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The Blackjack Dealer Was Flashing

Hole Card Tips for Beginners

By Arnold Snyder
(From Card Player, July 28, 1995)
© 1995 Arnold Snyder

Question from a Reader: Last week, the blackjack dealer against whom I was playing kept flashing her hole card in my direction. She wasn’t doing it on purpose; it was just the way she angled the hole card up as she slid it beneath her other card.

The only time that I could really tell what she had with certainty was when it was a facecard, because of all the colors. Most of my other reads were wrong.

I took insurance once when I thought that I saw an ace, but it turned out to be a three. I also mistook a five for an eight or nine once, and hit a hand that I really should have sttod on (thinking that she had a pat hand).

Probably the weirdest play I made was when I hit a hard 17 (and busted, of course), but it was the right play because I definitely saw a face card go underneath her nine up. One of the other players at the table got up and left when I took that hit!

I played against her for about two hours, and pretty much broke even. My bad plays due to my incorrect reads canceled out what I made from my good plays, when I clearly saw the face card.

I’m tempted to look for this dealer again very soon, but my reading ability leaves much to be desired. Do you have any suggestions on how I could take advantage of her more profitably? Also, are you sure this isn’t cheating? Could I be arrested for playing this way?

Answer from Arnold Snyder: Ever since blackjack has been played in casinos, sloppy dealers like the one you found have been taken advantage of by smart players. Professional gamblers refer to this type of dealer as a “front loader”, because the hole card is loaded beneath the upcard from the front by tipping the card up toward the player at the middle of the table. Dealers can also tip the card to either side at some point before loading it beneath the top card.

Dealers are taught specifically not to tilt their hole cards in this manner, or to shield the card with a hand during loading, precisely because a smart player can get a big edge if he or she knows what to do with such information. The precise edge available depends on what percentage of the time you’re able to read the hole card, how accurately you’re able to read it, how well you know what to do with the info, and how much you are willing to vary your playing strategy to take advantage of the info.

James Grosjean has run extensive analyses to figure out the best way to play hole card information under various degrees of certainty about your read. Much of his analysis is available in his book Beyond Counting. In addition, Norm Wattenberger’s Casino Verite software now has the ability to run extensive hole card simulations.

Other authors who have written extensively about hole card strategies are Stanford Wong, in his 1978 book Winning Without Counting, and Ken Uston in his 1981 book Million Dollar Blackjack.

If you run into a dealer who is flashing his hole card, and you haven’t had a chance yet to study all the nuances of proper strategy, here is a simple emergency strategy to use.

Down and Dirty Emergency Hole Card Strategy

First, forget normal basic strategy. You’re no longer basing your play on the dealer’s upcard. You’re basing your play on the total of the dealer’s hand, which you always assume (for playing purposes) will get hit with a ten if the dealer needs to hit.

If you know that the dealer is going to be standing, it should be clear to you, based on both your total and hers, what you should be doing with your hand. The only question is whether you think it’s wise to hit a hard 17 or higher.

If you know the dealer is stiff, you should definitely stand on all your stiffs, even if his upcard is a ten. The hand total is all that matters.

Also, if the dealer is stiff, you should double down and split pairs more frequently. You want to get more money on the table when the dealer is more likely to bust. If you can get away with splitting tens, do it. Double down on all soft totals.

If you know the dealer’s hand totals 7 to 11, you should hit your stiffs regardless of his upcard.

Again, this is a simple emergency strategy for when you run into a flasher but aren’t prepared. If you have ambitions to play blackjack hole cards professionally, you’ll need all the information you can get from the above-listed books.

And there is one more thing you should know if you’re going to try to take advantage of a hole card flasher–if the dealer can see you watching for the flash, she is going to very quickly correct her mistake herself.

Is Blackjack Hole Card Play Legal?

As long as you are merely taking advantage of the dealer’s natural sloppiness, and are not colluding with the dealer to flash her hole card to you (that is, paying her to show it to you), you are not cheating. [For comments on this issue from an attorney, see Blackjack Hole Card Play and the Law: Is Spooking Legal?, in the BJF Library.]

The danger of using hole card strategies, however, is that the weird plays you make might cause the casino to believe that you are colluding with the dealer. For a better idea of what can happen when a casino believes you’re cheating, even when you’re not, see James Grosjean’s article A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Forum, as well as Richard Munchkin’s Interview with RC (RC is one of the all-time great hole-card players).

What To Do When You’re Not Sure of Your Read

It’s a lot more difficult to find flashers these days than it used to be, because casinos are much more aware of the professional players who specialize in these games. That actually tends to work out to the benefit of professional players, who have the skills to read more difficult flashes. More subtle flashes mean the pros can exploit these games a lot longer, as the casino tends not to find subtle dealer error as quickly.

Professional players are able to deal with more difficult flashes because they have spent so many hours dealing with this sort of thing. Like anything else, you get better with practice. I have a hole card practice device in my office that I’ve shared with various players that increases your skill more rapidly–it’s essentially a card funnel attached to a viewer, which you use to flash cards past your field of vision as fast as you can handle.

But even professional players often have to make decisions with less-than-perfectly-clear information. You may have to base your playing decision on an impression of massed pips on the cards, rather than a few pips surrounded by a lot of white space, for example. Again, consult the texts recommended above for what to do with imperfect information.

The one thing you want to be sure not to do is just guess. If you really have no idea what the hole card is except when it’s a face card, then you’d be better off sticking with basic strategy unless you read a face card in the hole. It can be extremely costly to violate basic strategy on uninformed guesses.

Also, do not be surprised if this flashing dealer does not flash her hole card by the time you return to play against her. My guess is that if she was obvious enough for a beginner to play, the casino will figure it out pretty quickly and coach him on his mistake. ♠

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Hole Card Techniques and the Law

Is Spooking Legal?

By Arnold Snyder (With comments by Stephen R. Minagil, Attorney at Law)
(From Blackjack Forum VII #2, June 1987)
© Blackjack Forum 1987

As reported previously in Blackjack Forum (Vol. V #3), on December 18, 1984, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada ruled conclusively that certain types of hole-card play are legal at Nevada’s casino blackjack tables. The specific hole-card case they ruled on was the State of Nevada vs. Einbinder and Dalben.

Steven Einbinder and Tony Dalben are professional gamblers who had been arrested at the Golden Nugget Casino in downtown Las Vegas on November 22, 1983, and charged with violating the State’s cheating statutes. Specifically, they were observed and videotaped to be playing in a manner whereby Dalben sat in the first base position at a blackjack table, placing table-minimum bets, from where he was apparently able to view the dealer’s hole card whenever the dealer checked under an ace or ten for a possible blackjack.

The videotaped evidence supported the State’s claim that Dalben was then signaling this hole card information to Einbinder, who sat on the third base side of the table placing bets of up to $700 per hand. The State claimed that Einbinder was playing his hand according to the hole-card information signalled to him by Dalben.

A few definitions of some of the various types of hole card play that might be affected by this case:

“First Basing” Hole Card Play

This is precisely the type of blackjack hole-card play described above, as engaged in by Einbinder and Dalben.

“Front-loading” Hole Card Play

This is a type of play in which a player views the dealer’s hole card, not when the dealer checks for a blackjack, but when the dealer “loads” the hole-card beneath his up-card. This type of blackjack play is made possible by a dealer who tips the card up towards the players to slide it beneath his up-card, and a player who is either short, or slouching at the table, such that his eye-level is low enough to read the value of the card.

“Spooking” Hole Card Play

This is a play where the player has an agent — a “spook” — positioned behind the dealer, most often seated at another blackjack table on the other side of the pit, which enables the agent to view the dealer’s hole-card when the dealer checks for a blackjack. [Note from Arnold Snyder: If you watch the movie Casino, the players who got backroomed by Ace Rothstein were spooking.]

The “spook” then signals the player at the table with the hole card information, so that the player may play his hand accordingly. Another type of spooking employs an agent in front of the dealer, but far enough away from the table so that his angle of viewing allows him to see the dealer’s hole card as per typical front-loading, except that this type of play requires yet another agent to signal the player or players at the table of the hole-card value.

The Las Vegas District Court where Einbinder and Dalben were tried found them not guilty, based on the fact that it was the dealer’s sloppy dealing style that enabled them to obtain an advantage over the house. The players were merely using their powers of observation to obtain information that would have been available to any player in Dalben’s seat.

The State appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, and the not guilty verdict was ultimately upheld on the appeal.

Tony Dalben was kind enough to send me complete transcripts of the court proceedings. I’ve been studying these transcripts for some months now — 133 pages in total — to determine exactly what the Nevada Supreme Court found to be legal.

The actual order from the Supreme Court dismissing the State’s appeal is brief and to the point:

Respondents were charged with cheating at gambling and other related felonies. The facts of the alleged offenses were essentially undisputed In particular, the evidence showed that respondent Dalben was lawfully seated at his position at the blackjack table, that he did not use any artificial device to aid his vision, and that he was able to see the dealer’s “hole” card solely because of the admittedly “sloppy” play of the dealer. Respondent Dalben then communicated his information to respondent Einbinder. The district court ruled that respondents’ conduct did not constitute a violation of the cheating statutes. We agree.

Cheating is defined as the alteration of the selection of criteria which determine the result of a game or the amount or frequency of payment. NRS 465.083, see Sheriff v. Martin, 99 Nev.. 336, 662, P.2d 634 (1983). We have considered the briefs and the record, and we have heard the oral arguments of counsel. We conclude that in this case the district court correctly found that respondents’ conduct did not constitute cheating at gambling. Accordingly, this appeal is without merit and is hereby dismissed.

This decision indicates that the Supreme Court considered it significant that Dalben “did not use any artificial device to aid his vision, and that he was able to see the dealer’s ‘hole’ card solely because of the admittedly ‘sloppy’ play of the dealer.” (emphasis added).

This wording of the decision explains in part why the Nevada Supreme Court may have been prejudiced against Taft and Weatherford (Blackjack Forum VI # 1), who were convicted of using a video device to view the dealer’s hole card — though I still believe that Taft and Weatherford should have been found not guilty. At the time of their “crime,” April 1, 1984, Nevada had no anti-device law, they were not touching or in any way altering the cards and their potential advantage was also derived from sloppy dealers.

At the time the Nevada Supreme Court upheld the district court conviction of Taft and Weatherford, January 28, 1986, I had not seen the transcripts for the Einbinder/Dalben trial. I was unaware of the fact that the Supreme Court had specifically mentioned that no “artificial device” had been used by Einbinder and Dalben. I can see now the difficulty this must have posed to Taft’s and Weatherford’s attorneys in defending their clients. The Einbinder/Dalben decision may have provided only weak support, if any, for hole card play as practiced by Taft and Weatherford.

Prior to receiving materials from Tony Dalben, I was also unaware of the fact that Taft’s attorney — John Curtas — and Weatherford’s attorney — Stephen Minagil — were the same attorneys who had initially represented Einbinder and Dalben, respectively. And although Curtas and Minagil were dismissed from the case prior to the final decision, it is apparent from the preliminary hearing transcript that their arguments in the Einbinder/Dalben case were what ultimately won this case for the defendants.

My criticism of Curtas and Minagil (Blackjack Forum Vl #1) for not defending Taft and Weatherford on the basis of the Einbinder/Dalben decision was short-sighted. It’s apparent to me now why Curtas’ and Minigal’s defense of Taft and Weatherford was a brand new ball game.

So, does the Supreme Court’s decision in the Einbinder/Dalben case protect hole card players other than “firstbasers”?

Does it protect “front-loaders?”

Does it protect “spooks?”

The Supreme Court decision does not directly refer to spooking, but direct reference to this playing style was made during the District Court preliminary hearing, the transcript of which the Supreme Court used to form their decision. The date of this hearing was February 17, 1984, and at that time Tony Dalben was being represented by Las Vegas Attorney Stephen R. Minagil.

On page 48-49 of the court transcript, Minagil is arguing for his client’s defense:

Minagil: ” . . . I would use the analogy that two people, a husband and wife, maybe unsophisticated in gambling, and the husband is standing next to the wife and turns to her and says, ‘Gee, I saw she had a ten. Maybe we shouldn’t hit this one.’ Is that cheating?”

Court: “We don’t have a husband and wife here that we know about. Let’s say someone is sitting on the other side of the pit, slouched down in the chair and when the dealer looked at the dealer’s card, the person sitting there could see the card and the person flashed the signal to the person. Is that cheating?”

Minagil: “I think so in that you have a person behind the table. That would be cheating. But these gentlemen, they sat where they are supposed to sit. They didn’t use devices. And this dealer made a mistake.”

Does this reference in the hearing transcript make it ill-advised for a player arrested for spooking to cite this Supreme Court decision as a legal defense of his action? Nowhere does the Nevada Supreme Court state that having an agent behind the dealer is illegal. And it could certainly be argued that such an agent, like Tony Dalben, might be “lawfully seated at his position” — albeit at a different table from the dealer, and that such an agent may be using no devices other than his powers of observation.

It seems to me that a “front-loader,” who obtains his information to play his own hand, or to signal information to another player or players at his table, would likely be protected by the Einbinder/Dalben decision, assuming no “devices” — mirrors, “shiners,” video, etc. — were being used to obtain hole-card information.

A front-loader who was not seated at the table, however, acting as a “spook,” could be a different story. What about a front-loader who is seated at the table, but who is obviously slouching, or laying his head on the table to peek at the dealer’s hole card? Part of the testimony considered by the Nevada Supreme Court, from the same hearing transcript, contained this line of questioning of Golden Nugget Director of Surveillance, William McDonnell (p. 34-35):

Minagil: “Mr. Dalben, who I believe you testified was sitting at the first base position, to observe the hole card of the dealer, he just sat there, didn’t he?”

McDonnell: “That’s correct.”

Minagil: “He didn’t get up and make any physical movement to peak at the card, did he?”

McDonnell: “Not on this occasion, no.”

Minagil: “All he was using was the power of observation; is that right?”

McDonnell: “That’s correct.”

Minagil: “You’re not aware of any rule that requires players to look away from the dealer when she’s looking at the hole card, are you?”

McDonnell: “No.”

Minagil: “So it’s the dealer’s responsibility to shield that hole card, is it not?”

McDonnell: “That’s correct.”

Minagil: “And if the dealer allows a player to see a hole card, she’s making a mistake; is she not?”

McDonnell: Yes.”

I called Dalben’s former attorney, Stephen Minagil, and asked him, as a Nevada attorney, exactly how he would expect the courts to interpret the Supreme Court’s Einbinder/Dalben decision, and just what obstacles this decision might present to an attorney who had to defend a player who was arrested for either spooking or front-loading.

I taped Minagil’s response, and have transcribed it here with his permission:

Steven Minagil: I’m concerned that there is not much protection provided by the Einbinder/Dalben decision with regards to “spooking,” i.e., employing agents not at the table. Each decision rendered by the Supreme Court is limited to its facts. In the Einbinder/Dalben decision the facts were that they were lawfully seated at the table and used no artificial devices to aid their vision. I believe those are the key facts upon which the decision is based.

I see the Court making a distinction between those facts and a situation where a person is assisting a player, and the assisting person is not at the table. I’m concerned that the Court would use the rationale of Taft and Weatherford, wherein they said that using the equipment put the player in a position of superior knowledge, and therefore altered crucial characteristics of the game.

As to “front-loading,” that is a person you have defined as obviously slouching or laying his head on the table to feign drunkeness, etc., in order to see the dealer’s hole-card. That is a tougher question. Even though one is obviously slouching, I believe that those facts are within the parameters of Einbinder and Dalben, because that person would be lawfully sitting at the table and not using artificial devices.

I’m concerned about a court still using the rationale of Taft and Weatherford, that is, by doing something in addition to merely sitting and playing, that the player is placed in a position of superior knowledge, thereby altering the crucial characteristics of the game. But I think the front-loading question is a lot tougher, that is, that the possibility of the Einbinder/Dalben decision applying to front-loading is greater.

I have a real problem with the spooking example, but not so much with the front-loading example. I think the defense counsel would have a much easier time in getting the Court to sit down and think about applying the Einbinder decision in a front-loading situation than in a spooking situation.

So, if you’re under the impression that the Einbinder/Dalben decision protects you as a hole-card player, be aware of the limitations of that protection. Cheating is a felony in Nevada. Don’t take unnecessary chances. ♠

[Note from Arnold Snyder: There have been significant court cases regarding blackjack hole card play since this article was written, and each has increased the case for the legality of hole card play when the player is merely taking advantage of a sloppy dealer.

See Interview with Bob Nersesian, (the attorney who represented James Grosjean and his playing partner in their case against Caesars and the Griffin Agency, as well as Interview with the Legendary Hole Card Player RC.]

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Interview with Bob Nersesian

An Attorney Fights Casino Abuse of Professional Gamblers in the Nevada Courts and Wins

by Richard W. Munchkin
(From Blackjack Forum XXII #4, Winter 2002/03)
© Blackjack Forum 2003

[Bob Nersesian is a partner in the Las Vegas law firm of Nersesian & Sankiewicz. He specializes in representing players in lawsuits against casinos. Richard W. Munchkin is a member of the Blackjack Hall of Fame and the author of Gambling Wizards: Conversations with the World’s Greatest Gamblers.]

RWM: Why is it that attorneys don’t want to take cases in which card counters have been manhandled by casinos?

Nersesian: Number one, there isn’t enough money in those cases. Number two, and this is really bizarre to me, people in our community don’t understand that the casinos are invading someone’s rights when a card counter is back roomed or handcuffed. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve talked with other attorneys about this stuff and the reaction I get is: “Well for god sakes, he was counting cards. What do you expect them to do?” My answer is, “I expect them to follow the law, not falsely imprison the guy, not hold him out there and walk him through the casino and embarrass him in front of the world.”The law says that if they suspect him of a felony or if he is suspected of committing a misdemeanor on premises, they can detain him. It does not say they can detain him because he is winning, and that is what they are doing. The public accepts that, and most of the lawyers do, too. Across this country professional gamblers are vilified as far as perceptions are concerned. What we are faced with is a private company who says, “We don’t like what you’re doing. You’re hurting us, so we are going to get back at you.”

The general perspective when I approach other lawyers and upper management of casinos about counters being handcuffed, which does occur regularly, they are as aghast as I am. The policy has been changed, and been put out in writing at some properties, after lawsuits that I’ve been involved in.

RWM: That’s good to hear.

Nersesian: They know they can’t do that. I’m giving the upper management some credit here. It’s the way business works. They put out a dictate that says, “We’re supposed to make money.” Then you get down to the functionary level where they don’t deal with management decisions or the overall policy decisions. They just get the directive, “Your job is to make sure we make money.” They don’t know the ins and outs and niceties about it.The next thing you know they are handcuffing honest people. When the upper management finds out about that, they are pretty straightforward about changing their policies and seeing that it doesn’t happen again. Historically, few lawyers have been willing to sue, and nothing happens because of it. The casino management isn’t even aware there is a problem.

RWM: What is a case worth when a card counter is handcuffed and maybe pushed around?

Nersesian: I don’t want to put down hard numbers, but the patron generally walks away with $5,000 – $15,000. That is provided all the i’s are dotted and t’s are crossed. What I mean by that is there aren’t other reasons for what happened.The story that comes from my client in the first place is very rarely the story that you can see from the facts once things develop. For example, someone might assume they were back roomed for card counting, when in actuality they were back roomed because the casino suspects them of using a counting device. If that is the suspicion, and it’s arguably supportable, the detention can be found appropriate.There are usually videos of that back room, and the cases where I have been successful usually show the casino security lambasting my client and stating, “We saw you in the book. We know you’re a card counter. We don’t want your business.” The client is calmly standing there saying, “I told you outside that I didn’t want to come back here. Put away that camera. You are not going to take my picture. You have no business holding me here. You can ask me to leave. You could have done that out in the casino. Let me out right now.”

RWM: Is that what someone should do if detained?

Nersesian: First inform them firmly, but not physically, that you have no desire to accompany them anywhere.

RWM: Should you attempt to walk to the door?

Nersesian: Your call. I’ve had it both ways. Firmly state, “If you want to throw me out, tell me I’m 86’ed or trespass me. Do it now and do it quickly, because I intend to walk out that door.” If they say, “You’re not going,” or “You have to come with us,” don’t fight them, because they may beat the living daylights out of you.Do I want to see that kind of lawsuit? Not really. You get hurt on those. If they have determined that they are taking you to the back room, they will probably do whatever it takes to restrain you. Your firm statement that you desire to leave and they should not take you back there is all that is needed.

RWM: Unfortunately, the surveillance tapes don’t have audio.

Nersesian: No, they don’t. Once you get in the security office, say it again. That room is recorded with audio.

I want to give you an example of the way the attorneys here look at this stuff. I have a case going to trial on the 23rd. I’m suing a Gaming agent for what he did to a card counter. The court originally dismissed the action. This card counter spent a whole night in jail. He didn’t do anything illegal.When the court dismissed it, I had to go to the Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco, and that court reversed the dismissal. Now we have a judgment of liability. I am $80,000 into this case. What do my friends who are lawyers think when I describe the events to them? The guy spent a night in jail. He has never been arrested in his life. He is a wonderful father of two.The question to me is, “What was he doing?” He was counting cards. When I ask them what they think it is worth, they tell me, maybe $2,000. I ask, “Why only $2,000?” I was talking to two lawyers just yesterday and they said, “Because he was a card counter.” I said, “So, that’s legal.” They said, “It might be legal but it doesn’t garner any sympathy.”There might be some truth to that. I don’t think it’s a $2,000 case. If it ends up being a $2,000 case, so be it. I still proved my point.

RWM: What was their excuse for keeping him in jail?

Nersesian: He was actually arrested because he refused to give this cop his name.

At the same time I am trying to sue six other Gaming agents. The courts keep throwing them out. I’m going to take these cases to the Nevada Supreme Court. If that doesn’t work, I will try for the United States Supreme Court.I can’t believe what these police officers think they are allowed to do. In one instance, and this one blows my mind, I have a client who plays video poker. He found a machine that had an edge and he played the heck out of it. It turned out the machine was misprogrammed. After he won on the machine, two police officers held him in custody for well over an hour and a half, and repeatedly requested that he return the money before he could leave, or alternatively go to jail. He did not do anything illegal.Here you have the Nevada State Police acting as collection agents for casinos. Isn’t that special?

RWM: Nevada is a very special place.

Nersesian: That one will be going to the Supreme Court for darn sure. Are they going to confirm the court throwing it out? They might. But I have been very impressed with the Gaming Control Board itself and the Supreme Court on gaming issues. Those three guys who make the big decisions. Or, the Nevada Supreme Court. The games tend to go out the window, and they are very judicious, both the Board, and the Supreme Court, about applying the law.

RWM: Really?

Nersesian: Yes. You hear people say that they are rubber stamps for the casinos—not true. From what I can see, at the agent level, those guys seem to have a perspective that they’re working for the casinos. However, the Supreme Court and the Gaming Control Board seem very guarded about their perspective, and that they are working for Nevada. That includes the taxpayers and the people who play in the casinos, as well as the properties.

You might be familiar with another case I handled, which happened at another casino. There was a programming error on a 50-cent video poker machine. A progressive jackpot for four of a kind, which would normally pay $250, instead paid $100,000. My client hit it.A Gaming agent, in a throwaway off-the-cuff opinion, effectively stated, “There is no liability here on behalf of the casino. The patron loses.” The Gaming Control Board unanimously held that the casino had to pay. You see the distinction? The Board recognizes that the integrity of our system is reliant upon expectations being met. That sure was no rubber stamp decision for the casino.

RWM: If it were a PPE [Park Place Entertainment] or MGM/Mirage property, do you think the decision would have been the same?

Nersesian: Yes, in my opinion that would not make a difference. You see some similarities in this case with the other slot case where the agents held him and tried to get him to give back the money.One thing that is most curious is the video of that incident. The police officers were citing the Nevada tax base, and implying that injury to that tax base was something they weren’t going to allow to happen. If you take that in context, and expand it out to its logical conclusion, what they are saying is, “We will not allow casinos to lose in this state.” There is a voiced attitude of the agents that patrons have to deal with every day.

I have a client who was back roomed and we tried very hard to get Metro to prosecute the casino for false imprisonment. We showed up at the station and requested they take a report. They wouldn’t take a report. I actually spoke to a police officer who said to me, “Well, he was card counting. Of course they put him in the back room. That’s cheating.”This is a police officer in the state of Nevada who thinks it is cheating to count cards. No, sorry, the Supreme Court of Nevada has said three times it is not cheating. Reason tells you it’s not cheating. Maybe so, but the guy on the street doesn’t view a professional gambler with any sympathy. It might be jealousy. Whatever the rational might be, there just isn’t a depth of sympathy for card counters and other legal advantage players.

If the cop on the street thinks that is the case, how are you going to get lawyers or the general public to look at these people as anything other than dreck? Are they dreck? Not the ones I know. My clients include business leaders, mathematics professors at national universities, and noted authors. They are not dreck.This whole concept of treating them as less than upstanding citizens is particularly curious when you balance against it the idea that the casinos are allowed to use their skills to make money, and they are the stellar citizens of Nevada. But a player who uses his skills should be persecuted. Isn’t that a curious perspective?

RWM: It certainly is. Do you have any other advice to the player when confronted by the casino?

Nersesian: Don’t show a fake ID. I know a lot of guys are carrying them. If you use another name, one thing that might add some protection is to go down to the Clark County Clerk’s office and register that name as a “registered assumed name.” The law regarding identification is ambiguous and I believe unconstitutional. The law says,NRS 205.465 Possession or sale of document or personal identifying information to establish false status or identity.1. It is unlawful for a person to possess, sell or transfer any document or personal identifying information for the purpose of establishing a false status, occupation, membership, license or identity for himself or any other person.Nersesian: Pretty broad, isn’t it?

RWM: Wow. So if my wife uses my player’s card in the slot machine, she’s committing a crime under that law.

Nersesian: There is an argument that she is. I don’t think this statute passes constitutional muster. It’s vague and fails to include a scienter element, but do you want to be the guy who spends two days in jail before being bailed out for $5,000 to see if that is true?There is also a statute, or ordinances, that deal with doing business under an assumed name. The argument will be when this statute is popped on someone who has filed that DBA certificate is that this is not a “false” identity. This is a legal, fictitious identity, and there has to be a distinction between the two, else the assumed name statutes would not exist.If you are going to use fictitious ID, file an assumed name certificate in the county where you are using it. Even then you can’t be sure you are not committing a crime, as far as Nevada defines one. Isn’t this fun?

Gamblers have gone to great lengths to avoid being noticed. Often the simplest diversion will add hours to the play. For example, I know of a case where a Gaming agent, a professional security officer, and a chief of security watched the wrong guy on the table for hours before they figured out he was getting signals. They were dumbfounded as to where his information was coming from.Then they watched the other guy at the table, since the first guy was not doing anything to get information. They watched the other guy for hours to figure out what the signals were. The signals were blatantly obvious. My point is not that surveillance is inept. My point is that players think all this stuff is known, and as soon as you do something they are going to see it. The simplest stuff can take years for them to decipher.

On the other hand, I have another case where a guy was popped twenty minutes after he sat down. He was 86’ed. He somehow was in Griffin. His spread was $50 to $200. He’s relatively an amateur.

RWM: Why is this a case?

Nersesian: He was back roomed. And he did everything right. He said, “I don’t want to go there.” They entered the back room. “I don’t know why I’m here. Let me go.” Then the beautiful part, the security guard says, “You’re here because we found you in the book. We know you’re a card counter.” Talk about handing it to me.To add insult to injury, he asks the security supervisor who says, and this is cute, “You’re here because you’ve committed a gaming violation.” He asked, “What violation?” The security chief essentially says, “I don’t have to tell you.” And he walks out.Then he kept telling the other security officers, “Let me go right now. You have no right to hold me. You know that I have done nothing illegal. Let me out that door.” They told him to calm down and he said, “I’m perfectly calm. I just don’t want to be here.” Then the supervisor comes back in and my client said, “Let me go.” The supervisor said, “First, I want to ask you some questions.” My client again said, “Let me go right now.” Eventually when it became clear they would get nothing, he was allowed to leave.

RWM: Should he have said, “Call the police.”

Nersesian: That’s the case where we did call the police. They said, “So? You were card counting.” I’ve got a letter from Metro saying, to paraphrase, “We choose not to investigate or prosecute. Our scarce resources cannot be used on such claims.” No, but if a casino calls them up and says they have a disorderly person, how long before they are over there hauling that guy away?

RWM: My first question to you was: Why don’t lawyers take these cases? Now I’m wondering: Why do you take them?

Nersesian: I do this because what is going on in this community is not some minor infringement in everybody’s day-to-day life. To be thrown into a back room against your will, and be told that you have to do whatever they tell you for however long they want—that is imprisonment. It is traumatic beyond what you or I could ever fathom.Those lawyer friends that I told you about, and they are dear friends, they think I’m tilting at windmills like Don Quixote. I get very angry with them. If you’re a lawyer, you took an oath. When I tell my friends that this is what I do to give back, their reaction is, “Well, that’s pretty silly. You’re giving back by making things worse.” The kind of cases I am talking about, the casinos think they can treat patrons as chattel, as pieces of property. These people are not chattel, and they have not done anything illegal. For a casino to think that they have some special position in society that allows them to do this to innocent people cannot be reconciled with the country we live in.That’s why I do it. Because it angers me that much. I don’t make money at this. It has been a money loser for years, but it is a matter of principle, and a wrong that needs righted.
Bob Nersesian can be reached c/o:

Nersesian & Sankiewicz
528 S. 8th Street
Las Vegas, NV 89101
(702) 385-5454

Casinos and Nevada Politics

The Nevada Gaming Commission and the State Gaming Control Board comprise the two-tiered system charged with regulating the Nevada gaming industry. The Commission and Board administer the State laws and regulations governing gaming for the protection of the public and in the public interest in accordance with the policy of the State.

The Nevada Gaming Commission is a five-member lay body appointed by the Governor, which serves in a part-time capacity. The primary responsibilities of the Commission include acting on the recommendations of the State Gaming Control Board in licensing matters and ruling in work permit appeal cases. The Commission is the final authority on licensing matters, having the ability to approve, restrict, limit, condition, deny, revoke, or suspend any gaming license.

The Gaming Control Board is made up of three full-time members, appointed by the governor to four-year terms. The gaming statutes require the board to include: one person with a minimum of five years experience in public or business administration; one person who has been a certified public accountant for five years or more, or who is an expert in finance, auditing, gaming, or economics; and one person with a law enforcement background.The Board’s purpose is to protect the stability of the gaming industry through investigations, licensing, and enforcement of laws and regulations. They also insure the collection of taxes and fees, and maintain public confidence in gaming. The Board implements and enforces the state laws and regulations through seven divisions. Those seven divisions are: Administration Division, Audit Division, Corporate Securities Division, Electronic Services Division, Investigations division, Tax and License Division, and Enforcement Division.

If a card counter or other casino patron were to have an interaction with someone from Gaming, it would most likely be someone from the Enforcement Division. The Enforcement Division is the law enforcement arm of the Gaming Control Board. It maintains five offices statewide and operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.Primary responsibilities are: to conduct criminal and regulatory investigations, arbitrate disputes between patrons and licensees, gather intelligence on organized criminal groups involved in gaming related activities, make recommendations on potential candidates for the “List of Excluded Persons,” conduct background investigations on work-card applicants, and inspect and approve new games, surveillance systems, chips and tokens, charitable lotteries, and bingo.

For an in-depth look at the Gaming Commission, read License To Steal: Nevada’s Gaming Control System In The Megaresort Age, by Jeff Burbank. ♠

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The Blackjack Combine

More Equitable Compensation for Blackjack Teams

By Marvin L. Masters
(From Blackjack Forum Vol. III #2, June 1983)
© 1983 Blackjack Forum

Want to make money faster at blackjack? Join a blackjack team!

A blackjack team, or combine, is a group of investors/players who combine their individual bankrolls and/or playing talents. Each blackjack player can then legitimately size his bets according to the total team bankroll.

For instance, four players with four identical bankrolls can combine their money and then bet four times their normal bets. Result: Each makes four times as much money, with no increase in risk. There are two provisos: (1) They must not play at the same table, and (2) the current total bankroll must be communicated frequently to the blackjack team players.

The “blackjack combine” concept differs from the standard “blackjack team” concept by a more equitable sharing of profits and losses.

Details of the Combine Concept for Blackjack Teams

A combine member may be an investor, a player, or both. The players bet the combined bankroll per Kelly principles, keeping half of all winnings for themselves. If a player loses, he gets no money for playing until the loss is made up. Then the 50-50 split resumes. The second 50% of player winnings goes to the combine treasury. The treasury works just like a money market fund: Investors share profits (and losses) in proportion to their current shareholdings.

This idea works with one player with no bankroll teamed with one investor who doesn’t play. If a plan doesn’t work for this situation, then it’s no good for more complex teams. Ken Uston’s team plan (in Million Dollar Blackjack ) does not work for this situation.

Uston’s plan says that the 50% allocated to players should be divided 25% for time and 25% for money won. Moreover, a loss is not made up. This method is inequitable and unsound because:

(1) It is difficult to define and keep an accurate account of “time.” Some players waste time in a casino; others are more efficient. Besides, equal time should not pay equal money to unequal players. Better to combine the time and skill elements, since those who work longer and play better will presumably win proportionately. That’s good enough, and much simpler.

(2) It would be very tempting for a player to delay reporting a win or time played when he knows that the group is losing. He would not get rewarded for his performance, so why not wait?

The key point here is that a win is not a “win” until any previous loss is made up. The play never “ends” until the combine is dissolved. It’s a continuous series. If that series is broken at arbitrary points in order to distribute profits since the last point, the overall profit for each person will depend on when the breaks occur.

To see that this is so, imagine that I had an investor who bankrolled me for monthly trips to Las Vegas for one year. Suppose I alternately lose $500, win $1000, lose $500, win $1000, etc., for the whole year. If we settle up monthly giving him 50% of every win and 100% of every loss, the investor ends up with nothing while I get $3000. If we settle up at the end of the year instead, we each get 50% of the profit, $1500 apiece. Using my method of not taking a win until a loss is made up, the payoffs are the same either way.

The bankroll “share” concept presents some interesting facets. Typically, 50% or so of the “declared” bankroll should be liquid, readily accessible to the treasurer and players. This liquidity percentage depends on the number of persons who may be playing at the same time, and the readiness with which money can be passed back and forth.

Because bet sizing is a personal matter (Kelly betting may be more, or less, aggressive than suits a person’s circumstances), an investor with, say, a $5000 bankroll may wish to “declare” anywhere from $2500 to $10,000. If the team is betting per Kelly then declaring only one-half of one’s bankroll is effectively betting half-Kelly. This policy will lower the probably win but will substantially reduce fluctuations and increase the probability of being ahead at any given time.

Conversely, the $5000 investor may want to declare in at the maximum for his holdings, or $10,000. His $5000 will satisfy the 50% requirement for a $10,000 declaration. Perhaps he has an alternative source of ongoing income that may be considered bankroll. Or he might want to make a lot of money fast, and be willing to risk the 50% chance of being a loser (when betting Kelly x 2) in order to have the chance at a big killing.

The treasurer must maintain a separate account for investors’ funds that are not part of the official combine bankroll, to be used for adjusting shareholding as instructed by the investors. A person may say, “I want all wins put aside for me. Keep my bankroll value constant.”

Or perhaps he needs the income now. Those who are declaring more or less than their real bankroll will give instructions to the treasurer to adjust “declaration” bankroll after a team win or loss according to their particular circumstances.

The half-Kelly investor will want this share reduced by only ½ of any loss, and increased by just ½ of any win. His separate account will be used for such adjustments. The Kelly x 2 investor wants his share increased by twice any gain and decreased by twice any loss. He will not need a side account, because his 50% requirement is automatically maintained by this policy.

Expenses, being a personal matter, should come out of a person’s own money. If a player has no money for expenses, the treasury can advance the required amount, to be repaid out of the player’s share of his winnings.

You can have a “team,” or numerous “teams” within a single combine. A “team” differs from a combine in that team members play as a team, working together in a casino.

The usual arrangement is for one team member to be a “big player,” placing large bets at various tables as secretly directed by low-betting teammates who are scattered around the casino doing the counting. A blackjack team can thus be part of a combine but in this case the team would be treated, by the rules of the combine, as a single player.

The treasury gets 50% of any wins, with the remaining 50% split among the team members in accordance with the team’s own rules. The big player, for instance, may be a highly skilled person to whom the team votes more than a normal share. ♠

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The Blackjack Ball

The Most Elite Gathering of the Best Gambling Minds in the World

by Mark Truman
© 2017 Blackjack Forum Online

Every year in secret, the absolute cream of the global blackjack community convenes in the heart of Las Vegas. Somewhere, amid the bright lights and endless nights of the Strip, an incredibly gifted few gather to discuss, strategize and compete at the game they love.

Known simply as “The Blackjack Ball,” those in attendance aren’t simply high-rolling gamblers. The club assembled for the annual event represent the finest minds in what is termed “advantage play” in games of chance—and pretty much “playing smart” in any competition.

Professionals will use a variety of techniques to invert the casino’s edge in their favor, and while performing high-level maths amid the myriad distractions of the bustling floor at the Bellagio might be a feat too far for the average Joe, it’s not strictly against the rules.

Of course, this is not how the casino sees the matter. After losing stacks of cash to the attendees of the Ball and other such talented players, it’s hardly surprising that the house is keen to know exactly who makes up this ultra-elite club.

For this reason, many of the Ball’s guests live their lives under a pseudonym. Examples like “Dustin Marks” are tongue-in-cheek references to gambling lingo of yesteryear, and provide some level of security for the players using them. Additionally, attendance at the Blackjack Ball is by invitation only, insuring only a trusted few are permitted access to the event.

This makes an invitation highly prized, and tales of top level players waiting years for their chance to attend abound online.

Antidote for a Solitary Pursuit

The necessity of such an elite gathering likely arises from the lack of stage for these professionals to meet and compete on. Professional blackjack is a somewhat solitary pursuit, and while many players belong to teams, much of their working time is spent alone at the table or playing online. Many of those present first met one another at previous Balls, having little opportunity or cause to seek out fellow advanced players before.

That was part of the reason behind the event’s founding. Organizer Max Rubin explains: “It was a way for players of different blackjack teams and solo players to get together and hang out.”

Max first set up the clandestine meeting in 1997 and back then hosted proceedings in his own home. Since then, increasing attendance figures have given rise to the necessity of an alternative venue. The location, of course, is shrouded in mystery, and only those invited are privy to its whereabouts.

Online anecdotes from previous years’ attendees shine light onto the level of security required for players to emerge from their shadowy existence to meet, greet, and compare notes with the rest of their professional community. Stories of multiple levels of security checks to pass, and admittance being reserved for only those who arrive with a bottle of premium champagne are common—touches which add to the atmosphere of exclusivity and ensure a special evening is had by all.

The Blackjack Ball is more than just an exclusive shindig for the brightest minds in the game, however. Each year, a new addition is inducted into the Blackjack Hall of Fame at the event. For a guest to be considered, he or she must first be nominated by an existing member of the Hall, and then be approved by the attendance committee. Legend of the felt Don Johnson was fortunate enough to have his name immortalized this year.

Johnson may be the most widely known blackjack player ever. His victories in Atlantic City have been well publicized, and profits from these sessions run well into the tens of millions of dollars.

The Blackjack Cup

The highlight of the Ball for many is the annual Blackjack Cup, in which guests compete in a series of twenty-one rigorous challenges. Every facet of their abilities is tested, from speed card counting to general knowledge surrounding their craft. Participants are whittled down until a champion remains.

The challenge starts with a written test that is fiendishly difficult, and follows up with practical challenges that seem impossibly hard to an outsider. For many years, James Grosjean lifted the cup, until he was banned from competing by Rubin, in the interests of fairness for the rest of the field. But when Grosjean retired from the field of Blackjack Cup battle, the Cup itself was named after him.

The 2017 competition saw Anthony Curtis, a former blackjack and tournament pro and publisher of many classic books on advantage play, take the top spot. Curtis has also finished in the number two position in six of the previous twenty competitions.

In addition to the Hall of Fame inauguration and competition for the Grosjean Cup, attendees are treated to a different guest speaker each year. This year it was the turn of the grandfather of advantage play, Ed Thorp. Author of the distinguished guide, Beat the Dealer, amongst other classic titles, Thorp is largely responsible for most of the room’s fortunes at the felt. Mike Shackelford, authority on all things probability and chance, had the following to say about the 2017 speaker:

It would be hard to understate the impact Ed Thorp had on the game of blackjack. He was the first to publish both a basic strategy to a wide audience, to get the odds to almost breakeven, and how to beat the game by card counting. His book Beat the Dealer will go down in history as the quintessential book that changed the game.

Blackjack Hall of Fame

After the evening’s entertainment, the inauguration into the Hall of Fame, and the crowning of the world’s greatest blackjack player, the formal event comes to a close. What follows is an official after party, held at yet another secret location.

The annual event concludes with a second after party the next day, hosted by Hall of Famer Richard Munchkin. The Sunday party is a final chance to trade strategies, tactics, advanced concepts, and epic tales amongst the community. No doubt some hair of the dog is also required for those who overindulged at the previous evening’s festivities.

As the Munchkin after event winds up, so too does yet another edition of the Blackjack Ball. For many of those lucky (and skilled) enough to attend, the comradery enjoyed over this weekend in January must last a whole year. Back to the shadowy world of dodging pit bosses and performing advanced calculus they must creep.

At least, thanks to Rubin’s efforts in organizing this event, they can take comfort from the notion that they are not alone against the casinos, even if they feel that way the 51 other weeks of the year. ♠

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Atlantic City sexism and other capers; Falling Star

While we have no definitive idea whether Ocean Casino Resort CEO Bill Callahan is a male chauvinist pig, he certainly presents a convincing set of credentials in a Global Gaming Business puff piece. Never mind the efforts of predecessor Terry Glebocki (above, hounded out by the Illitch family), when it comes to Ocean’s reinvention from joke to overachiever, Callahan says he did it all himself, derogating previous administrations several times over in an ode to his own perspicacity. We’re sure that, by this point, Callahan has made some changes—like the new sports book—that are redounding to the good. But to take credit for everything … that requires a fair amount of gall.

Continue reading Atlantic City sexism and other capers; Falling Star
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When One Team Player Loses Big

Suspicions Arise…

By Arnold Snyder
(From Casino Player, January 1997)
© 1997 Arnold Snyder

Question from a Player:  I am part of a small group of friends who have formed a blackjack team. We have been playing now for about 4 months, and have been winning very slowly. Recently, we were going over everybody’s numbers and found that of the six of us, three of us are ahead in winnings, two players are close to break even, and one player is pretty far behind. We have all played a different number of hours on the team, though everyone is between 120 at the least and 200 at the most. We test each other all the time on card counting skills and index numbers, and I know the break even players, as well as the big loser, are capable card counters. Those of us who have been winning, however, are beginning to suspect that our non-winning blackjack teammates may be embezzling from the bank, and just claiming losses.

The big loser on the team, by the way, has the most hours in, almost 200, and he is down about $14,000. We all use a spread of about $25-250, and we estimate about a 1½% advantage. My ballpark estimate of the big loser’s result is that he is about 3 standard deviations below his expectation, which, as you know, is highly unlikely. I am personally up about $47,000 right now (I’m the biggest winner), and I have slightly fewer hours in than the big loser. This is very irritating to me, personally. I don’t like mistrusting a friend, but this guy’s losses just seem impossible. What do you think of lie detector tests?

Answer:  Based on the number of hours you have in, and assuming you play under typical crowded casino conditions, I would guess you and the big loser each have about 10,000 hands of play in. Based on your spread, I’d guess your average bet to be about $100. If we assume you’re right about your estimated 1½% advantage, then at this point you should each be about $15,000 to the positive. He is $29,000 below this. You are $32,000 above this. This is to say, he is losing at the rate of about 1½%, and you are winning at a rate of about 4½%. You know what? This is exactly why players join blackjack teams!

Both of you are experiencing radical fluctuations in opposite directions. If you were flat betting, then on 10,000 hands one standard deviation would be about 1%. This would mean that both of you guys were about three standard deviations from your expectations. But you’re not flat betting. You’re using a 1-10 spread. So, you have to figure out your standard deviation on each bet size, and if you do this, you will find that the results of your relatively few big bets skew the overall results quite dramatically — in fact, 10 times as dramatically as the results on your $25 bets! I’m sure both of you are well within two standard deviations of your expectations. Try to realize that a $14,000 loss is a loss of only 56 big bets (sized at $250). I’ll bet not one out of twenty hands is played at the $250 level, so in 10,000 hands, you’ve probably got about 500 of these big bets. It is not at all unlikely to lose an extra 56 units in 500 bets, just due to normal fluctuation with card counting.

It always amazes me how card counters can attribute wild positive fluctuations to skill, but suspect something crooked must be going on whenever wild negative fluctuations appear. If you play blackjack a long time, you will get used to these kinds of results, and believe me, when it’s your turn to be the big loser, you will suffer greatly when your teammates suspect you of either dishonesty or incompetence. This type of paranoia has destroyed many blackjack teams (and friendships).

Which is not to say I think your friend is honest. Frankly, I’ve never met the guy. He may be a weasel.

So, with regards to lie detector tests, I am not opposed to the idea at all. Most of the bigger, more successful, blackjack teams have used them. Bear in mind that it is important to test all players, not just losers. I once talked to a player who finally quit team play because he found himself so suspicious of his fellow teammates that he began misreporting his own results, and pocketing team money, to make up for what he thought his teammates were stealing from him! And he never even had any proof! He may have been the only crook on the team!

His method of embezzling, however, was not to exaggerate losses, nor to claim losses when he’d won, but simply to underreport his wins. He was a big winner on this team, so he was the player least likely to be suspected of dishonesty.

You may want to read up on lie detector tests also. They are considered fairly accurate, but they do have limitations. It is a known fact that some con artists (professional liars) can fool the tests. (And wouldn’t many card counters — even honest ones — fit in this category?) It is also a known fact that innocent people sometimes fail the tests just because they are nervous personality types who are afraid of being accused of something they didn’t do.

In any case, what your team is going through right now is a major reason why so many blackjack teams fail. Unfortunately, there are no easy answers.   ♠

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Lie Detectors for Blackjack Teams

The Politics of Polygraphs on Blackjack Teams

By Arnold Snyder
(From Casino Player, September1997)
© 1997 Arnold Snyder

Question from a Reader:  I have been playing for a blackjack team for about six months now. I believe I am a good player, but I have had some pretty bad losing sessions. I have been informed by the team leaders that before I can play any more, I must submit to a lie detector test. Apparently, the team has a contract with a private investigation agency in Las Vegas that regularly tests their team members.

When I first joined this blackjack team, I was told that all players had to submit to lie detector tests if asked. It seemed like a remote possibility at the time. Now, I’m terrified. I have been 100% honest in my dealings with the team, and I’ve never stolen a penny. But, I’ve read that these tests are unreliable, and it scares me to death to think I might be “identified” by some piece of electronic equipment as a liar and a thief. I’ve read that lie detectors actually measure “stress.” If so, I’m a dead duck, because I am really stressed out about this test, even though I’m innocent. If this test ruins my career, can I sue the agency that gives the test?

Answer:  No. Prior to submitting to the test, you must sign a form releasing the agency from any such liability.

Most big money blackjack teams use polygraph tests. Some test all players; some test randomly chosen players; some test only players under suspicion. Players who have undergone such tests tell me your apprehension is normal. One player said he could not sleep at all the night before the test, and went in for his test a nervous wreck. When it was over, he was sure he’d “flunked.” Another said he was sweating profusely throughout the test, and whenever the “loaded” questions were asked, he could feel his heart pounding in fear, even though he knew he’d been honest. He was also sure he’d failed. Yet, both of these players passed. This is not to say that the tests are always accurate, only that it is normal to feel very stressed out by the prospect of being tested, and that this stress will not necessarily foul the results.

Polygraph experts will tell you that the tests are usually 90 – 97% accurate, depending on the number of questions asked. The more questions, the lower the accuracy. And some people just don’t give valid results.

Blackjack teams usually have six major areas of concern: 1) Did you report all wins/losses accurately? 2) Did you report expenses accurately? 3) Did you ever play under the influence of alcohol or drugs? 4) If you are being paid for hours played, did you report your hours accurately? 5) If there is some confusion about money transfers from player to player, did you report those transfers accurately? 6) Did you violate any procedures that the team may require to maintain a high level of competency, i.e. did you drill properly on the strategy prior to play, count down X number of decks, etc.?

It is unlikely that you will be asked questions about all of these areas of concern. The team leaders will instruct the examiner to ask about two or three of these areas of concern, depending on your circumstances and their suspicions — if they even have suspicions. Some blackjack teams really do test players randomly, just to keep everyone honest. If a team is losing, it often saves the investors worries to know that the team is seriously confronting all possible problems.

When you go in for the test, the examiner will go over all of the questions he will ask you. There should be no “surprise” questions. Surprise questions, according to reputable polygraph examiners, tend to foul the results.

Also, 90 – 97% accuracy is pretty impressive, but not if you’re in that 3 – 10% of the population that just doesn’t test accurately. One blackjack team leader told me that he has used polygraph tests for many years, and will always use them, but that he would never allow the test results to be his sole criterion for judgment.

“If I personally don’t trust a player,” he said, “I don’t care what the polygraph shows. He could come up smelling like a rose, but if I lose faith in him, and I think he could be ripping off the team, that’s it. My gut feeling means more to me than the test results. By the same token, if someone fails a test, and I think this person is a straight arrow, I wouldn’t automatically let that person go. These tests aren’t 100% accurate. I might watch this person more closely and talk about this with my associates, just to make sure I’m not deluding myself. But my judgment of a person’s character is always foremost in my decisions.”

In any case, if you’re going to play on a big money blackjack team, you’d better get used to the idea of getting a lie detector test occasionally. All of the smart teams use them. They’re just a standard condition of employment for professional players.   ♠

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When to Surrender

Late Surrender Basic Strategy: Why the Correct Strategy Doesn’t Make Sense

By Arnold Snyder
(From Casino Player, February 1994)
© 1994 Arnold Snyder

Question from a Reader: The widely published and disseminated blackjack basic strategy for late surrender seems to me to be wrong. The strategy that is accepted is to surrender a hard 15 vs. a 10, and hard 16 (excluding 8, 8) to a 9, 10 or Ace. Although I am not using high-level blackjack mathematics or computers for my reasoning, it seems to me that the correct strategy would be to surrender every hard 15 or hard 16 (except 8, 8) any time a dealer shows 7, 8, 9, 10 or Ace.

My reasoning is that any time you take a hit on 15 or 16, over half of the cards in a full deck will bust you. If you have a 15, drawing a 7, 8, 9, 10, Jack, Queen or King will bust you. That equates to 7 out of the 13 possible cards to draw. If a blackjack game consists of four decks, and the player holds an 8 and a 7 versus a dealer 7, and those are the only cards that have been played, then 109 of the 205 unseen cards will bust him.

If a player is over 50% likely to lose all his bet, then it seems advantageous to surrender one half of his bet all the time. If my reasoning is flawed, I would greatly appreciate an explanation as to why.

Answer: This is a wonderful question because your argument is so persuasive, that to anyone — other than a mathematician — it makes perfect sense. First of all, you are 100% correct in most of your analysis. In a four-deck game, there are a total of 208 cards (52 x 4). If you remove a player hand consisting of a Seven and an Eight versus a dealer upcard of Seven, you will have 205 unseen cards remaining.

Of those 205 remaining cards, 109 cards (all remaining Sevens and Eights, plus the Nines, Tens, Jacks, Queens and Kings) will bust the player’s hard 15. One hundred nine cards represent 53% of the 205 possible hits. Furthermore, you would also expect to lose at least some of the 47% of the hands which you did not bust with one hit, depending on the ultimate totals of your own hand and the dealer’s hand.

So, since you know you’re going to lose more than 50 percent of your 15s played out against a dealer Seven—no doubt about it!— why don’t the “experts” tell you to surrender this hand as basic strategy, and hold your losses to an even 50 percent and no more?

This makes perfect sense, right?

WRONG!

This is what happens when amateurs try to do a dangerous stunt like statistical analysis. Statisticians are the Evel Knievels of the math world — trained professionals who dare to perform their feats of mental wizardry without any safety nets. But please, don’t try it yourself at home. You’re liable to start devising your own “basic strategy,” and the next thing you know, you’ll be panhandling for pocket change, wondering where your savings went!

Let’s simplify this problem. Forget about decks of cards. Instead, let’s use marbles in a vase.

Put 100 marbles in an opaque vase — 47 white marbles and 53 black marbles. You have to reach in and draw out one marble. If you draw a white one you win $1, and if you draw a black one you lose $1.

It is obvious from the start that you are going to lose 53 times out of 100 draws.

Therefore, if I offer you a surrender option, whereby you may simply give me 50¢ per draw, rather than risking a dollar to draw a marble, would you surrender?

No!

You’re forgetting that when you don’t lose, you win. In our marble example, you will expect to lose $53 on every 100 draws, but you offset this loss by winning $47 out of every 100 draws. So, your net result after 100 draws will be a loss of only $6. If you surrender 50¢ on all 100 draws, you will lose $50 instead of losing only $6! So, just because you know you’re going to lose more than 50 percent on a specified hand does not make it a surrender decision. No way!

What percentage of your hands do you have to expect to lose before you would be better off surrendering half your bet?

Consider the marbles…

If I had 60 black marbles (losses) and 40 white marbles (wins), what would be my net result from 100 draws?

-60 + 40 = -$20.

Still not enough black marbles to make surrendering a wise decision. What about 70 black marbles and 30 white ones?

-70 + 30 = -$40.

Still not enough black marbles. How about 75 black marbles and 25 white ones?

-75 + 25 = -$50.

Aha!

This is our break-even point, where 100 draws would result in the same expectation (-$50) as 100 surrender decisions.

Since 75 is exactly 3 x 25, then you know that surrendering half your bet is the optimal strategy decision only if you will lose more than three times as many hands as you will win!

With cards, instead of marbles, the math is not so simple because some hands will push, and we don’t know the precise win/loss percentages for Seven, Eight versus Seven without a more detailed analysis showing all of the possible player totals versus all of the possible dealer totals. But the simple fact remains that unless you expect to lose more than three times more often than you expect to win — don’t surrender.

If you want to work out all of the possible outcomes yourself, use a computer to cycle through all of the possible hands, because there are many thousands of possibilities. You could spend months trying to figure out what to do with 15 versus 7.

Instead, trust the dozens of mathematicians and computer programmers who have all come to the same conclusion — don’t surrender that hand. It’s true you will lose more than 50% of these hands. But you will not lose more than three times as often as you will win. And that’s how you determine your surrender basic strategy. ♠