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Weekend edition

Internet gambling produced more than Detroit‘s casinos did for Michigan last month, $131 million to $104.5 million. Unsurprisingly, BetMGM was dominant with $49 million. Thence came DraftKings ($26.5 million) and FanDuel ($19 million). Smaller fry included BetRivers ($9 million), Caesars Entertainment ($6 million), and WynnBet and Barstool Sports at $4 million apiece. Sports betting was not nearly so lucrative, with $24 million realized on $218 million in handle. A third of that went right back out in the form of promotions, with Barstool engaging in significantly less promo activity than its rivals, per Penn Entertainment CEO Jay Snowden‘s rationale for buying Barstool in the first place. As for revenue, FanDuel (32% of market share) outdueled DraftKings (21%), while BetMGM was close behind at 21%. Caesars and Barstool each accreted 7%.

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Leonard Benson’s Power Numbers Blackjack

A Report on the Claims, Training, and Results in Play

by John Leib
(From Blackjack Forum XVI #1, Spring 1996)
© 1996 Blackjack Forum

[Ed. note: In the September ’95 issue of Blackjack Forum, we published a letter that mathematician John Leib wrote to Leonard Benson, in which Leib offered to test the POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ system, which Benson was heavily promoting through newspaper advertisements all over the country. (Benson, by the way, continues to promote and sell the system.)

Leib told Benson he wanted to use Benson’s money to test the non-card-counting system, and stated that he would publish his analysis and results in Blackjack Forum. This is Leib ‘s follow-up report on his experience learning and playing the POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ system. — Arnold Snyder]

Leonard Benson Responds to the Challenge

Monday, September 11th, I returned from that ritual which humbles most of us: my 50th high school class reunion. When I got to the house, my wife had a telephone pink slip which I had not expected; I had gotten a call from Leonard Benson, purveyor of the Jacobs POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ way to relieve the casinos of their money.

I had not expected the call because the claims made for POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ did not seem possible to satisfy in actual casino play. I, as perhaps most of you, figured this was just another scam, designed to take money from the gambling public by use of the motivating feature shared by gamblers: greed. I was sure Leonard Benson knew it was a scam which could not withstand critical testing in actual casino play.

I had attempted to chide Leonard Benson into some response by my original letter (which was reprinted in the September issue of Blackjack Forum).

After that issue was distributed, I sent another letter, calling attention to my ability to deliver on getting ink in Blackjack Forum describing the results which I would experience by actually using POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ with real money. If Leonard Benson knows the system does not work, he surely would not initiate further contact, and instead would hope that, by ignoring my challenge, it would pass.

But he had called! What could he possibly want to talk about? The next day I called him and found him receptive to my proposal! We talked about how ten trials might not be enough, what with one fluctuation or another, and agreed to go for 25 trials instead. Except for the time involved, I knew the more the merrier. Leonard said he wanted to talk it over with Dr. Jacobs, the inventor of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™.

Later that same day, Leonard called to confirm agreement with my proposal. Dr. Jacobs thought it was a great idea, too. Leonard promised to send me the complete set of materials so that I could become proficient at utilizing POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ before I got to Vegas and was certified as competent to put it to the test with their money.

I must say that this agreement to test POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ in this unbiased way, agreeing to publication of the results, good or ill, told me that they were serious about the validity of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™. This was not a scam! I was very skeptical about its value, even if they weren’t, but I was determined to give them a fair shake.

Leonard Benson Provides the Power Numbers Blackjack Training Materials

True to Leonard’s promise, the material was shipped September 13th and arrived three days later on the 16th. I decided to chronicle the pertinent events from that point forward in diary form.

As advertised, the package contained:

A 2 hour video tape that explains, illustrates and plays the POWER NUMBERS SYSTEM™. There is no guesswork.

An 83-page Home Study Manual and Workbook explaining the POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ system in step-by-step detail.

A felt blackjack layout, chips and 6 decks of casino cards for practicing at home.

Free phone consultation on the Blackjack Hotline whenever you have questions.

Well, the free phone consultation wasn’t in the package, but everything else was.

I immediately dived into the Home Study Manual (HSM) and noticed rather soon that the claim of “no guesswork” did not quite apply to it. There were several inconsistencies, ambiguities and optional playing choices which would necessarily call for “guesswork” when one of these situations arose at the table.

Later, on viewing the 2 hour video (for which the claim was made), I found further areas requiring interpretation by the student (and, therefore, “guesswork”), as well as inconsistencies with the HSM.

On Sunday the 17th, and again on Monday the 18th, Dr. Morton Jacobs (the creator of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™) called me to see how I was faring in my pursuit of truth. I told him that my plan was to catalog my questions and concerns, and review them with him in Las Vegas the following Monday (the 25th). I wanted to play like a computer in the fashion he though would show off POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ in its best light.

In particular, I explained that I would be reviewing POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ in casino play against the claims made for it in the pre-sale literature, as I thought this was the appropriate standard since this was the promise made to the potential customer to encourage him to buy. Dr. Jacobs agreed with this thinking.

My plan was to layout the claims I felt were substantive, and then gain agreement on the machine-like casino play which should produce results which would validate these claims. Dr. Jacobs was in agreement with this approach, so all seemed to be “go” and I began to catalog claims and casino play questions where there still seemed to be “guesswork.”

Over the next week I did a lot of reading, watching and dealing, so that I would be well versed in the areas which required no “guesswork,” and had uncovered and recorded the areas where there was “guesswork.”

Note: I cannot reveal any of the concepts or details of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, as that is part of my agreement with the Leonard Benson Company. Only the actual results of casino play and my evaluation of how well it supports the pre-sale claims may be reported.

Sunday, September 24th. Full of my newly acquired knowledge (and newly acquired questions), I headed for Las Vegas. Five hours of determined driving got me there. I called Dr. Jacobs, but we couldn’t get together that evening. It was imperative that I be in full agreement with him on how to play and how to bet before I engaged in any actual casino play. So we planned to do this the next day.

My Power Numbers Blackjack Competency Test

Monday, September 25th. I was invited to Leonard’s apartment to meet with him and Dr. Jacobs. The discussion was frank on both sides. I told them that the ideal situation would be for Dr. Jacobs to play and for me to observe, and this was seen as a good thing all around. All my preparation to actually use POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ was not to be used in casino play, but this preparation did give me the ability to critically monitor Dr. Jacobs in action. We soon developed a good rapport and became at ease.

Dr. Jacobs was to play for a high roller that night at the MGM, and I was invited to come along.

Casino Play with Power Numbers Blackjack

Monday, September 25th. At the MGM I met the high roller, a Midwesterner named Al. Apparently Dr. Jacobs had played for him twice the day before, also at the MGM, and had won both times. Al was, of course, evaluating Dr. Jacobs, and was impressed. The first session had been using $100 units, the second was $200. (These earlier sessions are not included in my review because I did not witness them.)

So now it was time to move up to $300, and that was the level for the play on this night. The results were spectacular. In one hour Dr. Jacobs had won $2050. (After winning $1950 at the $300 level, he had dropped back to $50 units, and won another $100, two units. We stopped for the night and were comped to a fine dinner before we left the hotel. I had been accepted.


Tuesday, September 26th. Now it was time to move up again, to the next level: $400 units. This meant a bank of $8000, which didn’t seem to bother Al. We were still working out on the MGM, and they didn’t seem to mind. One thing that impressed me about POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ was the level of camouflage, the difficulty of detection that it provides. There was never any heat regardless of the betting spread and the amount we were ahead. I say “we” because, emotionally and acceptance-wise, I had become a member of the team trying to make the system work.

For a few hours we hovered around even, up a few units, down a few units, but mostly up. There was a time on a two-unit bet that the dealer had a two-card 19 and we had a two-card 18. If we had won that bet, we probably would have ended the session and quit for the night, up seven units ($2800). But we didn’t win and we didn’t quit. Things went downhill from there.

About a quarter to five the next morning, after seven hours in pursuit of our goal, we broke for breakfast. We were down fifteen units ($6000) and needed a time away from the emotional roller coaster to evaluate the situation. Over bacon and eggs, we considered what to do now.

It’s the same old story we have all been through at least once in a casino: we come to win some set amount with a betting and playing system and a pre-selected bankroll. We are sure of the soundness of our approach and know, rationally, that even if it isn’t winning at the moment, there is no basis to change. And we are prepared to lose the entire bankroll if the specific cards we must confront just don’t like us up to now, whatever “now” is. And we know we may lose all of this session’s bankroll occasionally. Not to worry. The system is sound and will overcome transient negative behavior in the long run.

Then this significant downsizing actually happens and all of our cool pre-session analysis and thought escape us. The plan no longer is inviolate and we look for changes to implement which will, by themselves, turn the trend around.

And on this early morning, hunkered down over coffee and eggs, the process began. I was mostly listening. After all, I was just an observer, and I didn’t want to taint my reporting by influencing the outcome. So the money man (Al) and the expert (Dr. Jacobs) made all the decisions. I only answered direct questions, and never said, “If I were doing it, then I would…”

Then we did something Kellyesque [Editor’s note: the author is referring to the Kelly principle for bankroll management, which professional gamblers use. To Kelly bet is essentially to bet a fraction of your total, non-renewable bankroll proportionate to your edge.] Since we had only one quarter of the original bankroll left, we dropped the unit size from $400 to $100, a move I though was only valid if this was not a renewable bankroll (which was not the case, since this was only a “session” bankroll). I did not voice this concern.

Another concern was that Dr. Jacobs was asking advice from us on how to modify his system. This hardly showed a strong conviction (at that moment) in the long-run correctness of the system. The emotions were overcoming clear thought.

So now we were back to a 20-unit bankroll, and in my mind this terminated the original session and began a new session. I mentally made a note to score it this way. Perhaps Leonard will not agree with this determination of scoring practices, but it made sense to me. This change in the system [ed. Note: reducing the unit due to loss] was not in accordance with what was advocated in the POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ manual or video, which was the system I was attempting to evaluate. So I decided to separate the data and deal with “units,” not dollars.

Dr. Jacobs played with the new bet sizing. His play didn’t always seem to agree with my understanding of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, but no mention was made that we were no longer getting data that was useful to my review. (If Dr. Jacobs had said that, I would have gone home and gotten some sleep.) Two hours later, we had lost the remaining $2000. Not a good night for showing off POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™. At 8:15 in the morning it was all over.

Later, both Leonard and Dr. Jacobs said I shouldn’t count that last portion of play since it wasn’t POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™. It isn’t clear how they would have wanted it viewed if we had made a remarkable recovery with this new approach. I am including it in my data as Session #3. You can adjust my conclusions as you like, removing this session if you feel so disposed.


Wednesday, September 27th. Much of this day’s activities were a continuation of the play started the night before, and are chronicled above. Then we all went home to rest.

Later that evening I was called home to San Diego for personal reasons. I called Dr. Jacobs and told him I was leaving, but would be back in November and would like to continue the data taking at that time. I told him that the best of all possible worlds for me (and, I presumed, for an objective review of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™) would be to have him play at low stakes just to provide data for my review. This way we could treat it as a laboratory experiment, and not get emotionally involved with the size (in dollars) of the wins and losses.

Dr. Jacobs thought this was a great idea, and offered to put me up in his guest bedroom when I was in town. Through the trials of the previous two nights, we had become good friends.

Another Trial of Leonard Benson’s Power Numbers Blackjack

COMDEX in November(the world’s largest computer trade show) presented the next opportunity to take data on the effectiveness of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™. Dr. Jacobs was not feeling well and could not commit to playing at any specific time, so I called Leonard and he got one of his students, Mike, to play while I watched.

Mike’s approach to stopping a session was different from that advocated in the POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ manual and video, so a “session” meant something different. But he was playing with his own money, so I could not object. Anyway, the most important thing was whether the basic play according to POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ will win significant money, measured in units per hour, so this data could be incorporated that way. And I needed data.

We played at the MGM again. Mike’s “unit” was $25, so the pressure from the amount of money was not great. Mike played for about an hour and a half, lost 6 ½ units, and declared the session over. We set the next session for the next day, and went home for the night. [An aside: later that night I played at a single-deck game at Circus-Circus, flat betting $3 and playing basic strategy. In about 100 hands, I won 27 ½ units ($82.50). Had I been playing $25 units, this would have been $687.50. And I didn’t even have a system!]

Wednesday, November 15th. Mike and I met at the Mirage for a short session (because his son was in town), and he played there for 25 minutes. He was ahead one unit ($25) when we quit.

Thursday, November 16th. Back at the Mirage with Mike. After 35 minutes, Mike declared the session over, 5.5 units ($137.50) ahead. This brought Mike back to even in my score book. We decided on another session that day.

Later we returned to the Mirage and had phenomenal cards, winning 10 units ($250) in just 15 minutes. Now Mike was helping the recovery from the disaster I had witnessed with Dr. Jacobs and Al.

Friday, November 17th. Mike and I met under the balloon at the MGM in the morning and things went as badly as they had gone well in the previous session. In 20 minutes he lost 6 units and called it a session, but not a day.

As it turned out, it was a day for Mike, at least where I was concerned. My pages to him, which had been promptly returned before, went unanswered that afternoon. Since my time was running out, I called Leonard, and then I called Dr. Jacobs, who was to coach another player that evening and thought that acceptable data could be gathered at the same time, and invited me to come along.

The player, it turned out, was an entrepreneur from Minneapolis named Steve Renner. Steve’s interest in POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ was in marketing it via multi-level marketing (MLM) though WIN (Winners; International Network, 612-349-5221), a company he owned. He wanted to master POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ so he could teach it to his MLM recruits.

The plan was for Dr. Jacobs to watch as Steve played, advising and correcting him in both betting and playing. This was their second such session. They said they lost 10 units the first time, but those results are not included in this evaluation because I have limited myself to what I have actually seen.

Dr. Jacobs chose Bally’s for our session. Play was to be with units of $10. After about 45 minutes and with Steve down 7 units, Dr. Jacobs had to take his daughter to some kind of lessons. He (Jacobs) knew I knew how to play POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, and he suggested I take over coaching Steve while he was gone. (NOTE: He was correct that I knew both how to bet and how to play POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, but nonetheless, I was surprised he let me direct the action while taking data.)

Steve continued playing, with me keeping him strictly on course in both betting and play. The cards continued to show POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ no mercy, and in another 30 minutes Steve had lost an additional 9 units. At this point he thought he should turn the task of digging out over to Dr. Jacobs when he returned.

It was about 9:00 pm when it became clear that Dr. Jacobs would not be back until after he had brought his daughter home (the plan had been for him to return during the four hours she was to be gone), and it would be about midnight when he would get there. Since I had to drive back to San Diego before morning, I called it a session and left. Down 16 units.

Third Trial of Power Numbers Blackjack

I drove all morning New Year’s Day to get back to Vegas and continue the data taking. Leonard knew this would be my last chance before submitting my results for the March issue of Blackjack Forum, and he accepted the task of finding someone to play the POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ system for my observation.

This time it was Chuck, a local student of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ who said he had seldom lost in more than 100 hours of play up to that point. His unit size was $10. First we played at Bourbon Street and quickly won six units. Then we took on the Maxim, dropping 2 units and calling it a session. Finally we played at the Poker Palace in North Vegas, losing 3.5 units and stopping for the night. Up 0.5 units for the day.

Tuesday, January 2nd. The first stop was back to Bourbon Street and two more quick units, then to the MGM and a 5-unit win, and then to the Tropicana for six more. Ahead 11 units, we declared this a session.

The next session started at the Maxim with a 1-unit win, continued to Bourbon Street for another 2 units, then finished at Bally’s with another 5.5 units. Session over +8.5 units.

The final session for the day combined play at Bally’s and the MGM. +4.5 units at Bally’s, -9 units at the MGM. Net for the session: -4.5 units.

Wednesday, January 3rd. The first session included playing at the Maxim (broke even), Bally’s (-1 unit), and the MGM (+5.5 units). Net for session: +4.5 units.

The second session was conducted at the Tropicana. Results: -5 units.

The third session was downtown at the Golden Nugget. Results: -3 units. Net for the day: -3.5 units.

Thursday, January 4th. Our last day of testing started off with a -4 unit session at the Maxim, followed by a +9 session, split between the Maxim and Barbary Coast. Two other short sessions at Barbary Coast netted +2.5 units and +2 units. Chuck’s contribution to the study of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK was a healthy +21.5 units.

This ended my data taking, as I needed to get back to San Diego. We hadn’t quite gotten 25 sessions, but 22 would have to do.

Evaluation of Leonard Benson’s Power Numbers Blackjack

My evaluation of the effectiveness of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, based only on mathematical considerations, is that the player risks money at a disadvantage of between 2.0% and 2.5%. [Editor’s note: John Leib was an aerospace engineer for Lockheed with a Ph.D in math. I met him after the great gambling analyst, Allan Wilson, recommended him as a brilliant math mind.]

Since I am prohibited from divulging the specifics of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, I am not free to explain where this range comes from, but suffice it to say that I can back up this estimate by analysis, regardless of the actual data collected.

I analyzed the data, if sloppily, well enough to draw a conclusion of how well it supports the 2.0%-2.5% estimate of player disadvantage. It should be noted that, sloppiness and all, we don’t need to tie this down to the nearest 0.1% to be confident of the validity of the conclusions.

Since there was a loss of 18 units during Session #3 (which is disputed as being the result of improper application of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, I decided to analyze the data in two ways (you may choose the analysis that appeals to you):

1. Using all the data collected, and

2. Using all data except Session #3.

The argument for (1.) is that:

  1. No announcement was made before hand that this data was inappropriate for my analysis. It was not my job to validate the betting/play as being in conformance with POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™. And besides, we had Dr. Jacobs, the inventor of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, betting the money and playing the hands.
  2. If POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ works, there would be no rationale for departing from it when things aren’t going well.
  3. I was asked to play a hand (at low stakes and with basic strategy) most of the time during Session #3 so we would have a better number of hands from which to know how to bet. This was in line with the precepts of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, so it looked like we were trying to follow, at least to some extent, POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™.
  4. It worried me that, perhaps, this session would not have been protested if it had been highly successful.
Analysis of the Power Numbers Blackjack Data
Win Rate:-0.67 Units/Hr.
Action:580 Units
Return on Investment (ROI):-2.6%
ROI Sigma:4.2%

The return on investment (ROI) of -2.6% is comfortably close to the -2.0% to -2.5% range predicted by rough analytical methods for POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™.

It should be noted that a change in the data of only 15 units (0.6 sigma) would have resulted in no loss at all.

Obviously, this limited data cannot adequately pin these numbers down from an experimental viewpoint. The only way to adequately approximate the true ROI figure with great precision is to perform an extensive simulation.

Data Analysis Excluding #3
Win Rate:+0.15 Units/Hr.
Action:497 Units
Action Rate:24.5 Units/Hr
ROI:+0.6%
ROI Sigma:4.5%

The data excluding Session #3 showed a net win of 3 units. If one is inclined to throw out this session, then it is impressive that POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ showed a profit; an impression which is limited by the fact that if 13 units (also 0.6 sigma) less were won, the data would match the -2.0% of the predicted range of -2.0% to -2.5%.

The primary conclusion to be made is whether or not POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ is a winning system. From a mathematical analysis point of view, disregarding the actual collected data, the answer is “No.” This conclusion was tested by taking data, and including Session #3 shows the shows the experience was a losing one. Ignoring Session #3 results in a very modest win, a win with little statistical support because of the limited amount of data.

It is my opinion that POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ is less desirable by 1.5% to 2.0% than is basic strategy, even though the situations it finds are better than average. The departures from basic strategy are quite costly. But, even with correct (basic) strategy, the player will be investing money at about -0.5%. In either case, POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ is doomed to long term failure. As I say, this is my opinion.

Power Numbers Blackjack: Results Versus Promises

The time has come to review the promises made for POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, and to compare them to actual casino experience and analytical predictions.

“$1,000 and more Profit Per Day Playing POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK.”

This was the grabber in the ad, the thing that makes you read the rest of the ad and, perhaps, call the 800 number. But what does it mean? Does this mean that, given enough days, you can average $1,000 per day, or will you, on some good day, net the promised $1,000? The use of the expression, “Profit Per Day”, implies an average; otherwise it should have read, “Profit A Day,” and be qualified with “sometimes.”

Using the (perhaps optimistic) results excluding Session #3 of 0.6% ROI, $1,000 would require “investment” of about $160,000 in the “1 to 3” hours required for a session, or about $50,000 an hour. With an action rate of 25 units per hour, this would require the unit to be $2,000.

“Amazing new discovery gives you a mathematical advantage Without Counting!”

Also from the ad, and the real grabber for one who has some analytical skills at the game of blackjack, particularly when coupled with the expanded claim, “Consistently win 10 units in 1 to 3 hours. Even win against so called ‘bad playing conditions, including bad players, 6 to 8 decks, crowded tables and clumps’.”

The “Without Counting!” claim did not turn out to be as anticipated. While the counting system used is not one recognized by the blackjack press, it is, nonetheless, a form of card counting.

Now, I have always believed that the ultimate test of a gambling hypothesis is experiment (simulation or actual casino play) to compare results to prediction. A mathematical advantage will then show up as a net win if sufficient play is involved. Unfortunately, enough data was not collected to be sure, but averaging a 10 unit win in 1 to 3 hours seems out of reach, at least by rational reasoning.

“It can be learned in 5 to 10 hours.”

Again, from the ad. This seems to be an overly optimistic estimate. The 2 hour video recommends that you watch it at least twice (4 hours plus rewind time).

The HSM takes longer than that, perhaps 4 hours per reading if you follow through the examples, and you should expect to do this at least twice (8 hours).

And then there is the recommendation that you have enough home practice to master the system before you go to actual casino play. My estimate for me is at least another 8 hours. My absolute minimum estimate is, then 20 hours. Probably much more for most players.

My estimate seems to be in line with this quote from the forward in the HSM, signed by Leonard Benson:

“…With a couple of weeks of diligent study and practice you’ll be able to be a consistent winner at blackjack, enabling you to make money the rest of your life.”

“Everyone is winning!”

From promotional material signed by Leonard Benson. This was brought into question by Leonard, himself, in our first telephone conversation when he said, “… We’ve had a couple people that the first time they started they got discouraged ‘cause they lost three times in a row.”

If the probability of winning any given session is .9 (“9 out of 10”, see the next claim), the chance of starting off with three losses is .001, one in a thousand. “A couple of people” experiencing this would suggest a population in the neighborhood of 2,000. In any event, the “Everybody is winning!” claim seems to be factually flawed.

“You’ll win 9 out of 10 sessions.”

From promotional material signed by Leonard Benson. It should be noted here that, given the amount you are prepared to lose and the amount you wish to win in a session of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, and if you were betting on tosses of a “fair” coin, then you would expect to win 2/3 of the time. This (2/3), then, would seem to be an optimistic number to use.

The argument might be made that many times you will “lock up” a small win and are prepared to risk your entire bankroll to do it. In a fair game, you would need to be prepared to lose nine times your “small” win to enjoy “9 out of 10” success.

“I have restructured the game of blackjack from the laws of probability to those of certainty. Structuring my betting on percentages, instead of luck or random chance betting, bringing it into the realm of reversing the edge of the House to the player.”

From “Comments from Dr. Jacobs.” This claim does not seem to be supported by the facts of POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™. While POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ does find situations with better-than-average potential, it does not improve enough above the off-the-top expectation to overcome the disadvantage of shoe games. Making it worse, POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ calls for disastrous departures from basic strategy, compensating (negatively) much more than this improvement gives.

“You will not lose your bankroll if you play POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK.”

From “Typical questions and answers about Dr. Morton Jacobs and POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™.” This is not the sure thing suggested by this statement.

“Q: Will everyone who uses the POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK system make money?

“A: Yes. You just have to follow the rules.”


From “Typical questions and answers about Dr. Morton Jacobs and POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™. This does not seem to be correct.

“Q: Will I have a mathematical edge over the casinos?

“A: Yes. POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK players have an advantage ranging from 5% to an incredible 20% and more! It’s absolutely amazing. You’ll be winning 10 units for every 50 to 150 units in action.”


From “Typical questions and answers about Dr. Morton Jacobs and POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™.” Surely, this is the most “amazing” claim of all. No one can take seriously a claim of an advantage of 20% “and more!” (It is, after all, “incredible.”) 5% might be credible, except that expert card counters would not seriously claim near that level of success.

My rough analysis suggests a negative player’s edge of at least 2.0%.

Observations of Leonard Benson and Dr. Morton Jacobs

There is no doubt in my mind that Leonard Benson and Dr. Morton Jacobs believe POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™ is everything they claim. There was no defensiveness. There was no attempt to keep me from seeing everything that was going on at the table, and keeping score for myself (which I did, and my score agreed with Dr. Jacobs’ and the other players’ scores). This was not the behavior pattern of people who are running a scam…

Since the last four days of data showed a strong positive surge for POWER NUMBERS BLACKJACK™, it might be argued that only then was its true potential being revealed. But one must remember that, in cases like this, the data could have come in any order. (This is also true for the individual hands.) So “trends” must include all the data. The last four days could have as easily been the first four days. Would different conclusions then be appropriate? ♠

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Bet Sizing for Recreational Players

Blackjack Betting: The Leib Criterion vs. the Kelly Criterion

by John Leib
© 1993 Blackjack Forum
[From Blackjack Forum Vol. XIII #3, September 1993]

Just when you thought it was safe to buy in,
Along comes blackjack’s black sheep with…

[Note from Arnold Snyder: In this article, our favorite heretic, mathematician John Leib, continues his arguments against the universally-accepted Kelly method of bet-sizing for blackjack betting.

Leib in fact attempts to answer some questions I’ve had about optimal blackjack betting for many years. The problem was articulated to me in the early ‘80s by a player who said he went to Vegas five or six times per year, always with $4000 to play with. He was a card counter, but did not entertain fantasies of becoming a pro. He was happy spreading his bets from $25 to a couple of hands of $100, had been playing this way for years, was well ahead of the game and was also collecting a lot of valuable comps.

From a Kelly perspective, he was grossly overbetting his blackjack bankroll, but he argued this point with me. “If I lose all the money I brought to play with, it’s not like I’m broke,” he said. “I’ll be back a few months later with the same bankroll—four thousand bucks. And if I win a couple thousand on a trip or even double my bank, which I’ve done on occasion, I don’t add it to my bankroll for the next trip. When I come to Vegas, I bring four thousand. That is my stop loss, I guess, not my bankroll.”

The problem I had was that this player wanted my advice on the optimal counts at which to raise his bets and/or spread to two hands. There isn’t an easy answer to his question, no matter what anyone says.

The player’s outlook on his bankroll is probably not all that unusual for a casual player, and in fact may be closer to the way in which the majority of players think about their gambling bankrolls. The Kelly method of bet-sizing fails to address this type of player’s concerns. Where does this leave us? John Leib proposed The Leib Criterion.]

John Leib on the Leib Criterion for Blackjack Bet Sizing

Simulation work supports discrediting the Kelly Criterion as optimal for any blackjack bettor, regardless of bankroll and trip goals, on any particular gambling trip. Its replacement is a thing of personal decision. I shall provide you with the information necessary to make that decision.

This material may not apply to professionals, those readers who do not have another source of income in addition to what they glean from the players’ side of the blackjack table. These are a special class to which (I am guessing) you do not belong, and to which I shall not presume to give advice. But it is unlikely that they approach a full Kelly betting fraction.

For purposes of the rest of us, I have assumed trips to Las Vegas or other gambling Meccas, be they occasional or frequent, are made with a total budget determined at the moment of leaving home. This budget is typically composed of two distinct partitions: an “expenses” partition for room, food and incidentals; and a “gambling” partition for action at the tables. I shall suggest a slightly different partitioning which may make more sense to you.

Proportional betting seems rational. Make the most of those good, positive expectation situations. I would not try to discourage proportional betting. But, what proportion?

We try to do our bet sizing as some fraction of the current state of the “gambling” partition and our understanding of the expectation on the next hand. This is a somewhat flawed approach because it doesn’t recognize the majority of the situations: those for which the expectation is zero or negative. Refusing to play in negative situations may be impossible, or bad for camouflage. Occasionally you can change tables or go to the rest room when things look bad, but usually you have to play through the bad hands.

So you may wish to accommodate these zero and negative expectation hands as a separate type of “expense” item in your trip budget, perhaps further partitioning the “gambling” partition into “gambling expense,” which pays for your seat at the table during hands which are even or negative, and “gambling investment,” from which your positive expectation wagers are taken and to which your positive expectation wager wins are credited. “Investment” wagers are then fractions of the current state of the “gambling investment” partition. When the term “bankroll” is used here, it refers to the “gambling investment” partition.

The “gambling expense” partition is a logical way to look at the rent for the “office” from which you work, much like the office of a lawyer or accountant, and is no less a real expense than room and food. It should be estimated from the game(s) you plan to play, how long you plan to play, and how you plan to bet in negative and zero expectation situations. Some conservatism may be in order in making this estimate.

A word about “risk of ruin.” Were you able to bet fractionally and perfectly, you would never go broke. But this is not the real world. Two possibilities (not including “barring”) exist that may cut short your gambling activity: you run out of money or you run out of courage.

We all (well, most of us) have, upon occasion, become so discouraged by poor results in potentially lucrative situations that, with no probabilistic justification for our decision, we stop playing, perhaps even for the remainder of the trip. So, to deal with the discouragement factor, I have, through simulation, looked at the effect of “chickening out” at levels of loss of 50%, 70%, 80%, 90%, and 95% of the initial bankroll. Such “chickening out” would be, for those of us who are not full-time professionals, the meaning of “ruin” for that trip, and shall be the meaning of “ruin” for the remainder of this article.

Now, some technical discussion about the simulation. I’m sorry, but this is necessary so you can judge its validity and applicability to your gambling proclivities.

Simulation of Blackjack Bet Size Strategies

The variance for the outcome of a hand of blackjack is about 1.26 times the bet squared, due to doubling, splitting and 3/2 payoffs for naturals (see Griffin, The Theory of Blackjack, Revised and Expanded edition, page 167). But this includes ties, which add essentially nothing to the variance while appearing to reduce the “risk of ruin” that a particular betting strategy incurs.

Since about 10% of the hands result in ties (see reference above), proper “risk of ruin” calculations require this variance to be divided by 0.9. This adjustment yields a variance of 1.40 for non-tied hands, with its corresponding standard deviation of 1.18 (as compared to the usually-quoted 1.12).

For calculating time in a casino, the number of non-tied hands must be increased by the factor of 1/0.9 to get the expected positive hands. The hand expectation must also be increased by this same factor, as the expected win comes in the fewer number of hands.

Since less than half of the hands will provide the positive expectation opportunity to be included in our computations (the rest of the hands are taken care of by our “betting expense” partition of the trip budget), I have chosen to consider one day’s hard play to yield approximately 500 such situations, and only 450 of these will be non-ties. For a weekend, I used 1000/900, and for a week I used 2500/2250.

The simulation emulates the toss of a biased coin on which we get to wager on the better side. Payoffs are even money plus an amount to increase the standard deviation to 1.18 times the bet. (This is not the same as betting 1.18 times as much with an even money payoff because you don’t collect the expectation on the extra fraction of a bet.) Perfect fractional betting is employed and no casino limits exist. The betting fraction is always some fixed multiplier times the instantaneous expectation for all wagers.

Positive expectations do not come like that so some composite distribution of the positive continuum must be used. At a loss to tell you what your style of game selection and play will yield, I referred to Dr. Edward O. Thorp’s classic, Beat the Dealer, 1966 Edition. Using tables 8.1 (page 104) and 8.5 (page 117), I constructed a rough approximation of the distributions shown on those pages.

The results of this part of the simulation process are shown in the tables under the heading of “Composite Projections.” (When other distributions become of interest, I will be happy to run them.) The composite projections give you a good approximation of what to expect of our “investment” budget in head-to-head play at single-deck.

The results of the simulation are tabulated in the manner I felt was most easily understood and used. You probably already have some idea of what kind of bettor you are, assuming you are (more or less) a proportional bettor. Do you typically make a half-Kelly bet? A full-Kelly bet? A two-Kelly bet? Are you going for a day? A weekend? A week? And do you “chicken out” before you lose it all?

Now I am going to ask you to perform that ever-popular task: “Meet me half-way.” Before you look at the tables, decide on an objective way to select a betting fraction which is just right for you, a “Figure of Merit” (FOM) by which you can judge the appropriateness for you of the competing Kelly fraction table entries. Such an FOM will include the positive value to you of average win (in terms of your initial bankroll) and the negative value to you of the probability that you will reach your “chickening out” level during the trip.

It is this old “risk versus reward” concept revisited. To be proper for you, these must be balanced, one against the other, because more of one necessarily means more of the other. You may be surprised to discover, after you have defined your FOM and then looked at the tables, that no betting fraction can satisfy what you thought were your requirements for projecting a successful trip. A successful trip projection is an acceptable combination of average win and the probability of disappointing results.

There is a table for bettors who like to bet half the Kelly fraction, one for full-Kelly bettors and additional tables for bettors with persuasions to bet one and one-half, two, two and one-half, and three times the one-Kelly fraction.

The tables contain the results for approximations of one day, one weekend, and one week of play, with a column for hand expectancies of 1%, 2%, 3%, 4% and 5%, and a row for each “chickening out” level. The results shown in each entry presume the entire time will be spent in that positive expectation situation, or in non-positive situations covered by your “betting expense” budget partition.

Finally, the composite results are presented, reflecting the more typical situation of varying hand-to-hand expectations for head-to-head single-deck play.

Find whom you think you are in the tables, and you can see what perfect proportional betting means, both in average trip win and the risk of suffering your definition of ruin.

A few comments about the tables:

  1. The “AVE WIN” and “AVERAGE WIN” columns presume an initial bankroll of one unit. The entries show the average final bankroll minus one. ALL entries show positive average wins.
  2. If you have a “chickening out” level, then high expectation hands pose a greater risk of “ruin” than do low positive expectation hands. So, if the “ruin” probability is too great for the desired average win, blame it on the really good hands!
  3. Table entries with very large average wins are unreliable. This is because the average tends to be dominated by particularly profitable, and quite unlikely, series. These wins are frequently so large that ignoring all other final bankrolls (setting them to zero) has little effect on the average.

    So, a simulation that gives a reasonable weighing to these possible outcomes would require a very large number of samples. It is unlikely that a second set of random samples would produce values that are “close” to those in the tables. Entries that appear eligible for such reduction in confidence will be more likely to appear for higher Kelly fractions and higher expectations. The “ruin” percentages, however, are likely to be quite accurate. All of the composite data, also, are likely to be quite accurate.
  4. The message is quite clear: The higher the betting fraction in positive expectation situations, the larger the average win and, unfortunately, the larger the probability of “ruin.” Where the tables seem to deviate from this message is in this unreliable range.

I propose The Leib Criterion as a replacement for The Kelly Criterion. This new criterion is based on the unquestionable correctness of a fractional bettor wishing to maximize his or her expected (average) win over a finite number of fixed-expectation wagers, but with the added requirement of limiting the likelihood of finishing the series of wagers “in the red,” to no more than about one-half.

The conversion factor in going from Kelly to Leib is simple and wasy to remember: One Leib Criterion equals Two Kelly Criteria. In other words, to bet according to The Leib Criterion you must bet twice what you would in following The Kelly Criterion.

This has the pleasant result of more than doubling your expected win while holding the likelihood of loss to approximately one-half, no matter how long a series of wagers you plan to make.

Perhaps this 50-50 split between the probabilities of winning and losing has caused some authorities to conclude that “It can be proved mathematically that an over-bettor who consistently bets twice the optimal amount will break even over the long haul” (Wong, Professional Blackjack, page 103.) The fallacy in this conclusion is, of course, that when you win, your average win is much larger than is your average loss when you lose; and you will win as often as you will lose.

Well, one size may not fit all. But if you wish to really understand proportional betting, and to find your comfort zone as a function of expectation, The Leib Criterion and the accompanying tables should give you what you need.

Snyder Comments on the Leib Criterion for Blackjack Bet Sizing

I think Leib has got something here, but before you run out and start betting double Kelly, bear in mind that Leib’s methodology would, in most cases, result in a bet that is less than full-Kelly, if you were figuring out Kelly in the traditional fashion.

Normally, we consider our total bankroll when estimating our optimal Kelly bet. Leib suggests first separating our gambling bankroll into two portions—”gambling expenses” and “gambling investment.”

This might provide a truer estimate of the appropriate Kelly bet, since Kelly advises no bet unless there is a player advantage.

But, what portion of your bankroll do you assign to “gambling expenses?” That would depend on the games you play in.

If you play in shoe games, and you do not table hop relentlessly, you will probably play 80+% of your hands without an advantage. So, even if you use a fairly large spread, a sizeable portion of your total playing bankroll should be assigned to the “gambling expenses” portion of your budget. Betting double Kelly with the remaining “gambling investment” portion might call for smaller bets than if you were betting full-Kelly based on your total bankroll. The wisdom of table-hopping shoe games becomes very apparent with a divided bankroll, as your investment dollars increase as your expense dollars decrease.

But even in single-deck games, most of your hands will not be played with the edge in your favor. Since single-deck games also usually require a player to keep his betting spread down, probably close to half of most players’ total bankrolls should be assigned to the “gambling expenses” bank.

One difficulty inherent in Leib’s methodology is that your “gambling expenses” bankroll will also be subject to fluctuations. You might “assign” $500 to your “gambling expenses” bankroll, but lose $1000 on negative advantage hands due to bad luck. You do not want to underestimate your potential table “expenses.”

A conservative way to overcome this difficulty would be to overestimate your “gambling expenses” from the start, and transfer funds from “gambling expenses” to “gambling investment,” or vice versa, according to your actual win/loss results.

In order to employ Leib’s methodology with any accuracy, we need to look at the frequency distributions for the various games, as well as the various blackjack betting spreads the player might use. Leib may draw fire for some of his unorthodox conclusions, but I find his basic idea here appealing. Since a blackjack player, out of practical necessity, must constantly violate Kelly, Leib’s separation of the player’s bankroll into “expenses” and “investments” is a unique effort to rethink Kelly for the reality of the game, and the variety of its players.

To View Tables, click here.

Again, Leib may draw fire for some of his unorthodox conclusions, but I find his basic idea here appealing. Since a blackjack player, out of practical necessity, must constantly violate Kelly in his blackjack betting, Leib’s separation of the player’s bankroll into “expenses” and “investments” is a unique effort to rethink Kelly for the reality of the game, and the variety of its players. ♠

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Money Laundering, Structuring, and Federal Forfeitures: A Guide for Gamblers

How Not to Launder Money and Get Caught Doing It

by L.J. Winsome
(From Blackjack Forum XVII #3, Fall 1997)
© Blackjack Forum 1997

In the case of federal forfeitures and money laundering, America may be becoming one of the many countries where — if one fits into one of the myriad “profiles” that indicate drug trafficking or affiliation with drug traffickers — one is guilty until proven innocent.

America is one of the few countries that taxes its citizens on gambling winnings. Apparently, the honor method of income reporting does not seem to be working. Laws have been put in place to ensure that the government knows who is making how much and where. Judging from the illegal seizures of money from innocent people as well as gamblers that have been depicted on television and in the press, they’re going overboard in what they deem “suspicious activity.”

Recently, I stopped over at the Reno airport on a one-way ticket from an international destination. The day before I had purchased a one-way ticket to San Francisco from Reno for the final leg of my journey. Because of this one-way ticket, I was required to go back to security and have my bags checked, even though I had already put them through the x-ray and walked through the metal detector. I had approximately $30K on me, but luckily I was wearing it.

The guard performed a “dump search.” Shampoo bottles were opened, books were rifled through, and every item was taken out of my bag. It was invasive to say the least, and a mere harbinger of what is to come. I’m convinced that if I hadn’t been wearing that money, they would have taken it. They could only have been looking for money or drugs, as I had passed the terrorist test when I went through the first time. Under the guise of the “War on Drugs,” the American government is turning anyone who can take a look into your private life into a sheriff.

Earlier this year, a player from a large team stuck his carry-on through the x-ray at the Philadelphia airport. The airline x-ray detected approximately 100,000 dollars in cash and casino chips. According to the team leader, the player was later apprehended at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago and taken into a back-room.

Two Drug Enforcement Agents confiscated the money. The player said that he tried to explain to them that he was a card counter — pointing out the chips — but they just laughed. The team will now have to spend thousands of dollars in attorney’s fees to prove that this player is innocent. Getting the money back will come later, and some of it could be withheld.

This team is large enough and flush enough to handle lawyers and endless bureaucracies in the form of casinos. An example of a team defending themselves against the powers that be is the well-documented Windsor case (Blackjack Forum December ’95), where Tommy Hyland took on the province of Ontario.

But it may not be worth it to an average low to middle-stakes player, who has less than $10K to $20K confiscated, to go up against a government agency that has all the time and money in the world. In the long run, it may cost more to get the money back than what was lost in the first place. So, besides always carrying your bankroll on your body, you might consider adopting a new hobby of petitioning your congressman or senator to get to work on returning some of your civil rights.

Title 211 U.S.C § 881(a)(6) authorizes the forfeiture of:

All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.

An article in the San Diego Union says:

“So much illicit cash travels down Interstate 5 to Mexico that law enforcement officers have dubbed the state’s main north-south freeway ‘the cash corridor.’ Millions of dollars are confiscated on this route each year during routine traffic stops in places such as Kern and San Bernardino counties, places that are bisected by freeways from other parts of the country. . . .

Typical seizures net between $30,000 and $100,000. . . . Officers are not allowed to pull cars over unless a traffic violation has been committed. . . . It is not illegal to carry large amounts of cash, but currency can legally be seized if prosecutors prove that the money could not have a legitimate source. Federal law allows money from the sale of illegal drugs to be seized and split among the agencies involved in its capture.”

The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (HR 1965), introduced by Congressman Henry Hyde, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, is pending in the House of Representatives. It’s stated goal is, “To provide a more just and uniform procedure for Federal civil forfeitures and for other purposes.” Those ‘other purposes’ are what the non-profit group Forfeiture Endangers Americans Rights (FEAR) are concerned about.

FEAR, formed in New Jersey in 1992 by a group of concerned citizens, seeks an end to the practices of letting the seizing agencies benefit from the proceeds of property seized, and of letting federal agencies adopt state seizures. According to a spokesperson from FEAR, “Things are getting worse on the forfeiture front. The Hyde/ Conyers bill that we supported — HR 1835 — was gutted by the House Judiciary Committee, with help from the Justice Department, and was renamed HR 1965. Not only does it make the procedures worse than under present law, but it adds a lot of new forfeitable “offenses,” and creates procedures allowing foreign governments to forfeit U.S. property! These provisions are alarming.”

At a late afternoon session, entitled “Money Laundering,” at the 10th International Conference on Gambling and Risk-Taking that took place in early June in Montreal, a representative from the Treasury Department explained how the U.S. government had turned the funny little Saturday morning cartoon characters called smurfs into the crime that the Treasury Department is attacking with the zealotry of the X-Men.

“Smurfing” or “structuring” is what the treasury department is afraid of from gamblers, said Ed Djinis from the US Department of the Treasury, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or at least people masquerading as gamblers. According to Chicago attorney Bob Loeb presently working on an illegal forfeiture case, often when suspected drug traffickers are caught with large unexplained sums of money, they claim that it’s gambling winnings, so Treasury Department or DEA officials become inured to this as a viable explanation for the money.

It’s almost an urban legend by now, but every gambler knows that 90% of all $100 bills have traces of cocaine on them. Unfortunately, casino chips don’t leave a tell-tale residue.

Djinis spoke at this conference looking every inch the government bureaucrat: his suit was gray, his tie was blue, and he repeated every concept he made, no matter how uninteresting. His one salient point, however, was a definition of what constitutes “smurfing.”

“If someone engages in currency transactions just below the currency threshold for reporting, it is called structuring or smurfing,” said Djinis. “In one instance it may not warrant much attention, but if the customer does this in a repeated fashion, either in conducting numerous transactions at the cage, or various buy-ins at numerous tables, that would constitute structuring.”

Djinis pointed out that casinos provide many of the services that banks and brokerage houses do, and were necessary in providing stopping points along the audit trail. Therefore they were uniquely positioned to watch for and report on currency transactions that looked suspicious.

Casinos have complied with the Bank Secrecy Act since 1986. It basically requires each casino to secure information on the patron such as the name and social security number. It’s then the casinos obligation to report that information to the government when the patron performs a transaction of over $10K.

An MGM Grand Casino representative, John Donnelly from the firm Levine, Staller, Sklar, Chan, Brodsky & Donnelly, disagreed with the feds’ explanation of the law the moment he took the podium. “Money laundering is not what is at issue. What is at issue is revenue enhancement for the Internal Revenue and Treasury.” He added that the Treasury Department didn’t believe the feds’ position either.

Donnelly explained that casinos are not the appropriate vehicles for money laundering because of the constant surveillance and the knowledge of what is going on at the tables. He pointed out that there has only been one criminal prosecution that has used currency transaction reporting out of a casino, despite that millions of reports that end up being filed in the Treasury Departments depository in Detroit, Michigan.

Djinis concurred, “Looking for suspicious activity and reporting it to the government puts the casino in the position of becoming a government agency, but the train has left the station and the government cannot do this in a vacuum.” Moderator of the panel, Frederic Gushin, Spectrum Gaming Group, New Jersey, disagreed that casinos are not good places to wash cash.

“We saw in Atlantic City, prior to 1986, many instances where criminals were attempting to launder money,” said Gushin.

Gushin related an incident of an LA bank-robber who brought a million dollars into a casino, documented in the book, Running Scared: The Life and Treacherous Times of Las Vegas Casino King Steve Wynn. When the robber brought the money to the cage all other activity stopped, except counting out the money. According to Djinis the more a customer uses a casino as a surrogate financial institution and less a source of entertainment, the more regulations will be imposed on it.

It’s clear that the casinos are loathe to make themselves a beacon on the audit trail, but that’s countered by the fees and commissions that a casino can charge for banking services, as well as the undisguised grin on your casino host’s face when you put more than 10K on deposit. Casinos want to perform these services, and they have to report them when they do. It seems that the train is careening down the track. The casinos have been deputized.

It also appears that regulations are going to become stricter. Here are two summaries of regulations that are pending addendums to the Bank Secrecy Act. They are excerpted from the Federal Register Vol. 62, Num. 98, May 21, 1997:

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) is proposing to amend the Bank Secrecy Act regulations to require money transmitter and issuers, sellers and redeemers, of money orders and traveler’s checks to report suspicious transactions involving at least $500 in funds or other assets. The proposal is a further step-up in the creation of a comprehensive system (to which banks are already subject) for the reporting of suspicious transactions by financial institutions. Such a system is a core component of the counter money laundering strategy of the Department of Treasury.

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) is proposing to amend the regulations implementing the Bank Secrecy Act to require money transmitters and their agents to report and retain records of transactions in currency or monetary instruments of at least $750 but not more than $10,000 in connection with the transmission or other transfer of funds to any person outside the United States, and to verify the identity of senders of such transmissions or transfers. The proposed rule is intended to address the misuse of money transmitters by money launderers and is in addition to existing rule requiring currency transaction reports for amounts exceeding $10,000.

The key that brings the earlier described airport horror stories and the seemingly unrelated late afternoon conference on money laundering together is the term “revenue enhancement.” The government wants to take your money, preferably in the form of taxes. Taxes require that your income be tracked. If that doesn’t work, the law allows agents to seize and keep money when it’s derived from drug dealing. CTR’s and the deputation of these various gatekeepers are attempts to track those who function outside the system.

The situation thus may be that you may want to allow CTR’s to be filed on you, just in case the money is confiscated. Of course, this will require that the gambler having the CTR filed on him pay taxes, and that is something some gamblers avoid like the plague. Many pros pay their taxes honestly, but part of why the lifestyle is so attractive to some is that one is free of the middle-class trap. The thinking is, if one has to pay taxes on one’s winnings, one may as well get a real job.

At the Montreal Gambling Conference, Max Rubin, author of Comp City, took the microphone during the question and answer period of the “Money Laundering” seminar to ask some specific questions about what constitutes smurfing.

“Does there have to be intent to evade taxes, or intent to evade the Treasury Department?” asked Rubin.

Rubin explained that card counters often stay under the casino radar by not showing ID and using different names. Obviously, when one fills out a CTR, one is required to show ID, so big money card counters might avoid doing it when using an alias.

“I know guys who pay hundreds of thousands in taxes,” he said, “but they don’t want the casinos to know who they are. Is that a crime?”

Djinis answered: “No, it’s probably not. If the intention is to evade detection by the casino, but not evade our reporting requirements, I don’t see a crime by the customer.”

It could be a catch 22, however, because if forced, a card counter would have to prove he was a card counter, and the only way to do that may be to have CTR’s filed in a casino.

If you would like more information on the Bank Secrecy Act or federal forfeiture regulations, you can find it on the internet at:
http://www.netrunner.net/~alert/document.html. This site was an invaluable source in the writing of this article, and it is constantly being updated as regulations are gutted or amended. ♠

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Las Vegas Blackjack Diary (excerpt)

Eight Weeks at the Blackjack Tables

by Stuart Perry
(From Blackjack Forum Volume XVI #1, Spring 1996)
© Blackjack Forum 1996

[In February of 1994, New Yorker Stuart Perry did what thousands of amateur card counters dream of doing—he took his $20,000 in savings to Las Vegas to take a shot at being a professional blackjack player. He spent eight weeks card counting full-time, and all the while he kept a session by session, casino by casino journal of his playing results, all 269 playing sessions, with his thoughts on the games and conditions he encountered, the dealers, the pit bosses, the heat, the barrings, his occasional suspicions of being cheated, and the roller coaster ride of the wild fluctuations.

Now, Stuart has decided to publish his card counting diary, which tells his story exactly as it occurred. His book is Las Vegas Blackjack Diary, and we’ve never seen a gambling book quite like this one before.

It’s not the type of book any major publisher would be interested in, so don’t expect to see it in your neighborhood bookstore. It’s not a glamorous tale of adventure, but a brutally honest account of what it’s like for a “little guy” to take on the casinos single-handedly. If you’ve ever dreamt of trying this yourself, don’t pack your bags till you read Stuart’s story first. It’s the truth.

Rather than write an extensive review of the book, we’ve arranged with the author to reproduce the first two days of his eight-week journal here. –A.S.]

February 28

Session One. Golden Nugget. 8:50-9:50 am. Graveyard shift. 1 and 6 decks.

I woke up a little nervous this morning. I guess that this is normal in any new venture—especially one in which everyone dealt with is the enemy—which is the reality for a blackjack card counter. As I drove to my money box to get $5500 (the normal amount I will use as a daily backup for card counting), I reminded myself that the odds will be in my favor and that these odds meant that I was merely going into the casinos to earn some money. This pep talk calmed me down.

Unfortunately, the session was a losing one, a possibility that has an almost even money chance of occurring. I made two bets of $50 off the top to start my single-deck play; I lost both hands to a dealer 20. Within 15 minutes I was behind close to $900.

After a small comeback, I left the single-deck game when three other players joined. I played a $25 shoe game in which I won a small amount over two shoes of play despite never having a true count of over 1 ¼; the count I needed to raise my bet minus camouflage—at least in this game.

I then hopped back to the now uncrowded single-deck game and won back about $200. One dumb thing I did was not making a bet for the dealer (toking) when I had two hands of $100 on the table at time when he could choose to shuffle.

The dealer shuffled. I left the bets out to start the new deck—pulling back a bet is a very bad practice for card counters—and split the two hands. Very soon after this, my hour was up.

Like last year, I was given no heat by the Nugget pit. I hope that will continue.-$443

Session Two. Riviera. 10:40-11:40 am. Graveyard shift. 2 decks.

The penetration was not good. The best I could find was 60%–which was about the worst available a year ago in the Riv’s two-deck games. Compensating factors—to an extent—were my $25-$400 (two hands of $200) spread and lots of fast head-on play.

Unlike the Nugget, I was given some slight heat. I once had a play decision in which it was correct to split two tens versus a dealer five; before doing so, I quickly looked around the pit and saw no one watching. I then made this move and won both hands. After this, a pit boss did start to watch.

I got ahead close to $1000 and then lost two straight $400 rounds (two hands of $200) near the end. The last deck went well, which helped ensure my maiden win of this blackjack venture.+$498.50

After my win at the Riv, I walked across the street to the Stardust, ate a couple of hot dogs, and then spoke to Paul—a sports betting money mover I know. He has only two NBA games to concern himself with today, but lots of college tournament games are on the horizon—a good time to avoid him at this place!

Session Three. Gold Coast. 1:20-1:35 pm. Day shift. 2 decks.

Incredibly, I suffered my first barring in my third play session. It was a shocking experience.

When I first entered the Gold Coast, I noticed only crowded $5 tables and one empty $100 table. I asked a pit boss if any quarter ($25 minimum) tables were available. The boss answered that the $100 table would be converted to a $25 one for me. After this was quickly accomplished, I sat down to play and was quickly joined by two other players. As I played, I engaged the pit boss in conversation. I asked about restaurants and other features of the Gold Coast (answers that I already knew).

As I talked, I had a lucky run in my blackjack play. Without ever going beyond two hands of $100—and progressing to this point only off a win with two hands of $50 or one of $100—I got ahead nearly $700 within 15 minutes. At this point, the pit boss said to me, “I think that’s enough.”

I answered him, “What do you mean, sir?”

“You can play other games here, but you aren’t allowed to play any more blackjack.”

As I colored up my chips without protest (what was I supposed to say?), one of the other players commented, “What the hell is this? The guy wins and they throw him out for that?”

I cashed out and left in a daze. Was my card counting that obvious? Was this the first in a quick, long string of barrings?

Later, Frank, my card counter friend, told me that the Gold Coast and its sister casino, the Barbary Coast, often throw out ANYONE who is winning any real money if they even suspect the player knows even basic strategy well. Franks also told me that each of these casinos has evicted him about 40 time. However, since they evict so many players, one could easily go back in—especially on another shift—and play again in day or two! I’ll see how I feel before I decide to go back to the Gold Coast.+$698

Session Four. Rio. 2:20-2:45 pm. Day shift. 1 and 2 decks.

After I recovered from my Gold Coast experience, I walked across Valley View to play at the Rio. After I crossed this mini-highway, a 40ish lady walked up to me and remarked how I looked like the “All-American Man.” Maybe with my Levi jacket and new Levi jeans, I did. At first glance, the lady looked cute, and I thought of the possibility of some fun later. However, on closer look, this woman looked less attractive and in our quick conversation, I came to feel that she was looking for someone to stay with and sponge off. Perhaps the Gold Coast bosses had sent her out there to snare me!!

After this diversion, I played mostly head-on in the one and two-deck games and my luck remained golden—even better than it was at the Gold Coast. I got blackjacks on several big bets (more likely in high-count decks, but I got far more than my expected share) and I won nearly every double down bet I made.

I used a little camouflage—mostly making some big bets off the top—and got no heat despite my winning. The tables then got crowded and I decided that it was wise to leave at this point.+1,317

Session Five. Flamingo Hilton. 3:50-4:35 pm. Day shift. 2 decks.

My three session winning streak came to an end. As I saw deck after deck getting reshuffled at 50% or so penetration, I asked myself, “Why am I playing in this crummy game?”

I know the sad answer to my question: to stop myself from over-playing and getting barred from all of the very few good games in Vegas.

The Flamingo Hilton machine shuffles many of their two-deck games; the dealer then cuts. I prefer a player cutting.

Even head-on play and a decent bet spread couldn’t make me a winner.-$77

Session Six. MGM. 5:40-6:45 pm. Day shift. 6 decks.

It sure is a LONG walk to the casino from the self-park.

In the next Blackjack Forum Cheesie awards, this casino should get the Pack Your Backpack Award. I’ll lose a couple of pounds in the walk this week.

The penetration was between 4 ¾ and 5 decks today. I never had more than two others at my table and the true count and ace side count—and my method of keeping it without being obvious in a shoe game—caused no problems.

Though this session was not any real disaster, it was the type of session that epitomizes the frustrations of blackjack for card counters. For most of the session I was winning—a few times by around $600. On the last shoe, the true count went past 2 ½ for the first time; I was thus a favorite to win more money.

Didn’t happen. I lost several $100 rounds (two hands of $50) and one $150 round (two hands of $75). Luckily, my camouflage of not increasing past two hands of $50 unless coming off a win saved me from a far worse loss, since the count got very high near the end of the shoe.-$141

Session Seven. Golden Nugget. 8:40-9:40 pm. Swing shift. 2 decks.

I got my first meal comp here. The dinner buffet—which I actually got comped to earlier on my graveyard play—was delicious. However, it didn’t come free!

With the one-deckers crowded on the main floor, I played in a $25 two-deck game in the baccarat pit. Two or three high rollers from the East played at my table. One of these high rollers claimed that he had won $27,000 in one night at Foxwoods (a mostly lousy penetration, eight-deck Connecticut casino, which I scouted but never played in). On one hand this player stood on a 15 versus a seven (in a neutral deck—though I new he wasn’t counting). This player and his friends must have gone through $5000 each in the time I played. I also did poorly, though my losses, and bets, were for far less.-$726.50

February 28 Totals: +$1,126, 5 ½ hours

I was happy with the results of my first day of play, but realize that my results are totally insignificant from a statistical point of view.

I know well that my trip winnings WILL NOT average $200 an hour as they did today. Still, sleep came easily at my apartment. This is typical for me after a winning day.

March 1

Session One. Riviera. 1:15-2:15 pm. Day shift. 2 decks.

I slept in late today. Most days, I’ll probably start earlier.

Penetration continues to be bad here. Plus, almost all of the few times that I had good counts, I lost. I never went past two hands lf $100. No heat for me today.-$864

Session Two. Golden Nugget. 3:40-4:40 pm. Day shift. 1 and 6 decks.

Before I started my Nugget play, I stopped in Leroy’s, my favorite sports book, across the street. I checked out the NBA lines. If I was betting the NBA, I suspect I’d bet the Knicks tonight. The Knicks have gone 0-3 on their four game West Coast trip and tonight’s game in Sacramento is their last and best chance to get a win on this trip. The game opened with the Knicks a 4 ½ point favorite and has now reached 6. Thus, I know that some big bettors feel the same way.

I realize that it would be dumb for me to bet this game since I am not following the league closely enough. I have not kept power ratings or anything else that would tell me if 6—or even the opening line of 4 ½–is too low or high.

Without such an anchor, betting basketball, or any sport, is a losing proposition. It’s like guessing in blackjack play—the act of a dumb gambler. My days of closely following the NBA now seem like 100 years ago.

At the Nugget, I ended my four session losing streak and also won in this casino for the first time in three tries. I played mostly single-deck with two shoes mixed in. In the single-deck, I was a little suspicious of how closely Lana held the cards to her chest. Later, I observed her and could always see the top card coming off the deck. Though I believe that blackjack cheating by dealers in Vegas is extremely rare, I am always alert to the possibility. At the end of my session, I played a little against Lana and added about $100 to my winnings for the session.+$466.50

Session Three. MGM. 10:30-11:40 pm. Swing shift. 6 decks.

After watching the Knicks pull away late in their covering 100-88 win, I left the Stardust—where I’d watched the game—and drove up the Strip to the MGM. And, no, I didn’t second guess my not betting the NBA.

I had my wildest blackjack session so far. The blackjack roller coaster was in full swing!

I first fell behind by over $800 in the first half hour—losing most of it in one high-count shoe in which I won very few hands. The pit observed me closely during my losing streak.

After this loss I decided, during a bathroom trip, to risk another $1000 plus in this decent penetration and uncrowded game. At first, I lost another couple of hundred dollars with one other player at the table. When this player left and I had head-on play, the tide turned—big time! The turnaround began with a four bet winner on a multiple split of threes (a very lucky win since splitting threes is a DEFENSIVE move, in which a player is trying to cut losses) when the dealer busted. In the next shoe, the count skyrocketed to a true count of plus eight. On the big bets, I won nearly every hand with dealer busts and my blackjacks being the key. At the end of the shoe—after a loss and a lowering of the count—it was natural to cut back to $25 bets. Because of this cutback, I decided to play one more shoe (I often will leave a casino if I am betting very high—two hands of $200—at the end of one shoe, since a small bet at the start of the next shoe is often seen as the sign of a card counter.)

Despite this late cutback, I had over a $2000 plus turnaround. Nothing spectacular happened in the final shoe.+$1067.50

Session Four. Flamingo Hilton. 12:40-1:40 am. Swing shift. 2 decks.

Crummy penetration continues to exist in this joint. I hopped around to find uncrowded conditions.-$268.50

Session Five. Rio. 2:20-3:05 am. Swing shift. 1 deck.

Because of my great session here yesterday—though it was on a different shift—I felt a little paranoid coming here. To give the pit bosses the “right” impression, I found some used keno tickets elsewhere in the casino before I sat down, and I bemoaned my “losses” in that sucker game. My keno ruse and my falling behind early by over $700 kept all eyes and heat away from me. I not only battled back to win, but also got a coffee shop comp from the pit boss.+$90

Session Six. Golden Nugget. 4:10-4:45 am. Graveyard shift. 2 decks.

Just as yesterday, I got walloped in the two-deck baccarat area game. Last year, the Nugget sometimes had $10 two-deck games in this pit, and I lost every time but once there then. Must be a jinx!

Unlike last night, I played almost the whole time by myself and thus lost faster. I don’t believe that I ever had over a $200 winning streak in this session. When my losses got close to $1000 for the session, I decided to quit for the session and the day.-$966.50

March 1 Totals: -$475, 5 ½ hours.

Week One Card Counting Totals: +$651

Time: 11 hours

As I well know, losing days at blackjack card counting are far from uncommon. I also know that I’ll have days on this trip far worse than the $475 I dropped today. ♠

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Did Jess Marcum Invent Card Counting?

Jess Marcum, Mathematical Genius, and the History of Card Counting

by Allan Schaffer, Ph.D.
(From Blackjack Forum Volume XXIV #3, Summer 2005)
© 2005 Blackjack Forum

[Editor’s Note: The thing that keeps striking me about Jess Marcum is the depth and intensity of respect and loyalty to him of the people who actually knew him and his achievements.

Marcum didn’t go for publicity or fame—he avoided it. He never published anything about his pioneering blackjack system. Yet 13 years after his death and over 50 years after his major accomplishments in card counting, he’s still vividly remembered by the professional gamblers who were active in Las Vegas then as the smart guy who figured it out, as well as to his later friends.

We are going to be documenting the history of those early days of card counting by publishing more articles on and by these early players in future issues of Blackjack Forum–Arnold Snyder]

Introduction to Jess Marcum and the History of Card Counting

Jess Marcum, card counting pioneerJess Marcum developed a basic strategy for blackjack and was counting cards a decade before anyone else. Why is it then that not many of the members of today’s gambling community have heard of him? The reason is basically because he was a very private person. In addition, throughout his active gambling career he endeavored to keep his accomplishments secret to protect the opportunities he had discovered.

I am one of the few people who know much of the story. We were close friends for the last 15 years of his life and were also coworkers and partners for extended periods during that time. I had a number of opportunities to ask him questions about his adventures in casino gambling and his answers are the basis for much of this article.

My reasons for writing the article are both to augment the history of blackjack and to correct or verify, as the case may be, some of the things that have been written about Jess.

Jess Marcum at Rand Corporation

Jess Ira Marcum (originally Marcovitch) was born in Knoxville, Tennessee on December 30, 1919. His father had emigrated from Russia in 1904 at the age of 14 and was an entomologist and professor at the University of Tennessee. His mother, a librarian, had come from Austria in 1902. Both were fluent in Yiddish.

There is little evidence in what is known about his early life to suggest that he was destined to become a genius in mathematical analysis. He graduated from college as an electrical engineer about 1940 and went to work for the Westinghouse Corporation in Pittsburgh. His duties later took him to England. After the war he studied for a Ph.D., I believe, at Princeton University, but quit because he lost patience with formal education (perhaps a sign of genius).

In 1947 he joined the highly respected Rand Corporation think-tank located at Santa Monica, California. He was not a founder of Rand, as reported in some articles, but by solving extremely difficult problems that no one else could, he became Rand’s preeminent mathematician with an international reputation. This was an astonishing accomplishment in view of the fact he had only a BS degree and Rand was loaded with brainpower and Ph.D. mathematicians. His genius had emerged.

His principal interest at Rand was statistical physics with emphasis on nuclear radiation propagation, nuclear effects and the processing of electromagnetic wave data. His premiere accomplishment was formulating the original equations for calculating the radar backscatter from a steady target in a noisy background, the so-called signal-to-noise ratio on which all radar design is based. Since the government classified this work as secret, it was many years before the scientific literature could acknowledge it as the Marcum equation.

Thus, his two premiere mathematical accomplishments in life—supplying the formulation for radar design and beating blackjack with card counting—were not widely known. However, this lack of (deserved) fame did not bother Jess at all. He was content with solving problems that others could not and beating the odds.

Marcum Leaves Rand for Gambling

Jess became enchanted with the mathematical analysis of casino gambling around 1949. A few years later he left California for the casino world and lived in that environment for the next 15 to 20 years. Although he still consulted on scientific matters, gambling activities consumed most of his time. Later in this article I will relate what he told me about his blackjack adventures during this period.

Sometime in the late 1960’s or early 1970’s Jess moved back to California and again made scientific work his principal activity. However, he continued to be in high demand as a consultant to both the gambling industry and to gaming commissions. For his scientific habitat in California he joined a company named RDA, formed mostly by ex-Rand luminaries. It was there that I met Jess. We worked together at RDA for a number of years and starting in 1977 were partners in a gambling-related sideline adventure that lasted for almost a decade.

In the late 1980’s Jess became addicted to the sleeping pill Halcion and it almost killed him. Some of the side effects were deep depression, difficulty in concentrating, and physical deterioration. Relatives and friends, myself included, tried unsuccessfully to convince him to seek medical help. Finally one friend literally forced him to go to a hospital and, once there, he made a remarkably fast and almost complete recovery.

He then moved to Reno, his favorite place, where he spent the last few years of his life living in a hotel. In 1990 he briefly returned to casino consulting in an episode so spectacular that it made the front page of the Wall Street Journal. His efforts rescued the Trump Plaza Casino from a mysterious “whale” who had, in a previous visit, won six million dollars at baccarat. I will give some more information about this episode near the end of the present article.

Jess died from natural causes in Reno at the age of 72. He had been dead for several days when his body was discovered in his room by a hotel employee. His death certificate is dated January 16, 1992.

Jess Marcum Invents Card Counting

What I know about Jess and blackjack comes directly from his answers to my questions. It was not his manner to volunteer information about his exploits, but I was curious and he answered each of my queries straightforwardly. In retrospect I wish that I had asked more questions.

You may be wondering why he gave me this information when, to my knowledge, he never provided it to anyone else. The reason is probably that our close relationship came late in his career when his casino playing days were long over.

One day in 1949 a coworker at Rand, who often visited Las Vegas on weekends to gamble, talked Jess into accompanying him on one of these trips. At that time Jess knew little about casino gambling. He spent this first visit to Las Vegas observing the various games, particularly blackjack, which at that time was played with a single deck dealt down to the last card.

On the drive back to California he shared with his friend the (then startling) observation that, if one were to keep track of the cards previously dealt from the blackjack deck, one would have a significant advantage at the end. In fact, one could know exactly what the last card was going to be. He said that he was going to analyze this situation and felt obliged to offer his friend the opportunity to join him. His friend declined. I believe that this was the only time that Jess ever considered partnering with anyone in blackjack.

Jess carried out his analysis of blackjack with only pencil, paper and his mathematical genius. Jess never used a computer to solve a problem; in fact he was, by choice, computer illiterate. He solved everything analytically; that is, he derived equations to obtain his answers. In some cases, once he had derived the relevant equations, he might have an associate carry out any ensuing routine calculations on a computational machine of some type, but in the case of blackjack, I do not believe that even this secondary association with such machines occurred.

The equations that he developed for blackjack produced both a strategy for betting and algorithms for recording the running card count and translating the results into an actionable assessment. To my knowledge his notes have not survived, but it is safe to say that his feat has never been duplicated, since subsequent blackjack analyses have largely been based on computer simulations whereby many thousands of hands are played to analyze each situation statistically.

Jess determined that his overall advantage against the casinos was about 3%, a number within the range of later results quoted for computer simulations with similar systems.

When Jess moved full force on the Las Vegas casinos in the early 1950’s, they literally never knew what hit them. He was aware that counting cards was tedious and that realizing the fruits of a 3% advantage required many long and patient hours, but he also knew that the outcome was a certainty.

He won steadily. He tried to be as inconspicuous as he could, but before too long he began to attract the attention of casino management. The pit bosses hovered over him continuously, but, although it was evident to them that he had a never-before-seen winning method, they had no idea as to how he was accomplishing this feat.

Nine months passed and they were still baffled. Finally in desperation the Las Vegas casinos joined together and banned him from further play. He might be the first person ever banned anywhere for simply being too good at gambling. No one knows how much money he won during this, or any of his subsequent, blackjack ventures.

After Las Vegas the next target area was Reno. The story was the same. He won steadily and the casinos were completely befuddled. After six months, desperate, they engaged a detective, who shortly after uncovered Jess’s Las Vegas exploits. Of course the Reno casinos immediately banned him.

He then moved on to various other casino locations. One place that he mentioned was Hot Springs, Arkansas, at that time a gambling hotbed. Another was Havana. Although I never personally discussed with him any details of his Havana venture, Sam Cohen (whose biography of Jess I will deal with later) reports seeing a clipping from the front page of the Miami Herald that described Jess’s triumph in Havana.

Jess Marcum and Ed Thorp

I was surprised one day when Jess made a less than complimentary remark about the blackjack analyses of Dr. Edward Thorp, who wrote the classic book Beat the Dealer published in 1962. The problem, as Jess expressed it to me, was that Thorp had to use computer simulations to solve a problem that Jess had solved analytically a decade earlier. i

This criticism has always seemed unfair to me in view of the fact that Jess had chosen to keep his own work secret. In any event Jess said that he had no quarrel with the correctness of Thorp’s results and that they were consistent with his own.

Jess also told me that he had tried unsuccessfully via an emissary to dissuade Thorp from publishing the bookii. When I asked Jess why he cared, since I was under the impression that he had exploited all of the available opportunities, he growled back “there was still the Caribbean”. He meant that he had not as yet visited the Caribbean casinos, and in fact he never did. Apparently, however, he had covered all of the casinos in the U.S. as well as Havana and perhaps elsewhere.

Upon the publication of Thorp’s book, Jess chose to end his own active blackjack career. Beating the casinos had been his private province for about a decade, and he was no longer interested when the winning techniques became available to the public.

Although Dr. Thorp did not personally know Jess (out of courtesy he referred to him only as “the little dark-haired guy from Southern California”), he does include in his book a few of the stories about Jess that have circulated around the gambling world. Only one of these stories is, I believe, factual; namely that Jess was the sole player to have been barred from blackjack in Las Vegas up until that time.

Marcum and Ruchman

Peter Ruchman, in his year 2000 column entitled “How BJ Card Counting Really Started” and his follow-up 2001 column entitled “Thorp Steps Up to the Plate,” purports, among other things, to recount Jess’s blackjack adventures. Although Ruchman does properly deduce that Jess was the first person to calculate a Basic Strategy, his deduction is based on the idea that Jess was able to use a high powered computer for this purpose.

Ruchman says that Jess fed thousands of punch cards through an IBM 704 computer to develop his blackjack strategy, which he subsequently shared with a small group of Las Vegas gambling friends to form a winning consortium. What Ruchman wrote is very different from the account that Jess gave me. In particular, Jess took pride in the fact that he had developed his system mathematically.

Jess Marcum and Sam Cohen

Sam Cohen, who was a coworker and sometime friend of Jess’s, wrote Jess’s only biography, which he titled The Automat—Jess Marcum, Gambling Genius of the Century. One reason for my writing the present article is to comment on Cohen’s book.

It is unfortunate that his biography was written by a man who felt extremely hostile to Jess. The book contains many interesting facts and anecdotes about Jess. However, Cohen’s statements that Jess became sadistic, psychotic, and ultimately committed suicide are completely at odds with my experience and with the testimony of all of his friends and associates with whom I conferred. Jess did have some quirks, such as being exceedingly tight with money, but nothing that any of us considered highly abnormal.

I can think of two reasons why Cohen came to hate him. One is that Jess needled Cohen incessantly. The incentive for this needling probably stemmed from Jess’s intense interest in psychiatry, which rivaled his interest in mathematics. His psychiatric self training led him to analyze each of his acquaintances and then to treat them as he concluded that they deserved to be treated. He evidently concluded that Cohen deserved to be needled, but I know of no other person, regardless of status, that Jess treated uncongenially.

The other reason for Cohen’s animosity probably resulted from the strong motherly affection that Cohen’s wife displayed for Jess. She continually looked after Jess despite Cohen’s objections. When Jess went through his disastrous times with Halcion, Cohen’s wife and I, unknown to each other, were both with him a lot and concluded independently that his problems, which were severe, were almost entirely due to the pills. By Jess’s own statement to me later, 90% of his problems disappeared when he finally ended his addiction to the pills.

From the gambling viewpoint there are several apparent fallacies in Cohen’s book. He states that it “is meant to be a tale mainly about the life and exploits of Jess in the world of gambling”. However, Cohen’s account differs greatly from what Jess told me.

Moreover, as I will explain, some of what Cohen thought he knew appears to be based on disinformation. Cohen states that Jess’s original gambling accomplishment was the development of a system that won at horse racing, and that he moved to Las Vegas to exploit this system, was successful and “became the first horse better in Las Vegas history to be barred from betting”.

In actuality, Jess was not an expert in horse racing, nor was it ever really a major focus of his interest. However he did, while at Rand, develop two short-lived schemes that made him some money at horse racing.

One scheme involved using the suggested odds from a newspaper handicapper, which Jess determined could show a profit. This endeavor was terminated after a year or two by the death of the newspaper handicapper.

The other scheme involved win/show anomalies. By peering into the totelizator control room, Jess would surreptitiously observe the win and show pools at certain tracks where, at that time, this information was not displayed publicly on the tote boards. Whenever he detected a gross disparity in the wagering pools, he would make sizeable show bets.

Jess apparently used these two modest ventures in horse racing to mislead Cohen and others at Rand into believing that he was off to Vegas to play the races. Of course, he was going there to play his never-before-seen system for beating blackjack.

Cohen devotes just one page of his book to Jess’s blackjack adventures. He briefly summarizes what he had gleaned, or surmised, about Jess’s various exploits and states that Jess’s major forays were bankrolled by some big time gambling friends. This statement rings untrue to me. Jess was never in need of money and definitely not the type to share his gambling knowledge or winnings with anyone. I think that Cohen was again the victim of disinformation—this time to shield information about the magnitude of Jess’s winnings from others.

Cohen also says that while in Las Vegas Jess became a magnificent poker player. This statement too does not agree with what Jess told me. He said that, although he did play some in the big games in Las Vegas, he soon concluded that he was inherently not good enough to compete with the very top players and therefore lost interest in the game. [Editor’s note: This was a period when cheating was widespread in the poker rooms.]

Poker did not fall within Jess’s characterization of a potentially playable gamble because he could not definitively calculate the outcome. He gambled seriously only when he could calculate a positive return.

Jess Marcum’s Final Triumph

Although the vast majority of Jess Marcum’s gambling income came from playing blackjack, his gambling studies were certainly not limited to blackjack; in fact, he analyzed almost all of the common gambling games and devices from sports books to slot machines. In the various sports books he capitalized on occasional miscalculations by the oddsmakers. With regard to slot machines, his expertise in their statistics and fluctuations led the Nevada Gaming Commission to call on him often as a consultant.

It was principally in this role as consultant to the industry that Jess continued his association with gambling long after his active blackjack days were over. Very late in his life he gained national notoriety from a consulting assignment that he undertook for Donald Trump and his associates in Atlantic City, as I will discuss briefly next.

On June 28, 1990 Jess called me from his hotel in Reno and mentioned that there was an article concerning him on that day’s front page of The Wall Street Journal. It was entitled “Tale of a Whale: Mysterious Gambler Wins, Loses Millions” and it describes how Jess saved the Trump Plaza Casino from a mysterious gambler who, in his previous visit there, had won $6 million at baccarat.

This exciting story (it even includes a murder) was later masterfully researched and recounted by David Johnston in his book Temples of Chance, chapters 1 and 24. Johnston provides a realistic insight into the working of Jess’s mind as Jess combines his mathematical prowess with his (self-taught) psychiatric skill to harpoon the Whale.

In view of these extensive previous accounts of this episode, I am only going to summarize briefly Jess’s part in it. He described the whole thing rather succinctly to me. He said that in winning the first $6 million, the Whale had simply not played enough hands (700) to have a high probability of losing. Therefore, Jess advised the Trump people to just “let him play.” Although they were very nervous about following this advice, they did and ultimately the Whale lost $9.4 million.

I learned from the written accounts cited above that there were two key components to Jess’s analysis of this problem. First, he calculated that if the Whale could be enticed into playing 5000 hands or so, he would have only about a 15% chance of winning. However, since the Whale made a practice of quitting suddenly if he was winning significantly, a scheme was needed to ensure that he would not quit early.

Based on observing the Whale’s mannerisms at the gaming table, Jess concluded that the Whale would readily agree to a double-or-nothing rule; that is, play would end only when the gambler had either doubled his bankroll or lost it all. Jess calculated that the Whale was five times as likely to lose his bankroll as he was to double it.

As Jess (via his “psychoanalysis”) had predicted, the Whale agreed to the double-or-nothing rule. Play proceeded and, of course, turned out precisely as Jess had predicted. After 5,056 hands, the Whale had lost $9.4 million (84% of his bankroll). At that point, he quit in a huff.

Finale

After his Atlantic City triumph Jess returned to Reno and contented himself with exploiting sportsbook betting anomalies that sometimes arose due to calculational inaccuracies by the oddsmakers. He died suddenly less than two years after his return to Reno.

His epitaph should read mathematical genius and gambling legend. The scientific literature abundantly attests to the former. My hope is that this article will cement the latter. ♠


i Jess may possibly have been unaware of the early analytical work performed by Dr. Thorp prior to his resorting to the computer.

ii Dr. Thorp has informed me that he has no recollection of being contacted by an emissary from Jess Marcum.

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Is Card Counting Legal?

Or . . . Is it Legal to Think in Casinos?

by Arnold Snyder

(From The Intelligent Gambler , April 1997)
© Arnold Snyder 1997

If you’re the type of person who lets the word out among your friends and acquaintances that you are a serious blackjack player — one of those notorious “card counters” — you may have noticed that quite a number of people, upon discovering this character flaw of yours, will cock their heads and say, with a disapproving grimace, “Oh . . . Is that legal?”

In the twenty years that I’ve been a professional gambler — writing about the game of blackjack for seventeen of them — I have been asked this question at least a hundred times. It still flusters me.

My immediate response, which is always something on the line of, “Of course, it’s legal! Card counting is just thinking while you’re playing. How can it be illegal to think?” is usually met with something on the line of, “Oh . . . The casinos let you do that?”

This always steams me, the suggestion that I must first get “permission” from the casinos to think while I play. But I usually say something like, “Well, if they know you’re counting the cards while you play, they’ll throw you out . . . But it’s not illegal to count cards.”

“I see . . . ” they say, obviously seeing nothing.

With most people, this is the end of the conversation. But a handful of intrepid souls will want to probe deeper into this curious avocation of mine. At this point, I’ll find myself knowledgeably discussing the innkeepers’ right to refuse service to anyone. I’ll expound upon how the trespassing laws are utilized in Nevada to eliminate card counters from the blackjack tables, as opposed to New Jersey — where innkeepers’ rights don’t extend to the blackjack tables. The Atlantic City casinos generally use more frequent shuffling, and various methods of restricting bets, to foil card counters.

I’ve also received disturbing reports that truly persistent card counters are sometimes arrested for “creating disturbances,” so that the local trespassing laws may then be applied. Some blackjack players have gone to court over these issues.

From here, the conversation inevitably turns to the extraordinary surveillance methods the casinos typically use to identify players as card counters, and the extraordinary methods card counters resort to in order to hide their identities, and their level of skill, from the casinos.

Recently, an hour or so into such a conversation, the woman I was talking with said in an exasperated voice, “Why didn’t you just admit it in the first place: Card counting is illegal!”

“It’s not illegal,” I insisted. “This is America! They can’t make it illegal to think!”

“Who are you kidding?” she asked in all seriousness. “You admit that you have to hide it from the casinos, and that once they know you can do it, they put your picture in a ‘mug book’ that gets circulated to the other casinos, so that you have to wear a disguise and get fake I.D. if you want to keep playing. But, if they see through your disguise, they can have you arrested for trespassing. So, obviously, the police are on the casinos’ side, as are the courts. And you’re saying it’s not illegal? You’re like a cat burglar trying to convince someone it’s not illegal to break-and-enter, provided you don’t get caught.”

“It’s not the same thing at all!” I protested. “A burglar is stealing someone’s property. A card counter is following all the rules of the game, as set by the casino, just like any other player at the table. He’s just thinking, that’s all. He’s not stealing anything.”

She thought about this for a moment, then said, “Obviously, there’s one rule you’re breaking.”

“What’s that?” I asked.

“You’re not allowed to think while you play,” she said matter-of-factly.

Unfortunately, matter-of-factly, she’s right.

When I was a kid, my father worked for IBM. He was a computer salesman back in the 1950’s when the only computers were garage-sized mainframes used by the few huge businesses that could afford them. On his desk at home, he always had a small wooden placard that read: “Think.” It was the motto of Thomas J. Watson, president and founder of IBM. On the few occasions I accompanied my father to his office in downtown Detroit, I saw these placards all over. Think. Think. Think.

Perhaps the casinos should adopt a similar placard they could set on each blackjack table, right next to the betting limit sign, a placard that says: “Don’t Think.” Or, maybe they could just append these words to the rules sign: “Double down on any two original cards. Split and resplit any pair, except aces. Split aces receive only one card each. No thinking.”

Or, as Descartes once said: “I think, therefore I can’t play blackjack.” ♠

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Insurance Oddity Solved

Blackjack Insurance on Good Hands May Be A Good Idea After All

by Peter A. Griffin
(From Blackjack Forum Volume VIII #2, December 1988)
© Blackjack Forum 1988

[Note from Arnold Snyder: In the December issue of Blackjack Forum (Vol. VII #4), Marvin L. Master conjectured that if your card counting system indicated that the insurance bet was dead even, it may be advisable to insure a “good” hand, since this play would tend to reduce fluctuation. Marvin’s logic is clear. If the dealer does have a blackjack, then you will lose a bet you expected to win. Taking insurance would save this bet on one third of these hands, and on those hands where the insurance bet loses, you still expect to win your initial “good” hand. Thus, bankroll fluctuations are reduced.

Here now, to lay this controversy to rest, is Peter Griffin’s final word on whether and when you should take insurance on “good” blackjack hands. More probably, this article will give nightmares to players who consider attempting to work out Griffin’s insurance formula when playing.

Griffin shows that it is sometimes advisable to insure good hands—in order to reduce fluctuations—even when the insurance bet has a negative expectation! Unfortunately, most dealers only allow a couple of seconds for the insurance decision. So, the simplest answer is: Marvin was right! Insure your good hands when it’s a dead even bet.]

Marvin L. Master asks the question: Should you, to reduce fluctuations, insure a good hand when precisely one third of the unplayed cards are tens?

The answer depends upon what criterion for “reducing fluctuations” has been adopted. Griffin, in his monumental epic The Theory of Blackjack, shows that there are occasions when a Kelly proportional bettor would insure a natural with less than one third of the unplayed cards being tens.

Theoretically, this criterion could also be used to analyze whether to insure 20 and other favorable holdings. However, the answer is dependent upon both the fraction of capital bet and the distribution of the non-tens remaining in the deck.

An approximate calculation based upon what would seem a reasonable assumption in this regard suggested that 20 should be insured, but 19 not. Precise probabilities for the dealer were not computed, and the answer could well change if they were, or if a different fraction than assumed were wagered.

Another, more tractable, principle to reduce fluctuations also appears in The Theory of Blackjack: When confronted with two courses of action with identical expectations (the insurance bet here is hypothesized to neither increase nor decrease expectation), prefer that one which reduces the variance, hence average square, of the result.

This proves particularly easy to apply here. Let W, L and T stand for the probabilities of winning, losing, and tying the hand assuming insurance is not taken. In this case the average squared result is

ENx2 = 1 – T

If insurance is taken the average square becomes

EIx2 = 1/3 02 + W(1/2)2 + T(-1/2)2 + (L-1/3)(-3/2)2 = (W + T + 9L – 3)/4

Insurance will have a smaller average square if

W + T + 9L – 3 < 4 – 4T

Equivalently

W + 5T + 9L < 7

Or, subtracting

5(W + T + L) = 54L – 4W < 2L – W < .5L < W + .5

This will clearly be the case for player totals of 20, 19, 18, 11, 10, 9 and 8 if the dealer stands on soft 17. If the dealer hits soft 17, 18 would probably still be insurable, but not 8.

Returning to the Kelly criterion, the interested reader would be well advised to consult Joel Friedman’s “Risk-Averse” card counting and basic strategy modifications. Among Joel’s astute observations is that if a player confronts an absolute pick ’em hit-stand decision he should hit rather than stand. The reason is that he thereby trades an equal number of wins, (+1)2, and losses, (-1)2, for pushes, (0)2, thus reducing fluctuation. ♠

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An Insurance Oddity

Blackjack Insurance on Good Hands?

by Marvin L. Masters
(From Blackjack Forum Volume VII #4, December 1987)
© Blackjack Forum 1987

Should you insure a good blackjack hand? Blackjack gurus ridicule this question, replying that insurance is a side bet that has nothing to do with the player’s hand. They say if you’re counting cards and know that more than one-third of the unseen cards are ten-valued then you insure; if less, you don’t.

But what if the tens make up exactly one-third of the unseen cards? That makes the 2 to 1 insurance payoff exactly right, with no advantage to the casino or blackjack player. At first glance it seems that taking insurance in this case is wrong. It’s like taking the odds in craps; you increase your bankroll fluctuations without any long run gain.

But wait. Let’s look at the statement that the insurance bet has nothing to do with the original bet. This is not true, because correlation is involved, and that is important when making your blackjack insurance decision.

Correlation and the Blackjack Insurance Decision

If you have a natural, the correlation is perfectly negative, -1.0. Whichever bet wins, the other loses. If you do not have a natural but the dealer does, then the negative correlation is also perfect: You lose the original bet and collect on the insurance.

But what if neither you nor the dealer has a natural? Now the correlation between the lost insurance bet and the result of the original bet depends on the quality of your hand. If you have a 20, the correlation will be highly negative: The insurance bet is lost, and the original bet will probably win. With a 16, however, the correlation will be positive: The insurance bet loses, and the original bet will probably lose too.

These correlations lead to some interesting conclusions when there are exactly one-third tens in the deck. If you have a natural, then taking insurance should be automatic. It costs you nothing in the long run, and reduces bankroll fluctuation.

If you have a 20, it seems to me that the decision should be the same. You will probably win the hand if you lose the insurance, so insuring to reduce fluctuation seems like a good idea.

With a 16, however, bankroll fluctuation is increased, not decreased, by the blackjack insurance bet. I speculate that a player hand of 11, 19, or 20 should take the blackjack insurance bet, but other blackjack hands should not. Do any mathematicians out there care to comment? ♠

[Note from Arnold Snyder: Yes, Peter Griffin did care to comment. You can see his response by clicking here.]

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Insurance Camouflage for Card Counters

Can You Disguise Your Insurance Bet?

by Jake Smallwood
[From Blackjack Forum Vol. VIII #2, June 1988]
© 1988 Blackjack Forum

After a recent blackjack trip I was chastised by my teammates. They objected to the fact that, as a part of my card counting camouflage, I was taking insurance on everything but my minimum bet. The consensus was that I had fallen into “idiot” camouflage. I decided to get an idea of what my insurance yield should be and just how much I was giving up with my insurance camouflage plays. Most of my card-counting play (that particular trip) was on double deck blackjack games using the Hi-Lo count with a 1 to 20 spread ($10 to two hands of $100 actually). My betting scale is proportional only in the sense that my top bet is about half Kelly in size after accounting for two-hand covariance.

In order to simplify, I decided to set up three schedules of count per deck (true count) with the assumption that one deck of the two had been played. One schedule was developed with the quantity of each card type (plus, minus, zero valued cards) held constant for each table.

Of course, the sample would have been much more representative if I had prepared tables that took each group of cards with normal density, half normal density, and one-and-a-half normal. But that would be a lot of work and would require weighting by the probability of occurrence of each of the nine subsets. After all, I only wanted an indication, not a high-precision answer.

For all tables I assumed that 20% of the minus-valued cards (tens and aces) were aces. The result was a “profile” of a 52-card remainder for the counts between plus and minus six. I had some old frequency distribution approximations around which I used to weight for the occurrence of each count in the table. The insurance result was tabulated for each of the 52 cards in the remainder to estimate the edge at that count for that type of remainder subset.

The traditional blackjack player who insures at +3 or more count per deck would make about a 2.5% profit on insurance action. With a 20 to 1 spread the “insure all” approach would about break even.

The way I have been playing costs me about 15% of my potential insurance edge.

Actually, the cost is less since at +2 I am betting at two greens but only taking two reds of insurance. The pit knows I can’t be bothered taking more insurance with only two green out. I assume also that there is some element of risk aversion in the sense of fluctuation leveling with taking some negative expectation insurance. Any such effect is ignored.

Now, with my dumb style of play, I often get the pit personnel urging me to bet at 40 to 1 ratios and more. Well, what do you think? Based on the evidence, should I give up my idiot insurance camouflage?
[Snyder comments: It’s easy to see what Jake has done here and why his idiot camouflage works so well. Since he never insures his minimum bets, he doesn’t take insurance at those times when the house has its largest insurance advantage-at low counts. Since he always insures all bets above minimum, he always takes insurance when he has the advantage on these hands (high counts). The hands on which he took the insurance bet when the count was too low for this to be the proper play would for the most part be close to the “borderline” for taking insurance. Very little is actually given up on these incorrect insurance bets.

As a card counting camouflage strategy, Jake’s psychology is sound. Many gamblers and high rollers ignore insurance on insignificant bets. They seem to consider it a waste of time to insure piddling amounts of money.]
Insurance Return for Three Styles

Insure All Approach
Cards ConstantActionReturn%
7,8,9496.0-6.37-1.28
2, 3, 4, 5, 6496.045.589.18
10, Ace496.0-38.19-7.29
 14488.01.02.21
Insure +3 or More (Traditional)
Cards ConstantAction (a)Return (b)%
7, 8, 9380.02.86-.75
2, 3, 4, 5, 6380.056.1814.78
10, Ace380.0-29.26-7.71
 380.029.782.61
Insure All Except Minimum (My Style)
Cards ConstantAction (c)Return (d)%
7, 8, 9427.5.86.20
2, 3, 4, 5, 6427.556.8913.31
10, Ace427.5-32.92-7.70
 1282.524.831.94

Notes

  1. Sum count per deck of 3 to 6+.
  2. Cumulative win for count per deck of 3 or more.
  3. Sum count per deck 2 or more.
  4. Cumulative win for count per deck of 2 or more. ♠