An ambitious new card counter recently asked me what I thought was the most important trait for a blackjack player to have to ensure his success—math ability, or a good memory?
I told him I didn’t think either of those talents was the single most important trait for a successful blackjack player. Most of the successful pros I know are pretty good at math and memory, or at least, they worked at those things long enough to get sharper than most people. But I do know some very successful players who are far from exceptionally gifted in those areas, and they’d be the first to admit it.
“So, do you think it’s the art of deception that’s the most important thing?” he asked. “Does it all come down to acting and the ability to fool the pit?”
“Well,” I said, “con artistry is important, too, but it’s not the most important factor.”
“Then it’s got to be connections,” he said. “You’ve got to know the right people, right?”
“No,” I said. ”That has nothing to do with it.”
“But if you don’t know the right people,” he said, “you’re never going to learn the top secret methods the pros are using. And that’s what it really comes down to, isn’t it… knowing the big secrets?”
“Well, not really,” I said. “There’s enough information out there that anyone dedicated enough can pretty much figure the big secrets out.”
“Now don’t tell me it’s money,” he said. “I don’t want to think it all hinges on whether or not you’ve got the big bankroll. That’s depressing.”
“No, no, that’s not it. You’re going the wrong way with this thing. I’d have to say the biggest factor that would contribute to any gambler’s chance for success—and I don’t think any gambler could really make it very far professionally without it—is love.”
“Love?” he said. “What’s love got to do with it?”
“You have to love winning,” I said.
“Are you sure you’re using the right word, Arnold?”
“If there was a stronger word,” I said, “I’d use it. But that’s the only word that fits. Nick the Greek once said that the only thing better than gambling and winning was gambling and losing. No wonder he died broke. No successful professional gambler could possibly utter such nonsense. I don’t know who said that winning isn’t everything, it’s the only thing, but that would be the guy who would make it as a gambler.
“A successful gambler doesn’t just want to win. He doesn’t just hope to win. He doesn’t just like winning. He loves winning, and he loves it so much, he can’t live without it.”
If a player tells me he wants more than anything in the world to be a professional gambler, I can predict his chance of success within a very short conversation with him, just by asking him a few questions about his life. You can predict your own chance of success at gambling if you read the next few paragraphs carefully, and consider how they apply to you…
Every successful gambler I know has spent his life winning. He didn’t win because he was lucky. He won because it was the most important thing for him to do to have any satisfaction at all in this world. When he played Monopoly as a kid, he won. If he played sports, he won. If he entered a project in the science fair, he won.
But don’t think a successful gambler spends his life winning because he’s good at everything. He’s not, and he knows it. He spends his life winning because he concentrates his time and energy on whatever he wants to win at.
Oftentimes, he picks things he’s already good at. If he’s good at video games, and he likes playing video games, his entire life will revolve around video games. He couldn’t care less about his grades in school, provided he can beat any kid in his class on a PlayStation.
Successful gamblers tend to be selfish. They want to do what they enjoy doing, and they have no desire to waste their time doing anything else. In fact, if he’s not particularly good at video games—he just doesn’t have the natural hand-eye coordination—but he really likes playing video games more than anything else, he will become obsessive about acquiring the skill he needs to beat any kid on the block at the games he likes. No normal kid would even imagine the private hours he would spend just to make winning look easy.
Pro gamblers tend to be workaholics. They spend every waking moment working on their next win. Mentally, they never stop moving in the direction of their goals.
If they’re poker players, when they’re not at the tables, they are constantly replaying hands in their heads.
If they’re blackjack players, they’re practicing how to track a new shuffle. Or they’re analyzing the advantage they can get when they can see the hole cards on a Three Card Poker game. Or they’re out there scouting for flashers.
Winning is so important to a gambler that he refuses to waste any time at all on any endeavor he can’t win at. If he likes school, then he’s going to Harvard, or Stanford, or MIT, and most likely he’s going on an academic scholarship.
If he doesn’t care much for school (like me), he’ll probably be collecting bowling trophies, or beating the sharks at the local pool hall. He’ll resign himself to getting C’s and D’s in school, because he’s not going to bust his ass for B’s for something he doesn’t enjoy. Whatever he does, he’s going to win.
Who said it doesn’t matter if you win or lose, it’s how you play the game? Not a professional gambler.
Most people are trained throughout their lives to accept being losers. They probably had various talents in various areas, things they were naturally good at, but they didn’t focus on those things; they followed the programs set up by their parents and their schools and their peer groups. If they were getting mostly A’s and B’s in school, but a C+ in physical science, they’d buckle down and cram on physical science to get it up to a B-, even if they hated physical science.
Losers strive to be “well-rounded.” Winners concentrate on dominating in the areas of their strengths. They don’t give a damn about being well-rounded. They just want to win at what they do.
When it comes to casino gambling, pros don’t look for games where they can just get an edge. They look for games they can crush. They want to destroy a game, annihilate it, kill it. And this is how they describe their exploits at the tables.
So, what are your chances of success as a professional gambler?
Well, have you already spent your life winning? I don’t care what you’ve been winning at, and it doesn’t have to be gambling. It could be Scrabble or darts or picking up girls. Have you been winning all your life at what you do?
If you enter a casino feeling like you hope to get an advantage over the house and maybe pick up some bucks, this is like aiming for all B’s in school. You might be able to make some money at blackjack if you apply yourself, but I wouldn’t bet on your making it at as a pro. If you want to crush the casino, destroy the game they offer, kill it—well, emotions that powerful can only come from one thing—love.
If you are a blackjack player who side-counts aces and uses a balanced, ace-neutral primary count, the Victor Insurance Parameter (VIP) can improve your game. The Victor Insurance Parameter is defined as the running count divided by the number of unseen aces. It provides a much simpler and more accurate assessment of the insurance situation than the customary match-up of true count and insurance index.
Like many blackjack card-counting techniques, traditional insurance decision-making is both cumbersome and imprecise. It involves estimates of undealt cards, true-count computations, and multiple indices for different numbers of decks — while still failing to account for the impact of ace-density. Yet as the Victor Insurance Parameter demonstrates, this unwieldy process can be avoided entirely. For ace side-counters, implausible as it may seem, the size of the remaining pack (or shoe), the true count, and the original number of decks in play are all immaterial to an optimal insurance decision.
An insurance bet is indicated whenever the VIP exceeds the applicable “threshold-value,” which varies from one counting system to another. But the appropriate threshold-value for a given system is the same regardless of the number of decks in play. In the infrequent event that there are no unseen aces, insurance should be taken on any positive count.
In his excellent article, A Theoretical Basis for the Victor Insurance Parameter, ET Fan not only presents an elegant mathematical proof of the validity of the VIP concept, but also identifies a simple method for determining the optimal threshold-value for any balanced, ace-neutral counting system. Additionally, he provides exact threshold-values for several of those systems:
Although insurance should be taken whenever the VIP exceeds the applicable threshold-value, an alternative, equivalent (and possibly easier) guideline is available for several of the above systems:
For Hi-Opt I: Insure when 1.5 times the running count exceeds the number of unseen aces.
For the Canfield count: Insure when 1.2 times the running count exceeds the number of unseen aces.
For Omega II: Insure when 75% of the running count exceeds the number of unseen aces.
For the Victor APC: Insure when 55% of the running count exceeds the number of unseen aces.
To summarize, these are the ways in which the Victor Insurance Parameter can benefit a capable ace side-counter:
1. It eliminates the need to estimate (or mis-estimate) the size of the remaining pack and compute the true count. The ace side-counter already knows the number of unseen aces.
2. It’s independent of the original number of decks in play. There’s no need for multiple indices; one size fits all.
3. It fully accounts for the impact of aces as non-tens, a factor that cannot be addressed without an ace side-count.
4. It not only eliminates errors of estimation, but also adds roughly two percentage points to the insurance correlation of any balanced, ace-neutral counting system. For example, the insurance correlation of Omega II rises from 85% to 87%, while the Victor APC’s insurance correlation goes from 89% to 91% with the VIP.
On average, the dealer will show an ace once every 13 hands — so it’s no small matter to be able to evaluate those situations quickly and accurately. The Victor Insurance Parameter is your shortest path to insurance efficiency. ♠
The Victor Insurance Parameter (VIP) system for the insurance decision is breathtaking in its simplicity and power. It almost makes me want to switch to an ace-neutral balanced count, instead of my not-broken-don’t-fix-it hi-lo. However, I had some difficulty understanding the arguments behind it in the library here. (I have trouble going directly from verbiage to hard numbers, without the intervening equations.)
The essence of the VIP method, as put forth by its inventor Rich Victor, is that the insurance decision shall rely solely on the running count (RC) divided by the number of unseen aces. If this results in a value greater than “the threshold,” then insurance is taken. This threshold is the same, regardless of the number of decks in the shoe, so it works the same for 8 decks as it works for pitch. With the VIP system there is no need whatsoever to estimate the size of the remaining shoe, and no need to do a true count conversion! Yet accuracy is actually improved for the insurance decision.
The purpose of this article is to put the VIP on a sound mathematical footing by sketching a proof showing it is precisely equivalent to the conventional (Griffin) method of combining a primary count with an ace side count. In the process I learned some interesting things, including a very simple way to calculate optimal threshold values. People uninterested in abstruse mathematics may wish to skip down to expression 11) where the main conclusions are presented along with thresholds for some popular counts.
We’ll start with the Griffin method, and simplify to VIP. We have a balanced, ace-neutral primary count (e.g. Hi-Opt I or the Victor APC) and we keep a side count of aces. According to the expression on pg. 64 of The Theory of Blackjack by Griffin, the correct adjustment of the primary running count for each extra or deficient blocked card is:
1) 52/(52-k) x ∑kE/k x ∑13Y2/ ∑13YE
Now we are looking at the insurance decision, so the E’s are just the effects of removal for insurance. Ie. 4/221 4/221 4/221 4/221 4/221 4/221 4/221 4/221 4/221 -9/221 for the ten ranks. k = 4 for the four aces, so ∑kE/k = 4/221, and the Y’s are just the tags for our primary count. Using these facts, plus the fact that for a balanced count, ∑9Y = -4 x tag10 , expression 1) simplifies to this:
2) -∑13Y2 / (12 x tag10)
I have dubbed this quantity w, for ace weight. w is generally a positive number, since tag10 is generally negative.
Our insurance criterion then looks like this:
3) {RC – (surplus aces) x w} / d > index
Where RC is the Running Count, w is the weight from 2), d is the number of unseen decks remaining (not necessarily an integer), and index is our insurance index. Looks simple enough, eh?
However, this index should not be exactly the same as the regular insurance index sold with the primary count. That insurance index is generally dependent on the number of decks we’re facing, in order to accurately adjust for effects of removal of one ace. In other words, you know the dealer is showing an ace when you’re making an insurance decision! But we are already counting all the aces in our side count. So the correct index to use is the index for an infinite deck. In that way, the one ace will have no effect (until you bring in your secondary side count), but your true count will still have an effect, since you’ve obviously counted infinitely many cards to achieve that TC (math head guffaw here).
To make things simple, I’ll calculate this infinite deck index based on a 52 card pack, and just ignore the removal of any aces. The calculation works out proportionately, for any number of decks up to infinity.
According to the principle of proportional deflection (see Grffin pg. 109, or the argument on pg. 63) the expected number of cards of rank i, for a given true count with 52 cards unseen, is:
4) 4 – tagi x TC / ∑13Y2
Specifically, for the tens (i = 10 to 13), the expected number is:
5) (4 – tag10 x TC / ∑13Y2 ) x 4
And the expected number of non-tens is:
6) 52 – (4 – tag10 x TC / ∑13Y2 ) x 4
If we take insurance, we win 2 bets when a ten is in the hole, and lose 1 bet when a non-ten is in the hole. We would like to take insurance when our expectation is positive. So our criterion for taking insurance is:
7) (4 – tag10 x TC / ∑13Y2 ) x 4 x 2 – {52 – (4 – tag10 x TC / ∑13Y2 ) x 4} > 0
Solving for TC, our insurance index is:
8) TC = -4 x ∑13Y2 / (12 x tag10)
Exactly 4 times as large as 2) — our expression for w. So we can rewrite 3) thus:
9) {RC – (surplus aces) x w} / d > 4w
We’re almost there! Naturally now, the expected number of aces is 4d. Let’s call the total number of unseen aces remaining in the shoe: aces (original, huh?) So the number of surplus aces is (aces – 4d), and 9) becomes:
10) {RC – (aces – 4d) x w} / d > 4w
Which simplifies to:
(RC – aces x w) / d + 4w > 4w
(RC – aces x w) / d > 0
And since d is always positive …
11) RC > aces x w
Ta Dah!!!! d drops out, and we no longer have to estimate the number of decks in the hopper to make our insurance decisions. And the “threshold” is simply w — the weight prescribed by Griffin for adjusting a balanced ace-neutral count for a side count of aces. We can calculate w very easily for any set of tags, using expression 2).
It seems appropriate to use the Victor APC as an example. To find the threshold, w = -∑13Y2 / (12 x tag10), we note the tags for the VAPC are: 0 2 2 2 3 2 2 0 -1 -3, so the sum of squares for the tags (∑13Y2 , remembering to multiply by 4 for the tens tag) is: 22 x 5 + 32 + (-1)2 + (-3)2 x 4 = 66. So w = -66 / (12 x (-3)) = 11/6 = 1.8333…
We will take insurance any time our Running Count is more than 1.8 times the number of unseen aces in the shoe. (It may be permissable to round the threshold down slightly, since insurance is often a variance reducer.)
Now that we have shown that the VIP is equivalent to the conventional Griffin method, we can assert that the VIP insurance correlations can be calculated with the formula for multiple correlations exemplified on pg. 62 of Theory of Blackjack, assuming we have valid thresholds. It turns out the insurance correlations are increased from the primary counts by approximately 2% in each case.
The thresholds for a few popular counts are listed below (without rounding):
Canfield (0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 -1 -1): 5/6
Hi-Opt I (0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 -1): 2/3
Hi-Opt II (0 1 1 2 2 1 1 0 0 -2): 7/6
Omega II (0 1 1 2 2 2 1 0 -1 -2): 4/3
Uston APC (0 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 -1 -3): 16/9
Victor APC (0 2 2 2 3 2 2 0 -1 -3): 11/6
For fun, here is a level 1 count with a threshold of exactly one:
(0 1 1 1 1 1 1 -1 -1 -1): 1
I don’t recommend this count, but if you use it, you can take insurance any time your RC exceeds the number of unseen aces. Same goes for this level 2 count:
[Editor’s Note: I don’t often see new card counting systems that are truly original and offer something of genuine value for players, and I am especially cautious about recommending higher level counts, but I consider this one promising.
For a level three system, Rich Victor’s chosen count values do offer surprising simplicity, as he explains, when counting two- and three-card combinations. In the original version of this article published in 1995, strategy indices were not included, but the author has provided them in this 2005 update of his system. –Arnold Snyder]
If you are unwilling or unable to accurately compute a true count at the blackjack table, the Victor Advanced Point Count (or “Victor APC”) is not for you. For everyone else who aspires to be a successful card-counter, but especially those who can properly use an ace side-count, the Victor APC is worth a close look. It combines level-three accuracy with nearly level-one simplicity.
The Victor APC came into being when I was studying the Uston APC in 1991. I noted that the seven denominations of cards below nine were assigned three distinct values: +1, +2 and +3. This made it necessary both to specifically identify every small card by denomination and to memorize the point-values of dozens of different two-card combinations, since most cards are counted in pairs. It occurred to me that the counting process would be greatly simplified by eliminating the +1’s, which could be accomplished quite easily by upgrading the deuces to +2 and downgrading the eights to zero.
Not only would those adjustments maintain a balanced (13-point) count, but the playing efficiency would suffer very little and the betting correlation would actually improve. These assumptions, initially based on the respective removal values of deuces and eights as listed in Peter Griffin’s The Theory of Blackjack (1988 edition), were confirmed by calculations under Griffin’s formulas for playing efficiency and betting correlation. Specifically, the playing efficiency fell only one percentage point, from 69% to 68%, while the betting correlation rose from 91% to 92% without ace adjustments and from 98% to better than 99% with ace adjustments. (For betting purposes only, each ace “rich” adds 3 to the running count, and each ace “poor” reduces the running count by 3.)
The simplicity of the Victor APC hinges on a critical mental adjustment. You need to think of the denominations below eight as either fives (counted as +3) or “smalls” (counted as +2). After a little practice, deuces and sixes, for example, will begin to “look alike” for counting purposes, just as certain small cards look alike (and have like values) in level-one systems.
Once the “fives and smalls” mindset is firmly in place, you can turn your attention to the values of the various two-card combinations; i.e., those that do not contain any aces or eights (the only zero-value cards). Unlike the Uston APC, the Victor count has only 10 two-card combinations without zero-value cards:
5 – 5 = +6 5 – s = +5 s – s = +4 5 – 9 = +2 s – 9 = +1 5 – T = 0 s – T = -1 9 – 9 = -2 9 – T = -4 T – T = -6
Additionally, these three-card combinations are well worth mastering:
s – s – T = +1 s – T – T = -4
The Victor count has an insurance correlation of 89%. The insurance index per half-deck is 2.8 for single-deck and 3.2 for double-deck. No insurance index is needed for shoe games; just insure when 30% of the running count exceeds the number of half-decks remaining in the shoe. In hand-held or shoe games, ace side-counters can increase the insurance correlation to 91% by following a different guideline: Insure when 55% of the running count exceeds the number of unseen aces. (Alternatively, insurance should be taken when the running count divided by the number of unseen aces exceeds 1.83.)
The strategy tables that accompany this article are geared to six-deck games, but the indices for four, six or eight decks are essentially the same. To avoid fractions, full-deck indices are displayed in the tables, but you are strongly encouraged to compute the true count per half-deck for greater accuracy. If you use half-deck computations, just divide each index in the tables by two.
If you’re not inclined to side-count aces, the Victor APC’s 68% playing efficiency will still prove very effective in single-deck games. But for ace side-counters, the 99%-plus betting correlation of the ace-adjusted Victor count will put you at a significant advantage regardless of the number of decks in play.
Side-counting is somewhat discouraged by Bishop Snyder and other blackjack notables on the grounds that it’s too difficult in relation to the modest gain it brings. That may be sound advice for the average player, but for the mathematically adept, utilizing an ace side-count is relatively easy and the rewards considerable. For most players, the alternative to side-counting is to use a primary count that assigns a non-zero value to aces. Including aces in the primary count typically produces a fairly good betting correlation but decidedly inferior playing efficiency.
Just how easy is it to side-count aces? Well, you can do it on one hand. Simply re-position your thumb on one or another of your fingers every time an ace appears. Your fingertips represent the first four aces; intermediate joints of each finger are markers for aces 5 through 8; and the bottoms of each finger signify 9 through 12. The next 12 aces are recorded in the same sequence as the first 12; and aces 25-32 (in eight-deck games) are marked just like the first eight.
If you’re able to handle the finger-mechanics described above, as well as ace-adjusting the running count for betting, the Victor APC will reward you with a near-perfect betting correlation and much better playing efficiency than if your primary count included aces.
In case you’re wondering how the Victor APC stacks up against the highly regarded Omega II, here’s the comparison: Victor has a far superior insurance correlation (89% to 85%), slightly better playing efficiency (68% to 67%), and a higher betting correlation by a hair (both 92% without ace adjustments and 99%-plus with ace adjustments).
More significantly, Omega II has the same drawback as the Uston APC, Wong’s Halves, and most any other multi-level system except the Victor APC: the need to memorize dozens of two-card combinations. Am I saying that my level-three system is not only more accurate but also easier to master than Omega II, the king of the level-twos? Absolutely.
Your current counting system is almost surely less accurate — and quite possibly more difficult — than the Victor count. Why not move up to the Victor APC and a higher win rate? ♠
VICTOR APC STRATEGY CHARTS
STAND
Stand
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
T
A
17
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
-15/-12
16
-21
S
S
S
S
20
19
11
0
20/9
15
-14
-17
-20
S
S
27
29
23
9
24/14
14
-8
-11
-14
-17
-16/-21
34
38
34
18
28/19
13
-1
-5
-8
-11
-10/-15
52
52
44
30
39/30
12
8
4
0
-3
-2/-7
H
H
H
56
58/48
Soft 18*
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
H
H
3/20
* Three or more cards
DOUBLE DOWN, HARD TOTALS
Hard Totals
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
T
A
11
D
D
D
D
D
D
-16
-10
-10
3/0
10
-21
D
D
D
D
-16
-12
-5
11
10/8
9
2
-2
-7
-11
-15
9
20
H
H
H
8
32
21
14
9
4
H
H
H
H
H
DOUBLE DOWN, SOFT TOTALS
Soft Totals
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
T
A
(A,9)
26
21
16
13
11/10
S
S
S
S
S
(A,8)
19
12
8
4
2/-1
S
S
S
S
S
(A,7)
1
-5
-11
-18
-18/D
S
S
H
H
3*/20*
(A,6)
2
-7
-13
D
D
H
H
H
H
H
(A,5)
25
6
-4
-13
D
H
H
H
H
H
(A,4)
29
11
1
-8
-17/-19
H
H
H
H
H
(A,3)
32
15
4
-4
-10/-12
H
H
H
H
H
(A,2)
29
16
7
1
-4/-6
H
H
H
H
H
* Hit below the index, stand at or above the index
PAIR SPLITS WITH DOUBLE AFTER SPLITS
Pairs
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
T
A
(A,A)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
-21
-19
-17
-19
-8/-10
(T,T)
26
20
16
13
11/10
N
N
N
N
N
(9,9)
-8
-10
-14
-18
-18/Y
9
Y
Y
N
9/4
(8,8)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
111
Y
(7,7)
-20
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
72
N
N
N
(6,6)
-5
-10
-15
-20
Y
Y3
N
N
N
N
(5,5)
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
(4,4)
N
17
7
-2
-5/-7
N
N
N
N
N
(3,3)
-1
-17
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y3
N
N
N
(2,2)
-8
-13
-17
Y
-13/-10
Y
11
N
N
N
PAIR SPLITS NO DOUBLE AFTER SPLITS
Pairs
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
T
A
(A,A)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
-8/-10
(T,T)
26
20
16
13
11/10
N
N
N
N
N
(9,9)
-4
-6
Y
Y
Y
14
Y
Y
N
10/6
(8,8)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
71
Y
(7,7)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
(6,6)
4
-1
-6
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
(5,5)
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
(4,4)
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
(3,3)
N
10
-1
-8
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
(2,2)
N
10
-4
-8
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
LATE SURRENDER (S17 ONLY)
Surrender (Late)
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
T
A
17
26
26
16
9
-1
-8
-4
8-8
14
2
8-7
17
7
0
5
9-6, T-5
15
6
-1
4
14
24
12
8
11
7-7
20
10
6
9
7-6, 8-5
20
12
20
9-4, T-3
24
15
24
S = Stand, H = Hit, D = Double Down (if doubling not available, then hit), Y = Split, N = Don’t split
1 = Split if below this index 2 = One-deck always split 3 = One-deck only
Note: Table entries with slashes “/” indicate different decision numbers for Dealer Stand Soft 17 and Dealer Hit Soft 17 games, in format S/H. For example, 2/1 would mean that the index is 2 if the Dealer Stands on Soft 17, or 1 if the Dealer Hits Soft 17.
Las Vegas, Nevada. Sometime in the year 2000. Max Rubin’s Blackjack Ball.
The new millennium had just kicked in and, for the first time in my life, I had made the final four. For a blackjack player, this was an honor beyond compare.
Max announced the next event — throwing a playing card into a bowl from a distance of ten feet.
I remembered the stories of the legendary Titanic Thompson, who could fling cards into a hat from a distance of 30 feet. And Ricky Jay, the actor, magician, and eccentric author of Cards As Weapons, who could sail playing cards hundreds of feet across an auditorium to hit a target.
Ten feet.
Ten measly feet.
As much of an honor as it was to be in the final four, I really didn’t want to end up fourth. The contest was set up as a pari-mutuel event, with the top three finishers—win, place, and show—in the money. To come in fourth was no better than coming in fortieth as far as the payout, which was zilch. And, with this crowd, the only thing that mattered was the payout. Two of those present—including my date—had put their money on me. I didn’t want to let my fans down.
Ten feet.
Ten measly feet.
I swaggered up to the starting line and, with a devil-may-care flick of my wrist, launched an eight of clubs toward that bowl that appeared to be so close I could almost reach out and touch it.
The eight of clubs did not cooperate. Like an autumn leaf on a windy October day in Michigan, it flitted and fluttered in the air, deciding in the last moments of its wavering descent to reverse direction. It came to rest on the floor behind my foot—a full eleven feet from that bowl that was just ten feet away.
A small voice in the otherwise hushed crowd summed it up perfectly. “That was pathetic, Arnold.”
My bruised ego was salved by the equally feeble efforts of the next two contestants. Alas, it is not easy to hit a target with a playing card, even at a measly ten feet. My forlorn look was slowly transforming into a smile of smug satisfaction.
Then Bradley Peterson approached the starting line. Max handed him a six of hearts and cautioned him to keep his feet behind the line.
Bradley shrugged, then casually crumpled that six of hearts in his fist, until it was a small, tight projectile. Just as casually, he tossed it into that beckoning bowl that had proven so elusive to the rest of us. No flitter. No flutter. At that distance, who could miss?
That same small voice in the hushed crowd once again broke the silence. “Is that fair?”
But we all knew it was just as fair as glimpsing a dealer’s hole card, or check-raising with the nuts. This was war, and in love and war, all is fair.
Although Bradley scored all the points for that round, I did ultimately manage to show in the competition, and I was ecstatic to finish in the money. I took third place by beating a professional card counter in the left-handed arm-wrestling event. I no longer remember exactly what Max’s justification for this event was—I mean, all of the contests were supposed to have some kind of a gambling angle. I only remember looking at the puny twerp I was going to be arm-wrestling with, knowing in advance that although he was earning half-a-million a year from the casinos, he was about to lose his shot at the hallowed Blackjack Cup that probably meant more to him than money.
Bradley didn’t win that year either, and the following year Max instructed all contestants in the card-throwing competition that they could not “alter” the shape or form of the playing card. Kind of like a casino installing auto-peek devices after a spooking team had already beaten their brains in.
But none of those present at the millennium Blackjack Ball ever forgot the lesson that Bradley taught us: the most important trait of the professional gambler is versatility.
In my Sermon in the last issue of this esteemed mag, “Girls Just Wanna Have Fun,” (BJF Spring 2002) I said there was one big factor that separated the pros from the wannabes—persistence, the only thing that overcomes the whims of fluctuation.
But the truth is for every long-run winner, there are hundreds of persistent losers. If you persist in any game with a negative EV, persistence is your enemy, not your salvation. And if you play just well enough to kill the house edge, like Sisyphus, you can persist in going nowhere. More important than persistence for anyone trying to beat the odds for a living is versatility. You’ve got to be able to change with the times, adapt to the games, and let your strategies evolve with the playing conditions.
Johnny Moss, the poker legend, and the only three-time champion of the World Series of Poker, didn’t start out his gambling career as a poker player. Moss spent twenty years of his youth hustling golf. He only turned to poker in his later years, when the younger golfers could drive farther and had better eyesight than he did.
To the average person, golf and poker may seem like extremely different activities. Skill at one would not necessarily translate to skill at the other. To Johnny Moss, however, they weren’t really all that different. In his youth, though he’d developed a considerable level of skill at golf, he had never thought of himself as the world’s greatest golfer. Instead, his talent lay in sizing up his opponents, matching his strengths against their weaknesses, and getting them to bet against him only when he had the best of it. That is how he beat a lot of better golfers out of a lot of money.
Poker is a game where, in the long run, everybody gets the same percentage of good hands and bad hands. The successful pros are the players who can read their opponents and make those with stronger hands fold, while keeping the weaker hands in the game. To Johnny Moss, there wasn’t much difference between winning money from golfers and winning money from card players. He simply adapted to conditions.
For blackjack players, this ability to adapt is just as crucial. When Thorp exposed the secrets of card counting in the 60s, it took a few years for the casinos to catch on. But they did catch on. All pit bosses today know basic strategy, and they know the common changes from basic that card counters make.
For a while, the casinos felt they were safe again when they started dealing shoe games. Thorp’s ten-count wasn’t designed to work against a four-deck shoe—it was just too difficult to apply at game speed. But the pros turned to easier point-count systems, to Lawrence Revere’s revolutionary “true count” method, then to concealed computers, shuffle tracking, hole-card strategies, ace location—the shoe games were being attacked by pros from a dozen different directions.
The successful players will always be those who adapt to the latest conditions. Forty years after Thorp, blackjack remains one of the most beatable games in the casino. The thing is, you’re not going to be able to beat the game by using Thorp’s ten count. The game itself has simply changed too much.
Every time a gambling pro publicly reveals his methods of winning, the value of that information suddenly has a “shelf life.” That shelf life is based on how widespread the dissemination of that information is.
When Doyle Brunson published his Super System in 1978 (originally titled How I Made Over $1,000,000 Playing Poker), a book that revealed, among other things, how he played no-limit hold ’em, Brunson found almost immediately that he had to change his strategies. His opponents had all read his book, and he’d lost his edge.
Once he realized that the players who had read his book would assume he played in certain ways because his hand was strong or weak, or because he believed their hands were strong or weak, he could use their assumptions against them. He adapted.
The casinos have read all the blackjack books. They know about card counting. They know about shuffle tracking. They know about front-loading, first-basing, ace-sequencing, warps, tells, spooking—you name it, they’ve read it all. And because they’ve read all the books, they assume they know all about what all of these strategies look like. But the pro doesn’t quit because old secrets have been revealed; he uses the casinos’ assumptions against them.
An amateur blackjack player today, who has read all the books, is usually like the amateur poker player who just finished reading Brunson’s book 20 years ago. He goes out and plays “by the book,” wondering why his competition seems to be reading him like a book!
When a blackjack pro reads a book that reveals a new method of winning, his first thought is not, “Hmmm, I wonder if I should give this a try?” Instead, it’s “Hmm, interesting, but the casinos have probably read this too… How can I pull this off without looking like this is what I’m doing?”
If you play by the book, you’ll never make it as a professional gambler. You’ve got to write your own book, and then, whatever you do, DON’T PUBLISH IT! If you don’t have the versatility to adapt quickly to changing conditions, give it up. Go play golf. But just don’t bet serious money against golfers you feel sure you can beat. I hear Tommy Hyland spends a lot of time on the links these days. ♠
10. Dealers and other players start asking you where you work.
9. You actually come close to using some of those comp show tickets.
8. The teller at your bank’s local branch no longer asks for your ID.
7. Although your standards for “dirty” continue to slide, you have a laundry near a casino you think of as “yours.”
6. You’ve awakened from at least one dream where you were held hostage by a gun-wielding Debby Reynolds, Wayne Newton, or Steve Wynn.
5. You need an extra suitcase for your stash of hotel toiletries.
4. Daily fluffing and buffing seems like too much trouble. As you abandon shaving, make-up, and jewelry, your reflection looks amazingly like the stereotypical counter.
3. You take to carrying a hotel shower cap for surreptitiously wrapping buffet brownies to take to your room.
2. You’ve been to a mall—even if it was just to buy clean underwear. (drum roll, please)
1. You’ve stopped ordering an appetizer and dessert with every entrée when on a coffee shop comp.
—Rebecca Richfield (who didn’t reach this stage till week nine.) ♠
On September 19, 1987, in his rented vacation apartment in Paris, France, Ken Uston was found dead of an apparent heart attack. French authorities reported that no foul play was suspected. His death was attributed to natural causes. His long-time friend and business manager, Jerry Fuerle, was quoted in the Las Vegas Review-Journal, as commenting, “His lifestyle just caught up with him.”
His body was cremated, and his ashes were flown back to the U.S. At the time of his death, Uston was working as a computer consultant for the Kuwaiti government, and writing a book about his experiences in the Middle-East.
The blackjack world has lost its most flamboyant, most famous, and most controversial character.
Three weeks prior to Uston’s death, I had the pleasure of meeting attorney and author I. Nelson Rose (Gambling and the Law, Gambling Times, 1986), at the Seventh International Conference on Gambling and Risk-Taking in Reno. Rose revealed to me that he had helped Ken in his futile legal battle to prohibit the Nevada casinos from barring card counters.
Rose worked for Uston’s cause anonymously and without pay. “I did it,” Rose said, “because I believed in what he was doing. The only ‘pay’ I asked from him was an afternoon of his time, so that we could go around to different Las Vegas casinos and play blackjack together. That was worth it to me. I wanted to be able to tell my grandchildren that I’d played blackjack with Ken Uston. He’s a legend.”
In 1986, I myself spent a summer afternoon playing blackjack with Ken Uston. I was staying at the Circus Circus in Las Vegas and Uston was at his home away from his San Francisco home at the Vegas Jockey Club. I had been doing consulting work for Ken on a number of projects and he’d told me to call him when I was in Vegas because he wanted to show me his new “big player” act.
“I want you to see this, Arnold,” he said, “but you can’t write about it.”
So I called him when I got to town. I told him I was at the Circus Circus.
“Great,” he said. “I’ll be there in an hour. I’ll be down in the blackjack pit. When you find me, call me ‘Tommy.’ That’s the name I’m using. Tommy Thompson. Circus Circus is one of my favorite casinos these days. Nobody knows me there. I took thirty-five hundred bucks out of there last week.”
I couldn’t imagine Ken Uston playing for big money in Circus Circus. High rollers were such a rare sight at their mostly $2 tables. But then, I’d never seen Ken Uston in action.
It took me half an hour just to find him. I’d known him personally for years, but I had never seen him before without his beard. The only way I did find him was by hearing his voice. He had a very distinctive voice. He was yelling for a cocktail, “. . . and make it a double!”
He was a sight to behold, this man who held degrees from both Harvard and Yale, one time Vice President of the Pacific Stock Exchange. It was Uston’s voice, but it was coming from a pathetic looking bum — a clown of a figure with a two-day growth of stubble, a rumpled plaid shirt, dirt under his finger nails.
I approached the table hesitantly.
He jumped out of his seat when he saw me. “Arnold,” he beamed. “Sit down! I’ll buy you dinner if I can just get my damn money back. Shit, this always happens on payday. These bastards take everything I make!”
I sat down at the half-full table and put a nickel chip in my betting circle. Uston was playing two hands, at $200 each. “How are you doing, Tommy?” I asked.
“Man, it was hot down there today,” Ken went on. “No matter what the temperature is here in Vegas, it’s twenty degrees hotter down in them sump pits at the Hoover Dam. I gotta find a better job, man. I hear they’re hiring busboys down at the El Cortez, but the pay is shit. Man, it’s gotta be better than cleaning out them smelly sump pits.”
I had no idea what a sump pit was. I wondered where this otherwise meticulous man – who had never done a day’s hard labor to my knowledge – had found dirt to put under his fingernails. In the potted plants at the Jockey Club? It was difficult for me to contain my laughter. He went on like this for half-an-hour, complaining about his demeaning job and his gambling losses, belting down drinks, spreading his bets from $5 to two hands of $200 each.
There was no heat. He was scaring tourists away from the table almost as soon as they’d sit down, but the pit boss didn’t seem to mind – not the way this seemingly foolhardy loser was throwing his rent money on the table. Well, Kenny, you were one-of-a-kind. I number myself among those who are honored to have played at the same table with you. There are few who lived life as fully as you did. You were always David fighting innumerable Goliaths. And more often than not, you won. We’ll miss you, Ken. ♠
For Ken Uston’s amusing account of his blackjack team play, see his book The Big Player. For more stories about great professional gamblers, see The Big Book of Blackjack by Arnold Snyder.
[Editor’s Note: The complete Over/Under Report is now available free at the link below. I’m posting this article under Blackjack History because it describes how exciting and valuable this side-bet was to card counters in the early years of its existence. It also provides some of the early computer simulations of the bet in various games with various numbers of decks. I’m not aware of any casinos that still offer this bet, although there is an occasional report of a casino that offers it with a continuous shuffle machine, making the counting system irrelevant. – A.S.]
It’s been a year and a half now since I published my Over/Under Report. Since that time, the number of casinos offering the over/under rule at their blackjack tables has continued to climb. Not a few serious players have also discovered the many cruise ships that are offering the over-under rule.
Since cruise ship games are typically heat-free, allowing min-to-max spreads without countermeasures, card counters who can afford $100 bets are finding that the potential win on “cruises to nowhere” more than justifies the cruise expense. Prior to the introduction of the over/under rule, the otherwise lousy rules on cruise ships, always in shoe games and usually with unexceptional penetration, failed to attract serious players.
According to Caesars Tahoe pit boss, Ken Perrie, who invented the over/under rule and markets the distinctive over/under table layout, more and more casinos all over the world will be opening over/under tables in the near future.
The Huxley Corporation (London) handles marketing of the over/under rule in foreign casinos. They report sales of over/under table layouts to casinos in Yugoslavia, Poland, Turkey, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, Canada and the Isle of Man.
Ken Perrie is currently negotiating with casinos in the Bahamas and Aruba to begin testing the over/under rule on some tables. He has also been negotiating with all of the Atlantic City casinos to begin field testing over/under games. Two riverboat casinos running out of Iowa now have the over/under rule on all blackjack tables—the President’s Cruise Line and the Dubuque Belle.
There are also 10 to 20 over/under tables scattered throughout various of the Deadwood, South Dakota casinos. As previously reported, the Ojibwa Indian Reservation Casino in upper Michigan also has over/under tables.
All of the blackjack tables on the Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines ships now offer over/under bets, as do all tables on the Dolphin Cruise Lines. The Carnival Cruise Lines have some over/under tables available on all ships. The Norwegian Cruise lines, Kloster Cruise Lines, Atlantic Maritime Cruise Lines, and Princess Cruise Lines offer over/under games on some, but not all, ships.
In Northern Nevada, you’ll find over/under tables at Caesars Tahoe, Hyatt Lake Tahoe, and coming soon to Harrah’s (Stateline), Harvey’s and the Horizon (formerly High Sierra). In Reno, over/under bets are still offered on all tables at the Comstock Casino and on one two-decker at the Peppermill. The Comstock has recently undergone a management change, and according to one dealer, their over/under games will be restricted to the new shoe games they are installing.
Bally’s has taken out one of their two over/under tables and the other is reportedly open only in the evenings. You’ll also find an over/under table at Stockmans (in Fallon) and at the Red Garter (in Wendover).
In Las Vegas, you’ll find over/under tables at Caesars Palace, the Golden Nugget (which has more over/under tables coming—hopefully with higher limits!), the Holiday, Whiskey Pete’s, the Silver Nugget, and coming soon to the Tropicana.
In the fifteen years I’ve been observing casino blackjack, I don’t recall any new rule spreading so fast or so widely. The reasons for the popularity of the rule are many. It’s an easy rule for players to comprehend; it’s easy for dealers to incorporate into the game; it has no significant effect on any other aspect of the game; from the players’ perspective it’s an attractive betting option; from the casinos’ perspective, the house edge is four to five times higher on over/under bets than on the regular blackjack hand.
Frequently Asked Questions About the Over Under Report
The Over Under rule attracts amateur counters and wannabe counters like flies because it seems so easy to beat. In fact, very few over/under bettors make any money on their over/under bets. Standard blackjack card counting systems just don’t work very well for over/under bets.
I’ve been receiving many letters from players who have purchased, or are considering purchasing, my Over/Under Report. I’ve recently used John Imming’s RWC simulation software to answer the three most common technical questions I get.
Question #1: “All of the predicted win rates in your Over/Under Report are derived by mathematical analysis using your calculated effects of removal with Hi-Opt I frequency distributions. I’d love to believe your estimates, but couldn’t you run some computer simulations to back up your predictions?”
Using the RWC software to test the 1- and 2-deck Reno games, with both 67% and 75% shuffle points, what follows are the win rates after 40+ million hands each, using the Over/Under Count, as published in the Over/Under Report. I used a flat-bet strategy, a 1-to-2 spread, and a 1-to-4 spread.
RENO ONE-DECK
Flat
1-to-2
1-to-4
67% dealt:
1.66%
2.49%
3.25%
75% dealt:
2.15%
2.97%
3.62%
RENO TWO-DECK
Flat
1-to-2
1-to-4
67% dealt:
0.53%
1.12%
1.70%
75% dealt:
0.87%
1.55%
2.16%
You can see here why I advise counters in hand-held over/under games to flat bet, especially if there’s decent penetration. You can get a healthy edge with a flat bet and you’re less likely to wear out your welcome.
Caesars Tahoe has 6-deck over/under tables. They’ve also recently made their rules better: Vegas Strip rules with double after splits and late surrender (just like Caesars Palace in Las Vegas). The following chart shows what the over/under count gets in the Caesars game. The over/under count surrender indices were not published in the Over/Under Report. Use these:
OVER/UNDER COUNT SURRENDER INDICES
9
X
A
16
+1
-2
-1
15
+3
-1
+2
14
+3
CAESARS TAHOE 6-DECK
Flat
1-to-2
1-to-4
67% dealt:
0.01%
0.22%
0.57%
75% dealt:
0.18%
0.50%
0.97%
I also simulated the standard (no surrender) 8-deck Atlantic City game, with the typical 2 decks cut off (75% penetration), but I put in the over/under option:
ATLANTIC CITY 8-DECK
Flat
1-to-2
1-to-4
75% dealt:
-0.06%
0.20%
0.55%
If you compare these computer simulated win rates with those predicted in the Over/Under Report via mathematical analysis, you’ll find that the mathematical analyses were quite accurate.
The next most common question I get is: “Wouldn’t it be helpful to know the over/under indices for ‘standard’ card counting systems? I use the Hi-Lo Count, and I can’t see learning a whole new counting system for the few over/under games available. How much potential gain is there for the Hi-Lo Count with optimal over/under bets?”
Using the Hi-Lo Count, you should place the over bet if your true count is +5 or higher, and you should place the under bet if your true count is -8 or below. Let’s compare the win rates of a player using the Hi-Lo Count with and without these over/under indices in the 6-deck Caesars Tahoe game (using Wong’s Professional Blackjack strategy indices for other playing decisions), along with the win rates of a player using the Over/Under Count, as published in the Over/Under Report.
This is how the count values compare:
COMPARISON OF COUNT VALUES
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
X
A
Hi-Lo
+1
+1
+1
+1
+1
0
0
0
-1
-1
O/U
+1
+1
+1
0
0
0
0
0
-1
+1
And, these are the win rates:
CAESARS TAHOE 6-DECK (75% PEN)
Flat
1-to-2
1-to-4
Hi-Lo (no o/u)
-0.23%
+0.05%
+0.41%
Hi-Lo (with o/u)
-0.14%
+0.16%
+0.52%
O/U
+0.18%
+0.50%
+0.97%
So, in this 6-deck game, a Hi-Lo counter can get about a tenth of a percent extra if over/under bets are allowed. Hi-Lo players should note that there is virtually no gain whatsoever on the under bets.
Although the under bet should be placed at a true count of -8 or below, which rarely occurs, you should not increase your bet until your true count is -11 or below, which will almost never occur in a shoe game. Until your count gets to -11, the expected loss on your blackjack hand exceeds the expected gain on the under bet. From -8 to -10, the under bet just acts as a hedge to reduce your loss.
For this reason, if you typically table-hop with the Hi-Lo Count, you should continue to do so in over/under games, but take advantage of the over bet at +5 or higher. With the Zen Count, place the over bet at a true count of +6 or more. With Hi-Opt I, make the over bet at +4 or more.
If you side-count aces, with an ace-neutral count (like Hi-Opt I), adjust your ace into the plus count cards for over/under bets. If you side count aces with an ace-negative count (such as the Hi-Lo), double the adjustment you usually make to neutralize the ace, so that the value applied to the ace is reversed to a plus count. (If this doesn’t make sense to you, you probably shouldn’t be attempting to side count aces!)
If you find yourself playing in over/under games frequently, you should probably learn the Over/Under Count. The potential gains are that substantial.
With or without the over/under bets, a Hi-Lo counter would not want to sit through all negative counts in this 6-deck game with a small spread. An Over/Under counter may obtain a decent win rate in this game, even sitting through the negatives with a small spread. Deeper penetration would be desirable for any counter (natch!).
An Unbalanced Card Counting System for the Over Under Bet
The third most common question I get is “Can’t you develop an unbalanced running count system for the over/under bets? I’ve gotten so used to the ease of the Red 7 Count that true count adjustments and strategy tables put me off.”
The main problem here is that I can’t come up with any easy running count method that will take advantage of both the over and under bets. Using the RWC simulation analyses, however, it’s easy to see that even with the over/under count, the significant gains in multi-deck over/under games come from the over bets. Since most of the over/under games available in casinos are shoe games, we can develop running count systems for taking advantage of the over bet only.
Here are three unbalanced running count systems that will work very well on over bets in multi-deck games:
COMPARISON OF COUNT VALUES
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
X
A
Sys. 1:
+1
+1
+1
+1
0
0
0
0
-1
+1
Sys. 2:
+1
+1
+1
0
0
0
0
0
-1
+2
Sys. 3:
+2
+1
+1
0
0
0
0
-1
-1
+2
If you are familiar with the Red 7 Count (from Blackbelt in Blackjack), these counts work the same way, except that in each of these systems, the “pivot” equals 4 times the number of decks. In other words, in a 4-deck game, the pivot equals +16, while in a 2-deck game, the pivot equals +8, and so on.
All betting and strategy decisions for these counts are made at the running count pivot. In other words, at the pivot or higher, raise your bet, take insurance, place the over bet, and alter these basic strategy decisions:
Stand on 16 vs. 9, X and A
Stand on 15 vs. X
Stand on 12 vs. 2 & 3
Double down on 10 or A vs. A
Surrender 15 vs. 9 and A
Surrender 14 vs. X
Use basic strategy for all other decisions.
This is an easy system to remember. In the 6-deck game, all betting and strategy changes occur at a running count of +24.
I computer tested System #3, which is the best of these counts, in the 6-deck Caesars Tahoe game. We’ll call this unbalanced running count system the “Over Count,” as opposed to the “Over/Under Count,” and compare it to both the Over/Under Count and the Hi-Lo (with the optimal Hi-Lo over/under indices +5 and -8).
CAESARS TAHOE 6-DECK (75% PEN)
Flat
1-to-2
1-to-4
O/U:
+0.18%
+0.50%
+0.97%
Over:
-0.03%
+0.31%
+0.80%
Hi-Lo:
-0.14%
+0.16%
+0.52%
So, even though the unbalanced Over Count is placing no under bets, the gains on the over bets are so substantial that the player may play basic strategy through all negative counts and still get the lion’s share of the potential gains in this game.
A player using the Over Count would enjoy even more substantial gains if table hopping to avoid negative counts. Despite the fact that the Over Count is a level-two counting system (aces and deuces count +2), in my opinion it is quite a bit simpler to learn and play than either the Over/Under Count or the Hi-Lo. With just a few strategy decisions that change at the same running count, as professional level systems go, this one’s a piece of cake.
The unbalanced Over/Under Count is also effective, but substantially less effective, than the Over/Under Count in hand-held games. These are the single-deck win rates:
RENO 1-DECK, 67% Dealt
Flat
1-to-2
1-to-4
O/U:
1.66%
2.49%
3.25%
Over:
0.93%
1.60%
2.17%
RENO 1-DECK, 75% Dealt
Flat
1-to-2
1-to-4
O/U
2.15%
2.97%
3.62%
Over:
1.28%
2.05%
2.69%
So, if you ever play single-deck over/under games, I’d advise learning the Over/Under Count with the complete set of strategy indices published in the Over/Under Report. The simplified Over Count will take substantial gains in this game, but no running count system is comparable to a balanced true count system for hand-held games.
One other question I’m frequently asked, which I’m going to answer succinctly without charts and tables: “Can I use the Over/Under Count for regular blackjack games that don’t offer over/under bets?”
Unfortunately, unless you normally play in deeply dealt single-deck games with a small spread, this is not advisable. Both the Over/Under Count and the Over Count correlate poorly to your betting decisions in regular blackjack games. If you find it impossible to learn and use two different counting systems, one for regular blackjack and one for over/under blackjack, then you’re going to have to make some kind of compromise.
Maybe you should just stick with your regular counting system and take the small gains available with over bets when available. Maybe you should learn to side count aces so that you may adjust the ace to the plus or minus side as appropriate to the game. Maybe you should take up gin rummy. The casinos are putting more and more of these over/under tables in because they are beating the majority of the players who place over/under bets, including the card counters.
The fact remains that if you have access to over/under games, and you know how to play them, these games offer the most profitable opportunities for card counters to be found anywhere. ♠
Card counters live in fear of discovery. That’s what makes it fun. The cops-and-robbers aspect of professional blackjack adds play-acting, and a hint of danger, to the mundane recreation of gambling. You just can’t get that James Bond rush at a crap table or a bank of slot machines. Adults in our society, other than real cops and robbers, don’t often get a chance to pretend that they’re not what they appear to be.
Unfortunately, most card counting camouflage comes with a price tag. When you make “dumb” plays for the purpose of confusing the bloodhounds on your trail, it costs you. Holding down your betting spread, insuring your blackjacks, not taking advantage of surrender or soft doubling opportunities, etc., are all excellent methods of hiding your card counting abilities because, in fact, you are relinquishing varying amounts of your potential gain from counting.
If you make too many of these types of card counting camouflage plays, you will no longer have any advantage at all over the house. What is the value of eliminating the possibility of discovery if there is nothing worth discovering? If you don’t utilize the information you gather, then gathering the information in the first place was a waste of time. Use it or lose it.
Some card counting camouflage, however, is cost-free; and ironically, this cost-free camouflage is often the easiest type of camouflage to pull off. Misplays, as a form of disguise, require a knowledge of, and attention to, how much these plays cost, so that you don’t kill your edge. Cost-free card counting camouflage, on the other hand, is not based on misplaying hands, so it’s a no-brainer exercise.
What is cost-free camouflage? Rather than misplaying your hands, you allay suspicions by the image you project, the way you look, exploiting general prejudices and preconceived notions that exist within the common pit boss/casino security mentality.
Let’s dissect these biases.
Card Counter Stereotypes and How to Exploit Them for Camouflage
1. Age: Young. If a young man and an old man are playing at a blackjack table, all other factors being equal, the young man will be suspected of card counting sooner than the old man.
2. Sex: Male. If a man and a woman are playing at the same table, all other factors being equal, the man will be suspected sooner than the woman.
3. Race: Caucasian. A white player spreading his bets will be suspected sooner than a black or an Asian player. This racial prejudice, as a matter of fact, even extends to casinos in other countries. Asian card counters often find the casinos of Korea, Macao and other Asian countries to be profitable, heat-free venues for their action. Their betting spreads and strategy variations are virtually ignored. White players, on the other hand, and especially Americans, are immediately suspect if they play for big money, and they often find themselves persona non grata if they spread their bets even moderately, or win any substantial amount of money.
4. Nationality: American. This is tied into the previous factor. All of the notable books on card counting have been published in the U.S.A., and few are obtainable in bookstores outside of this country. This fact does not escape the notice of casino management in foreign countries, nor is it ignored in this country. In fact, there have been some very sophisticated and well-bankrolled European counting teams that have attacked the casinos of the world, including those in the U.S. In many cases, these teams have gotten away with incredible betting spreads for lengthy periods of time before anyone in the pit took notice.
5. Demeanor: Introverted. You put a quiet, thoughtful player at the same table with a gregarious, talkative player, and the quiet player will be suspected of counting before the talkative one.
6. Dress Code: Stylish-Casual. A player who is nicely but casually dressed will be suspected of card counting before any other fashion type. Card counters don’t wear three-piece suits, nor do they dress like outlaw bikers. They don’t look like hippies or punks. They’re not decked out in Western gear. And they’re usually not shabby, not if they’re playing for serious money.
7. Body Type: Ectomorph. You put a fat man and a thin man at the same table, and the lanky guy will draw the heat first.
Now I’m aware of the fact that there are many exceptions to all of these prejudices. I know that fat card counters, and female counters, and nonwhite counters, etc., have all been discovered and barred at one time or another. And I’m sure there are some pit bosses and security personnel who will state emphatically that they only watch for playing styles to determine which players pose a real threat to their tables.
But all of these prejudices do exist in the general casino security mentality. I’ve heard so many stories from so many players who have found that one or more of these seven factors have contributed to their longevity (or lack of it) at the tables that I believe these biases to be real. Most of them (but not all), as a matter of fact, are based on truths.
Card Counting Camouflage: Conclusion
Looking at these seven bias factors, we can now draw a picture of the player most likely to be suspected of card counting, as well as the player least likely to fall under such suspicion.
Most likely card counter: A young, white, American male, who is thin, casually dressed, and playing quietly by himself.
Least likely card counter: A heavy set, gray-haired, nonwhite woman, who speaks with a foreign accent, is loud and talkative with friends or other players at the table, and is dressed in some unusual cultural outfit or simply cheap unstylish clothes.
The more a player looks like the “most likely card counter,” the more he will have to employ costly “misplay” card counting camouflage. The more a player fits the image of the “least likely card counter,” the more freedom he/she will have to play accurately and with a wide betting spread according to the count.
All of this is wonderful news for you card counters who have been struggling for years for picayune win rates with constant heat. You can forget all of those costly camouflage plays that have been eating away at your long run expectation lo these many years. Just walk in looking like a seventy-year-old grandmother, wearing a sari and a babushka, ranting loudly in some language other than English, and you can really take those casinos for a ride! Happy days are here again! Winning was never so easy! ♠
The first article I ever wrote for a gambling periodical was on dealer tips. I wrote it in October 1980, for Rouge Et Noir News, and later included the article in my book, Blackbelt in Blackjack, as Chapter 12: Toking Guidelines.
Now I don’t expect every card counter on earth to have read my book, and I sure don’t expect many to have read an issue of Rouge Et Noir News that’s now more than 10 years old. But it kills me that so many otherwise intelligent blackjack players still don’t understand the mathematics of toking.
Let’s acknowledge that blackjack dealers make their living from tokes. If they don’t get tokes, they starve. If you like a dealer and you win any sizable amount of money, you should toke as a matter of common courtesy, just as you’d toke a waitress or the valet who parks your car. In general, try to size your tips so that they add up, over time, to a fixed small percentage of the expected value from your play.
I’ve known low-stakes card counters who were trying to go pro who realized they were tipping the dealer almost their full ev. Bad way to go pro.
Bad Reasons to Tip the Dealer
The reason for this article is that many card counters have this weird view of toking. They see it as part of their playing strategy. The usual belief is that by toking the dealer, the player can buy a more profitable card counting game for himself. The way I hear it most often, the player says something like, “The count was through the roof and the dealer was about to shuffle. So I matched my $50 bet with a $5 bet for the dealer to get another round.”
Exactly how stupid this strategy is depends to some extent on the precise definition of “through the roof.” But the fact remains that this is an ignorant ploy. Even in the most deeply dealt single-deck blackjack games, the player will almost never see a 10% advantage. With a common, level-one card counting system, and Las Vegas Strip rules, a 10% advantage would correspond to a true count per deck of about +20.
If you did have this theoretical 10% advantage, however, with a $50 bet on the table you would expect to win about $5, which is 10% of your bet. Of course, it’s impossible to win exactly $5 on one $50 bet at blackjack. Your real world possibilities on this hand are to lose $50, to win $50, to push, to win $75 (with a blackjack), or to win or lose $100 or more (with pair splits and/or double-downs— though these wins/losses require an additional investment on your part over and above your initial $50).
Over the long haul, however, if you tally up all of the results from your $50 bets with a 10% advantage, you’ll show a win rate of about $5 for every $50 bet. That’s what a 10% advantage is. So, if you’re betting $5 for the dealer to deal this hand, you’re giving him all of your potential profit. You’re wasting your time playing the hand and risking negative bankroll fluctuations for no expected profit whatsoever.
The sad fact is that card counters who try to buy deeper penetration from a dealer with tokes are rarely in 10% advantage situations. More often than not, a high count will indicate a player advantage between 1% and 3%, depending on the game. Toking from $1 to $3 for every $100 bet gives you the same break-even expectation, because you’re virtually handing your total potential profit to the dealer. Most players who toke to get an extra round are often giving the dealer more than their expectation.
Toking to get an extra round almost never makes sense. Even if you are a black chip player, willing to give up a small percentage of a potential win to a dealer, you can’t insult the dealer by betting 50¢ for him when you’ve got a couple hundred dollars bet for yourself.
Furthermore, how often do your tokes actually achieve the purpose of getting an extra round? Many dealers would not comprehend that you’re trying to buy an extra round, because they don’t know you’re a card counter, they don’t know the count is high, and they don’t assume that a bet for them means “deal one more round.” You have to further reduce your expectation when the dealer innocently shuffles away the extra round you thought you were purchasing.
Or, are you going to be a real boor and pull back your bet, including the dealer’s toke, when he shuffles the cards? An amateur move like this will get you real far as a card counter. You might as well hang a picture of Ken Uston around your neck.
Tipping the Dealer for Tells
Then there are players who toke for tells, and believe that by throwing money at a dealer, the dealer will “help” them play their hands. Let’s say you’re playing in one of the few remaining casinos where dealers still peek under 10’s. And, let’s say you actually have found a dealer who’s crooked enough to play your hand for you if you’ve got a bet out for him. What’s it worth to you?
If it goes on for any length of time, you’ll probably get a free trip to the Nevada State Penitentiary, after the eye-in-the-sky video of your playing session gets shown in court. Working in collusion with a casino dealer is a felony in Nevada, with a minimum sentence of one year in prison.
When Tipping the Dealer Pays
Tipping the dealer can pay off in particular circumstances. If you’re a shuffle tracker, for example, you can often buy the cut card by putting out a bet with a tip for the dealer as she’s finishing the shuffle. In that circumstance, you’re paying for a big advantage through an entire slug, not just one hand.
Tipping is also good camouflage if you play at the highest stakes, if you don’t overpay. Again, make sure that your overall tipping remains a small percentage of your overall ev.
Just remember, the truth of the matter is that the majority of players who toke for favors get nothing. And although many players may be unaware of the law in Nevada (at least, this would be their defense in court), dealers are not. Toking a blackjack dealer in order to get a more profitable game is like giving a waiter a buck and hoping he’ll steal some desert from the kitchen so you don’t have to pay for it.
The only thing a blackjack dealer is “selling” is a friendly game, carefully dealt, according to house rules and procedures. If that’s what he delivers, you toke according to your means.
Send 10% of all the money you save in stupid tokes after reading this column to The Bishop. ♠
