; there were whole other sets of topics for craps tournaments, keno tournaments, etc. The point is, we spent a lot of time outside the pages of Wong’s tournament manual.

These days, I don’t play the tournaments nearly as often as I used to, so I don’t mind letting you in on a few of our conclusions. Don’t get too excited, though. Compared to the value of the information in Casino Tournament Strategy, and the strength of the singular tactic of betting your money (see “Bombs Away” below), this information is of marginal value. Then again, you just might pick up a tidbit that will get you through an extra round or two.

Choose Casino Tournaments Wisely

One easy way to improve results (regardless of skill level) is to be choosy about which tournaments you enter. Several factors are involved here, but equity is the fundamental measure of playability. Equity is the percentage of entry fees collected that is returned in the form of prize money. It’s an important consideration. Any time the prize pool returns less than 100%, you have a decision to make. Namely, are you superior enough to the average player in that tournament to make up the shortfall? I don’t care who you are, there is always a point where the answer has to be “no.” The better you are at pegging that percentage, the better your results will be.

I find myself laying off of more and more tournaments these days because of the dramatic increase in the public’s skill level. If the average player is nearly as skilled as I am, then even a tournament that pays close to 100% equity offers too small a return on my investment to make it worth playing from a purely monetary standpoint.

Often there are ancillary considerations. In my case, I have the unique luxury of being able to play in tournaments where I have a small edge thanks to the publicity value I derive from winning. When I calculate equity, I sometimes assign double or triple value to the prize pool because of the increased credibility that winning the championship gives my career as a gambler-writer. A professional, for example, might assign added value for the hard-to-come-by practice he gets by playing. A novice might justify his entry by considering the vacation value-he makes up the difference with a free room, comps, parties, drinks, and other perks that go with tournament entry. I know of many people who just plain love to play tournaments. For them, the enjoyment factor lessens equity requirements.

Here are two other realities that literally leap out at you when you examine extensive records of tournament results. First, early-entry discounts are available. Be sure to plan far enough ahead to take advantage of the savings they represent. Second, over-the-table losses represent a huge cost of doing business. Tournaments contested with funny money are usually best of all.

Don’t Count Cards In Blackjack Tournaments

I always rub my hands together when I run into card counters on a tournament table. Why? Because they’re so predictable. A powerful play in tournament competition is to create the opportunity for a swing when you’re behind. That usually means betting big when your opponents bet small (or vice versa). This can be problematic when the key opponent bets after you because he can simply mirror your bets to the degree that he chooses. Since some card counters would rather be publicly caned than raise their bets into a negative deck, you can create the potential swing any time you want just by betting contrary to the count.

The most remarkable example of this I’ve come across occurred in a big tournament in the Bahamas. I was on a table of five and all of my opponents were dyed-in-the-wool card counters. A third of the way through the round, the shoe went positive and the four others jumped on it. Having already drifted a few maximum bets down, I was happy to let them go, hoping that a few good hands by the dealer would bring them back to me. But by the time the shoe was finished, I was too. The four were in a dead heat for the lead some eight max bets ahead of me. Given the one-person-advance format, I was all but sunk.

The next shoe, however, quickly went negative. I made a max bet while everyone else bet the minimum. I won and gained a bet. As we played on, I didn’t even worry about what I was dealt. I was busy praying that the count would stay negative so I would continue to be the sole big bettor. It did, I was, and on the last hand I had only to win my bet to advance to the four-man final for $250,000. (Alas, my remarkable comeback wasn’t consummated.)

After the round, one of the players who knew me as a card counter came up and said, “Nice comeback, but why were you betting so heavily into that huge negative count?” The question was even more ridiculous than is obvious-we were playing with funny money!

Though a vivid example, it’s by no means the main problem with counting cards in tournaments. If you know how to count, you’ll do it while you play, and there’s nothing wrong with that in the early stages. In fact, in one-advance formats where it’s almost certain that you’ll have to make at least one (preferably uncorrelated) big bet sometime during the round, making that bet early and according to the count will improve your results over the table. But in the last five to ten hands, you’re out of your mind if you maintain the count at the expense of all the more important things there are to be aware of, like an accurate accounting of the threatening bankrolls.

The Importance of Position In Casino Tournaments

Few players give position the consideration that it merits. It’s important to base your total game plan on the last-hand betting order, especially in the one-advance format. In a nutshell, the worse your position on the end, the more aggressive you need to be before you get there. If position is determined by a dice roll or a draw at the table, you must immediately calculate where you will bet on the last hand (if everyone makes it that far), then play accordingly. You must also be prepared to recalculate and switch strategies when players bust out and change the last-hand order. Positional considerations, by the way, are much more important (and complicated) in tournaments other than blackjack, like craps.

It’s Better When The Casino Likes You

The most successful card counters spend a lot of time making sure that the welcome mat remains out. You’d expect that tournament players would do the same, but they don’t. For some reason, the typical tournament expert can’t resist flaunting his talents, not so much to the casinos or other customers as to one another.

Tournament players congregate in groups and cliques, openly analyzing every move they and their cohorts make during play, and making not-so-subtle jokes about the non-optimal play of the less informed. The tournament pros need to realize that the very players that they’re exploiting are often the casino’s best customers. Antagonize them enough and they’ll eventually complain to casino management, and there goes the welcome mat. The casinos won’t risk losing their good customers for the sake of a few entry fees.

Some of those esoteric discussions I mentioned earlier had to do with how much leeway to give the regular casino customers when they make mistakes (rule infractions, receiving overpayments, etc.) before raising an objection that might make an enemy. Don’t underestimate this consideration. Some of the most successful long-term tournament winners I know are also among the most likeable people I’ve ever met.

Bombs Away–Casino Tournaments Are About Betting

If you’ve done any studying of tournaments at all, you’re probably already aware of what I’m about to say. But it’s so important that I just can’t imagine discussing tournament play without mentioning it. No other strategy is as powerful as this: Bet your money when you’re behind. A tournament is a gunfight, and the chips are your bullets. You must shoot those bullets until you either win the gunfight or run out of ammunition. If the heat is on and you’re not sure what to do, employ this rule: When in doubt, put it out. I do. Betting the max may not be the best play, but it’s rarely the worst.

I once played in a mini blackjack tournament where the whole table had the betting bug. It was a frenzied affair with five of us turning a $500 buy-in into more than $2000. When the smoke cleared in the tournament, I had advanced along with a young airman from Nellis Air Force Base who was playing his first blackjack tournament ever. The airman had caught on quickly, making max bets every time someone’s stack of chips exceeded his. After the round, the excited airman jumped out of his seat, ran over to his girlfriend and shouted: “That wasn’t about playing cards. That was about betting!” Truer words… ♠

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A Nevada Court Victory for Card Counters

By Robert A. Loeb, Attorney at Law
(From Blackjack Forum XX #1, Spring 2000)
© Blackjack Forum 2000

On March 9, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in favor of a card counter and ordered the return to him of $40,400 in winnings which had been seized when a casino discovered that he had used false identification at the blackjack table.

This is an extremely important case, because there are very few decisions from the Nevada Supreme Court that affect counters, and because it deals with many important issues related to card counting.

Ultimately, the court found that the player did not commit fraud, because he had not cheated in the play of the game, and so the court ordered that the seized chips be returned to him.

The Legal Facts of the Card Counting Case

In order to analyze what the case means and doesn’t mean, we have to go back, look at the facts, and review what happened at the blackjack table, at the cashier, at the gaming board and in the lower court.

Card counter Richard Chen bought in for $29,000 at a blackjack table at the Monte Carlo casino in Las Vegas in April, 1997. As a known card counter, his picture was already in the Griffin book, so when the casino asked for identification (presumably to fill out a cash transaction report, as required by the government), Chen presented a purported passport from Burma (which does not exist anymore) in another name. Later that evening he bought in for an additional $15,000, but no identification was requested at that time.

Chen then played blackjack, apparently for several hours. At some point, pit supervisor Dave Schugar recognized him as a card counter, stopped Chen from playing more, and asked Chen to accompany him to the cashier to cash out. At the cashier, Chen produced $84,400 in chips, and when asked for identification, produced the same false passport.

Schugar noticed the irregularity and notified casino security and the Gaming Control Board.

Chen admitted to Carl Vidano, the Gaming Board agent, that the passport was false; he provided his true identity and the casino filled out a corrected cash transaction report (the Nevada 6A version of a CTR). Vidano directed the Monte Carlo to retain the chips and to give Chen a receipt for the full $84,400, pending a review of surveillance tapes and a criminal investigation.

A few days later, the Monte Carlo informed Vidano that the tapes showed card counting but no cheating. Vidano directed the Monte Carlo to release the money to Chen, and the casino refused. Vidano initiated a patron dispute case and issued a formal decision directing Monte Carlo to pay Chen the $84,400. The casino again refused, and appealed the agent’s decision to the full Nevada Gaming Board. Vidano did note that Chen did not commit any criminal violation, other than the misdemeanor crime of possession of false identification.

Three months later, the casino returned $44,000 to Chen (the total of the buy-ins), leaving the $40,400 in winnings as the subject of the dispute before the gaming board.

On the Legality of Card Counting: The Gaming Board and Lower Court Decisions

After hearing the evidence, the Nevada State Gaming Board ruled in favor of the Monte Carlo, allowing it to retain Chen’s winnings.

The hearing examiner felt that both parties agreed that had Chen provided his true identity, he would not have been allowed to play, although, I think it would have been more accurate to say that Chen could have begun playing; his session just wouldn’t have lasted as long.

The Gaming Control Board found that Chen’s use of false identification was a fraudulent act to gain admittance to the blackjack game. The Gaming Board also found that if Chen had provided his true identity, he would not have been allowed to play.

The District Court in Las Vegas considered the briefs and arguments of both sides, and it upheld the Gaming Board’s decision to allow the Monte Carlo to seize and retain the winnings. Chen appealed the case to the Nevada Supreme Court.

The Player’s Side of the Case

The Nevada Supreme Court is a court of review. This means that, like most appellate courts, it does not hear testimony or substitute its own view of the facts of the case. Its job is to accept the testimony given in the lower courts and determine if any legal mistakes were made, such as improper admission of evidence or erroneous legal conclusion.

In this case, the primary issues were whether or not the District Court made a mistake in reaching its conclusion that the casino had the legal authority to confiscate the chips, and whether Chen had committed fraud in acquiring the chips.

Chen’s contentions are contained in the brief which his attorney (John Hawley) filed with the Nevada Supreme Court. They took the position that no law or administrative rule gave a casino the legal right to seize and confiscate chips in this manner, and pointed out that Agent Vidano agreed that there was no such statute or regulation to authorize impounding the chips by either the casino or by the Gaming Board.

Chen and Hawley also took the position that the profits resulted not from the use of the false passport, but rather from Chen’s legal blackjack play according to the rules set by the Monte Carlo. Finally, they pointed out that a CTR is not a prerequisite to playing blackjack.

The Casino’s Side of the Case on the Legality of Card Counting

In the brief filed by the Monte Carlo, the casino framed the issues in different and perhaps chilling terms.

The casino stated that the issues were: “Whether a gambler can present false identification under a false name in order to play blackjack? and Does the Nevada State Gaming Control Board have the authority to use common law principles to protect the integrity of gaming in Nevada?”

If the Nevada Supreme Court had ruled in the casino’s favor on the first issue, casinos would be allowed to compel legal identification from any player.

If the Court had adopted the casino’s argument in the second issue, it would be fraud to give the casino a false identification, allowing for the seizure of profits after detecting a fake ID.

In the absence of a statute or rule authorizing confiscation of chips, the Monte Carlo was asking the Court to rule that the commission of common law fraud gave the casino such authority.

The casino’s choice of words in its brief is interesting. For instance, the Monte Carlo claimed that Chen “is a self-admitted card counter.” (What a humiliating admission to make!)

The Monte Carlo then describes his play as “he would observe a blackjack game for a few minutes, then begin to play and bet heavily and win several hands in a row…This style of play is consistent with the techniques employed by card counters.” (If only it was that easy!)

Finally, the Monte Carlo would characterize Chen’s winnings as unjust enrichment because of the use of the false passport.The casino made its case by claiming that the commission of fraud would allow for confiscation even without a specific statute or rule, and that Chen’s actions constituted fraud.

The elements of fraud are discussed in the next section. The Monte Carlo’s brief ends by asking that the Nevada Supreme Court “send a message to casino patrons that the use of any type of fake identification when engaging in legal wagers will not be condoned.”

The Decision: Why Fraud Was Not Proven

While this case was pending, I feared that it had the potential to be the most catastrophic court finding ever for card counters.

That is because if this decision had gone the other way, it had the potential to allow the casino to seize the profits of a card counter using an alias but to let the player lose at his own risk. In other words, the casino could let that counter play; if he won, the casino would seize the chips he had won. If he lost, the casino would certainly not return any money to him. There would be no risk to the casino.

Conceivably, it might even apply to players who had been previously backed off under one name, played later under a different name, but never even used false identification.

It was with a great deal of trepidation that I awaited the decision in this case. The court noted that to establish fraud, the Monte Carlo had to show that (a) Chen provided a false representation of a material fact, which he knew to be false; (b) that Chen intended the Monte Carlo to rely on the misrepresentation; (c) that the that the Monte Carlo detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation; and (d) that the misrepresentation proximately caused damages.

It is pretty clear that Chen in producing the fake passport, provided a false representation of a fact which he knew to be false; that representation was material when made in that it helped provide him the opportunity to play. It can easily be inferred that Chen intended that the Monte Carlo relied on that misrepresentation. Thus, as the court found, the Monte Carlo successfully proved the elements in (a) and (b).

But the court found that the Monte Carlo did not prove element (c), that the casino detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation. The identification requirement was to comply with Regulation 6A dealing with the government requirement of cash transaction reports; the identification requirement was not a prerequisite to the purchase of chips.

In addition, the casino had no policy instructing casino employees to cross-check the player’s id with a list of counters who might not be allowed to play. If the casino had such a policy, and had taken that step in this case, then element (c) would have been proved, according to the court.

The most important element in this case was (d), and the court perceptively found that the false passport was not the proximate cause of Chen’s winnings. The court stated, “The false identification allowed Chen to receive $44,000 in chips, but it did not cause Chen to win. Thus, we hold that the Gaming Control Board’s determination that Chen committed fraud is contrary to law because the Monte Carlo did not establish all of the elements of fraud.”

Other Observations of the Case on the Legality of Card Counting

The issue of the legality of tendering a false identification was not before the court, and accordingly, the decision does not deal with that issue.

Instead, the court was deciding whether the seizure of the chips was proper or not.

No police agency brought a criminal charge dealing with the false identification, and the court did not discuss that aspect. It would be wrong for a player to conclude from this decision that the use of false identification is legal just because no charges were brought.

It is important to note that since March 9 when the decision came out, Hell has not frozen over, and there have been no sightings of flying cows. Both of these phenomena had been predicted to occur before the Nevada Supreme Court would ever rule in favor of a card counter, but the predictions were wrong.

Additionally, this case was not a slam dunk for the player, in that the casino came close to establishing the legal elements of fraud. But a different decision may have even been detrimental to Nevada casinos, because it could have given the appearance that Nevada games are rigged in favor of the casino, an image that would have been far more costly to the casinos than the $44,000 which was at issue.

In any event, a player-friendly decision from the Nevada court system is worthy of recognition.

Finally, a different decision in this case could have given semi-official status to the Griffin book. If the use of an identity different from that which was in the Griffin book had been found to be fraudulent, then Griffin book entries would gain the imprimatur of law enforcement to the point where it would be considered fraud to give identification different from that in a Griffin book, regardless of Griffin’s accuracy. This might have been a longshot, but it was not impossible that a court would so find.

Implicit in the decision is that the legality of counting cards is again recognized. It’s not that there was any question as to that issue, but it’s reassuring to see that reaffirmed.

Three justices of the Nevada Supreme Court recused themselves from the case; this means that they did not participate. Three justices joined in the decision.

The final justice (Maupin) disagreed with the decision, and wrote that “neither card counting nor the use of a legal subterfuge such as a disguise to gain access to this table game is illegal under Nevada law. I conclude, however, that the misrepresentation here, the use of a fraudulent passport for identification, was not a legal subterfuge and enabled [Chen] access to high stakes play for the purpose of frustrating legitimate attempts by [Monte Carlo] to prevent this from occurring.” ♠

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General Blackjack

Here We Go Again . . .
by Arnold Snyder

The Key to Success as a Gambler (read me first)
by Arnold Snyder

The World’s Foremost Blackjack Authority
by Arnold Snyder

The House Edge at Blackjack
by Arnold Snyder

Blackjack Reality vs Blackjack Hype
by Arnold Snyder

Graduating from Red Chips to Green
by Barfarkel

Four Simultaneous Blackjacks
by Arnold Snyder

Exploiting Dealer Errors
by ETFan

Losing Money on “Good” Rules?
by Arnold Snyder

Disappearing Spots at the Blackjack Table
by Arnold Snyder

Toking Guidelines
by Arnold Snyder

Blackjack Routes of Las Vegas
by G.K. Schroeder

Accommodations in Las Vegas
by G.K. Schroeder

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Quote of the Day

“Much of what takes place presently seems to be based between the two extremes of corporate image-cleansing and the glorification of victimhood. Moreover, the degree of virtue signaling at these extremes is neither constructive nor pretty to watch. This all needs to change to give the appearance that the problem gambling effort has adult supervision. In short, I think we all need to try harder.”—Richard Schuetz, on the dysfunction of anti-problem-gambling campaigns … and much else.

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Quote of the Day

“And, honestly, a group of spider monkeys throwing darts at the 2020 release schedule would have done a better job than the Hollywood Foreign Press Association this time around.”—Boston Globe film critic Ty Burr on the head-scratching Golden Globes nominations.

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Quote of the Day

“The moment people don’t feel it is in their interest to act democratically, democracy is just lost. The Constitution cannot save it. It’s not going to leap out of its case in the National Archives and start attacking people.”—George Washington University professor Michael Miller, on authoritarianism in America.